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 Introduction 
 FROM ARAB SOCIALISM TO 
NEO- LIBERALISM: THE POLITICS OF 
IMMISERATION 
 At the time of writing this introduction, in early 2016, the richest countries 
on earth, the Gulf States, were bombarding Yemen, possibly the poorest of 
all countries. Conditions of malnutrition, confl ict, or a combination of both, 
characterise most Arab countries today. But things were not always as bad. 
As in much of the developing world, the immediate post- independence period 
represented an age of hope and relative prosperity. Yet, imperialism does not 
fall asleep while the Third World develops. No sooner than it could inter-
vene with the assistance of its class allies to destroy Arab post- independence 
achievements, imperialism did so in a big way. Two principal defeats by, and 
losses of territory to, Israel in 1967 and 1973, and many others that followed, 
left behind more than mere destruction of assets and loss of human lives; the 
Arab World (hereinafter the AW) lost its ideology of resistance, Arabism, and 
its associated socialism. This book is a modest attempt to understand why 
Arab development declined from its peak in the heyday of Arab socialism to 
the present desolate conditions. 
 Reversing this defeat and ideological defeatism requires a metamorphosis 
of the multitude into the masses and of the working class into a proletar-
iat. It requires people who espouse an ideology – the actualisation of which, 
through policy, assigns a greater share of wealth to the security of the working 
classes. A living security, nonetheless, which obtains from an anti- imperialist 
struggle because the higher share of wages in the aristocratic nations have 
for long created the colonial mercenaries who pillaged the developing world. 
Undoubtedly, all ideologies will represent a system of thought shaped by 
the conditions of the class struggle.  Revolutionary theory regards reigning 
ideology, even its own, as involving a biased perception of real processes. 
 Capitalistic ideologies, however, are either the prefab social dicta meant to 
discipline labour or the unexamined assumptions upon which theory is built 
to strengthen the rule of capital.  Deciphering positive from negative ideology 
requires more than just the Debord (1967) criterion: the true is a moment of 
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the false. In revolutionary praxis, the true is not any moment of the false; the 
true is its determining moment; the true is its state of becoming in continued 
anti-imperialist struggle and all-round development. 
 The consensus on the signifi cance of ideological shifts to policy turna-
rounds dates back millennia. 
 The Annunaki of the sky 
 Made the Igigi (lower- class gods assigned hard work) bear the workload 
 They were counting the years of loads 
 For 3,600 years they bore the excess 
 Hard work, night and day 
 They groaned and blamed each other 
 Grumbled over the masses of excavated soil: 
 Let us confront our Warden 
 And get him to relieve us of our hard work! 
 Then Kingu, (a rebellious god) made his voice heard 
 And spoke to the gods (the Igigis), his brothers: 
 Now, cry battle! (Atrahasis, eighteenth- century BCE, as compiled by 
Lambert, 1999) 
 It has taken the Igigis 3,600  years to rise up, win their war and retire 
to leisurely activities. However, as production came to depend on higher 
circulation of exchange value, which entailed an ‘annihilation of space by 
time’ (Marx [1877] 1973), ideological shifts and revolts became all the more 
frequent. With the growth of socialising space and communication, people 
unexpectedly change their views and ‘theory becomes a material force as 
it grips the masses’ (Marx 1844). The exercise of realising the necessity for 
change, or of socialising what is socially produced – as opposed to privatis-
ing – is also an exercise in individual freedom on the way to emancipation. 
 The ethical connotations of such an ideological process may be summed up 
in the set of policies that negate private property (Truitt 2005). 
 In the Marxian sense, it is the experience of the masses in the course of the 
class struggle that shapes their consciousness.  The recent experience of Arab 
working classes in the neo- liberal age is an extreme version of war, poverty and 
underdevelopment. The combination of armed confl icts, petrodollar-funded 
civil society, and neo-liberalism has deconstructed working-class organisations, 
tarnished their symbols and engendered widespread despondency, catapulting a 
signifi cant mass of working people into the lap of reactionary fatalism.  But, for 
Marxism change is the only constant, and class war never comes to rest. It is always 
fought, in practice and in theory. Subjected to systematic imperialist assault, 
the AW has lived through an extraordinary experience in which the weapon 
of criticism is yet to replace the criticism of the weapon (as paraphrased from 
FROM ARAB SOCIALISM TO NEO-LIBERALISM
   3
3
Marx 1844).  The practice of revolutionary theory in war and, especially, the war 
of ideas, is what resituates class struggle on an emancipatory path. 
 More so than in the past, the future of class struggle in the AW appears to 
be taking the shape of armed struggle. One is painfully aware of the fact that 
this would not need to be as protracted had there been advances in socialist– 
internationalist ideology; but that is a far cry from the way things are.  In 
this historical epoch, Arab death rates due to hunger, disease and war rose 
signifi cantly. The prevailing state of consciousness associated with war, the 
rise of the war economy in several Arab states and its associated war- indigent 
proletariat seem to prolong intercommunal confl icts and the policies that 
have bred abjection. 1 More and more, worldly phenomena acquire religious 
interpretations. The delusions of theocratic mysticism infi ltrate and set back 
every aspect of social development. There are probably millions of examples 
that could illustrate the ebbing of revolutionary symbols and practice in class 
confl ict, but one instance may be worth mentioning.  When an Iraqi woman 
parliamentarian was asked why she ran for offi  ce in the National Assembly 
erected by Paul Bremer, she answered: ‘I really cannot care less for parliamen-
tarianism, but my husband told me to run for offi  ce because the US- drawn 
constitution designated seats by quota in parliament for women, so I  am 
doing this for my husband; otherwise the role of women is to be at home with 
the children’. 2 Non-secular or imperialistically constructed states in which 
social and legal representation occurs through the sectional-identity form, as 
opposed to working-class citizenry, cannot intermediate social contradictions. 
They become the terrain of easily ignitable wars. The case is doubly relevant 
 1  A war economy has at its disposal real and fi nancial resources that are put to work to 
produce a service, which is the outcome of the war and its power balances. It also has a 
ruling class composed of the relationship of the inter-fi ghting factions that appropriate 
their surplus product via the pillage of the national economy at the behest of imperialism 
and the regimentation or workers-soldiers, the war-indigent proletariat employed in war 
or war eff ort. The war- indigent proletariat group solidarity is established around some 
form of identity politics that utterly conceals the joint class lines. Although each warring 
section of the war bourgeoisie competes with the other for moneyed and real resources, 
their competition dollarises and draws down the values and resources of the national 
economy. In the process of the war bourgeoisie’s self-reproduction, which involves dollar-
isation, destruction and cheapening of third world resources and values and, ultimately, 
the eradication of revolutionary  ideological power, the principal benefactor becomes 
the superior bourgeois relation of US-led international fi nancial capital and its practice 
of imperialism. The transformations of the nationalist state bourgeoisie from the days of 
Arab socialism into a structurally imperialist- allied merchant class bourgeoisie and later 
into a war bourgeoisie that is consuming the life and labour of its own working class, all 
occur as successive concessions to defeat to the power of imperialism. 
 2  Discussion with M. Hage Ali of the London School of Economics. 
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when the developing region in question, the Arab region, is subjected to per-
sistent imperialist off ensives. 
 The imperialist objective of setting on course the self- destruction of Arab 
society is as easy as devolving funds to the working class along identity demar-
cation lines or applying the darker side of the Drucker thesis (1964) of man-
agement by objectives (creating incentives for agents to willingly engage in the 
act of self- destruction).  At any rate, the practice of survival by identity- based 
value grab in a state whose authority over its own territory is questionable 
becomes tantamount to permanent inter- working class confl ict.  The residues 
of petrodollars, or only the pittance of what remains in the AW after the 
bigger shares of Gulf oil wealth have gone to circulate in the global money 
markets, underwrite the phenomenon of spiritual underdevelopment mani-
fested in American- sponsored political  Islam . In contrast to this most recent 
period, between 1950 and 1980, the AW experienced faster and healthier 
growth and social development in spite of lower earnings in oil revenues. This 
divergence in performance between then and now requires an even- handed 
explanation that steers clear of the hallucinatory constructs of individualistic 
freedom and choice.  It does not make sense to speak of individual choices 
when the choice is often a single one, handed down by the class in command 
of history to the majority. This book is one attempt to understand these per-
plexing issues without resort to such ideological legerdemain. Obviously, one 
cannot cover all areas related to the topic, but in the present work I  focus 
on the concept of Arab socialism in general, its application to three Arab 
states – Iraq, Syria and Egypt – and two cases of perverse transformation 
under neo- liberalism: the creation of a huge mass of redundant labour as a 
result of dispossessions in the hinterland; and the persistence of what amounts 
to permanent war in the AW. By the end, I hope to defi ne and qualify the way 
the AW has become articulated with the global economy. 
 An Overview of the AW 
 Once a relatively equitable group of societies, the AW has come to be charac-
terised by acute income inequality (nearly the highest rate, according to the 
Texas Income Inequality Database 2012).  Several military losses shook up 
these societies and metamorphosed the ruling nationalist Arab bourgeoisie 
into a comprador– merchant class fully integrated with international fi nancial 
capital. Between 1970 and 2010, the shares of manufacturing in Syria, Egypt, 
Algeria and Iraq went down from 19 to 5, 21 to 15, 10 to 2, and 12 to 4 per 
cent respectively (UNIDO, various years) .  With the material grounds for the 
reproduction of the wealth of the ruling classes shifting from national industry 
to the international dollar- denominated fi nancial space, social integration, 
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both national and regional, faced insurmountable diffi  culties. Arab merchant 
classes – sprouting like toxic mould on the back of military defeat  and social-
ist ideological defeatism,  and owning the state apparatus – constructed open-
ness policies that acted as conduits for the usurpation of national wealth.  The 
bulk of regional oil revenues, especially in the Gulf, fl y abroad into US T- bills, 
 affl  uent consumption and  military and regime security spending (defence 
spending alone is twice the world share from GDP, according to the World 
Bank (WB), with American military aid to the Arab region ranking the high-
est).  In 2004, the Inter- Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation (IAIGC) 
estimated that Arab assets abroad are at $1.4 trillion. This is likely a crude 
underestimate. In the same year, the Union of Arab Banks (UAB) estimated 
the fi gure at $21 trillion. 3  The intra- regional disparities are also glaring: in 
contrast with the rich Gulf States, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia and Mauritania 
are among the poorest countries in the world.  While Egypt and Morocco are 
not in an open- confl ict condition, their working families spend 60 per cent of 
their income on food (WB 2011). 
 The Gulf States are an oddity, with citizens earning some of the highest 
incomes globally. The rich Gulf economies represent around 5 per cent of 
the total Arab population (Gulf citizens number around 20 million) but earn 
1.6 per cent of world income (World Development Indicators (WDI) 2012). 
In less oil- endowed Arab economies, around 350 million people earn 0.9 per 
cent of world income, of which the labour share is estimated at 0.3 per cent 
of world income (WDI 2012). This fi gure is only slightly higher than the sub- 
Saharan Africa rate.  Gulf industrialisation centres on costly oil derivatives or 
on facilities that exhibit few positive technological linkages to the rest of the 
economy. By reducing modern industrial expansion and its associated space 
for worker socialisation, the ruling merchant capital contributes to holding 
back the production of knowledge as the practice that engenders the develop-
ment of society. 
 Nearly all Arab states are oil exporters and price their oil in dollars. They 
also peg the national currency to the dollar, despite the fact that most of 
their trade takes place outside the dollar zone (China and Europe). For dollar- 
pegging states, monetary policy becomes ineff ective; because the majority 
cannot export enough oil to earn foreign currency and pay for imports, their 
fi scal policy (under neo- liberal austerity) has to contract – save for the Gulf 
States, of course. It is not just because the exchange and interest rates do 
not adjust to calibrate the demands of savings or trade accounts; it is more 
because pegging in an open- capital- account context hands over monetary 
 3  Arab funds invest $21 trillion abroad, 2004. Online:  http:// www.albawaba.com/ busi-
ness/ arab- funds- invest- 21- trillion- abroad (viewed 9 October 2015). 
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policy to the country of the stronger partner to whom the currency is being 
pegged  – in this case the United States. Also, apart from the Gulf, Arab 
states experience a balance- of- payments constraint and exercise an infl ation- 
targeting monetary policy under open capital accounts leading to de facto 
dollarisation of the national currency.  The impact of dollar fl uctuations on 
the domestic price level has been negative, as seen in the rise of food prices in 
2008 that caused death on bread queues in Egypt (Slackman 2008). 
 It is not easy to measure unemployment in the least- developed or war- 
torn Arab countries. Where unemployment has been measured, the offi  cial 
rate may appear as somewhere around 10 per cent, but in actuality,  with 
absolute poverty (below 2 dollars a day) being higher than 50 per cent (AMF 
2011),  the true unemployment rate is also closer to the 50 per cent mark. 
People who are forced to eke out a living at below- subsistence levels in infor-
mal employment cannot be counted as employed.  Aside from the Human 
Rights Bill edict on the right to work, counting them as employed contradicts 
the Decent Work clause of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). In 
some Gulf States, unemployment hits the 20 per cent mark, but given their 
wealth profi le, the unemployed do not face the same conditions of poverty 
prevalent elsewhere.  Yet, in the Gulf, one observes nearly 20 million foreign 
workers who occupy local jobs. With elastic supplies of rights- deprived Asian 
workers, more will be hired by profi t- driven commerce because investment in 
local labour is much less lucrative for the ruling merchant class: they neither 
depend on the industrial skills of the labour force nor on a rising productivity- 
wage internal demand component.  The synergy between labour and industry 
that may promote rising- productivity- led development is central to building 
security capabilities and, as such, it represents a threat to US- led hegemony. 
 Merchants, their neo- liberal policy patrons and their institutions engineer the 
necessary mismatch between capital and labour at every stage of the labour 
process. Many highly skilled workers emigrate, while foreign labour com-
petes with unskilled national labour for low- paying jobs.  Productivity growth 
often exhibits negative signs (KILM 2014).  Although one may posit that pro-
ductivity growth has fallen as a result of a substitution eff ect (cheaper labour 
replacing capital), the principal cause is to be found in a combination of slow 
endogenous technology growth and a ruling class with no commitment to 
capitalising the national economy. 
 While AW countries are deindustrialising and slowing down the rate of 
decent job creation, the numbers of poverty- wage service- sector jobs nat-
urally swell. Simply put, new entrants or laid- off  working people have no 
other source of income apart from informal/ poverty work.  A  highly capi-
talised oil sector has created few jobs relative to its capital stock, and decent 
job expansion initially arose in the public sector – but only initially, because 
FROM ARAB SOCIALISM TO NEO-LIBERALISM
   7
7
public- sector wages later fell, spearheading wage compression for the econ-
omy (UN 2006).  Together, deindustrialisation, poverty- wage employment 
and the shrinking of decent job creation resulted in enormous unemploy-
ment (measured by the minimum level of decent income).  The capping of 
resource fl ows to the working class, the erection of constitutional frameworks 
that sanctify working- class dividedness by identity and the limiting of social 
spaces or proxy factory fl oors that unify labour’s position, together resulted in 
inter- working class divisions that eclipsed the development of revolutionary- 
class consciousness. 
 With comprador- merchant capital rising to power in Arab states – gradu-
ally, beginning with Egypt’s swerving to the US imperialist side after the 
Camp David Accords of 1978 –  oil revenues were purposefully used to sow 
divisions in societies.  Moreover, besides being a precondition for internal 
war, deepening working class diff erentiation – working class diff erentiation 
bears little or no resemblance to the apolitical ‘labour market segmentation’ 
of the mainstream – combined with uncertainty, also enhances short- term 
returns in all sectors. For economic agents holding moneyed wealth, the pre-
sent becomes more valuable than the future.  Above all, geopolitical uncer-
tainty and the threat of war, conjointly with institutional brittleness, shape 
inter- temporal investor preferences (Do investors think they make more or 
less money in the future?). Investment lodges in fi nance or short- gestation pro-
jects. However, it is not the individual decision that matters for investment, 
but the overall geopolitical context.  Class disarticulation in both conscious-
ness and spatial demarcation lines associated with confl icts, in addition to 
deepening income divisions and rural– urban disparities, also fuels identity- 
based confl icts. The capacity of the working class to steer the circuit of capi-
tal for its benefi t becomes estranged and demolished by sectarian or tribal 
politics. Working- class politics becomes a self- defeating goal as the cycle of 
inter- working class violence and the consequent weakening of the state con-
tinuously tip the balance in favour of US- led imperialism and its regional 
class allies. 
 For comprador- merchant capital, more- equitable redistribution in the 
form of presumptive income and capital gains taxation (as opposed to the 
predominant form of indirect taxation) and greater interest in regional devel-
opment via a stronger demand side, are anathema.  The merchant class repro-
duces itself via a commerce almost bereft of national industrial production. 
 The social contract that brokers class diff erences nationally shifts from one 
between the national ruling and ruled classes to one between international 
fi nancial capital and the ruling Arab merchant class.  In the circulation of 
value within the triad of state, capital and labour, the policy outcome of the 
new external social contract is to reduce the cost of the social reproduction 
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of the working class by a combination of dispossession, undermining public 
services, and raising unemployment. 
 In retrospect, the divide between pan- Arab secularism and monarchism- 
Islamism has mirrored the US– Soviet rift during the Cold War and contin-
ues to form the basis for the ‘rights of the working class versus charity to the 
working class’ debate.  The Gulf States, whose security and sovereignty are 
maintained by US imperial coverage, propagate and fund free- market adher-
ing political Islam or Salafi st ideologies and movements: their funding of the 
Afghan jihadists is one historical watershed. After the occupation of Iraq and 
the rise of Iranian backed Shiite militias, US- led imperialism capitalised on 
such sectarianism to fuel indefi nite regional confl icts sponsored by the funds 
and ideology of Wahhabism. The power that US- led capital amasses from 
rearing the Sunni– Shiite divide, the rising terror threats worldwide shifting 
control into the hands of capital’s security apparatuses, and the ensuing mili-
tarisation are the real loot from its invasion of Iraq. 
 Throughout the AW, a rise in obscurantism and identity schisms has 
weakened the foundation of the state as the principal body that could negoti-
ate the position of the working class in the global economy.  Given socialist 
ideological decline and much of the working class eking a poverty- stricken 
living, it takes an insignifi cant share of Gulf petrodollar revenues to fund 
unrest. In a strategic region such as the AW, political considerations eclipse 
short- term economic cost considerations. Nonetheless, the total volume of 
petrodollar fl ows from the Gulf (second to East Asia in size) are worthwhile 
to Western fi nancial markets.  The Gulf’s sovereign funds are too substantial 
to be controlled (not just managed) by Gulf sheikhs, and the imperialist edict 
to arrest Arab industrial development ensures that these assets remain unre-
quited transfers or uncashed cheques. 
 The Gulf’s earning- without- work model had served, by the demonstration 
eff ect, to disrupt the industrious and regulated Arab economies of the 1970s 
and had thwarted work incentives.  Petrodollar remittances to non- Gulf Arab 
countries distorted exchange- rate regimes and had Dutch- disease– like eff ects 
on the national industry, especially on the protected economies of Syria and 
Egypt. These remittances did not, however, fall outside the destabilising 
geopolitical- rents component of imperialist intervention; they came laced 
with the ideological poison of colonially and American- groomed political 
Islam. That said, capital outfl ows from the majority of Arab countries (non- 
Gulf ) are insignifi cant in global terms. Most non- Gulf Arab countries exhibit 
balance- of- payment constraints. The fl ows from these non- Gulf countries are 
gauged, not according to their money value, but according to their impact in 
destabilising national states and, conversely, buttressing the position of US- 
led imperialism, regionally and globally. 
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 When oil prices fell at the beginning of 1981 and remained low until 
2002, the biggest economy in the Gulf – Saudi Arabia – could not maintain 
its previous living standards as did the smaller and richer per- capita Gulf 
States.  Saudi’s real per- capita income fell from around $18,000 in 1981 to 
about $8,000 in 2000 (WDI, various years). By the late 1990s, the Saudis had 
borrowed more than $200 billion in short- term, high- interest loans to cover 
fi scal shortfalls (WDI 2002).  In 2003, poverty reports from Saudi Arabia 
indicated that nearly 25 per cent of the population subsisted at below the 
national poverty line. 4 The oil price hike, beginning in 2003, leveraged the 
Saudi economy; however, under the neo- liberal policy package, power del-
egated to private actors grew, channelling more resources away from labour. 
The recent fall in oil prices beginning in January 2015 may precipitate yet 
another, even more serious lowering of the standard of living. 5 
 In the early 1980s, neo- liberal policies eff ected under the name  infi tah 
(Arabic for ‘openness’) came into operation. Two signifi cant military losses 
in 1967 and 1973 had already raised national social tensions and risks and 
had lured investors to the safety of US- dollar markets.  As is typical under 
structural adjustment, policymakers deregulated trade and capital accounts . 
 National industry started to shrink because of falling investment and increased 
 4  See ‘Poverty in the Oil Kingdom: An Introduction’, 2010. Online:  http:// www.jadali-
yya.com/ pages/ index/ 202/ poverty- in- the- oil- kingdom_ an- introduction- (viewed 12 
March 2014); and ‘[i] n wealthy oil- rich countries: a quarter of Saudis under poverty 
line’ (Arabic), 2013. Online:   http:// middle- east- online.com/ ?id=146523 (viewed 6 
April 2015). 
 5  It was not diffi  cult to foresee that the regional macroeconomic trends were headed for 
collapse. The following passages from the work of the Economic Analysis team at the 
Western Asia offi  ce had forewarned of decline or violent transition.
 ‘But only three years after the decline in oil prices in the fi rst oil boom, per capita income 
fell drastically and certain States resorted to short- term borrowing from private banks 
at high interest rates to redress their fi scal defi cits. Recently, moreover, speculative ele-
ments have accounted for a signifi cant proportion of the oil price. If speculative pres-
sures subside, a fall could occur again, yet this time at a higher rate (UN 2008b).’ 
 ‘The full repercussions of the war in Iraq and the stalemate in the peace process are yet 
to be seen. In addition, and as always, continued insecurity in the Near East threatens 
more than just the region and raises the security premium of the member countries. If 
and when the very volatile oil price tumbles, a whole mode of development that is based 
mainly on oil revenues will be held in check (UN 2005a).’ 
 ‘The likelihood that major macroeconomic and demographic variables will, inevita-
bly, collide means that there is little space for argument over whether or not change is 
avoidable. The buildup of imbalances in a regional economy that does not expand at a 
rate commensurate with the demands of the demographic transition means that, unless 
the system experiences a chance occurrence of heavy oil rent fallout, change cannot be 
gauged in terms of degree (UN 2003).’ 
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competition from scale- enhanced foreign industry.  On average, economic 
growth rates fell for everyone, but more so for the Gulf.  The combination 
of shrinking public- sector revenues, lower public investment, and shrivel-
ling national industries lowered the rate of job creation even as labour- force 
growth rates were not as high as those of the post- independence period.  In 
contrast, under Arab socialism, population growth rates had reached the high 
plateau of 2.5 per cent as of the late 1950s, and job- creation nearly matched 
workforce growth (AMF 2005). Ironically, neo- liberals lay the blame for high 
unemployment on the demographic transition and supply- side elements (as in 
inapposite education), in spite of the fact that population pressure tapered off  
as of 1990 and neo- liberally imposed cyclical contraction crushed the previ-
ously enacted decent job- creation rate. 
 Economic growth rates were on average higher under state  dirigisme in the 
1960s and 1970s (WDI, various years). 6  Unemployment rates were lower as 
well.  In the two decades between the fi rst and second oil booms (1980– 2000), 
the AW exhibited the highest unemployment rates, the lowest average real 
per- capita growth rates, and the widest gap in income distribution within 
and across regional countries (UN 2005).  With lower oil revenues, funding 
to the social infrastructure retrenched, causing the quality of public ser-
vices to follow suit.  As for economic infrastructure, in 2002 investment rates 
were the lowest of all regions, at 16 per cent (WDI 2002).  Intra- Arab trade 
remained low, between 7 and 8 per cent, with much of the Gulf’s excess sav-
ings channelled abroad (UN 2008b).  With shrinking investment in plant and 
equipment and the hollowing- out of capital (in other words, with reduction 
of the technical composition of capital) for a good two decades (1980– 2000) 
the AW was the global record- holder in malperformance.  As evidenced by 
the pre- Arab Spring social disaster, when the new oil boom arrived in 2003, 
the policy of freer markets had already distorted resource- allocation mech-
anisms and most growth resulted in anti- development outcomes.  In 2003, 
Saudi Arabia needed to sell its oil at $18 per barrel to balance its budget (UN 
2005). In 2015, a $100 price per barrel is required for the Saudis to off set their 
government spending (Hallinan 2015). Rough estimates indicate that Saudi 
Arabia will draw down its fi nancial reserves within a period of ten years, 
given oil prices hold steady at around $50 per barrel. For a state to quintuple 
its rate of dependency on oil revenues in the span of decade is indelible proof 
of massive industrial and developmental failure. 
 6  All Arab states adopted a high degree of dirigisme, or government intervention, in their 
economies. Arab socialism represented a higher degree of dirigisme combined with pre- 
distribution and nationalisation/ socialisation of assets and key sectors in the economy. 
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 Whole cities in the Gulf (‘Cities of Salt’, as per the metaphor of Saudi nov-
elist Abdul Rahman Munif, 1987) that were constructed with little concern 
for energy conservation serve as monuments of the type of low output to capi-
tal ratio investment that the rest of the AW copied. Imported technology nei-
ther linked up with local industry nor deepened the production value chain 
(Krogstrup and Matar 2005).  The combination of cultural retreat related to 
the sinking knowledge attendant to the development of national industry and 
unemployment in the absence of socialist ideological alternatives facilitated 
the growth of spiritual fatalism.  With capital becoming more united across 
borders (universalising through fi nancialisation), and its organisation becom-
ing more eff ective through international fi nancial institutions, the old– new 
cultural phenomenon of political, and later Salafi , Islam – beginning with 
colonial backing for the objectifi cation of constructed forms of identity into 
states – splintered working classes. The schism in consciousness – between 
what it takes for the working class to grasp a higher share of the social prod-
uct and the illusory ideas that sanctify private property and expropriation as 
entitlements – gaped further. 
 In the 1960s and 1970s, oil revenues funded the social and productive 
infrastructure through a high rate of public investment. As of 2002, rising 
oil revenues had leveraged speculative activities on poorly regulated stock 
markets that had grown several- fold in the previous ten years (WDI, various 
years).  Hollow growth meant that the offi  cial unemployment rate for Arab 
countries went down cumulatively by around 3 percentage points for some 
50 percentage points of growth between 2002 and 2011 (WDI, various years). 
 A comparison between economic  dirigiste regimes and the ‘free market’ shows 
that it is in the diminishing role of national agents in development and con-
sequent declining public investment that the diff erence lies. As public invest-
ment fell, private investment failed to fi ll the gap left behind.  As the former 
national agents of development  – the military in alliance with broad sec-
tions of the professional working class and bureaucratic elites – integrate with 
international fi nancial markets, a class emerges whose task is not to industri-
alise and trade within the region but rather to gradually dismantle the state. 
This class (the newly evolved merchant/ comprador class) eff ectively becomes 
part of the international fi nancial class, albeit a subordinate partner in the 
imperialist relationship, for whom (the combined comprador and imperialist) 
war is not only a profi table endeavour, but also a condition of its very exist-
ence as capital.  The AW is a peculiar case; the high frequency of confl icts in 
a strategic region such as this turns war- for- the- sake- of- war into a medium of 
accumulation. The  Arab wars and their associated war economy are more 
relevant to imperialism than buying and selling dates, cars and so forth to 
a part of the global working class whose income is a mere one third of 1 per 
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cent of global income.  Accumulation by wars of encroachment, the imperi-
alist wars that strip nations of their autonomy and resources, as opposed to 
market realisation is now the mode of integration of the AW into the global 
economy. The implications of war to fi nance, imperialist power repositioning 
and imperial rents, as will be seen later, necessitates the disempowerment of 
Arab working classes and their states. 
 The AW as a whole has undergone shrinkage in output per worker, and 
the quantity and quality of the consumption bundle of the working class has 
deteriorated relative to the rise in the historically determined level required 
for working- class reproduction.  The AW’s ruling classes have become fully 
articulated with world capital as subordinate partners willing to set their own 
nations ablaze as their wealth becomes dollarised.  This class alliance with 
imperialism is a form of apoptosis, the internationally conjoined class of capi-
tal killing part of itself to maintain its strength.  The Arab losses in successive 
wars and the severely tilted balance of military forces against their nations 
leave working classes with little room to exercise their civil and national 
rights.  These stark quantitative and qualitative divergences from the devel-
opment path of the rest of the world newly characterise the way the AW is 
integrated with the global economy.  These divergences did not spring from 
the reifi cation- driven policies of neo- liberalism (reifi cation is Georg Lukacs’s 
term for the process, described by Marx in Capital vol. I, in ‘The Fetishism 
of Commodities and the Secret Thereof’) by which relations between human 
beings appear as relations between things –  thingifi cation of social processes. 7 
Rather, they emerge from intermediated human agency in historical time or, 
more aptly, from shifts in Arab class structure. Policies are mere instruments 
that serve class interests. What are the new classes that shifted policies, and 
how did conditions deteriorate as such?  
 From Arab Socialism Onwards 
 Something striking when reading Arab economic history is the dictum 
that import substitution or  dirigiste policies have somehow ‘run their 
course’. Policies do not run things; people organised along class lines do. 
 During the post- independence years, development in Arab socialist states 
was led by an alliance of the military and the working class. The army 
 7  As a synonym of ‘thingifi cation’, the inverse of personifi cation, reifi cation refers to the 
transformation of human properties, relations, processes, actions, concepts etc. into 
things that act as pseudo- persons, endowed with a life of their own’. F. Vandenberghe 
(2001) ‘Reifi cation: History of the Concept’,  Logos , vol. 14, no. 1. See also Section I ‘Rei-
fi cation and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’ in Georg Lukács (1967)  History & 
Class Consciousness (London: Merlin Press). 
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was the dominant partner in this relationship and played a progressive 
role by placating populist aspirations for a more egalitarian distribution. 
The army, the state bureaucracy and the leadership of the working class 
formed a state bourgeois class and exercised collective ownership of the 
state, characterised as what Hussein and Abdel- Malek termed a  proxy bour-
geoisie (Abdel- Malek 1967; Hussein 1971).  Under Arab socialism, the pre-
dominant relationships remained capitalist, and the exploitative control 
of the labour process necessary for value creation persisted.  However, by 
creating the fi nancial space for the expansion of state- led industrial invest-
ment, investing in social infrastructure and undertaking vast land reform 
and redistribution measures, the Arab socialist model dramatically outper-
formed the current neo- liberal model in economic and social dynamism. 
 Beginning with the neo- liberal model, however, the military re- allied itself 
with the merchant class and global fi nancial capital. In the new ethos, 
‘generals aspired to be merchants’, which weakened the national security 
front considerably. The old state bourgeois class transformed itself into a 
full- fl edged comprador class. In this new ruling class alliance, the nation-
alist army no longer held sway. The Arab ruling class became a subordi-
nate partner of imperialism. Social conditions in Arab states have since 
worsened, contributing to massive uprisings at a time when socialist ide-
ology as an alternative is no longer readily comprehendible. As a result, 
social formations collapsed and states crumbled, and Islamists of various 
sorts rose to authority, enrobing neo- liberal usurpation in divine fi at. 
 Setting aside for a moment the much- discussed disaster of neo- 
liberalism:  wars upon the AW act as the instrument by which social and 
non- monetised resources and labour are coercively engaged in the formation 
of value under capitalist accumulation. Wars on an  already defeated AW have 
served multiple overlapping functions: 
 •  to maintain US control of oil supplies through military hegemony; 
 •  to stabilise a fi nancial order in which the dollar remains the world reserve 
currency and wealth- holding medium; 
 •  to reinforce militarism and religious and ultranationalist ideologies; 
 •  to assist in the compression of the global wage and, ultimately, 
 •  to hold at bay ascendant and competing imperialist powers with US- led 
capital. 
 The violence of imperialism boosts capital’s principal ideological drive to 
achieve the division of the working class by fanning hatred. Materially, impe-
rialist wars cheapen capital inputs and labour power supplies. To date, the US 
still assumes surrogate sovereignty over the whole of the Gulf – Iran excluded, 
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although its ruling class wishes to partner with a reluctant US- led imperial-
ism. This control itself aff ords US- led fi nancial circles seignorage rights and 
imperial rents that exceed petrodollar fl ows from the AW and extend their 
sources of revenue far beyond its boundaries . 
 However, the economic mainstream posits that private earnings in non- 
warring periods hold steady, and that even military industries can still 
perform profi tably in peacetime conditions. More salient mainstream com-
mentators point out that much of the Third World is trivial money- wise to 
the West – it is too poor to trade with – and therefore the West can prosper 
without it. Both views, though, are falsifi cations of fact. The grim social con-
ditions, the battered countries and labour organisations that pave the way for 
higher profi ts, do so at various lags. Fuller conceptualisation of events is not 
only about where to draw the timeline of the points at which various inputs, 
such as the initial securing of cheapened labour and raw materials by capi-
tal, increase production and profi ts; but also the recognition of the fact that 
war is a permanent feature of the global capitalist condition. One might also 
suggest that the West could do without colonisation or imperialist interven-
tion, but there has never been a time without imperialist intervention. Such 
scenarios are counterfactual, and the study of history disallows the inclusion 
of the hypothetical except where it serves as an analytical illustrative tool to 
elucidate a fact (Hobsbawm 1998). 
 The capital- production process is an integrated whole. One must assess its 
parts in relation to the whole picture. In any fi rst- year psychology textbook, 
the symptoms of a certain class of severe schizophrenic depressions are said to 
include the oddity of partial vision. Instead of seeing the whole picture at once, 
the patient sees only a skewed section of the whole. If the patient is viewing the 
painting of a human body, for example, that patient is seeing only a foot or a 
head although he or she is at an adequate distance from the image to see the 
entire body. One of many causes for such a strand of mental illness is said to be 
spitefulness.  In much the same way, Eurocentric economic thinking (including 
some versions of Marxism) claims to be unable to ‘see’ value extracted from 
the Third World (because it is too small in price terms) while simultaneously 
writing off  much of the world and its history from the global production pic-
ture. But value is formed by a historical process of dispossession. 
 By the time a commodity has gone through numerous nodes of a global chain 
to arrive at the doorstep of the consumer, it has incorporated not only the inputs 
of low- paid labour- power but also massive amounts of underpaid and unpaid 
labour and ecological inputs. Capitalists drain hidden surpluses from household 
and informal- sector activities. A long dark- value chain of food producers and 
informal- sector activities is needed to generate the productive capacity and the 
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survival maintenance of every waged labourer. This fl ow of dark value lowers 
the reproduction costs of peripheral labour and, thus, the wage level that capi-
talists pay. These household and informal sectors are not outside capitalism, but 
are intrinsic components of global commodity chains. (Lauesen and Cope 2015) 
 In the context of the AW (also Africa), one may add that the darkest of the 
dark value is generated by colonial and imperialist wars. Money values refl ect 
deep- seated social and political processes. For example, if workers are banned 
from organising and imprisoned for seeking higher wages, their share of income 
will decline over time. Similarly, for Europe to self- develop, it had to obstruct 
the Third World’s autonomy and block its industrialisation. As happens in 
countries in which labour representation is weak, European colonialism and 
later imperialism also reduce Third World countrywide representation and its 
share of income in money value.  To juxtapose the fi nal money- income to the 
value of people is to not see the history of commercial exploitation. 8 In exactly 
the same manner as a mentally ill person imbued with hate sees only a part of 
a whole picture, mainstream social science refuses to assign value and determi-
nacy to Third World labour’s contribution to an organic global production pro-
cess. It is not only a question of how much value the Third World contributed or 
whether global wealth could have occurred without violent Western interaction 
with the Third World (throughout this work, Western is an ideological descrip-
tor and  not a geographic one); wealth is the result of a determining stepping 
stone, the pedestal by which the West rose in Marx’s language, which is the 
commercial exploitation inherent in colonial and imperial wars of aggression. 
 In an exponentially growing system that metabolises humanity and nature 
at progressively higher rates, the social relations that enhance economic 
growth in its money- form aspect piggyback on the most aggressive of capital-
ist relationships: imperialism. Wars, as an exercise of violence and as major 
events that generate the symbolism of power, entail  imperial rents . These rents 
 8  The concept of  commercial exploitation can best be illustrated with Marx’s remark 
when addressing the genesis of  capitalism in  Capital , vol. 1 (1867): ‘[T]he veiled slavery 
of  the wage workers in Europe needed, for its pedestal, slavery pure and simple in the 
new world’. It is about reducing the social relationship of  subject-object to object only, 
or to grab resources whose collective ownership was dismantled. Just like slavery: impe-
rialism grabs resources for nothing; similarly as slaves cannot negotiate their wages and 
work for no wages, countries could be reduced to slave like position when their will to 
rule themselves is sapped. Another way to put forth the point in terms of  value relations 
is to say that the quantifi cation of  value in imperialist constructed prices leaves out all 
the grabbed resources and unpaid and low-paid Third World labour whose slave-like 
poverty conditions are the product of  colonialism and imperialist policy. In the tradition 
of  Marx, Smith (2016) highlighted that the super-exploitation of  the periphery provides 
the foremost mitigating factor against the declining rate of  profi t. 
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are the totality of benefi ts, economic, cultural and otherwise, that the empire 
enjoys – not only by exploiting the Third World but also by limiting its devel-
opment.  Although Amin (2012) attempts a quantitative assessment of impe-
rial rents, he underestimates the value because he does not take into account 
the historical momentum of imperialist power building that keeps shifting 
the playing fi eld in favour of imperialism and, hence, the totality of the ben-
efi ts accruing as historical surplus value (as per Abdel- Malek [1963] 1981). 
 Abdel- Malek’s chapter on the defi nition of historical surplus value includes 
the following: 
 Historical surplus value designates the looting of all major continents as of 
the fi fteenth century and the accumulation of their wealth in the then rising 
bourgeoisies of the West. The roots of violence and the roots of global war lie 
in the historical restructuring of the international order, that is, the formation 
of western hegemony, rooted in the historical surplus value from the fi fteenth 
century onwards. This strangely ignored condition by western academia con-
siders capitalist surplus value as if it was a product of the last stage of the his-
tory of mankind and or a product of the of the last phase of the class struggle, 
during which the bourgeoisies were to exploit the working class. The historical 
surplus value is not limited to economics, raw material, energy, resources, land 
and space etc., it above all provided Europe with the means to secure world 
hegemony. Historical surplus value provided the grounds for the rise of the sci-
entifi c and technological revolution. Its geopolitics furnished Europe with the 
means of control of the world via sea routes while the dissemination of ideas 
from the centre via communication technologies dictated the theories and 
conceptions for the third world to grow into. As such, the ethical- normative 
position by which the Western liberal left judges violence as a pathology of the 
system, or as an exogenous syndrome, conceals the fact that the historical con-
text and its colonial policies were laid down by the violence of European impe-
rialism, and that Asia, Africa and Latin America could only develop along the 
lines suggested by Western schools of thought. Imperialism as a central factor 
in the power structure of modern times was viewed in its immediacy and not as 
a contemporary expression of a historical process. (Abdel- Malek 1981, 71– 73) 
 The United States, for instance, still imposes upon many parts of the 
world an amount of American television drama time that national visual 
media must air, even if against their wishes. Imperial rents cannot easily be 
reversed with protectionist Third- Worldist policies alone; they also require 
civilisational turnarounds (Abdel- Malek 1981; Frank 1998). In one aspect 
of imperial rents, as confl icts around the world escalate and risk premiums 
rise in dollarised transactions, the creation of fi nancial wealth attendant on 
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dollar- money growth and its fl ows into the US- led fi nancial market gain 
speed.  Wars abet the process of world dollarisation. They shock and expand 
the money supply, providing more credit to fi nancial institutions. It is not just 
in oil or weapons sales that the bulk of profi ts is made; it is in the trillions of 
dollars of debt issued to fi nance wars and the power structure that releases 
value back to empire by dollarisation and fi nancial fl ows.  The combined cost 
of the Iraq and Afghan wars is nearly six trillion dollars (Bilmes 2013), which 
constitute a great part of the revenues of the US- led capitalist class. Estimates 
of the service of war debt in total American debt vary according the method 
of measurement.  Foster et al. (2008) estimate that a little over half of US gov-
ernment debt- service fi nances past wars, nearly 60 per cent of tax dollars in 
discretionary US government spending funds current militarism, and in 2007, 
real total US military spending amounted to about 8 per cent of GDP.  By 
2015, Lindorff  (2015) estimates that 69 per cent of each tax dollar supports 
military spending. He explains that the media presents a smaller fi gure ‘by 
sleight of hand, because it does not break out just the discretionary budget, 
or point out the parts of the budget that are outside the Pentagon but that are 
still really military- related, and then lump the huge outlays for Social Security 
benefi ts and Medicare into the overall spending budget, although the latter 
are partly auto- funded by a Trust fund of some $1.7 trillion, which was created 
over the years by specially dedicated payroll taxes separately paid by workers 
and their employers over the working life of each person’ . 9 Although counter-
vailed by the hegemony and the wealth drawn from the dollarisation of the 
world economy, as government, private and corporate US debts are added, 
the total in 2011 would ‘indeed exceed 350 per cent of GDP and is much more 
than double what it was in the early 1970s’ (Goodwin et al. 2015). 
 So much liquidity was available prior to the 2007– 2008 crisis that the lev-
erage power in fi nance allowed a speculator to borrow nearly fi fty dollars for 
every dollar he or she deposited in the banks (Liu 2008). Almost- free money 
was loaned to institutional investors without collateral, yet the 2007– 2008 
crisis is blamed on poor home owners. The creation of unwarranted sup-
plies of money to satisfy higher fi nancial profi t rates necessitate future wars to 
underwrite superfl uous dollar debts. 
 An economy in hypothetical space (approaching a steady state) tends to 
exhibit steadily lower growth rates.  Shocks represented by fi scal or monetary 
expansions or new technical discoveries may lift such an economy out of its 
 9  According to the Congressional Budget Offi  ce (CBO) the discretionary budget is 
about 40  percent of total government spending.  https:// www.cbo.gov/ sites/ default/ 
fi les/ 114th- congress- 2015- 2016/ graphic/ 51112- discretionaryspending.pdf (Viewed 2 
March 2016) 
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slump.  Also, tautologically, a rising profi t rate entails a larger share of the 
income pie for capital vis- à- vis labour’s income share, especially as the politi-
cal power of labour wanes. A lower wage share lowers consumption demand 
and output. Left to uninterrupted expansion, growth rates will fall unless 
demand and supply are managed simultaneously to keep labour’s share of 
income rising uninterruptedly. To achieve this not only requires stabilising 
opposing political forces (capital versus labour) but also obliges a plan to 
manage resources throughout the supply chain by setting production prices 
at values that address income imbalances within the working class and the 
needs of a just society. For example, low- paid agricultural workers would have 
their produced commodities priced higher and their wages rise to compara-
bly higher wages within the national economy. This is obviously more than 
Keynesian demand management; it is edging toward an equalising tax struc-
ture imposed on production, or perhaps even planning. For this to work, it 
entails rising incomes and equalisation of product revenues by workers across 
sectors. 
 Demand management or its ultra- version in planning are anathema to 
free- market doctrine (only theoretical comparisons are given here; ideo-
logically, demand management is a capitalist measure, and planning is a 
step up to end capitalism).  Anyway, these Keynesian and socialist policy 
designs are also ideologically defunct at the present historical stage.  The 
anarchy of the free market and the ideological hold of capital have gener-
ated highly inequitable income shares and suppressed the demand driv-
ers of the economy.  Hence, along with interest- rate reduction – which, as 
a result of the crisis of confi dence underpinned by weak demand under- 
fi nancialisation no longer has the immediate bearing on growth it used 
to enjoy – imperialist war becomes the chief strategic shock instrument, 
whose success in undervaluing developing nations’ resources dynamises 
the US- led global business cycle. Wars stimulate credit expansion and 
technological innovation and restructure power and income shares, lead-
ing to higher profi t rates. Even if war is fought by proxies of empire and 
appears to have no monetary bearing on the economy, the shifting balance 
of forces in international relations alone adds to imperial standing and 
subsequently to imperial rents. 
 On its own, money – and its value signifi cation – cannot explain itself: how 
it came to be or how the world transitions from one state into another. If 
money accounts could explain social transitions, the world would be too sim-
ple to explain; it would need only accountants and not social scientists. Money 
is a mediated manifestation of deeper social relationships of production and 
exchange. For the money- rents to fl ow to empire, the ruling class and its deci-
sion structures must reproduce the power undergirding their position – using 
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both violent and nonviolent means.  Staying ahead requires the use of power, 
especially ideological power. US leadership in the international division of 
labour, to which the contribution of technology  – much of which derived 
from military R&D – is foundational, implies that the formalised agencies 
of capital  – that is, nearly all eff ective national and international institu-
tions – will promote war and its associated industry, save the agencies resist-
ing and escaping the ideological hegemony of capital.  The justifi cation for 
war is often framed as an existential threat, as in the requirement to respond 
to some peripheral nation threatening the American way of life. However, 
underneath the rhetoric there is a sequence of events that determines the 
value circuit and capital fl ows: these events constitute the US- led imperialist 
power endorsing the dollar money supply and its capacity for the production 
of knowledge (militarily induced technology), which together act as the pur-
veyors of fi nancial wealth through war and technology rents. 
 If one relies on the current profi ts amassed in money- form to explain why 
there were colonial or imperial wars in the AW or Africa, the reasons one 
fi nds would be insignifi cant. In the latter stages of colonialism, the money- 
value extricated from the poorer corners of the developing world became 
negligible in comparison to incomes and trade volumes circulating within the 
more industrialised regions. In fact, if one counts aid, it is possible that the 
developed nations may appear to be unnecessarily charitable toward their 
undeveloped partners.  With exceptions like the works of Baran (1957), Amin 
(1974 [1957]) Emmanuel (1972) and others, notably Abdel- Malek (1961), 
 Eurocentric accounts have judged imperialism by the superfi cial appearances 
of money and have concluded that the money- profi ts from the Third World 
are neither worth the eff ort nor serve as justifi cation for colonial wars. On the 
basis of such mistaken assessments, the cause of war can be avidly assigned to 
a civilising mission. That the West credulously undertakes war to civilise oth-
ers – and persistently makes blunders resulting in unintended consequences – 
speaks volumes about its ‘naiveté’: one pleads, when can the ruling Western 
classes stop being such good folk? 
 In addition to mediating the contradiction between use value and exchange 
value, money- value resolves a series of social, political and production- 
exchange relationships- cum- contradictions, which include colonisation, 
bombing for raw material, co- opting unions and so on. Without the suppres-
sion of labour as a political force and the dislocation of peripheral peoples, 
money would not possess the value it bears in the West vis- à- vis its value in 
the AW and Africa. The ceaseless propping- up of the power platforms under-
pinning exchange is a shifting process that assigns value by force or by strip-
ping the owners of commodities of their power to negotiate. The whole idea 
that the West can survive or has survived in trade isolation from the poorest 
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countries is too absurd to discuss. An oft- cited proverb in the weekly souks of 
Mount Hermon says that if one bargains to buy something for a very cheap 
price, one ought to make sure that the owner of the item for sale is dead. 
The war process drives the class power restructuring, the auto-confl icting 
relationship between diff erent national capitalists, which cements the hold of 
imperialist classes on property and, as such, it is inseparable from the neces-
sity of value destruction and value creation under capitalism. 
 Imperialist assaults are necessary and mediate the contradictions at the root 
of global capital. The strategic value of the Arab region brings us ever closer 
to a condition where the primacy of politics (or the subordination of economic 
concerns to political ones) is realized for the purpose of fi rming up the capi-
tal relationship. Imperialist oil control and war objectives intertwine to rain 
down one blow after another upon the working peoples of the region. War saps 
resources, and the loss of a war is a watershed event that remoulds the dominant 
ideology (the objective stock of knowledge instrumentised to serve the interest of 
capital). The chain ‘defeat- destroy- disengage assets’ is the form of articulation 
of the Arab formation with US capital.  It issues from outright US military supe-
riority and hegemony, and the reproduction of wars of encroachment, to dimin-
ish Arab state sovereignty – that is, working- class representation mediated in 
national and policy autonomy.  Continuous defeats are followed by the decline 
of nationalist ideology . This decline accompanies the ruling classes accommo-
dating the terms of surrender by instilling a perverse rationale whereby society 
justifi es its own dismemberment.  To reverse Badiou’s (2014) optimism regarding 
events, wars as events are ruptural in relation to the dominant order, destroy-
ing the dominant state of the situation and writing off  constructive alternatives. 
 From a people who, in the era of Arab socialism, believed in a shared Arab 
identity with egalitarian goals, the Arab masses’ negative ideology – as per an 
extreme version of Larrain (1983), which is a distorted view of the real processes 
enacted in sectional identity politics – permits them again and again to re-elect 
to power the same ruling class, under neo-liberalism. This is more than just a 
case of false consciousness instilled by the cultural arsenal of Islamist politics; it 
is an unthinkable perversion of reality, in which the alternative of a better world 
has disappeared, and the masses of people are left to compete for imperialisti-
cally imposed limited resources, or for resources that are plentiful but that are 
made scarce by the distributional policies of capital. In the present epoch, there 
is precious little in the cultural debate to delegitimise the transfers of value away 
from the working class or, similarly, to condemn the rising death rate from war 
and disease in the Third World. This vanishing of alternatives to capitalism 
and its agendas is a hideous novelty in modern history. 
 Emerging in a state of war in the second half of the twentieth century, the 
Arab states spent double the world average on defence (WDI various years). But 
it is not higher rates of defence spending that in themselves constitute national 
FROM ARAB SOCIALISM TO NEO-LIBERALISM
   21
21
security; far more important is the totality of cultural- cum- productive structures 
that secure the needs of the working class.  When arming the Egyptian army 
prior to the Six- Day War in 1967, the Soviets worried that so many Egyptian 
soldiers were illiterate and would not be able to operate their weapons systems. 
 Security, per se, is a condition derived from better livelihoods and cultural and 
industrial development. As regimes weaken after defeat, their policies and secu-
rity spending veer away from working- class security (or the security of people 
and state as a whole) and toward regime stability and the security of the class 
controlling the state apparatus. The changes in resource fl ows involve ideologi-
cal revisions, which, as elsewhere around the world, correlate with the rise of 
neo- liberalism as the ideology of capital. It is at this conjunction of military 
defeats and neo- liberalism that wars begin to raise the cost of maintaining the 
security of the working class.  The earliest break with the nationalist ideological 
status quo became manifest with the reforms of Anwar Sadat in Egypt in May 
1971, which, by 1977 resulted in the fi rst popular anti- regime protests, known as 
the ‘Bread Riots’. 10 Since then, social conditions have been deteriorating across 
the AW. To make matters worse, as the crisis deepened, its neo- liberal ideol-
ogy rose to occupy a policy position to which there was no other alternative. 
Maldistribution and war – or at least war’s inevitable threat – weakened the 
state as the agency of development. In this book, I follow the descent of devel-
opment from the days of Arab socialism, focusing on the conditions of three 
former Arab socialist states: Egypt, Syria and Iraq. I begin by defi ning and 
exposing the Arab socialist development experience vis- á- vis neo- liberalism. 
I  then turn to specifi c development patterns in these three states and exam-
ine their diff erent processes of developmental descent. In the last two chapters, 
the focus shifts to the perverse transformation under neo-liberalism, whereby a 
huge reserve army of labour was created, and ends with a discussion of what it 
means to be integrated into global economy via the combined channels of war 
and oil; the latter being a form of commercial exploitation, which reduces sub-
ject-object to object (resources without owners) and enslaves whole countries. 
 Chapter 1: Arab socialism in retrospect 
 Prior to the ongoing counter- revolutionary phase, the neo- liberal Arab state 
depressed wages, lifted its protection of national industry, set single exchange 
and interest rates and opened up trade and capital accounts with the intention 
of readying cheapened national resources for transfer abroad. This chapter 
 10  ‘36 Years after the “Bread Uprising”: Egypt’s Struggle for Social Justice Lives On’, 2013. 
Online:   http:// english.ahram.org.eg/ NewsContent/ 1/ 64/ 62785/ Egypt/ Politics- / - 
years- after- the- Bread- Uprising- Egypts- Struggle- fo.aspx (viewed 5 November 2015) 
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traces the metamorphosis of the state bourgeois class in Arab socialist coun-
tries, namely Egypt and Syria, into the neo- liberal- cum- comprador class. 
With the exception of Iraq, which was crushed from without by the force of 
outright occupation, the other states experienced gradual social erosion lead-
ing to uprisings from within. This chapter reassesses the social and economic 
development under Arab socialism and examines how, as neo- liberalism 
dawned, the state bourgeois class underwent a transformation from a sur-
rogate national bourgeoisie to a surrogate international fi nancial bourgeoisie. 
 Chapter 2: The devastation of peace in Egypt 
 This chapter begins with the premise that a disempowered Egypt is relevant 
for value transfers from Africa to the AW. A brittle Egyptian social forma-
tion contributes to imperial rents being more than they would be in an Egypt 
developing along industrial lines which, under the appropriate policy inter-
face, would empower its working population. Low historically determined 
subsistence levels for broad sections of the working class were brought about 
by Egypt’s loss of two principal wars, the signing of the Camp David Accords, 
and the introduction of a process of economic liberalisation that began in 
the 1980s. But instead of a post– Camp David peace dividend leading to fur-
ther development, Egypt slid further into misery. By applying neo- liberal 
policy, Egypt was paying the conqueror tribute derived from the resources 
that otherwise would have strengthened its working class and, by implication, 
national security. The systematic weakening of Egypt and its incorporation 
into the US- led imperialist orbit was part of US- led imperialism achieving its 
broader goals in Africa and the Middle East. Economic stabilisation arrange-
ments, as in US or Gulf aid, are secondary in relation to the broader US- led 
imperialist hegemony. 
 Chapter 3: The infeasibility of revolution in Syria 
 This chapter assesses the policies of the Arab socialist experience and inves-
tigates the history or the social class that precipitated the social disaster in 
Syria. There is an ideological blame game that vulgarly personalises class 
relations with the aim of exonerating this or that side in the war. This chapter 
attempts to dispel the mystifi cation attendant upon such facile explanations. 
The subject of history is the social force that moulds ideological and social 
relationships to ensure an outcome favouring its class interests. The chapter 
focuses on the circulation of capital under Arab socialism and later under 
neo- liberalism as it veered away from the Syrian working class. Under neo- 
liberalism, the regime abandoned the old Arab socialist strategy of combining 
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development with security objectives. It formally split the economics of resist-
ance from the politics of resistance and, instead, destructively pursued 
resource- grabbing. With this transformation, the Syrian state became only 
secondarily the Syrian regime’s means of repression and exploitation; that 
means was principally imperialism. This chapter argues against the percep-
tion that a small clique in a somewhat isolated state like Syria makes history. 
The social forces that produced the conditions for blind accumulation (short- 
termism competition for profi ts without concern for social stability) when the 
Syrian regime combined absolute political and economic power are the impe-
rialistically imposed terms on which the regime engages in economic activity. 
As socialist ideology ebbs and labour, as an internationalist power, fragments, 
US- led capital continues to be the uncontested subject of history. This chap-
ter concludes that given Syria’s geostrategic position and the political mileage 
that imperialist forces gain from having a foothold there, it is presently impos-
sible for a social democratic revolution to succeed. 
 Chapter 4: Iraq then and now 
 This chapter examines the historical causation behind the destruction of the 
Iraqi state. In the two decades after 1958, Iraq made considerable social and 
economic advances. Yet, despite rising oil revenues since the 2003 invasion, 
violence, poverty and destitution are rampant. The windfall profi ts from oil 
have entrenched a divisive social mode that has been put to the service of 
global capital. While the AW rebels against abjection in favour of civil liber-
ties, in Iraq the sectarian divide preempted the grounds for revolt. In point of 
fact, there is no true singular state with a government to rebel against; there 
are many ‘Iraqs’. The decapitation and immiserisation of Iraq strengthened 
American hegemony over the global accumulation structure. 
 Chapter 5: The perverse transformation 
 Much has been said about the neo- liberal fi asco in the AW and elsewhere. 
The Arab Spring exposed the disaster. In this chapter, I re- examine the capi-
tal process by looking into its most defi ning constituent, the labour process 
and, specifi cally, into rising proletarianisation under neo- liberalism. I exam-
ine how wars and neo- liberal polices served as the means of massive labour- 
force dislocation at a time when job creation was decelerating at a tremendous 
rate. Evicting the peasants from the land, making them into wage labourers 
and depriving them of their private means of subsistence combine into a pro-
cess of socialisation that intensifi es the contradictions of capitalism. Massive 
socialisation of the labour force was accompanied by increasing privatisation 
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of output and rising inequality. I  show how redundancy and working- class 
insecurity are even more necessary to fi nancially integrated capital. The 
abundance of the reserve army of labour implies that the horror of a wage 
system devoid of labour representation works itself more aggressively into the 
labour process, which circularly determines the global structure of capital 
and its power. When there is a need for an excessive and low- priced labour- 
power commodity, and when that commodity stands above people and rules 
over them, for capital to dispose of that commodity it has to render human 
lives more dispensable than they already are. 
 Chapter 6: Permanent war in the Arab World 
 In the fi nal chapter, I pay a closer look at the operation of imperialism in an 
Arab context. Intertwined with oil control, imperialist- sponsored wars in the 
AW have become an ends in themselves. Every economic process has social 
and political underpinnings that render the making of exponential profi ts 
possible. These social and political relationships are labour’s expropriation, 
disciplining and regimentation, which assume the form of wholesale pillage 
in the AW and Africa. 11 The intensity of repression in these corners of the 
globe is related to the law of value (the mediation of use and exchange val-
ues through power- derived price systems) inseminating the easily penetrable 
social formations. Cheapened human and natural resources extracted from 
insecure formations along with ways of controlling crucial territories and 
strategic resource fl ows also reinforce imperialist positioning. The rates of 
exploitation appear to not contribute very much to value creation from the 
productivity (relative surplus value) side, but surplus value per se would not 
have existed without primitive accumulation  cum commercial exploitation, 
which involved the consumption of the labourer along with his or her labour 
power. The drainage of historical social wealth is accomplished as the accu-
mulation of surplus value from the moment the debilitation of the colony 
begins. The value derived from inhibiting industrialisation in the colony, and 
the impetus that the rate of destruction of wealth in the periphery realises 
since primitive accumulation, never comes to rest, together contributing to 
an iterative wealth- making process that requires not only living labour to be 
consumed in production, but also living labourers to literally perish in the 
 11  The process of recurring forms of primitive accumulation, meaning the socialising of 
the workforce, in the insecure periphery of the AW does not displace labourers from 
the land to rehire them in industry as happened in England; primitive accumulation in 
the war- integrated areas such as the AW leads not to factory- type exploitation; it rather 
leads to commercial exploitation. 
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colonies, or on the periphery where forms of primitive accumulation resolved 
into commercial exploitation persist. Measuring values by the sum of prices 
is like squaring the circle, especially in the peripheral economy, where these 
prices are determined by imperialist fi at. Value creation as such becomes a 
derivative of human annihilation set against an exponentially rising meta-
bolic rate of capital accumulation. Seen from the point of commercial exploi-
tation, whose fi rst instantiations involved slavery and genocide, wars in the 
AW are a necessary by- product of the crisis of global capital. 
 Postscript 
 State- led as opposed to market- led development under neo- liberalism did not 
just appear on the world stage circa 1980 out of nowhere. Its recent history 
is rooted in the decline of the world ‘socialist’ camp and its ideology, which 
began with the Sino- Soviet split in the early 1960s. 12  At that time, Nikita 
Khrushchev taunted the United States that the Soviet Union had reached 
outer space fi rst and would soon put more sausages on East European 
tables. The ‘more sausage’ line drew both ridicule and critique from hard- 
line Communists. The emphasis implied by Kruschev’s remark on divert-
ing resources to consumption at home in the Soviet Union and away from 
supporting national liberation movements abroad implied that the Soviets 
wanted to build a more affl  uent ‘socialism’ at home and to peacefully compete 
with the United States in improving standards of living . But it was not only 
the inapposite belief in peaceful competition with the United States upheld by 
sections of the Soviet ruling class or the exorbitant costs of the military arms 
race that ushered in the decline of the idea of state control of the economy; 
it was also the ideological rift that divided the world ‘socialist’ camp. In ret-
rospect, one can see that a combination of Cold War costs, relative loss of 
 12  The idea of neo- liberalism itself dates back to the Austrian school of economics. It 
was later heralded by Milton Friedman in his ‘Neo- Liberalism and Its Prospects’, 
Farmand, 17 February 1951,  http:// 0055d26.netsolhost.com/ friedman/ pdfs/ other_ 
commentary/ Farmand.02.17.1951.pdf (viewed 15 March 2016). Although Friedman 
assumed that the early fi fties were the right time for a turn in events by which the bil-
lions of people begin to choose what to consume guided by a ‘system of prices that will 
allocate resources effi  ciently,’ the end of collectivist ideology dawned when the Soviets 
and other national liberation movements began to place their ruling class interests 
above commitment to internationalism, and it later peaked with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The ‘prices’ of which Friedman speaks are the product of power rela-
tions intended to deprive the working classes of the living security gains achieved via 
collective struggle. Ideas do not assume a real living shape unless victorious historical 
forces resurrect them in form, but not in content, to meet their historically specifi c 
requirements. 
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fi rst- strike capability and a class of social imperialists using the metaphor 
of the sausage to acquire more wealth via the medium of the state – these 
together brought the Soviet Union to ruination, and with it the utopia of 
socialism. I want to state very cautiously, knowing the diffi  culty of the sub-
ject, that for the sake of continuity in the argument it was essentially the shift 
in the ideological foundation of the Soviet ruling class from commitment to 
internationalism to commitment to their own prosperity that unravelled the 
Soviet socialist experiment. 
 More sausages on the table entailed the idea that some sort of moneyed 
incentive is required to mobilise individual productivity that would raise the 
standard of living in the Soviet camp. This pernicious myth of individual 
money incentives – the central pillar of ‘free market’ propaganda – would 
feed Soviet class antagonisms and the rise of neo- liberalism as the nouveau 
ideology of capital. While support for the industrialisation of China and the 
developing world was attenuated by the cliché of US– Soviet peaceful coexist-
ence, capitalism was, in in the background, beginning to devour socialism. 
Initially, Soviet ‘socialism in one country’ created a huge anti- imperialist state 
that would catalyse national liberation movements in the developing world. 
The process of introversion (socialism in one country would be criticised by 
the European left for delaying the onset of revolution in Europe, but later 
would be praised in the Third World for creating a viable anti- imperialist 
bloc under whose shade many national liberation movements gained inde-
pendence.  As of the split with China in the early 1960s, the Soviets began to 
shift more resources to peacetime consumerism at the expense of supporting 
the potential rise of Third World resistance and autonomy. 
 Tangentially, one should not draw conclusions on the basis of the 
argument that Europe was more developed or technologically readier to 
make the transformation to socialism than was less- developed Russia or 
the Third World, as in  Deutscher (1964 or 1967). The Eurocentric bent 
reeks of chauvinism even when it originates in Marxism. Speaking of 
China’s fast ‘descent into Bolshevism’ because of its lack of a European 
cultural heritage, Deutscher (1964) remarked that ‘the archaic structure 
of Chinese society was impermeable to European ideological ferments, 
and Western imperialism was unable to fructify the mind of China with 
any vital liberating idea’.  There possibly is a ‘Chinese Mind booklet’ that 
guides US State Department work in China, a publication similar to the 
notoriously racist ‘Arab Mind’ manual that owes its conceptual grandiosity 
to Deutscher.  Apart from the ignorance of revolutionary and egalitarian 
moments in Eastern history, which is often shrouded under the blanket 
label of ‘Oriental Despotism’, the idea that one society is more receptive 
than another to socialism because of its level of technological development 
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contradicts Marx’s views; it was not the stock of wealth and technology 
that Marx had in mind, it was the mode of social organisation governing 
the reproduction of society. Capitalist progress measured by an analytical 
scale of the sort that ‘Europe killed hundreds of millions of natives but the 
remaining few can have electric showers’, is not a method that Marx used 
to supplement his historical approach. Capitalism and its more violent 
form, imperialism, are born in crisis and only impart misery by the abso-
lute general law of development of capitalism, which transcends national 
borders. Marx recognised the growing class- cum- wealth rift between the 
colonising and colonised nations and proposed that communal forms of 
social organisation (especially Russia) could just as equally become plat-
forms readied for the development of socialism (Hobsbawm 1964).  It is not 
the technological level of development proper that would ensure socialist 
construction, but the direct social and popular hold on the means of pro-
duction that engenders a civilisation of communal social responsibility. 
 Many are the reasons for the fall of the Soviet Union, but as in any system 
that falters, the Achilles heel is ideological decline or the loss of the hold of 
the ruling class on the state. That fall accounts for today’s rise in unfettered 
capitalism under the guise of neo- liberalism. Against this broader context, 
the downward Arab developmental spiral is conditioned by the reigning neo- 
liberal ideology that has hijacked working- class consciousness. Internationalist 
ideological retreat reproduces laggard nationalist development and invokes 
the worst symbols and superstitions from the cultural heritage as a way for 
society to cope with the diminishing opportunities for work and worsening 
living standards. The perceived unreliability of alternative socialist models 
and institutions, and the defeat and marginalisation of the international left, 
can only further the retrogression. 
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 Chapter 1 
 ARAB SOCIALISM IN RETROSPECT 
 Early in the post- independence years, major socialist Arab states such as 
Iraq, Syria and Egypt undertook massive land reform measures, nationalised 
industry and fi nancial institutions, provided universal healthcare and educa-
tion and clamped down on the cycle of resource usurpation. 1  This class of 
Arab states sought self- suffi  ciency in production, endorsed import- substituting 
industrialization and eff ected public investments in heavy industry while syn-
chronizing the demands of a growing industry with adequate human skills. 
In social and economic dynamics, the Arab socialist model has outperformed 
the ongoing neo- liberal model, which began to be implemented in the early 
1980s (see Annex to this chapter for tables on economic growth records and 
other economic indicators for three major Arab socialist countries: Egypt, Iraq 
and Syria). In popular culture, this period is dubbed  Alzaman Aljamil : ‘beauti-
ful times’.  Although standards of living are historically determined, the period 
1960– 1980 represented an epoch in which Arab countries exhibited dynamic 
performance in terms of real wages growth, more equal income distribution 
and improvements in infant mortality and life expectancy as well as many 
other social indicators. Arab socialist regimes in particular have not only out-
shone the rest of the Arab countries, but also scored high growth averages in 
social and economic indicators relative to the rest of the world. With the begin-
ning of the Arab Spring in 2011, nearly all the previous Arab socialist states 
experienced collapse, save Algeria, which staggers along depending more on 
oil revenues than on auto- development or an economy that grows and develops 
by relying on its own productive capabilities. The Arab socialist model may not 
have been super but, in comparison, neo- liberalism had stripped the working 
population of its previous social gains and raised the measure of repression. 
 Development outcomes depend on the commitment of the social class in 
power to real- resource mobilisation. This chapter addresses the issue of Arab 
 1  In addition to the three countries mentioned above, Algeria, Sudan, South Yemen and 
Libya are also states that followed the Arab socialist model. For the purpose of illus-
tration, I will draw examples from only the three states and, in the chapters to follow, 
examine their recent developments. 
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socialism and investigates the structure of the class formation that shaped 
development in the post- independence years.  The class of military offi  cers 
and its adjunct ally, the intermediate stratum – composed of professionals, 
small capital holders, including sections of the small land- holding peasantry, 
which together formed the state bourgeois class (by virtue of their control 
over state resources) – assumed the role of agent of development during the 
Arab socialist phase. 
 As a social relationship, the intermediate stratum is codetermined by its 
relationship to other classes and to its sources of material and ideological 
reproduction. This stratum is not the middle class in the Weberian sense, or a 
categorisation by income, as opposed to being related to the mode of creation 
and appropriation of productive capital assets in their various forms. In its 
relationship with other classes, a social class historically acquires, in memo-
ries, symbols, institutions and forms of organisation.  It is decisively defi ned 
by its forms of control over, and its property relationship with the means of 
production. In terms of structure, petty property owners without control, or 
those with access to smaller forms or amounts of productive capital, do not 
constitute capital.  It is not theoretically suffi  cient to limit the defi nition of 
the working class to the absence of ownership of productive capitals or to 
working for capital owned by the capitalist class. It is also not suffi  cient to 
classify self- exploiting workers with petty ownership of capital as not ‘working 
class’. Concretely, workers may be defi ned by their particular relationships 
with particular forms of capital.  Moving back from the analytics of this, and 
seeing class as a historical relationship – one not determined by the infl ated 
‘I’ of mainstream social science realised in the ideologically slanted system of 
bourgeois democracy, but by the intermediated political agency arising from 
inherited forms of social organisations and the state of play in working- class 
ideology – would allow us to suffi  ciently grasp the real process that is inter-
mediate class  cum modern petty bourgeoisie.  The weight of history cannot 
be written off ; and it is not only the forms of property but also the systems of 
control via mediated political agency and ideology that make the appearance 
and evolutions of social classes the fl uid historical moments that they are . 
 Both Poulantzas and Labica stress the diffi  culty of giving analytical 
shape – a structure – to the petty bourgeoisie. Poulantzas (1978) observes that 
there is no clear demarcation line between the old and the new forms of the 
petty bourgeoisie; their relationship in terms of the structure arising there-
from is intertwined and complex.  Labica (1985) posits that  petty bourgeoisie is 
a malleable concept, diffi  cult to grapple with, but still one with bourgeois 
undertones that slot it within the tier with the least self- consciousness among 
the more defi nitive working social classes. This concept’s variable identity, 
unlike the more stable proletariat or the peasantry, oscillates between the 
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two words that compose it:  petty and bourgeois (Labica 1985).  The petty 
bourgeoisie’s position in several disparate social groups is mediated as part of 
the contradiction between the working class and the ruling class.  Meillassoux 
(1998) aptly uses the term ‘social corps’, those who are not signifi cant proprie-
tors but whose services are required for capital to rule. They are the service 
groups generated as functional to the forms of capital in question. 
 In an Arab context, modern class formation was born within the limp-
ing process of transformation to capitalism and under the colonial yoke; 
it retained many of the characteristics of the pre- capitalist class structure. 
 However, it did so only in terms of appearance rather than essence (the dialec-
tical category), for the latter is determined by the historically specifi c material 
and ideological circumstances underpinning the class. 2 As neo- liberal open-
ness began to take its toll, and the earnings of the intermediate class moved 
from relying on rents raised by national productivity growth to geopolitical 
or fi nancial rents, the intermediate class, or the old ‘corps social’, ceased to 
exist. As aptly observed by Sourani (2015), these intermediate classes could 
have only survived under Arab socialist regimes and, indeed, vanished as 
soon as the nationalist economic system was exposed to the vagaries of the 
international market.  For very practical reasons related to activism under 
occupation in Gaza, Sourani delineates the successor class as the new petty 
bourgeoisie composed, albeit in a socially engineered order, of three eche-
lons: high, medium and low – ranging from professionals to shopkeepers to 
self- employed menial workers whose power in the state is negligible. This 
classifi cation issues from broad quantifi ed averages and aids to clarify the 
grounds for activism – Sourani is an activist in the Occupied Gaza Strip. To 
Sourani, the new petty bourgeois order is more befi tting of lagging produc-
tion conditions under openness that predisposes many who make ends meet 
to do so with their own meagre means of production or subsistence. 
 2  The dialectical category of essence does not mean a trait that is innate to culture across 
history (a defi nition that is currently fashionable), but it is the law of motion in its total-
ity. It is not, for instance, an essential characteristic of Islam to suppress civil liberties 
and that, subsequently, for Islam to be realised it would actually require a form of 
organisation similar to an IS caliphate. There are as many ideas and forms of thought 
as the infi nitude of thought meeting practice; but for a certain idea from Islamic history 
to be resurrected in the twenty- fi rst century requires a current form of social practice 
rooted in the necessities of the current era. Ideas may still share the same name, but 
their historical content and meaning have become something totally diff erent. Apart 
from lacking respect, the current defi nition of essentialism is ‘past alive in the present’. 
In such notions of essentialism, there is utter disregard for the diachronic development 
of concepts or the social relationships that underlie forms of social organization, which 
makes them more racism than social science. 
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 Taking Labica to an extreme, Sourani also extends the variability of the 
petty bourgeois class position to the development of its consciousness in a 
refl exive manner. Because of its oscillation between working and ruling 
classes, the petty bourgeoisie’s position swings wildly and has never been able 
to attain a mature class consciousness of its own (Sourani 2015). In other words, 
there is some ideal consciousness that is only attainable through the defi nite-
ness of being engaged in socialised wage– labour activity. The value- creating 
working class as the totality of a multitude of social relationships incorporates 
the disengaged and the self- exploiting strata as well as the ‘factory employed’. 
It (the working class) is an organic state of being and becoming mediated by 
the developments in working- class organisation and consciousness. Such con-
sciousness, however, is rooted in the historically borne organisational power 
of global labour and its ideological counterweight to the neo- liberal doctrine 
of capital – obviously more so than the isolated development in national ideo-
logical conditions. The objective basis of repression attendant upon capitalist 
exploitation is the immutable condition of being (there is always repression 
and exploitation under capital), whereas the subjective sphere or the ideo-
logical development whose ideal end is realising the demise of the wage sys-
tem is historically contingent upon the class struggle despite being necessary 
and emancipatory. These ideological developments cannot pertain to a pre- 
envisaged linear or nonlinear path; they are socio- historical and uncertain. 
Take, for instance, the recent crisis, the deaths and hunger culminating in 
the revolts known as the Arab Spring, in view of the uncontested avalanche 
of neo- liberalism: Arab misery elicited none of the measures that would even 
slightly dent the drudgery of the wage system. 
 In terms of structure, Petras (1976) points out that the intermediate stratum 
comprises skilled professionals – such as schoolteachers, university professors, 
civil servants, accountants, military offi  cers, medical doctors, engineers and 
lawyers – whose status is not dependent on the ownership of property and 
wealth, but on their training and performance. The intermediate stratum 
refers to a diff erentiated relationship within the working class distinguished 
from the less- privileged working- class on the basis of salary, education, skill 
and, more decisively, by the degree of control over the means of production 
delegated to it by the military. Note that in a war context with weak institu-
tions resulting from the potential insecurity of the state, the military emerged 
as the key player on the Arab political scene. The rise of the Arab bourgeoi-
sie can be dated to European and, specifi cally, to early nineteenth- century 
Napoleonic changes to landholding laws empowering individual capitalists, 
but the embryonic formation of the intermediate stratum (the state bourgeois 
class) took hold as Arab industry in the early twentieth century grew under 
the shadow of European industry and war (Abdel- Malek 1968). The history 
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of modern Arab states, like European history in the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries, is a history of national movements (Rodinson 1978). Alongside 
the national struggle for liberation, there existed a social struggle against a 
national bourgeoisie that had already become an appendage to Western colo-
nial interests and industry (Abdel- Malek 1968). 
 Because of the underdeveloped capacities (lacking in fi nance and real capi-
tal) of the national bourgeoisie at the time of independence after World War 
II, the state bourgeois class assumed the role of a surrogate national bour-
geoisie (Hussein 1971; Abdel- Malek 1971). Accounts of the detailed aspects 
of the interface between national policies and their developmental outcomes 
show that the broad determinants of the relative success of the Arab social-
ist regimes stem from the fact that they tackled  security and developmental 
concerns jointly. In terms of defi nitions, development policies remain the 
resource- channelling mechanisms that direct wealth fl ows to the social class 
in command.  Security is a totality that encompasses communal and national 
securities, knowledge- related productive capacity, including health and edu-
cation, with working- class security being the backbone of national sovereignty. 
 In the Arab World (AW), US- led imperialist control of oil is pivotal to 
maintaining the global accumulation process. In this context, Arab auton-
omy with respect to territory, resources and policy becomes the  sine qua non 
for development.  Subsequently, the reverse development or  lumpen develop-
ment, as used by A. G. Frank (1972, 17) incurred by the AW in the ongoing 
neo- liberal phase can be mainly attributed to the structural terms of surren-
der to imperialism. The neo- liberal phase did not end with the beginning of 
the Arab Spring. If anything, failure to redistribute plundered assets through 
bourgeois power in the state and continuing adherence to ‘free- market’ poli-
cies indicate that many of the dispossessory tendencies of the past will gain 
momentum under the elected or unelected governments that have resulted. 
 As with state- socialist or dirigisme models elsewhere around the world, the 
turnaround from Arab socialism to neo- liberalism occurred as a result of the 
retreat of socialist ideology, peaking with the demise of the Soviet Union. With 
successive Arab military defeats and the sinking- in of defeatism, the ideological 
conditions developed for the state bourgeois class in power to manifest apostasy 
and lead the assault on working- class security. The end of the Arab social-
ist project had more to do with a shifting of class alliances that structurally 
absorbed the terms of surrender, and with the global ideological move away 
from socialism, than with mass dissatisfaction with socialist measures. Egypt 
succumbed fi rst, as it signed the Camp David Accords; Syria followed, with its 
second phase of neo- liberal reform introduced in 2000; and in the case of Iraq, 
despite many concessions off ered by the regime to avert war, the precipitous 
and wholesale destruction of the social formation was necessary to capital, as 
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opposed to the gradual descent into the neo- liberal quagmire experienced by 
the other countries in this study.  The metamorphosed ruling class, the disar-
ticulation of hierarchically structured factions looting the national economy, 
which presided over the current neo-liberal social disaster has ceased to be a 
surrogate national bourgeoisie;  it has become a proxy for the rule of the more 
aggressive facet of imperialism associated with international fi nancial capital. 
 As already noted, strong state intervention and state- led investment dur-
ing the 1960s characterised the path of Arab socialist development.  The 
state bourgeois class supplanted the national entrepreneurial class, promoted 
investment in heavy industry and, in general, built productive capacity. The 
rise of this class is premised on the absence of a nationalist bourgeois class, 
which could have acted as an agent of development (Amin 1976; Petras 1976). 
Not that the case of the AW is peculiar:  in most of Africa and the Middle 
East, the postcolonial capacity debacle and the inability of the entrepreneur-
ial business class to promote development paved the way for the rise of a rul-
ing class made up of an alliance of the military, small landholding peasantry 
and the middle class, or a state bourgeois class. This mishmash of alliances 
led by the military became the subject of the postcolonial development pro-
ject in many of the newly independent Arab states. 
 To further clarify: in much of the immediate post- independence AW, an 
entrepreneurial class was not totally absent. In Iraq, Syria and Egypt, prior 
to independence, sections of the national bourgeoisie with limited ties to 
the colonialists took part in ferocious anticolonial struggles. Yet, as soon as 
independence was won, the social frailty of the national bourgeoisie became 
evident, especially as their umbilical cords with the colonialists (through mer-
chandise trade) were severed. From the ashes of the old classes – such as the 
 Wafd in Egypt and the national block in Syria – there arose a set of military 
dictatorships competing in populist and genuine anti- imperialist positions. 
The old, colonially reared sections of the bourgeois classes were politically 
subjugated in the process of strengthening national independence. In an 
ideological tidal wave of equity and national liberation, the social inequi-
ties of colonialism were scornfully rejected and egalitarian measures were 
implemented to redress what was perceived to be odious development under 
colonialism. 
 Whether it is a bourgeois class per se or a state bourgeois class, the com-
mon denominator of  bourgeois implies a similar substance to both of these 
classes. In an oil- producing or geopolitical rent- driven context, given the pull 
of a cross- border class alliance, the state bourgeois class is innately predis-
posed to surrender under imperialist pressure. As a bourgeois class, it can 
off er concessions to the working classes but cannot provide them with the civil 
liberties that would undermine capital as a social relationship. Braverman 
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(1959) foresaw the bifurcation in development lying ahead and warned that 
unless the working population politically participated in the making of social-
ism, that is it hegemonised the political process to ensure a growing share of 
the surplus product, the whole process of egalitarian distribution undertaken 
by Arab socialism could be easily reversed. The repression attendant upon 
the labour process implied that socialisation and egalitarian distribution 
could be easily overturned from above without much resistance from below 
once historical conditions were ripe. When frequent military routs (the 1948, 
1967 and 1973 wars with Israel, to name a few) instilled a state of defeatism in 
the upper layers of society, and working class and civil society organisations 
remained appendages to one- party regimes, the class in power easily over-
turned the gains acquired by working people under Arab socialism. 3 That it 
is impossible to militarily defy nuclear- powered imperialism was the thought 
that encapsulated the  état d’esprit motivating the process of de- socialisation. 
 By the time the uprisings occurred in 2011, the state of social devastation 
in the AW was so severe that the masses poured into the streets without a 
revolutionary plan. Their principal aim was to change the status quo, but 
with what? These were revolutions with neither a party vanguard nor social 
programs. The only organised groups were free- marketeer Islamists already 
operating in Gulf- funded and US- funded civil society. 
 The political relationships of diff erent ruling classes to imperialism as 
well as their control of the means of production, including informal forms of 
property control via the medium of the state, underscore the transition from 
socialisation to privatisation. The underlying conditions for the social muta-
tion of the ruling classes from national bourgeoisie to agent of global fi nancial 
capital occurred as a result of ideological and military defeat that, in any case, 
has engulfed much of the world’s left- leaning national movements. Defeatism 
erased armed struggle from the nationalist agenda and replaced it with insti-
tutions that promote ‘peaceful resolutions’ to the confl ict with imperialism – 
especially in the Arab- Israeli confl ict. Once the politics of compromise steer 
the political strategy, the natural end is for the nationalist class to fall into the 
lap of imperialism (Frank 1982). Time after time, armed resistance against a 
better- armed enemy was touted as futile. To make matters worse, under the 
blows of international fi nancial capital, which prefers a higher income share 
 3  The swift defeat of Arab armies to Israel in the 1967 and 1973 wars represented an 
attestation to the superiority of United States’ conventional weaponry. In such a stra-
tegic region, these highly publicized wars contributed to the power standing of the 
United States vis- à- vis the Soviet Union. The ideological impact of such military routs 
propped up the ideological position of the United States, off setting its retreat else-
where, demonstrating its industrial superiority and the effi  cacy of its market  economy. 
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by seizure, it became diffi  cult for a national alliance of classes in the AW to 
maintain a nationalist predisposition. Gradually, but also willingly, the Arab 
ruling classes internalised the terms of surrender as dictated by the Bretton 
Woods institutions. They have realised their potential as a bourgeois class 
subordinated by world capital and become modern suzerains of empire. 
 In exploring the subject of this chapter, the argument will pursue the 
shifting class structures and the changing mode of appropriation in imperi-
alistically aggressed formations. All by itself, the topic is broad, and a single 
chapter will not do it justice. Capital accumulation in a developing context 
cannot be read using either a neoclassical outline of voluntary employment 
or a Keynesian full- employment framework.  Under capitalism of any sort – 
predatory or ‘docile’ – a full- employment hypothesis does not even apply in a 
developed context, let alone in a developing one.  Although necessary, demand- 
side (Keynes and Kalecki) approaches are also inadequate on account of frail 
capacity in the developing world. What is there to demand when there is lit-
tle productive capacity with which to meet demand? Developmental capital 
accumulation is not solely the incremental rise in capital stock over time; it 
is primarily based on the social relationship that underpins the decision to 
build and recirculate the social product nationally. In Marxian phraseology, 
the degree of development is the degree of independence from wage slavery 
or ‘how well off  people are’ even when not engaged in wage employment. 
Hence, the point is to explore the primacy of the social class in charge of 
development. In the socialist AW, as the state bourgeois class represented an 
alliance of the intermediate class with the military, one witnessed a marked 
developmental impact. However, when the class alliance became that of 
the military with a capitalist class that moved from industry to externally 
tied commerce, the result is developmental retrogression. The underlying 
hypotheses are: (a) changes to the class structure in the group of Arab social-
ist countries occurred under the weight of consecutive Arab defeats and a 
concomitant rise of neo- liberal ideology globally; (b) the state bourgeois class 
structurally fulfi lled the conditions of surrender and underwent a transforma-
tion from national bourgeoisie to surrogate international fi nancial bourgeoi-
sie, and: (c) situated in a context of accumulation by wars of encroachment 
and commercial exploitation, the social formations holding by the ideology 
of modern nationalism are destined to come undone if US- led imperialism 
holds sway in the sphere of international power relations. 
 The line of thought in this chapter tracing the changing nature of the 
state bourgeois class from nationalist to comprador will be structured as fol-
lows. In what follows, I examine the relevance, to a developing Arab context, 
of the concept of state capitalism and state- led development. In the section 
titled ‘The State Bourgeois Class’, I investigate the state bourgeoisie, its frailty 
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and its predisposition to capitulate to imperialism. The colonial legacy and 
its weak entrepreneurial class in the AW will be analysed in the sections 
‘Colonial Plunder and Beyond’ and ‘A Frail Arab Bourgeois Class’. No dis-
cussion of this specifi c Arab experience in development can proceed without 
exploring the dominant role of the military in power; hence, in the section 
titled ‘The Military in Power’, the rise of the military to power, its transfor-
mation into a comprador segment of the ruling class and the versatility it 
exhibited when faced with successive defeats are detailed. The section ‘Arab 
Socialism’ deals with the historical achievements of the Arab socialist experi-
ence and the reasons for its collapse. 
 State- Led Development 
 In characterising socio- political entities like Arab socialist states, Kalecki 
(1972) employed the concept of ‘intermediate regimes’. He describes those 
regimes as being neither strictly capitalist, as foreign infl uence on them was 
limited, nor truly socialist. On an international level, intermediate regimes 
obtained credits from both socialist and imperialist camps.  In the case of 
Egypt’s Nasser regime, for instance, the archives of the US State Department 
from 1958 to 1961 reveal how Nasser acquired American Hawk missiles in 
addition to being tempted with credit from the United States in an eff ort to 
dissuade him from forming an alliance with the Soviet Union. 4 
 Gramsci ([1928] (1978)) tackled class formations in peripheral Eastern and 
Southern European societies and noted the conspicuous rise of an intermedi-
ate stratum that occupied middle- of- the- road functions between the state and 
the workers or peasant populations. A broad spectrum of intermediate classes 
stretches between the proletarian and capitalist classes and seeks to carry on 
policies of their own, with ideologies that infl uence broad layers of the prole-
tariat but that particularly aff ect the peasants and rural communities. 
 The intermediate strata in the AW had partnered with the military in an 
Arab- Israeli war context but did not own signifi cant properties apart from 
those for personal use. The power aff orded to these strata during the Arab 
socialist age was delegated to them by the military. Though subordinated 
to the military, they eff ectively became part of the ruling nomenclature as a 
result of the expanding bureaucracy and by means of their indirect control 
of the economy via the state bureaucracy. At the beginning of the neo- liberal 
period, defi ant sections of these intermediate strata rejected the neo- liberal 
 4  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958– 1960 , vol. XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; 
Arabian Peninsula, Document 210, 1959. Online:   https:// history.state.gov/ histori-
caldocuments/ frus1958- 60v12/ d210 (viewed 11 February 2015) 
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transition and were ruthlessly suppressed by the newly transformed ruling 
class. The military then (under neo- liberalism) parted with the intermediate 
strata and allied itself with the local merchant class. This alliance became a 
subservient partner of global fi nancial capital, at fi rst implementing the reci-
pes of structural adjustment and neo- liberalism later. 
 Within the class of intermediate regimes, a narrower band of regimes 
closely resembling the Soviet model, to which the Arab socialist states also 
belonged, were dubbed state- capitalist (Petras 1976). This was more or 
less a general label for any socialist regime that still drew surplus value 
from wage labour but also exhibited a higher degree of equitable distri-
bution as a result of asset distribution as compared to the salient capi-
talist regime with heavy state intervention. The same concept, however, 
as developed within various tendencies of Northern Marxism after World 
War II had carried a pejorative connotation in line with the imperial-
ist ideological assault on the Soviet Union (Binns 1986; Binns and Hallas 
1976; Cliff  ([1955] 1974). The state- capitalist states were not as socialist 
when compared to the utopia that Western socialists had in mind.  This 
strand of thought proposes that the Bolsheviks (Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union) had, by 1929, crushed workers’ democracy, or the original 
content of the  soviets or workers’ councils. Democracy here is understood in 
the abstract Western sense of individual freedoms (bourgeois democracy) 
and not in the derived civil liberties wrought through victories of working 
classes over imperialism (working class freedom from want). The consoli-
dation of the lines of defence in conditions of war involve the application 
of communal or class freedom and not abstract individual liberty. Socialist 
humanism is best expressed in terms of class dictatorship rather than in 
terms of personal freedom (Althusser 1964).  The argument also assumes 
in a counterfactual roundabout that, had the workers themselves remained 
in power and consolidated the soviet system, many problems would have 
been overcome despite the low level of development in productive forces. 
One need not argue the counterfactual; however, when interrelatedness is 
introduced as opposed to formal compartmentalisation, the reversion of 
the Soviet Union to stricter forms of regimentation tally with the retreat 
of socialist forces as Western social democracy turned to  social fascism , a 
term publicised by Browder (1933). Dropping interrelatedness in the form 
of assessment of the historical moment and the balance of forces poised 
against the Soviet Union internationally  – including imperialist wealth 
buying the conscience of its working class as the majority of humanity 
remained colonised – is selective and pernicious science. 
 The Soviet Union was isolated in the midst of a hostile capitalist world. 
It did not possess the means and capabilities for the construction of an 
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immediate modern economy that would bolster its security. Industrial mod-
ernisation was more about self- defence than ensuring a socialised working 
class (proletariat) more prone to a transformation to socialist values than was 
the small landholding peasantry. But the pre- Soviet MIR (collective non- 
owning peasantry) was predominant vis- à- vis a minority of Kulaks (land-
holding peasantry) by comparison ( History of the CPSU , 1939). The transition 
to a modern economy (the building of national security) required massive 
industrial transformation. At fi rst, the Bolshevik leadership believed that 
completing socialist construction in the Soviet Union would need the unfold-
ing proletarian revolution in the more advanced capitalist formations of 
Western Europe (Germany especially), which would later supply Russia with 
the prerequisites needed to develop a socialist workers’ state. For several years 
after the 1917 October Revolution, the dominant language of the Comintern 
(the Communist International) remained German in the hope that Germany 
would become the next socialist revolution. The extinguishing of socialist 
transformation in Western Europe by social fascism (social democracy) and 
the budding of fascism forced the Soviet Union into the position of building 
socialism in one country. The real rift that occurred within the international-
ist socialist movement is not the one between proponents of permanent revo-
lution and Stalinism, the former group was puny in armed and organisational 
capacity and inconsequential globally. On the ideological plane, Western 
Marxism piped the same anti- Soviet cant as bourgeois democracy. Behind 
this propaganda there lingered the sort of chauvinist Eurocentric valorisation 
of human lives, which really trailed from the unquestioned ethos that capital-
ism was historical progress in spite of its many genocides in the colonies: one 
Westerner’s life is more valuable than many Africans or Asians. Value theory 
is not only about the moneyed surplus labour time, but more so about the 
real human lives from the Third World wrested by violence to produce the 
commodity since the birth of commodity production. The real fi ssure in the 
socialist movement is the Soviet shift from China (early 1960s), which weak-
ened national liberation movements, allowed colonialism to position itself 
geostrategically by reconciliation across bourgeois classes alliances, and con-
tributed to weakening the building power momentum of many nations in the 
Third World. 
 Extensive socialisations in land and social resources, which were carried 
out under Arab socialist regimes, indeed resemble the Soviet model. However, 
Arab socialist regimes did not extirpate the old bourgeois class as did the 
Soviet and Chinese models. In their fi ve- year plans, their inter- industry 
prices were not fully set at cost (as in social costing under the Soviet system), 
and where the private sector was involved in the production chain, a price 
markup that generated profi ts was permitted up to a capped level. A  limit 
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on the prices of goods provided by the private sector mirrored the depth 
and the power of this sector’s involvement in the broadly socialised economy. 
Until 1980, these price caps were only slightly above production cost and 
restricted private- sector expansion.  In the neo- liberal era, price- capping was 
gradually removed, except in Iraq, which was at war and had to ration food 
and other commodities. As will be seen in  chapter 3 , when Assad liberalised 
prices and removed price caps, the private sector assumed full control of the 
Syrian economy beginning in 2007. Egypt’s Sadat began the process of liber-
alisation as early as 1980, and the results of neo- liberal growth were socially 
disastrous, as will be shown in  chapter 2 . 
 The very notion of state capitalism, however, can be simplistic or a sort of 
one- size- fi ts- all concept. It is unlikely that any state in transition out of capi-
talism can escape the totality of capital as a social relationship. The abolition 
of capital as a social relationship under state ownership of national resources, 
although possible (if only on account of structural shifts in history), is unlikely 
to occur precipitously and in a single developing country, particularly if the 
country in question is subjected to imperialist aggression. This is so even if 
civil liberties and working- class participation in the political process are freed 
from state control.  Imperialist assaults aimed at snuffi  ng out successful social-
ist models and the unevenness inherent in capitalism would necessitate a cal-
culus of redistribution under which surplus value would still be generated 
and unequally allocated in the early phases of socialisation. Equalisation pay-
ments between sectors or fast- paced industrialisation would imply distorted 
surplus value distribution even under pristine worker democracy climates. 
Building security under early socialism, redressing unequal development and 
maldistribution would also entail exploitation, regimentation and protracted 
aspects of repression pertaining to a capitalist labour process. 5 These symp-
toms of early socialism would emerge all the more so in small developing for-
mations whose aim is to buttress security and industrialise simultaneously.  An 
ideal state in which working- class consciousness is based on public property 
that society internalises as full social responsibility is a historically contingent 
process 6 that is dependent upon several parameters, the least of which would 
 5  Workers’ democracy per se is the working-class’ realisation in the state that develops 
in conditions of struggle limiting the wrath of the operation of the law of value and its 
more violent mediation, imperialist assault. As a self-conscious working class seizes 
control of production, its redistribution of surplus-value, its supply lines of needed 
goods, including diff usion of information and skills to less-developed areas become 
part of the revolutionary process, which is also a process of ideological self-defense. 
 6  The very solidarity and collective action that could bring this into being is already the 
basis of working- class consciousness – it is forged in action and disrupts the circuit of 
value by direct assertion of collective human need (Luxemburg 1913). 
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be the level of advancement of productive forces and the effi  cacy of socialis-
ing appropriation through nationalisation, but the most determining would 
be a civilisational leap (a shift in the basis of the reproduction of knowledge 
that sustains life through an organisation of man and nature in unison (Davis 
1993)).  Thus, for capital as a social relationship to promptly self- disband after 
state ownership of the means of production, is not at all a plausible assump-
tion even under a working- class participatory democracy. The dissolution 
of capital is a process undertaken by workers and their class allies assert-
ing collective human need and allocating goods and services (and therefore 
social- labour time and productive resources) according to that imperative. 
Not that it is impossible to make historical transformations, for the very idea 
of impossibility is a form of thought that is irrelevant to social agency within a 
historical process in which change is a state of becoming, otherwise: Whither 
the science in social science? 
 Moreover, the traditions and symbols of oppression are not immutable but 
are historically cast and would,  pari passu , frustrate the progress of socialisa-
tion. The stubborn force of habit ‘in millions and tens of millions is a most 
formidable force’ and is a thousand times more diffi  cult to vanquish than 
the centralised big bourgeoisie because millions of petty proprietors through 
their ordinary, everyday, imperceptible, elusive and demoralising activities 
produce the very results that the bourgeoisie needs and that tend to  restore 
the bourgeoisie (Lenin 1920).  Some half a century later, the internalisa-
tion of capitalist daily life as ‘ideology materialised’, to use Debord’s (1967) 
term, became the assimilation of bourgeois fetishism as one’s own rationally 
discerned conviction.  The diffi  culty is that bourgeois ideology has not only 
instilled its own images, ideas and symbols as if they were the working classes’ 
own, it has also provided the initial hypothesis, the method of reasoning and 
the axiology with which to reason. Paradigmatic reasoning reigned, and there 
was no shortage in the usage of the expression ‘paradigm shift’ when nothing 
was shifting so long as the class in power stayed put. There is a lot to overturn 
if one wants to follow on Marx’s advice of ‘changing the world’, especially, as 
the method of bourgeois science has become the only irreproachable science. 
 For the above reasons, the use of the term ‘state capitalism’ tallies with 
any state under capitalism or those which are in transition to socialism and, 
hence, its meaning is only discernible within a specifi c structure in a given 
discourse.  For the purpose of this chapter, the class that owns the means of 
production through the state and is in charge of development in the subject 
group of countries will be referred to as the ‘state bourgeoisie’. 
 The very act of socialising is anti- systemic and a process of self- negation 
for capital. The social relationships holding capital together as a state of 
exploitative existence begin to tear at each other once nationalist socialisation 
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of assets bridges internationalist working- class concerns; otherwise it would 
still be a payoff  of one working class against another. In the intermediate 
term, socialisation can discipline but not abolish capital. Historical experi-
ence teaches that nationalising assets, combined with a centralised democ-
racy for the working class, is a requisite step for a socialism growing in the 
midst of a hostile international milieu.  However, within the class of socialist 
Arab states under discussion, the socialisation of the means of production was 
incomplete, and the realisation of the working class in the political process, 
its democratisation, was partial. Arab socialism was in retrospect capitalism 
held in suspension by Soviet support and also because it did not suffi  ciently 
bond together the national front in anti- imperialist struggle. In hindsight 
too, Arab socialism was moribund from birth; socialism as an ideology was 
defeated and, subsequently, its more dynamic social performance would not 
come into question (and rarely brought up in discussions) because the victori-
ous neo- liberal ideology inverts past and present realities. Arab socialism was 
nonetheless a model that had put into place the necessary measures that were 
to redress much of the catastrophe of maldistribution and underdevelopment 
inherited from colonial rule. 
 Developing- country socialist regimes, including Arab socialist regimes, 
undertook three vital steps in consolidating their post- independence posi-
tions.  The fi rst step was the confi nement of policy to the remit of the state 
and its control over natural resources, which would harness the surplus to be 
redeployed in national development projects (Petras 1976; Amin 1978).  The 
second was agrarian reform, which concurrently limited the political power 
of the traditional landlord class. The third was economic nationalisation of 
large- scale fi nancial and industrial institutions. Typically, these regimes sup-
ported import- substitution strategies, controlled the capital account and pro-
digiously invested in manufacturing, heavy industry, and infrastructure.  A 
national modernisation project was carried out by linking the production of 
knowledge to industrial capacity, including the modernisation of agriculture. 
Attesting to the latter point, the swift restoration of electric power and partial 
rebuilding of the infrastructure in Iraq, with indigenous Iraqi engineering 
capabilities – doing so while under embargo after the 1991 Gulf war – is often 
given proof of the synergy between the state- guided production of knowledge 
and its application to national technology. 
 The Arab socialist state became the chief owner of the means of produc-
tion and appropriator/ allocator of the social product. In Arab socialist states, 
as earlier noted, the private sector was not wholly superseded. It absorbed 
a minor proportion of the labour force in services and traditional activi-
ties. State ownership existed side by side with this constrained private sector 
where, with the certitude of hindsight, the private sector’s scope for expansion 
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would be reopened after the state bourgeois class in power underwent a meta-
morphosis into a fully fl edged comprador bourgeoisie. 
 Economic planning and government intervention in relative autarky was 
the means by which one of the binding constraints of underdevelopment – the 
fi nancing needed to galvanise national resources – was to be overcome. With 
low import to GDP ratio and concessional terms for debt service, the national 
currency circulated without the pressures of the international fi nancial mar-
ket. Current- account real and capital balances were devised to suit industrial 
policies. Several interest and exchange rates were put in play to attenuate the 
impact of foreign- exchange shortages on the national issuance of currency. 
 This was a time when the idea of free markets was ebbing relative to the 
advance of socialism and national liberation movements around the globe. 
 The threat of Soviet ‘socialism’ as an alternate model of society helped lay the 
groundwork for this ideological shift toward socialisation nearly everywhere. 
Government ownership and massive intervention were premised on the inad-
equacy and ineffi  ciency of market mechanisms, the need for social control in 
investment strategy and a more egalitarian redistribution of income (Kalecki 
1976).  This was all to change under the weight of emergent neo- liberalism 
and of several Arab defeats that ended with the occupation of Iraq, the rise 
of monetarism, and the deepening crisis of socialist ideology that assumed 
catastrophic depth upon the collapse of the Soviet Union. From around 1980 
onwards, US- Saudi neo- liberalism eclipsed the Soviet- Nasserite period of 
Arab history. 
 The State Bourgeois Class 
 The state bourgeois class, composed of the military and the intermediate 
strata, exercised bureaucratic control over the state and economy via a one- 
party system in which the military had the last word.  The state bourgeois 
class in structural terms consists of the party bosses: the top ranks of the mili-
tary forces, the uppermost levels of the state bureaucracy and the profession-
als from the intermediate classes that lead various regime- allied civil society 
organisations, such as unions and societies for women rights. The litany of 
scholarship on stratifi cation in the AW, however, pursues a more constricted 
approach in explaining the autocratic nature of Arab regimes by relating 
it to the ‘cultural mentality’ of Arabs. This cultural paradigm, which is a 
disguised form of racial diff erentiation collated to the practice of imperial-
ism, presupposes inherent traits in Arab culture. During the proceedings of 
a conference titled ‘The Role of Economic Institutions in the Organization 
of Middle Eastern Economic Life in the Modern and Pre- Modern Periods’ 
(2011), two presenters were separately running two 1,500- year regressions to 
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show that the Western world appears more stable and more democratic than 
the AW across 15 centuries, either by the length of time a ruler stays in power 
or by the number of elected councils (CMES 2011). How is an Arab- type 
backwardness (ascribed to immutable cultural values and which trails from 
so far back) not going to call into practice some kind of visual stigma with 
which an Arab may be singled out? One cannot help but remind the reader – 
although by now this is probably overemphasised – that the book entitled  The 
Arab Mind by Raphael Patai is the manuscript of choice for informing US 
State Department personnel about the AW and is, of course, the epitome of 
the cultural- qua - racist stance. 
 In historically concrete defi nitions of social classes, however, not only in 
terms of relationship to property but also in terms of their forms of organi-
sation and ideological leanings, especially in relation to modern- day fi nan-
cial imperialism, the AW world exhibits an outstanding particularity. The 
specifi city in the AW is the newly independent state that came under impe-
rialist assault as soon as it proclaimed its independence. This latter con-
tradiction (resulting in the defeat of nationalist forces) around which the 
character of the national bourgeoisie transmigrates into its opposite – an 
anti- national social class – is the state of becoming that is discernible from 
a cursory reading of Arab modern history. The United States changes from 
being the great evil to an inspirational model. The intersection at which 
national peripheral classes confront imperialism and to a large extent are 
redefi ned by this relationship, involves the diplomatic work of sugar- coating 
surrender as peace and prosperity under freer markets.  In her fi eldwork 
as reported by Matar (2016), the head of industrial promotion policy in 
2007 was asked why Syria was dropping the import- protection measures 
to enter the WTO, when the US vetoes such a step (Syria’s accession to the 
WTO), the top bureaucrat answered that Syria is swerving economically 
to the right so that later it could move politically to the right, implying a 
potential peace deal with Israel. In itself, the WikiLeaks- exposed detail 
level of information that the US State Department receives from the AW 
about dissent is telling about the organic ties between the diff erent spheres 
of capitalist social classes. At any rate, the class position of one national 
group vis- à- vis another and the national interest in a postcolonial Arab 
context would be determined by its orientation toward imperialism. The 
political stance of social classes, as in ‘for or against’ imperialism, is the 
watershed moment  – more so than narrow unionism or commitment to 
national industrialisation – that defi nes their political position. Being con-
stantly aggressed upon, the national ruling class is not ruling in relation to 
its own working class alone; it is also ruling in proportion to the strength 
of its bonds to imperialism. 
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 This intermediate stratum is a diff erentiated section of the working class 
that supplies recruits to the ruling class. It is considered a subsidiary force in 
the government of society. The stability of a given post- independence Arab 
political entity partly depended on the effi  ciency of this stratum.  Petras (1976) 
sees the intermediate stratum as a class- conscious and independent social 
layer – distinct from both ordinary wage- workers and from traditional land-
owners – a stratum that is horizontally and vertically anchored in the salaried 
middle- income strata and has its own political and economic agenda and, 
whose promotion of market relations and capitalist development is extended 
under the expansion and shadow of state enterprise. Petras’s model closely 
follows the contours of the Arab socialist ruling class, a joint military and 
intermediate class that reinforced its grip on power by populist appeal to 
pan- Arabism and socialism. However, it was a class whose commitment to 
the broader working classes was shaky given its petty stock of wealth and 
Veblenian- envious emulation of the bourgeoisie. 
 The alliance of the intermediate stratum and the military contributed to 
the partial erosion of some traditional classes (landowners and the colonialist- 
bred bourgeoisie) and the promotion of others, such as the new and expanded 
intermediate stratum that grew up as a result of free universal education, sub-
sidised basic necessities, housing and healthcare. 7 These expanded interme-
diate strata consisted of the professionals who were engaged in technocratic 
jobs and in running the vast social programs of the state.  Immediately after 
independence, the national industrial bourgeoisie was crippled politically, 
either because its close ties to the previous colonist were severed or because 
the post- independence crisis was too deep, and it became feasible for the state 
bourgeoisie to fi ll the class power vacuum and consolidate the bureaucracy 
around the state (Abdel- Malek 1967; Hussein 1971).  In these new social rela-
tionships of production, the state bourgeoisie maintained not only its relation 
to the means of production through the state itself, but also distributional 
arrangements that reinforced the pace of capital accumulation. This was 
the organised dimension of capital under these regimes: a political process 
safeguarding capital as a social relationship and the inevitable capitalistic 
growth of the state bourgeois class. Solidifying control over state power has 
the goal of entrenching the wealth of this newly developing social class itself. 
More egalitarian distribution boosted demand, growth and the stock of 
 7  There was a signifi cant expansion in education in Egypt. Primary enrolment rose from 
1.4 million in 1952 to 3.5 million in 1965, and university enrolment increased from 
35,000 in 1952 to 123,000 in 1969. The rate of enrolment in higher technical schools 
that provided recruits for industry rose signifi cantly from 1,320 in 1952 to 34,000 in 
1969 (Central Bureau of Statistics Egypt, General Indicators, Cairo, 1952– 1970 200– 
204). 
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capital. The state, in return, would promulgate the law in tandem with the 
new class’s own expansionary pace. Under more stable conditions, working 
classes in relation to the dominant military class would have maintained their 
organisation, nationalist struggles and experiences, which would continue to 
infl uence the cohesion of the working population as a whole, including the 
peasantry. Under conditions of war, workers’ rights were curtailed to main-
tain stricter national defence. The degree of egalitarian redistribution of the 
social product was proportionate to internal (demands of the working class) 
and external power considerations (imperialist leverage) meant to maintain 
regime stability. In the Arab socialist period, national security and develop-
mental objectives were intertwined. The fi rst major schism between develop-
ment and security was to occur when Egypt signed the Camp David Accords 
in 1978 and moved into the US orbit. As will be seen in the  next chapter , 
this step weakened an already frail Arab security arrangement, put working- 
class security at risk and opened a new window for imperialist intervention in 
much of Africa and the AW. 
 In privately ordered capitalist markets, the process of capital accumula-
tion is mediated through various legal and political institutions organised by 
individual capitalists owning shares or property titles; in contrast, the process 
under Arab socialism was organised by offi  cials of the state or their hired 
managers (Abdel- Malek 1971).  As the contradictions inherent in class soci-
ety built up as a result of regressive redistribution and successive losses in 
war to imperialism, an internal clash unfolded between the state capitalist 
class, which owned state resources, and an increasingly socialised labouring 
class.  The rate of proletarianisation (as in labour becoming socialised) was 
rising and, in the seventies, the share of the intermediate class from national 
income gradually began to rise at higher rates than that of the broader work-
ing population (Charafeddine 1981). This phenomenon has also been wit-
nessed elsewhere.  Kalecki (1976) observed, with respect to the general case 
of intermediate regimes, that the demands of a growing urban labour force 
have brought pressure to bear on the state bourgeoisie, and repression has 
consequently increased against organisations representing the rural and 
urban poor. 
 The class fault lines under Arab socialism became progressively more pro-
nounced.  In the latter years of the Arab socialist project, access to foreign 
exchange in the form of petro- remittances permitted sections of society to 
visibly display signs of wealth, fi rst in Egypt and then in Syria. Iraq, how-
ever, is a peculiar case: it was too engrossed in confl ict for foreign earnings 
to weigh on class divisions more than did the confl icts themselves.  Under 
Saddam’s regime, the force of the law dealt quickly with shadow- market cur-
rency traders. 
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 The initial populist euphoria that accompanied state- bourgeois- led devel-
opment was followed by more repressive measures against the working class, 
especially as the walls protecting national industry began to collapse as they 
were undermined by stealthily infi ltrating petrodollars from the oil states. 
 Dollars and petrodinars traded in the black markets allowed similar con-
crete work, as in engineers performing similar tasks in the Gulf and in the 
home economy (the Arab socialist country), which is denominated in petro- 
currency abroad, to acquire much more wealth at home as a result of repa-
triation and foreign- exchange dealings. The Arab socialist currency was 
fi xed at high rates against the dollar (a protection measure) and the aspiring 
intermediate class paid for dollars at several times the offi  cial exchange rate 
(shadow- economy operations) fl ooding the economy with the national cur-
rency, exerting pressure to devaluate and infl ate national prices. The protec-
tion that the offi  cial exchange rate provided was not in setting the exchange 
rate at the real level or in terms of how much of similar commodities the local 
currency could buy at home for what the dollar buys in the United States. 
Not that there is a real level, but the offi  cial exchange rate represented a 
negotiating position, redressing the previous power imbalance with coloni-
alism. It was partly this power that the national economy sought to project 
in international trade. Since the Camp- David Accords turning point, condi-
tions of uncertainty associated with a combination of political uncertainty 
and institutions devoid of working- class representation rendered short- term 
profi teering from commerce, devoid of industry, the principal undertaking of 
private investors. 
 Capitalist and merchant classes are not synonymous. The merchant class 
circulates money rather than converts money into physical elements used for 
producing wealth (Marx 1867). Its process is that of distribution of goods 
rather than production of goods and creation of new value. The profi ts 
attained by mercantilist practice are eff ectively a transfer of value from mem-
bers of society to the merchants through price mark- ups. 
 However, the lax attitude of the Arab socialist regime toward illicit market 
operations indicated that certain segments of the military and state bour-
geoisie were benefi ciaries of such illegal currency- exchange activity. Because 
of this covert collusion, the walls of the dual exchange- rate regime (it is de 
facto a multiple rate, but let us just say dual for the sake of perspicuity) that 
protected national assets from being bought at prices set by the imperialists, 
collapsed. 
 These dual exchange- rate structures came into eff ect to protect the national 
consumption bundle from foreign- exchange variations and to rebalance the 
prices assigned to products of diff ering qualities or to domestically produced 
versus imported goods.  Besides regulating imports, since dollars could only 
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be acquired through the state, the dual exchange rates were correlated with 
a tariff  structure that disproportionally raised the price of imported com-
modities in order to protect national markets.  Dual exchange rates addressed 
a lopsided power structure left over from the days of colonialism in which 
the colonising state priced national currencies at low levels to get the most 
out of the occupied economies with its own currency. Trade unions and less- 
favoured sections of the working class bore the worst of the assault on the 
currency when the cohort of the intermediate stratum veered to the politi-
cal right in pursuit of petrodollars, and class alliances began to shift. But a 
reminder is in order here; the shift to the right of the intermediate stratum 
and the ruling military was preceded by a similar shift to the right around 
the world, while US- led regional military superiority and the Camp David 
Accords whisked Egypt away from the joint Arab security arrangement. 
 It may be argued that the emergence of this category of Arab socialist 
structures is a movement from one type of exploitation to another without 
a radical shift in the value- extraction process attendant on accumulation 
(Petras 1976).  The increasing mechanisation of production (socialist indus-
trialisation) meant that there was more output per worker compared with 
the colonial era; obviously, the additional value produced was more equally 
distributed under Arab- socialist measures. Resource retention within the 
national economy was also key to the success of socialist performance. The 
act of recirculating national resources prevented the monetary (waged work) 
and non- monetary elements that form value (what people need in order to 
enjoy a certain living standard) from being transferred to the ex- colonialists. 
As elsewhere in the developing world, prior to independence and the rise 
of Arab socialism, the colonial circuit of value transfer – by which national 
resources were appropriated at minimal or no cost – prevailed. The transition 
from the postcolonialist bourgeois formation to state- ownership- led forma-
tion occurred with only cosmetic changes to the fundamental construct of 
capitalist relations, of which the most fundamental is the wage– labour rela-
tionship or labour’s ownership of its product. In particular, the key aspect of 
 workers in control , which transforms the labour process, did not take root. The 
appropriation of surplus value proceeded via capitalist- class control through 
the state as distinct from control through private/ titled ownership. One can 
say that Arab socialist industrialisation drove up relative surplus value by 
increasing productivity, thereby also increasing incomes and wealth. Until 
the state bourgeois class switched course, rising wages and reinvestment in 
the social infrastructure, particularly in health and education, recycled value 
back as services to the working classes. 
 Social change – in particular, the leap from colonisation to Arab social-
ism – can be gauged by the overall betterment of living conditions. Although 
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it is not odd that a fundamental departure from the colonial past in terms 
of welfare did occur, capital as an exploitative relationship held its ground, 
which is also not aberrant. What is relevant is the higher degree to which 
more productivity and egalitarian distribution followed.  Concomitantly, 
despite a reduction in income inequality under Arab socialism, workers and 
peasants remained passive participants in the political process; their realisa-
tion in the state was passed- down as a result of national security concerns 
as opposed to their dominance in the state through active political strug-
gles. The war eff ort and the insecurity of the state created a condition of 
regime paranoia and a race with time.  The prioritisation of military security 
by socialist regimes undermined the impetus that integrates and internalises 
a working- class culture of resistance. It created masses of workers who were 
prohibited from autonomously organising or from defending their gains once 
the neo- liberal phase prevailed. 
 Hence the post- independence experience of this class of Arab countries was 
not of radical structural transformation of capitalist relations  proper , but rather 
a transition favourable to workers that did not challenge capital as a social 
relationship governing production. Most signifi cant in this process of main-
taining the rule of capital is the regimes’ virtual elimination of autonomous 
working- class organisations by a level of suppression that mirrored the ambi-
tions of sections of the state bourgeois and intermediate classes capitalising on 
defeat to loosen the spigots of value transfer in their favour. In a sense, what 
occurred is the opposite of the petty bourgeois suicide that Cabral proposed 
in 1969 in times of socialist transition. Cabral recognised the class landscape 
in a developing formation as mainly peasant with a puny industrial work-
ing class, a signifi cant petty bourgeoisie and a small elite. He also discerned 
that colonialism spares few from its wrath, and the petty bourgeois class with 
the kind of personal experience of colonial oppression will most likely head 
the revolutionary process (Cabral 1969); however, he pinned revolutionary 
success on the suicide of the petty bourgeois class or on how it sets aside 
its servility to capital as a result of safeguards that limit its privileges in the 
revolutionary age. New social institutions that protect the petty- bourgeoisie 
leadership from the temptations of power and lead it to give up its positions 
of privilege are key to direct democracy (Cabral 1969; Meisenhelder 1993). 
 There was a power of ideology, consciousness and will in the days of Arab 
socialism for the petty bourgeoisie to be circumscribed, but the institutional 
structures of radical socialist democracy that would stymie the avarice of the 
petty bourgeoisie were missing. 
 It is diffi  cult to assess the counterfactual; that is of whether it would have 
been possible to allow a higher degree of civil liberties under conditions of 
war; the war- associated losses and the threat to the homeland had never 
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abated. At any rate, while state- led development lifted these economies out 
of their decrepit postcolonial status, the Arab socialist composite ruling class 
simply assumed power at the ‘positive pole’ of the capital relationship. It 
would later transpire that the rising levels of repression functioned as a pre-
fabricated socioeconomic medium that facilitated surrender and the transi-
tion to neo- liberalism. 
 The accent on an ‘Arab’ socialism fi tting the demands of a national culture 
was the veil behind which sections of the state bourgeoisies concealed their 
growing private interests (Charafeddine 1981).  The foremost advocate of an 
Arab type of socialism was the Egyptian jurist Ismat Sayf al- Dawlah.  He 
worked out an elaborate philosophy entitled ‘The Dialectic of Man’, which was 
meant to oppose the allegedly barren spiritual grounds of dialectical materi-
alism as the foundation for Arab socialism. Although, his approach replicated 
Hegel’s notion of history as the development of spirit in time, he also reduced 
materialism to its vulgar usage, as in the debasement of human qualities by 
consumption, and not the ontological precedence of matter over spirit. In his 
magnum opus, the  Fundamentals of Arab Socialism (1965), he stressed the devel-
opment of a moral code reinforcing the Yugoslav type worker- owners of the 
means of production. He upheld the belief that autonomous workers freely 
participating in the political decision- making process will creatively engage 
with Arab socialism. His was an eclectic socialism, but he also was one of the 
fi rst anti- openness dissidents to be imprisoned by Sadat (Charafeddine 1981). 
 Arab socialism was a socialism without the Soviet- style historical material-
ism  – allegedly sustaining a higher individual liberty and the rights to small 
holding ownership (as in the Egyptian land reforms distributing small parcels 
to peasants as opposed to outright Soviet- like collectivisation) and, ideally, 
would also part with the exploitation of capitalism. To Charafeddine (1981), 
the particularity of Arab socialism as envisaged by Sayf al- Dawlah is justifi -
able given the ravages and alienation of the national culture under colonial-
ism, which had led the nationalist intelligentsia to view foreign social recipes, 
even Soviet ones, with suspicion. 
 Colonial Plunder and Beyond 
 As elsewhere in the developing world, Arab industrialisation was curtailed 
under colonialism.  A classic illustration is Duri’s account of the British suf-
focation of Egyptian textile production in the mid- nineteenth century (Duri 
1969). Not that colonial plunder requires much in the way of proof: the split-
ting up, by newly drawn national frontiers, of Tripoli, Aleppo and Mosul 
(1917), cities that in the early twentieth century had formed an embryonic 
industrial hub, corroborates accounts of colonial anti- industrial bias. To 
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industrialise, Europe had to limit the industrialisation of other nations 
(Emmanuel 1972). As always under colonialism, commerce had been the 
dominant activity for the capitalist class.  And as was common practice, colo-
nialists did not breed an autonomous bourgeoisie. The bourgeois class that 
they weaned in the immediate postcolonial years was fi nancially weak and, in 
terms of real resources or productive capacity, incapable of promoting devel-
opment in scale (modern) economies. If one posits that development is akin 
to industrialisation, it follows that a national class other than the national 
bourgeoisie, commandeering the capabilities of the state, had to assume the 
responsibility for industrial development. Only state resources could have 
met the challenge of redeeming the damage of colonialism and postcolonial 
dilapidation. 
 There is quite a diff erence between the brutal facts of colonial plunder 
causing underdevelopment and the convenient theory of ‘late- developer syn-
drome’ whereby a country starts from some fi ctitious underdeveloped point. 
Late- developer syndrome is said to impose enormous burdens on newly 
independent countries such that the possibility of solving problems by means 
of individual entrepreneurial activity all but disappears (Buick and Crump 
1986). ‘Late developer’, however, sounds value- neutral and bereft of politics; 
as if European barbarism has to be forgotten because many nowadays use 
a mobile telephone, which is a product of an industrial revolution that was 
itself the product of colonial pillage. Colonial- type plundering never went 
away in the AW, and the imperialist assault regained momentum after the 
fall of the Soviet Union.  A constant state of war was endured by alleged Arab 
‘late developers’ – a war that not only forestalled the emergence of a national 
bourgeois industrial class, but also increased the risks of private investment to 
the point at which it became almost an act of fatalism to invest over the long 
term. Since independence, conditions of uncertainty associated with a combi-
nation of political risk and institutions devoid of working- class representation 
rendered short- term profi teering from commerce – devoid of industry – the 
principal undertaking of private investors. 
 The normal industrial role played by the bourgeois class had to be 
passed on to other social classes (the military and the intermediate class), 
which were no less committed to the accumulation of capital than a run- 
of- the- mill nationalist bourgeoisie. The new class alliance of military 
and intermediate strata sought to achieve development by social means, 
as distinct from individual entrepreneurship (Abdel- Malek 1971). Such a 
process paved the way for major economic, social and political changes 
to be carried out from above, either through the state or through an alli-
ance with the Soviet bloc (Turner 1984; Petras 1976). But it is relevant 
to recall the order of priority. It was not only the vacuum of agency left 
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by a deliberately weakened bourgeoisie that allowed the agent of develop-
ment to be transplanted in and around the state; imperialistically orches-
trated disasters wreaked on the AW – the constant state of war with the 
newly settled Europeans in ethnically cleansed Palestine, the Suez war of 
1956, the French depopulation policies of the Algerian independence war 
and so forth – have all contributed to the development of an environment 
that looks for national leadership in nationally committed social classes. 
In retrospect, the dangers to national security that provided an alibi for 
the state bourgeois class to separate the working class from the political 
process were arguably domineering in that historical epoch, but when the 
neo- liberal landslide commenced, the politics of working- class estrange-
ment from direct representation in the political process also permitted the 
state bourgeois class to uncontestably transform itself into an imperialist 
partner. 
 In the transition from state- led to private- led development, there occurred 
a rising Gini coeffi  cient (income inequality gaped wider), a  trade policy suit-
able to WTO standards of liberalisation, the annulment of multiple exchange 
rates, the  liberalisation of basic commodity prices (removal of price caps) and 
the pegging of the exchange rate to the dollar while facilitating capital trans-
fer. Seen together, these measures imply one sordid condition, which is:  to 
facilitate the transfer of value or non- monetised assets and value- forming 
resources to the ex- colonial powers all over again. Additionally, as a result of 
the receding power of the Soviet Union and its eventual collapse, the reign 
of neo- liberal ideology became progressively more complete. The state bour-
geois class, which had guarded the fundamental social relationship of capital 
under the guise of socialism, shifted into full- fl edged capitalism, albeit some 
slowly like Syria, and some in haste like Egypt. 
 In the fi nancialisation phase of imperialism that accompanied the neo-
liberal transition, the social and economic disarticulation endured by Arab 
societies as a result of gravely imbalanced power structures and resource 
usurpation, wreaked havoc on nationalist class alliances and structures. At 
the level of working- class consciousness, the divide between the state of being, 
rising poverty levels and a historical grasp of that state of being – the mode 
of knowledge employed by people to understand the reasons for their pov-
erty – spread wide as socialist ideology was in free fall. What people’s lives are 
really like in terms of low wages and services that did not provide for a decent 
living coincided with the delusions that people adapt to justify such poverty 
without anti- systemic resistance targeting the capital relationship. Inherent 
capitalistic tendencies in the partly socialised Arab formation rose anew, pit-
ting the private against the social and further driving integration with global 
capital. These outcomes were not peculiar to the AW, but they were more 
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biting because of severe military and ideological defeats that rained down on 
socialising states in the 1980s and were too weighty to be withstood by small 
developing countries. 
 A Frail Arab Bourgeois Class 
 In the two decades that followed World War II, more than half of the AW 
population remained in the countryside, and the industrial proletariat 
amounted to a relatively insignifi cant proportion of the working class (Turner 
1984). The commercially engrossed  ancien bourgeois class circulated capital 
in a mercantilist fashion. Money returned to money without signifi cant value- 
added to commodities and with heavy reliance on manufactured imports and 
few goods produced locally.  Entrepreneurial skill swung toward commercial 
trade as opposed to industry (Turner 1984). Both Berger (1958) and Turner 
(1984) agree that the weakness of entrepreneurship stemmed from the fact 
that the merchants and small retailers represented a large proportion of the 
bourgeois class. Moreover, the small number of manufacturers that actually 
existed emerged from the ranks of the merchant class itself. The vast majority 
of industrial enterprises were founded by traders or fi nanciers, generally mer-
chants, engaged in foreign trade. No private class on its own had the capital 
necessary to undertake postcolonial development (Issawi 1955). But it was 
not entrepreneurial psychology per se that inhibited investments; it was war 
or the potential of imperialist onslaught premised upon encroachment – the 
act of dominating the national political process. To the extent that socialist 
Arab states built their self- defences through alliance with the Soviet camp, 
redistributed resources nationally and solidifi ed the internal class alliance of 
workers and peasants, they were capable of redressing the balance of forces 
with the imperialism and developing. 
 The social disaster wrought during the neo- liberal era is the result of the 
structural terms of surrender dictated by imperialism via the interlocution of 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) policy. Oppression 
and political persecution in the neo- liberal age have exceeded anything wit-
nessed during the Arab socialist age. One should recall the historical con-
text before judging on the basis of psycho- behavioural assumptions whether 
a risk- taking entrepreneur can exist in an Arab context. Formalised risk is 
calculable but uncertainty related to the objective and impersonal social 
agencies that make war part of their raison d’être is wholly unpredictable. At 
any rate, prediction is foolhardy in the best of circumstances; to paraphrase 
the astute American philosopher Barrows Dunham (1955) regarding decision 
under social uncertainty, any concurrence between prediction and outcome 
or pronouncement and truth is purely accidental, especially in the temporal 
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order, the world of space and time, which is full of grotesque injustice, stu-
pendous ills, malevolence, murder and McCarthy’. 8 One may add that the 
AW experiences very few periods of tranquillity and is full of potential for 
unpredictability and, as such, one need not go as far as relying on philosophy 
to make the point on the diffi  culty of prediction. The social and macroeco-
nomic structural shifts driven by defeat and imperialist encroachment wars 
could not have possibly made the context relatively stable for an actuarial 
type assessment of the future. 
 The Military in Power 
 In the major Arab socialist states, the colonially trained military emerged as 
a social force after the departure of colonialism (Abdel- Malek 1968; Owen 
2004). These militaries had grown after independence, and most offi  cers were 
recruited from the intermediate strata or smallholding peasantry. Because of 
the tension generated by imperialist threats and the formation of the state of 
Israel, armed forces played a central role in the politics of Arab states. Coups 
and the recycling of military regimes were a common feature of postcolonial 
Syria  and, to a an  equal extent, Iraq.  Although, because of the popularity of 
Nasser, such coups did not in occur in Egypt the ‘May Corrective Movement’ 
(1971) undertaken by Sadat was in many respects similar to a putsch.  The 
higher frequency of coups in Syria and Iraq may be attributed to a fi ercer 
international struggle over both states as well as self- induced factors of insta-
bility (Picard 1988). Khuri (1982) posits that in some developing regions, the 
military seemed to act outside class relations as a moderator as it intervened 
in civilian aff airs only to put things in order then return to the barracks, but 
not so in the AW.  The idea that contingently any group, including the mili-
tary, may fall outside class relations assumes that classes are static constructs 
and not the historically set social relationship into which people are born, 
react to through organised political agency and are socially situated. The 
armed forces in the AW amassed authoritarian power at the behest of shifting 
class forces, especially the subservient partnership of the national bourgeoisie 
with colonialism, and not in spite of class relations. Class relations are makers 
of history, and the rise of the armed forces was a historical outcome.  They 
intervened directly in civilian aff airs and, at later stages, practically comman-
deered the economy through the state. In Egypt, Syria and Iraq the military 
 8  Dunham actually says McCarthy in the original because he lost his job at Temple 
University in 1953 for refusing to ‘name names’ before the House Un- American 
Activities Committee. 
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rose as the principal political actor and instrument of government, but its 
public visibility varied according to regime stability. 
 Once the disappointing developmental performance of the national bour-
geoisie of non- military postcolonial regimes became apparent, the military 
took the leading role in ‘radical’ socioeconomic reform through a revolution 
from above. Vatikiotis (1972, 12– 13) argues that political insurrections, upris-
ings and rebellions witnessed in the Middle East region often referred to as 
‘revolution from above’, cannot be considered as revolutions and only repre-
sented ‘middle class dissent’. However, if ‘revolution’ implies social and politi-
cal change, then these coups were signifi cant revolutions. Military offi  cers 
broadened and cemented their hegemony through the state over the social 
base by espousing the aspirations of broad sections of the masses. Nasserism 
in Egypt and Ba’athism in Syria and Iraq undertook extensive asset- 
distributional reforms, infrastructural projects, and heavy- industry develop-
ment favouring the betterment of conditions for the lower strata (Khuri 1982). 
Sophistic tweaking of the concept of revolution as some sort of platonic ideal 
to which real- world processes have to measure up in an instant is more theol-
ogy than social science. 
 The broad consensus in the literature presents the military as a progres-
sive social force and an instrument of social change and modernity (Abdel- 
Malek 1971; Charafeddine 1981). The military is also acknowledged to have 
partially met the demands of the working class and to have shrunk the infl u-
ence of the traditional classes of the  ancien regime  – the landed aristocracy and 
the colonialist- bred bourgeoisie. Unlike the old ruling class, whose origins 
remained strongly rooted in feudal absolutism, the military acted as a social 
revolutionary force in the AW,  enacting laws that revamped the foundation of 
civil rights, including the rights of women. Article 45 of the Syrian constitu-
tion of 1973, which mimics the Egyptian and Iraqi constitutions, states: ‘The 
state guarantees women all opportunities enabling them to fully and eff ec-
tively participate in political, social, cultural, and economic life. The state 
removes the restrictions that prevent women’s development and participation 
in building the socialist Arab society’. 9 
 The military’s top rank and fi le were drawn, by and large, from well- to- 
do sections of the working class and smallholding peasantry. The case may 
be that the pull of petty property ownership deters social progress; however, 
the ideological élan of post- independence liberation and Soviet- infl uenced 
social ideals/ programs prevented vestigial eff ects or socially regressive tradi-
tions from hampering progress.  At a later stage, as the military capitulated 
 9  Syria  – Constitution Adopted on 13 March 1973  http:// www.servat.unibe.ch/ icl/ 
sy00000_ .html (viewed 7 June 2014) 
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to imperialist diktat, it was not the resurrection of some inert cultural value 
originating in small property holding that swayed it to become a comprador 
class; it was pliancy induced by military and ideological defeat. Although the 
alleged inertness (à la Bernard Lewis) of reactionary traits among Arabs occu-
pies a huge space in the colonial– imperialist imagination, this approach should 
not be admitted into proper social science simply because the ‘transhistorical 
ethos’ of peoples explains almost all there is to know about them. The abstrac-
tion of the Arab as an inherently regressive type is ahistorical and too absurd to 
discuss – and is in any case contradicted by the real changes in social norms and 
behaviour that occurred under Arab socialism. 
 To assess the shifting class allegiance of the military, one needs to exam-
ine the key alliances that the armed forces undertook at diff erent historical 
periods. The fi rm articulation between the military and the newly expanding 
intermediate strata in the socialist radicalisation phase of the 1960s strength-
ened the hegemony of the armed forces over the social base (Leca 1988). As 
of the early 1980s, weakened national security implied weaknesses at all secu-
rity levels, including working- class security – that is, fi rst of all, security from 
want. By the early 1980s, petrodollars began to seep into the semi- autarkic 
economies of Arab socialism, and signs of conspicuous consumption emerged. 
The state bourgeois class became noticeably capitalistic and abandoned its 
populist working- class rhetoric. At fi rst sight, it appears as if this bourgeois 
predisposition is driven by the dynamic of inequity under any capitalistic 
mode of development. However, upon a closer look, these changes were deci-
sively determined by the onslaught of militarised imperialism against this 
crucial oil region. 
 By the 1980s, Egypt had already switched camps, and Syria was left alone 
facing Israel, while Iraq had just entered another war. Evidently, these quag-
mires along with the advent of neo- liberalism pressured socialist institutions 
and expanded the potential for private accumulation – taking the faster route 
to profi t- making. A litany of defeatist literature as of the Camp David Accords 
stressed the faults of autarky and socialism and the reasonability of pragma-
tism (Hassan 2005). With the ideological interlocking of national ruling classes 
and imperialism afoot, the determining moment in the transition had little 
to do with the tendency of national capital to grow by accentuating unequal 
conditions, and a lot to do with the implicitly enshrined terms of surrender 
to imperialism. Recalling that imperialism has engaged the region through 
the war and oil channels, and growth occurred under conditions of increas-
ing inequality. The drive to recolonise in order to commercially exploit, or to 
draw strategic power, also meant that US- led imperialism had to pauperise 
and disempower Arab working classes. The mode of integration of the AW 
through the combined channels of oil and war requires the articulation of the 
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AW with the global economy via a pattern of destructiveness or a deconstruc-
tion of popular forms of working- class organisation. Gaining imperial rents 
from war required the creation of more war- prone social conditions, and – as 
will be argued in  chapter 6  – under a persistent global overproduction crisis, 
the disengagement of Arab national assets was under way. 
 In Iraq, the embargo and the never- ending state of war necessitated heavy 
state involvement in the economy. The regime rationed scarce goods and 
could not have possibly embarked on neo- liberal policies that would structur-
ally weaken the economy in times of war.  Iraq’s form of Arab socialism, the 
indepnendent position of its leadership and its vast reserves of oil implied that 
its surrender could only be brought about by invasion and re- colonisation.  At 
one point prior to the second Gulf war in 2003, the Iraqi leadership nearly 
pawned its oil output to French and Russian cartels in order to draw them to 
its side in the war, but that was not enough to deter the United States from 
aggression. As will be seen in  chapter  4 , the subjugation of Iraq was pon-
dered by the United States during the Cold War, but Soviet nuclear capabili-
ties acted as deterrent at the time. For imperialism, Iraq is too strategic to be 
left standing; its dissolution into several antagonistic territories and continuous 
internal strife is an imperialistic model that will stifl e popular sovereignty for 
years to come. The collapse of Iraq as a state appears to have been necessary 
to tilt the balance of power securely in favour of militarised imperialism. The 
rise of Islamist terror and its associated military- fi nancial rent  premia is but a 
case in point. It is fallacious to comprehend the goal of the United States in 
terms of a desire to set up a stable social formation in Iraq. The continued state 
of violent fl ux militarises the globally crucial Gulf region and hollows out the 
social formation of Iraq so that it is no longer able to sustain itself. In a narrow 
sense, and relative to a degree of working- class representation in the state, to 
disengage Iraqi resources and dislocate people cheapens them, which is profi t-
able to capital because it can harness cheaper inputs and sell its excess goods 
to unproductive regions. However, the destruction of the Iraqi state atten-
dant on the social formation as a viable political entity and the rise of Israel 
as a regional superpower enhance the clout of the US- led imperialist camp. 
Whereas working people stand to benefi t from inter- capitalistic divisions and 
from the retreat of extractive and militarised capital, such a state of play hin-
ders the potential progress of the international working- class movement. 
 While, as noted, there was political repression under Arab socialism, it 
was during the neo- liberal period that the intelligence agencies (or secret 
police) in these three countries, the  mukhabarat , became the most powerful 
institution and main instrument of social control. With the retreat of social 
benefi ts and lower wages, the suppression of organised labour and other civil- 
society organisations assumed new intensity (Belqaziz 2003).  State bourgeois 
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classes, which had capped affl  uent consumption and funnelled resources into 
public investment, would in the 1980s come to mimic Western consumption 
patterns and, conjointly, to rely more heavily on coercion. The postcolonial 
crisis of underdevelopment, which was bolstered by a crisis of inequitable 
distribution and was partly redressed by Arab socialism, re- emerged under 
the rule of the newly established military- global fi nancial elite- merchant class 
alliance. Income inequality rose at an increasing rate (University of Texas 
Inequality Project UTIP, various years). 10 In this new order, the military con-
centrated more power in its hands and became strictly the subject of devel-
opment (or rather de- development). The military’s rule in Egypt since the 
uprising remains unbroken. The military’s top ranks have linked themselves 
closely with vested interests in the commerce of their respective economies. 
They did so in relation to an import- led mode of development that slowly 
displaced national industry. Upon retirement, the brigadier was destined to 
enjoy a state patent over a certain imported product or economic undertak-
ing. The public sector was fated to become privately owned. 
 Arab Socialism 
 Arab socialism, as it has been discussed so far, was led by the class alliance 
between the military and an intermediate stratum. However, a formal char-
acterisation borrowed from the mainstream implies that it was the rule of a 
middle class, or a class considered as distinct from the working class, as per 
the putative usage of the term in the United States: 11 
 The propertied middle class could not compare in terms of capital, skill, and 
organisation with the resources and power which governments muster for rap-
idly overcoming economic backwardness and keeping pace with social change 
in the Middle East […] only the new, salaried middle class, clustered around a 
core of civilian and military politicians and administrators, seems capable of 
leading the quest for status, power, and prosperity by taking control of the state 
apparatus. (Halpern 1962, 279) 
 10  There is extreme paucity of data from offi  cial sources on income distribution. Know-
ing that the UTIP score itself may not be an adequate representation of income ine-
quality, in this estimate I consider only variations along a trend, which shows a steep 
rise in income disparity. 
 11  Actually, the term has been used to mean roughly a stably employed worker who can 
aff ord to buy a house and appliances. However, a class is the resultant vector of rela-
tionships to other classes whose actualisation is presented by the historical forms and 
power structures with which people interact and which, in the absence of organised 
labour, emit time and again through the politics of the class struggle the poorer condi-
tions for livelihood and for job instability or stability. 
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 This distinction between strata within the working class on the basis of 
diff ering skill levels and amounts and modes of wage payment (monthly or 
weekly salary versus hourly wage, for instance) is a politically constructed 
falsifi cation. The compartmentalisation does not genuinely defi ne a social 
class in relation to other classes or, more specifi cally (in an Arab context), in 
relation to imperialism. It one- sidedly measures the materialisation of class 
in the income position of a group at a specifi c moment, as distinguished from 
the historically given social relationship reproducing the incomes via the pro-
cess of capital accumulation. The latter is a class- defi ned process. The degree 
of cohesion of a working class depends on its position vis- à- vis the ideological 
power of capital. The share of wages, which is the share of the working class 
from the social product denominated in money form, is unevenly distrib-
uted between sections of the working class on the basis of a false science that 
reduces socially emitted productivity to personal eff ort and promotes diff er-
entials such as skill, marginal productivity and so forth and always in relation 
to the power of capital. In broader terms, capital elevates absurd particular 
conditions such as individual productivity to the position of a fetish, while the 
particular could not come into being without the general condition, which is 
social productivity. 
 It was not the reasoned discourse of capital that conquered the AW; as I dis-
cuss in  chapter 4 , winning hearts and minds was never the purpose of US- led 
aggression anywhere in the region. It is brutal imperialism, a formidable force 
by which workers’ lives are crushed, their value is destroyed and their submis-
sion is wrought. The US military bases scattered around strategic resources 
all over the world are the embodiment of international fi nancial classes in 
actual physical form. None of the Arab class structures can any longer be 
said to exist outside this militaristic relationship to imperialism. In the 1960s, 
with colonialism retreating, imperialist clout over national social classes was 
waning, and anti- imperialist fronts were buoyant, placing working- class strat-
egy above narrow sectional identities. However, inasmuch as Arab modern 
states were remoulded by imperialism, so were their bourgeois classes. As 
soon as the Arab socialist project succumbed to a combination of imperialist 
assault and internal fracturing, the ties of bourgeois ‘national’ classes with the 
previous colonists  cum imperialism were re- established. The ideology of the 
imperialist victor blamed debts, import substitution policy and war fatigue 
for the failure of Arab socialism. But in actuality, socialism had outperformed 
the neo- liberal model on economic dynamics and social measures. Defi cits, 
infl ation and unemployment were all at lower and tolerable levels (see annex 
to this chapter). What was intolerable was the state of military and ideological 
defeat that shifted the allegiances of bourgeois, military and sections of the 
intermediate strata from the national base to foreign pursuits. 
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 It may well have been the so- called frustration of the new educated ‘mid-
dle class’ that emerged after the colonial period that escalated the sentiments 
of anti- Westernism, but the real reasons for the anti- Western stance are far 
more complex and multilayered. They cannot be reduced to the undulat-
ing feelings of a social substratum. Anti- imperialist positions gained momen-
tum in response to the practice of imperialism and the abject conditions that 
were created by the colonialist forces. The rising tide of socialist ideology and 
national liberation movements in this post– World War II epoch earmarked 
the anti- imperialist struggle. The Arab bourgeois class, on the other hand, 
composed of merchants and large retailers, was deeply integrated into the 
capitalist system during the pre- and postcolonial period. This class acted 
as an appendage to imperialism (Amin 1978). It served foreign interests by 
colluding with the West and by stifl ing resources (al- Hamsh 2004, 40).  In the 
more general case, Petras (1976) argues that the global expansion of imperial 
capital into the developing formations has incorporated the national bour-
geoisie into its international network through trade, joint ventures, patents, 
loans and credit. These linkages strengthened the dependency of host econo-
mies on foreign capital in fi nancial and technical support once independence 
came through. 
 In addition to insuffi  cient fi nancial and material resources to build pro-
ductive capacity in the immediate postcolonial phase, the Arab bourgeoisie 
also failed to garner legitimacy. The lingering postcolonial inequality and 
underdevelopment laid the groundwork for discharging the old land- owning 
and comprador classes once the tide of socialist ideology took root. With the 
Soviet Union exemplifying the social model of state- led development, the 
new ruling alliance of military and intermediate strata emulated Soviet- style 
socialism. While the scale and form of state intervention in political, eco-
nomic and social activities varied from one country to another, the trend of 
the post- independence years was for growing state ownership of the econ-
omy. As shown by the statistical record in the annex to this chapter, even 
mainstream scholars such as Anderson (1987) had to attest to the fact that 
 the Arab socialist models acted as engines of growth. The fabrications spun 
around rising debts and trade defi cits breaking the advance of socialism are 
not borne out by the data as shown in the Annex to this chapter. The only 
valid reason for the academic assault on the socialist measures was to further 
the debilitations of the Arab socialist states in favour of imperialist strategy. 
The state bourgeois class led the process of development by focusing on indus-
trialisation and infrastructure.  In the mid- 1960s, the Syrian Ba’ath carried 
out massive land reforms. In Iraq, the Ba’ath nationalised oil in the 1970’s 
and redistributed land and oil revenues in more equitable ways. In Egypt, 
state- owned enterprises accounted for about 60 per cent of value- added in 
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manufacturing, and in Syria they accounted for about 55 per cent. The out-
put of these newly established public enterprises recorded 13 per cent of GDP 
in Egypt and 11 per cent of GDP in Syria (Richards and Waterbury 1990). 
Land reform accompanied these achievements, and increasing agricultural 
productivity partly stemmed rural– urban migration. 12  Until 2006, Syria was 
exporting cereals (AMF 2007). With extensive social investment, standards of 
living rose signifi cantly (Ayubi 1995; Anderson 1987). 
 The regional as well as the particular Arab socialist growth rates of the 
pre neo- liberal period as compared to the more recent neo- liberal one were 
higher. 13 In the uncertain immediate post- independence environment, the 
state acted as a guarantor of long- term investments in plants and equipment. 
State- owned industrial and agricultural banks lent to national projects at 
concessional long- term rates. A so- called blacklist protected national indus-
try from foreign competition. A tightening of the capital account and a mul-
tiple interest- and- exchange- rate policy galvanised national resources and 
provided exchange- rate stability. Subsidies and price controls in essentials 
raised the standard of living for the rural population. Land reforms, which 
have since been rolled back, raised food production considerably (FAOSTAT, 
various years). 
 As already discussed, unlike in Soviet socialisation, the private sector 
remained partially active under Arab socialism. Cooper (1983), for instance, 
argues that there is a tendency among scholars to dismiss public– private 
oscillations that characterised what he terms ‘state capitalist’ regimes of the 
Arab region. He concludes that state capitalist regimes failed to transform the 
fundamental structure of their societies, either into a dynamic capitalist form 
or into a non- capitalist one; hence they oscillated between various mixes of 
public and private, that is, mixed or joint- sector structure in which the public 
sector was ineffi  cient. Moreover, Cooper (1983, 458) presents Egypt as a case 
model, whereby ‘state control did not obviate the role of private ownership’. 
 12  The state bourgeois class under Arab socialism reasoned that food security is part 
of national security. It glorifi ed farming and invested substantially in agriculture. 
Of course, rural– urban diff erences remained, but not to the degree seen under colo-
nialism. When the neo- liberal age dawned, investment in agriculture fell, and so 
did agricultural output. As will be seen in  chapter 5 , under neo- liberalism, nearly 
100 million people left the countryside for urban areas between 1980 and 2010 only to 
fi nd themselves faced with poverty once again. The uprising cohort during the 2011 
Arab Spring was principally composed of descendants of pauperised rural migrants. 
 13  Also, the whole region performed at higher rates prior to neo- liberalism. GDP and 
GDP per capita growth rates of the Middle East region registered 7.5 per cent and 4.8 
per cent respectively for the 1964– 1974 period. These rates dropped to 2.9 per cent 
and 0.3 per cent during 1985– 1995 (World Bank 2009). 
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Cooper notes that the incentive to accumulate was always present and strong, 
both in the agrarian sector, where the incentive was to escape from state 
control, and the non- agrarian sectors, where eff orts were made to maximise 
one’s ability to gain from the state’s economic development.  The problem 
with this doctrinal line that dubs the public sector ineffi  cient is the sloppi-
ness of branding any form of state intervention as ‘state capitalist’ and then 
assuming that privately motivated profi teering is something innate to human 
nature and runs against the grain of socialism. The pursuit of private interest 
pitted against public welfare was conditioned by the form of social organisa-
tion, which was principally the hegemony of capital through the state. Hence, 
rent- seeking around the state counter to the public interest is a consequence 
of the ideological strength of the capital relationship. When the supposedly 
ineffi  cient public sector was curbed under neo- liberalism, the whole of the 
social structure in these countries went into a tailspin. Effi  ciency is a value 
criterion related to class interests. In the absence of unemployment insur-
ance, the public sector served as a welfare cushion when job creation declined 
and fell far below the rate of growth of the labour force. Under capitalism, 
in whichever form it appears, private incentives and habits are not going to 
immediately disappear. The stubborn fact remains that during the immediate 
post- independence period, no individual incentive framework motivating the 
private sector could have carried out the task of development given its struc-
tural incapacitation in terms of resources and fi nance. Incentive or not, the 
private sector was puny, in actual productive capacity and fi nance. Moreover, 
the comprador- class’ tolerance of imperial intervention in national aff airs dis-
credited it as a subject worthy of carrying out the task of development. 
 When former Arab socialist countries followed the neo- liberal mantra of 
free markets and private- led investment, as noted in the Introduction, the 
investment rate in general fell from a high plateau of nearly 30 per cent in 
1980, to a low of around 20 per cent in 2010 (WDI, various years).  More 
important, the quality of investment worsened in terms of output per capita 
(see annex to this chapter). That private investors in the AW cannot lead in 
capacity building is not only due to lack of fi nance or to geopolitical uncer-
tainty, but also to the broader imperialist objective of controlling oil by disem-
powering and pauperising the population in an oil- abundant region.  In the 
socialist phase, the private sector was free- riding on the success of the state 
interventionist model. In Egypt and Syria, what remained of the private sec-
tor after massive socialisation in the mid- 1960s grew in tandem with growth 
in public investment. The private sector parasitically survived at all stages of 
the socialist project. The same private sector would infect the state capitalist 
class that metamorphosed into the new owning class of the neo- liberal era 
with the culture of neo-liberalism. It became the fermenting agent that would 
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contribute to converting the state- capitalist class into the new comprador 
class. The fact that the Arab socialist transformation was not more radical, 
especially when the working class were alienated from direct participation in 
political life, does not mean that the socialist state- led developmental experi-
ence did not bring about structurally and historically positive social transfor-
mation. The welfare outcome of socialisation is not wholly irreversible, but to 
date, it has proven diffi  cult to completely eradicate. 
 The case of Iraq is, however, diff erent because higher oil revenues provided 
the socialising state with leverage to fi nance welfare with foreign exchange. 
Iraq is also diff erent in the way its terms of surrender were imposed by mili-
tary devastation rather than through neo- liberalism leading to indigence or 
war, as was the case of Syria. Criticism of the regime that arose from a leftist 
perspective appears retrospectively to have been displaced and hid an ulterior 
motive that abetted the imperialist drive. 14 
 Al- Khafaji (1986), for instance, argues that the ‘socialist’ state in Iraq 
strengthened the private sector and the economy’s transition toward a capi-
talist state. He describes the Iraqi genre of Arab socialism throughout the 
1970s and 1980s as the state’s incubation of Iraqi capitalism whereby the 
state supported and monitored its development in a controlled manner. That 
may as well have been the case in Syria, but in the context of the Iraqi state 
 14  Unethicality and the aesthetic category of the ugly, to borrow from György Lukács, 
are omnipresent under a market economy and capitalism. Nearly all is unethical 
except the anti- systemic struggle against the rule of capital understood as political 
sequences of criminality initiated by US- led imperialism whose economics and poli-
tics are ‘utterly destitute of ingenuity and value’ (Badiou 2001). Ethics is discerned 
as truth from the concrete, which is the ideology, organisational forms and practice 
of the international fi nancial class and its imperialism. The concrete is not the spec-
tacular event of Iraqi regime crimes or the ‘shock and awe’ of Iraq’s bombardment; 
that is a false non- truth- invoking event to continue using the terms of Badiou. The 
moral position is to arrest the growth of capital, the ‘singularity’ of which diff ers little 
from Nazism as practiced in the Third World (Badiou 2001). Current imperialism 
does not avow a racial motive for war, however: it reconstitutes its power by killing 
indiscriminately by ad hoc reversion to all sorts of alibis, and foremost in these are 
its own generated class morality and human rights. Ethics exists in the realm of the 
universal, whose truth derives from the event that is capital, which in the Marxian 
characterisation ‘drips in blood from head to toe’. Ethics, if it is to materialise, using 
Badiou’s language, is not a question of human rights and morality but a question of 
the fundamental battle for equality of all people against the law of profi t. In hindsight, 
it was not naïve, but the utmost evil to demonise the Iraqi regime as justifi cation for 
invasion. From where we stand, one could easily see that isolating and fl aunting the 
transgressions of the Iraqi regime as a singularity similar to Nazism was more Nazi- 
like propaganda in order to justify and reinforce the US invasion that has strength-
ened militarism as the basic avenue for accumulation at the global level. 
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such observation is irrelevant in view of the devastation of the social forma-
tion by invasion. The Iraqi opposition was so engrossed in its allegiance to 
imperialism that in one rather stupendously ludicrous work, the poverty and 
misery under the US- imposed embargo was blamed on the monetary policy 
of the Saddam regime. The state over which the old Iraqi state bourgeois 
class presided is not the Iraqi state of today. To put it facetiously, if there was 
an incubation of the private sector in socialist Iraq, it did not generate the rise 
of private bourgeois class; instead it hatched recolonisation and the destruc-
tion of the society. 
 In Iraq, the conditions of surrender were not laid down gradually through 
structural adjustment programmes; they were imposed by guns and the poli-
cies of Paul Bremer.  Juhasz (2004) noted that before his departure, Bremer 
issued 100 orders to dramatically restructure Iraq’s economy to fi t free- 
market ideals, and no Iraqi, including future elected offi  cials, can undo them. 
Bremer tore down what was left of national industry and agriculture that the 
bombardments had not already destroyed. The majority of the left in Iraq 
purposefully underestimated imperialist intent and tempered their critique of 
imperialism to justify imperialist expansion. 15 A nationalist social class in a 
former colony is nationalistic by virtue the working- class alliances it holds and 
the distance it keeps from the imperialist centre. To use Althusserian phras-
ing: anti- imperialism holds primacy in the overdetermined whole because the 
principal contradiction is between the integrity of the national state against 
US- led imperialism. Underestimating the signifi cance to imperialism of the 
destruction of Iraq or, worse yet, relegating the whole US assault on Iraq to 
a mistake based on misinformation, guides the scope of research into the 
absurd. The historically relevant condition rests in the deepening crisis of 
capital that drives powerful trends toward further imperialist expansion, oil 
control and resource grabs. To condemn the preservation of the private sector 
in Iraq is off  the mark. It assumes that with more radical forms of socialisa-
tion, Iraq could have escaped the war and the oil- control agenda of imperi-
alism. Deconstructing global capital is not an analytical process but a real 
anti- systemic process in which class struggles, especially those stemming from 
the struggle against imperialism in the periphery, politically pressure capital 
into making further reforms and concessions in favour of working people in 
poorer nations. 
 In all Arab socialist countries, the state- centred economy protected cer-
tain niches occupied by the private sector. Private- sector activities were con-
centrated on retail and construction rather than large- scale manufacturing. 
 15  ‘I did not want to be a collaborator’, said Issam al- Khafaji, a former member of the 
Iraqi reconstruction council, explaining his decision to resign (al- Khafaji 2003). 
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Their inputs were state- subsidised and the prices they passed on to consumers 
were capped to moderate their profi ts. The tariff  walls that were designed 
to protect public enterprises also protected private enterprises from foreign 
competition.  The state extended supply and construction contracts to the 
private sector, and private- sector profi ts were amassed through subcontract-
ing. The latter gave rise to patron– client relationships between state offi  cials 
and businessmen.  However, Batatu (1986) notes that the leveraging power 
that the private sector enjoyed under the government of Saddam Hussein 
was minimal.  This particular point could be made for all the Arab socialist 
regimes by the degree to which they upheld an anti- imperialist position that 
required a fortifi cation of national social cohesion through redistribution. 
The post- independence imperialist assault on these formations also condi-
tioned domestic economic and social policies. Until their capitulation, these 
socialising states were at risk of war or in a state of war, and as the cost of 
essential commodities peaked as a result of shortages during confl ict, the pri-
vate sector would naturally voice its concern by critiquing the ineffi  cacy of the 
public sector’s seeking a broader role in the economy. Judging by the private 
sector’s failure as of the Arab Spring, not only its ineffi  ciency measured from 
the social side, but more so from the way it created the objective grounds for 
national dissolution, these states may have been theoretically better off  had 
they extirpated the private concerns. 
 With the exception of Iraq, which was shattered by imperialist aggres-
sion, the remnants of the private sector in Arab socialist states did indeed 
serve as the embryo for broader private- sector- led development at the later 
stage of neo- liberalism. The very class in power under socialism moved into 
the private sector and formalised its control of state property in titled form 
during the neo- liberal stage. The immense growths in the private wealth of 
the ruling classes in Egypt and Syria, in contrast to misery, are irrefutable 
testimonies to this public- to- private wealth transfer. In view of the way impe-
rialism had engaged in wars of destruction against sovereign states in this 
region, it is very likely that in the case of Egypt, and later Syria, submitting 
to the diktat of imperialism proceeded in a way that may have pre- empted or 
delayed imperial aggression, Iraqi- style, upon their territory. The proclivity 
of the bourgeoisie to grow without public regulatory restrictions and shift into 
the merchant mode, away from industrialisation, had already been groomed 
by colonialists paving the way to cement the objective divides that engender 
state implosion. 
 Underneath the potential of US- led aggression, imperialism unleashed 
neo- liberal openness in an institutional context, which is skewed and anti- 
labour, instead of bombs (as was the case in Iraq). To be sure, the destruc-
tion of Iraq cannot be attributed to the stubborn position of its leadership, 
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or its refusal to partly surrender to the conditions of capital laid down in 
neo- liberal policy; no liberalisation program was seriously presented to the 
Iraqi authorities to follow. The modern history of Iraq is a history of wars, 
or history has presented Iraq with the one alternative, which is war. The 
regional balance of forces and the end of the Cold War presented imperial-
ism with a window of opportunity that it could have not forfeited. Short 
of re- colonisation, US- led imperialism would have not taken an Iraqi ‘yes’ 
for an answer. Notice that as of late (since the 2003 invasion of Iraq) the 
global and the regional balance of power, including the positions of Russia 
and China on Syria, do not make of Iran the current soft spot that Iraq 
represented then. Iraq’s destruction proper engenders more enhanced 
power standing for the US. It will be argued in  chapter 4 that in view of 
the dynamic growth of US- led capital, which requires restructuring power 
and value relations by seizure continuously, it was indispensable for US- 
led imperialism to turn the balance of power in its favour by demolishing 
the whole of the Iraqi social formation.  The current protracted process 
of destruction in Syria follows a similar rationale in terms of raising the 
scale of accumulation by militarism and devalorisation in easily penetrable 
formations exhibiting low calculated risks to US- led imperialist forces. To 
speak in the colloquial media stance that was once employed during the 
invasion of Iraq: The destruction of Syria costs less than a cakewalk and 
shooting fi sh in a barrel. 
 The debate concerning equitable distribution between the state and 
the national bourgeoisie during the 1950s addressed the crisis of inequity 
bequeathed by colonialism. The state had to force through equalisation 
measures such as land reform given the highly unequal distribution of post-
colonialism. However, the idea fl aunted during the socialist days – that the 
private sector constituted an indispensable constituent of the national front 
in the struggle against imperialism – has not been borne out by the facts. 
The weakening nexus of development and security in the neo- liberal era is 
ipso facto proof that private- led policy was a failure.  The state bourgeoisie 
later used the private sector to carry through the conditions of capitulation to 
imperialism and relaunched itself as a full- fl edged private capitalist class and 
a partner of the old bourgeoisie.  The defeat of Arab socialist states to Israel 
in two major blitzkriegs was manifold, but the further retreat in socialist ide-
ology following the Soviet collapse provided the state bourgeoisie with the 
ideological pretext for the  volte face . Without the condition of Soviet collapse, 
which resembles a  force majeure , the ease with which these social transforma-
tions and class restructurings were carried out by the autocratic regimes may 
not have been so unproblematic or implemented without eff ective opposition 
from the working classes, as they evidently appear so in hindsight. 
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 At the time of independence, the private sector was submerged in crisis, 
its reputation tarnished by the stigma of a shifty national allegiance, and its 
structural shortcoming, which is its lack of capacity to tap into the substantial 
resources needed for development, was evident. During the Arab socialist 
phase, the determining moment in the course of development was not merely 
in superfi cial squabbles between party bosses and merchants, but crucially 
in joint Israeli– American pressures which were kept up by military force to 
drain the capacities of the noncompliant states. Had the state not intervened 
in the economy, it is doubtful that any meaningful net additions to modernise 
the capital stock and real development would have followed. 
 It is an intractable task to dissociate policies and development outcomes by 
attributing them exclusively either to internal national class formations or to 
the external meddling of the imperialist camp in national aff airs. The main-
stream often employs an analytical frame of reference that is freighted with neo- 
liberal ideological bias. It adopts a language of blaming national forces for the 
shortcomings in development policies in order to exonerate imperialism from its 
wrongdoings.  Corruption is the mainstream’s oft repeated refrain. But external 
involvement in national aff airs forms part of the class structure that constitutes 
the state and its policies. Corruption requires a context conducive to the illegal 
funnelling of public assets to private ends – a context that has been provided by 
the introduction of neo- liberal policies, especially pegging the currency to the 
dollar in open capital and trade accounts and, in an institutional context, already 
hijacked by the state bourgeois class. To question whether the Arab developmen-
tal disaster is the fault of national elements or of imperialism, subjects social 
science to the banality of crude empiricism that overlooks contingency as the 
outward manifestation of determinacy in class– power relations or to the whim 
of empire. This cross- border class relationship is not an analytical object per 
se; it is a process of history. Whatever class alliance existed in the socialist Arab 
state, it was developmental or anti- developmental according the distance it kept 
from the US- led imperialist centre. Depending on the centripetal strength of the 
working class, national class formations shape the condition that combines the 
struggle against imperialism and development outcomes in real and ideological 
forms. This strength ultimately secures the fl ow of resources within the national 
economy and clamps the venues of resource outfl ows or regulates the context 
that is conducive to the ultimate in corrupt conduct, which is the intertwined act 
of cheapening and dollarising national physical and human assets. 
 The chapter on Latin American Structuralism and Dependency Theory by 
Saad- Filho in Jomo (2005) proposes that the national bourgeoisie was respon-
sible for the poor developmental outcomes; its message is that subordination 
to a world market seals the fate of nations and that is squarely the doing of the 
national class in charge of development. Not that there is much national in 
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weakly sovereign countries, especially Arab countries, but the fate of nations 
in an increasingly interconnected world remains contingent upon the existence 
and relative strength of an anti- imperialist international class alliance. On bal-
ance, the nature and behaviour of a national bourgeoisie is determined by its 
mode of integration with global capital and its mode of appropriation from the 
national economy. The class in its impersonal and objectively specifi ed his-
torical relationships, transcends the national context. The roots of its material 
appropriation and reproduction provide the objective grounds occupied by the 
national class. Unfettered expansion denominated in dollars in a macro context 
of openness, fi scal austerity, dollar pegged currency, dwindling capacity and ris-
ing import dependency, will inevitably convert the national bourgeois class into 
a compradorial one. A social class cannot be defi ned in terms of the passport 
it holds. Historically, a social class supersedes the modern form of the nation- 
state. The bourgeoisie organises the pursuit of profi t through the state, and the 
state is only a means to an end. The agent of development, which is a social 
class not principally defi ned by ethnicity or skin colour, but by its relation to the 
appropriation of surplus from social production, is the subject of history and of 
social science.  Accordingly, to expect that a national bourgeois class in defeated 
social formations will oppose imperialism on nationalistic grounds or because 
it is committed to its own national working class over the long term on the basis 
of nationalist affi  nity is a supposition that runs counter to the materialist logic 
of social class reproduction, especially so in the dollar-dominated fi nancial-
ised age, or when the class has become the historically given inter- confl icting 
 relationship destroying its own national base as tribute to imperialism. 
 From the standpoint of Arab working classes alienated from their states 
and subjected to the threat of US- led or induced bombardment, the present 
global structure appears immutable. Change is class- determined, and the 
victorious imperialist capitalist class with military bases across the Middle 
East forms the determining constituent of Arab states. Historically, Western 
anti- war protest movements have been unsuccessful in arresting war. The 
Northern labour aristocracy nationalised, as opposed to internationalised, 
the struggle and sought an end to wars as if it were a form of charity by the 
rich North to the poor South and not a historical imperative. The creation 
of social wealth by more productive means in the North became possible 
by usurping and destroying the productive means of the South. The domi-
nant social democratic stance has given wealth creation a Western nationality 
proper; it severed the organic ties of international labour. To date there is no 
recognition of the failure and, in light of the ties of theory to practice, Western 
social democracy theorised the wrong object and practised the wrong theory. 
 There is not even a semblance of recognising the responsibility for a history 
of genocide in the colonies, which if it had really existed the world would be 
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completely diff erent. Such a Eurocentric approach, which is often upheld by 
Western Marxism, represents a distortion of value relations wherein Western 
lives are dearer than those of the rest according to the criteria of a nationalism 
invariably laced with racism. It is neither through the nationalist structure 
scope nor through the atomised- individualistic perspective that an under-
standing of the issue forms; it is through understanding that the social ties 
of the working classes are real and transcend the fi ction of national borders. 
 The above discussion has summarised the reasons why the state bour-
geois class, which in the postcolonial period assumed the position of anti- 
imperialism under Arab socialism, was later to become more alienated from 
its own social base under  infi tah (literally ‘openness’, the Arabic equivalent 
of neo- liberalism) and a close ally of imperialism.  Infi tah was no ordinary 
neo- liberal model. It was capitulation to every conditionality imposed by the 
Bretton Woods institutions. Opening up national markets along with geo-
political rents levelled the national productive capacity, brought down the 
protective dual- exchange rate arrangement and enacted the Saudi model 
of earning without eff ort. US– Saudi administered geopolitical rents were 
accompanied by obscurantist (Islamist) ideology, which is already noted as 
a quintessentially capitalist framework of resource allocation. 16 The blame 
game – trying to decide whether this retreat was the fault of the AW or the 
fault of the centre that caused developmental disasters  – is a disingenuous 
debate; it misses the point that global accumulation is an interconnected 
social process, which is valued and monetised subject to the  rapports de force in 
international class relations. 
 16  Modern Islamic economics, which bears only superfi cial resemblance to pre- capitalist 
Islamic practice, exceeded neo- liberalism in its penchant for laissez faire economics. 
Consider for example the twisting of the meaning of Islamic justice by modern Islam-
ists that assumes new heights as justice becomes equated with the trickle- down eff ect of 
neoliberal markets: (a) obstructions of unrestricted trade, free capital fl ows and market 
openness become a violation of Islamic justice (Chapra 2014); (b)  free movement of 
goods, people and capital accelerate development and further cement solidarity and 
integration, which are among the important objectives of Islam (Chapra 2001, 7); 
(c) the neoliberal recipe is central to development, and it is (Islam- wise) unjust to stand 
in the way of such development (Chapra 2001). The projection of old Islamic thought 
upon the modern world without major qualifi cations can be meaningless because 
under capitalism commodifi cation prevails and, at least in one area of fundamental 
diff erence with past modes of production, there is a necessity to disengage assets that 
did not exist in Islamic times. Modern Islamic economics, like neoclassical econom-
ics, falsely constructs history as a set of homogenous commercial relations continuous 
across time. The modern capitalist market little resembles the Islamic market of the 
past. In the time of the caliphates the market extended narrowly to luxury goods and 
barter, such that when disrupted, it resulted in no major perturbance of day- to- day 
existence. By contrast, under capitalism, market activity determines most of social life. 
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 Closing Comment 
 From a culturalist perspective, limited industrialisation and development in 
the Third World has been ascribed to the lack of a spirit of entrepreneurship 
or the ‘problematic of the missing middle class’ (Turner 1984, 44). However, 
Poulantzas (1973) thinks little of this alleged problematic. Poulantzas argues 
that, although the capitalist class plays a dominant role in capital accumula-
tion, it nonetheless is not to be found in a vacuum. To him, the totality of the 
mode of production, in which the state is central, constitutes the determining 
relationship of social and economic transformation. One cannot accurately 
identify or defi ne social classes without prior identifi cation of the mode of pro-
duction – Poulantzas (1973), drawing on Marx 101 so to speak. The case of 
the AW is especially acute, since the capitalist system incorporated the Arab 
region in terms of production, exchange and cultural relations via colonisa-
tion and raw material extraction (Amin 1978). The entrepreneurial spirit said 
to be bred by and within the capitalist social formation was here constrained 
by a national structure commanded by colonising foreign capitalists. And as 
Baran (1973, 385) rightly points out: ‘in the absence of industrial capitalism 
there are no industrial capitalists’. The existence of an ‘entrepreneurial role’ is 
sociologically determined, not generated by the genius of abstract individuals. 
The contemporary class formation in the AW is the product of an oil- and- war 
co- determined articulation, which is instantiated fi rst by militarisation. It is 
this militarised articulation that forbade not only the evolution of a vibrant 
entrepreneurial class, but also precipitated the planned abortion of develop-
ment in the AW. This condition is not unique to the AW, but it is certainly 
glaringly obvious in the war zones of developing regions (Africa, for example). 
It becomes visible at the point where the metabolic rate of the reproduction of 
capital imposes social dislocation to a degree that meets the depth of its crisis 
of accumulation. 
 Real developmental achievement leaves its imprint in real time, which is 
one continuous socially reinforced whole and not the formalised short- term/ 
long- term neoclassical travesty it is often made out to be. The positive devel-
opmental impact of the socialist Arab state was real and lasting. Lumping 
together Arab socialist states and their later mutations, the neo- liberal 
regimes, on the grounds that they were both capitalist is self- delusional or, to 
rephrase Hegel’s parable: in the dark night, all cows are black. In real terms 
no socialism could be created overnight, and the socialist leadership must 
grapple with the strategic goal of how to remove the last traces of capital, 
not only concerning the abolition of the wage system but, equally important, 
as a civilisational turnaround whose defi ning feature is transforming private 
responsibility into social responsibility. Gauged against an ideal socialist state, 
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these Arab socialists could only have been capitalists parading under the logo 
of socialism, but that would be a hollow comparison against an idealism yet to 
be achieved.  To be sure, the Arab socialist investment and egalitarian redis-
tribution undertaken in the early stages of independence left a lasting impact. 
To have drastically raised living standards, health and education is in itself a 
signifi cant accomplishment.  
 Diff erent starting points of development lead to diff erent paths of develop-
ment afterwards. Thus, a socialism emerging in a less- developed Arab for-
mation, threatened by belligerent imperialism, was in terms of its populism 
a democracy responding to the demands of the working class. That was also 
a time of global victory of labour over capital allowing for a closer interface 
of socialist theory and practice. The state fi ats of ‘equalise assets and lands, 
industrialise and grant women rights’ could have only been the encapsulation 
of the demands of a working class that had already waged a combined war of 
independence and a class war.  Yet, the concordance of theory and practice at 
the socialist Arab level can also be ascribed to the global working class that 
emerged stronger after World War II. Western imperialism was on the defen-
sive as colonialism was dismantled and the global ideological debate had, at its 
ceiling, full employment and the eradication of poverty via state intervention. 
 There cannot be a current re- enactment of that history – unless one infl ates the 
puny size of socialist organisation to the megalomaniacal stature of academics 
who think that they can achieve humanitarian socialism through the channels 
of bourgeois democracy. No small country will be successful in socialising on 
its own. More so in the neo- liberal era than before, socialist theory and practice 
in the AW will meet or depart from each other by the outcome of international 
class struggle than by any nationally confi ned class struggle. 
 The reading of class transformation in this chapter is based on the premise 
that it was submission to imperialism that revamped class structure in order 
to absorb the successive terms of surrender.  Arab socialist regimes went from 
being led by an alliance of the military and the intermediate strata to an alli-
ance of the military with a more aggressive and domineering international 
fi nancial capital. A  telling drawback of Arab socialist regimes, however, is 
that the working population was not aff orded adequate civil liberties to par-
take in the political process. This repression came in handy for capital when 
the turn to neo- liberalism took place at a later stage. Critiques of this experi-
ence from the far left exhibit a moral overtone that indicts the Arab social-
ist model on the grounds that it had maintained the relationship of capital 
under partial collectivisation along with state bureaucratisation and capped 
western style democratisation. The argument implicitly reifi es the bourgeois 
democratic experiment and meets with concerns of the liberal right.  Osman 
(2013) summarises these critiques in that the Nasser experience, for instance, 
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is said to have supplanted the liberal experiment and halted a transformation 
to a genuine liberal democracy. 
 True enough, a working class is itself the agent of social transformation 
and should not be excluded from control of that transformation by a state 
bureaucracy. The realisation of the working class in the state as democracy 
and the organisation/ implementation of the socialist plan via the bureaucracy 
are expected as the working class assumes power. The question, however, 
remains: How is it possible for a weakly armed working class, both in terms of 
munitions and cultural hegemony – in an underdeveloped country, where the 
cost of making ballot boxes may come at the expense of bread – to erect a dem-
ocratic model by quasi- universal suff rage without losing out to more powerful 
imperialist meddling? Can one presume that imperialism will respect the will 
of Third World working classes? Not even remotely will imperialism acquiesce 
to a modicum of socialist activity. The European– US bourgeois democratic 
processes and their election models are anathema to working class democracy 
and rule. Judging by the state socialist organisational collapse along with a 
corresponding ideological collapse, Western social- democratic reform, with its 
organising and door- to- door canvassing for votes, resulted in social fascism – 
not revolution. It failed because it theorised the wrong subject, a nationally 
partitioned working class or, it had placed its nationalism before international-
ism and compromised on principle with capital. 
 Bourgeois democracy is capital’s key resilience mechanism. Where the 
chief contradiction of capital, the rising private appropriation at the expense 
of the social would bring down the system, the payoff  to parts of the Western 
working classes via a sectional election process, would restabilise it. In rela-
tion to global accumulation, such a ‘democratic’ measure becomes the funda-
mental point of departure for fuelling North– South working- class divisions 
and the imperialist drive.  The strength of capital’s ideology in obscuring the 
insidious Western democratic process is multifarious, but I will name two: 
 (1)  The promotion of Western- style democracy in the Third World, the appli-
cation of the very contrivance that props capital in the North, cannot be 
implemented as a reform and redistribution channel in the South because 
it homogenises labour. Said diff erently, the absolute general law of capital-
ist accumulation implied under historically determined living standards, or 
the rate of surplus drain from the South that must buttress both Northern 
profi t and wage rates, cannot admit political reform measures that would 
equalise the disparate global wage rate, revalorise Third World labour 
upward and decrease both the rate of the metabolic consumption of man 
and nature, which would lower the rate of profi t (more on this in  chapter 6 ). 
 (2)  Of the conceptual paraphernalia of mainstream social science, democ-
racy and the right to vote stand atop the pyramid in sacred sainthood. 
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That a context of legal and social inequality redelivers through the voting 
booth the same condition time and again is irrelevant to the alleged moral 
position that without the individual right to vote, there will be suppression 
of freedom or free speech. This mainstream individual is both abstracted 
from his or her own social being and de- contextualised from his or her 
social relationships. Seen socially however, the individual, necessarily but 
not exclusively, acts in line with the vested interest of the social group to 
which he or she belongs and mediates the position via the politics of the 
given historical structure; fi guratively speaking, in the absence of a biting 
crisis and alternative socialist ideology,  the two- party system will repeat-
edly be re- elected by the central working classes that partake in the spoils 
of imperialism (Emmanuel 1972).  Such a scheme that omits the real – 
as in global interrelatedness, value transfers from the sweatshops of the 
South, war deaths of the Third World, and de- historicises social devel-
opment by packaging fascist- like platitudes as science – is an advanced 
form of bourgeois ideological reconstruction. It achieves its goal not only 
by mystifying and convoluting language and facts in bamboozling the 
working class, but also by continuously distorting the means of perception 
by fortifying the hegemony of a false science. As the dominant ideology 
fans Western democracy into dogma and dogma into science, a system of 
knowledge collapses into a system of belief. This phantasmagorical fabri-
cation of democracy and the tribute paid out in bribes to Western classes 
are at the heart of the stabilising mechanism of capital. It is this crucial 
area that mainstream social theory rarely theorises. 
 That is why central to the movement of the working class is its self- activity 
in a context of its own dictatorship. Practically, for a democracy to work it 
has to be a democracy for the working class only. The real movement that 
is communism/ socialism is inseparable from this self- activity, which is the 
dictatorship of the proletariat as unity of means and ends. As such, the issue 
of democracy is not an ethical point but a philosophical and practical one. 
 Communism is for us not a state of aff airs which is to be established, an ideal 
to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real move-
ment which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this move-
ment result from the premises now in existence. (Marx 1845) 
 Ethical evaluation begins at the intersection of theory with practice, and 
not of theory with theory (Dunham 1955). Capitalist social relations are 
entrenched, and radical socialist change would have required more than a 
simple commitment to socialism in some corner of the Third World, such as 
the AW. Given the low level of development in Arab states and their traces 
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of semi- feudal despotism, Arab socialism on its own could not have speedily 
attenuated the repression attendant upon the labour process. The failure of 
the Arab socialist model is more related to the loss of socialism in general 
rather than to its particular Arab brand of socialism. 
 Annex 
 Table 1.1  Yearly average real GDP per capita growth, real GDP growth and output 
per worker growth rates in constant local currency units for the periods 1960– 1979 
and 1980– 2011 
1960– 1979 1980– 2011












 Due to data availability prior to 1980, the rates are calculated using at least 10 consecutive 
observations for Iraq, 15 for Egypt, and 20 for Syria. Post- 1980, the economic performance 
of Syria and Egypt depended more on oil revenues. The data demonstrate that in terms of 
growth and output per worker, the Arab socialist period was by far the better performer. 
 Source : The Penn Tables (Feenstra et al. 2015). 
 Table 1.2  High and low points of infl ation for the periods 1960– 1979 and 1980– 2011 
followed by modal range and average for infl ation rates 
1960– 79 1980– 2011
Egypt – 1.6 and 10% (modal range 4– 5%), 
average 5.6%
5 and 25% (modal range 12 13%), 
average 14.5 %
Iraq – 1 and 4% (modal range 3– 4%), 
average 4.5%
5 and 450% (modal range 23 26%). 
average 65%
Syria – 4 and 10% (modal range 4– 5%), 
average 5.5%
7 and 60% (modal range 13 15%), 
average 12.2%
 The data from this table show that infl ation rates were on average lower and steadier during 
the Arab socialist period. Because of high variations in infl ation rates, the mode or modal 
ranges are better measures of centrality.
 Source : World Bank, WDI, various years. 
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 Table 1.3  Average unemployment rates for the periods 1960– 1979 and 1980– 2011 
1960– 79 1980– 2011
Egypt 5.2% 13.2%
Syria 4.2% 10.9%
 Iraq is not included in this table because much of Iraq’s data have been removed from the 
WDI database. Obviously, the unemployment rate under Arab socialism is much lower. The 
measurement of the unemployment rate under Arab socialism was more accurate because 
the labour resource was surveyed regularly in planning procedures and input- output models. 
 Source : World Bank, WDI, various years. 
 Table 1.4  Average total debt service as a percentage of Gross National Income for 
the periods 1960– 1979 and 1980– 2011 
1960– 79 1980– 2011
Egypt 3% 4%
Syria 2% 4%
 The time series for Syria ends in 2007.
 Source : World Bank, WDI various years. 
 Table 1.5  Average for the diff erence between the rate of investment and the rate 
of saving as a percentage of Gross National Income for the periods 1960–1979 and 
1980–2011 
1960– 79 1980– 2011
Egypt 4% 7%
Syria 5% 5%*
 Although the diff erence in Syria remains the same before and after, the dependency on foreign 
aid and loans grew under neo-liberalism because the state under open capital accounts was 
no longer as credible or eff ective in issuing new credit substantiated by national means. *The 
series for Syria ends in 2007. 
 Source : World Bank, WDI various years. 
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 Chapter 2 
 THE DEVASTATION OF PEACE 
IN EGYPT 
 In Egypt, the internationally integrated ruling class imposes a schismatic 
relationship on the development of society, the symptom of which is the 
growing gap between the working and the ruling classes. The rift deepens 
by the extent to which the ruling class submits to US- led imperialism. The 
sources of growth in such a disjointed economy after 30 years of liberalisation 
(1980– 2010) depend little on standard macroeconomic recipes or whether the 
interest rate or the currency is undervalued or overvalued. Growth origi-
nates in the United States sponsored geopolitical rents, fi nancial fl ows and 
trade considerations needed to stabilise, or to destabilise if need be, the socio- 
economic formation. In any case, principal macroeconomic variables have 
become the tools for imperialist plunder. 
 The mainstream’s economic concept of eff iciency derived via prices 
obscures the workings of economic-transfer mechanisms. More than else-
where, in Africa and the AW prices are generated by repressive power 
structures, and much of value is snatched by forcible dislocation of people 
and resources or by aborting the gelling of working class revolutionary con-
sciousness and organisations. The means of f iscal or f inancial intermedi-
ation between the public and private spheres in the forms of redistributive 
taxation and recirculation of rents/ profits within the national economy 
are calibrated to imperialist desires.  The tax base of the state depends 
less and less on direct or progressive taxation, and the assets of the public 
and private sectors are de facto dollarised as a result of openness, multiple 
internal and external deficits and the informally pegged exchange rate. 
In 2010, the year of the uprising, Egypt’s indirect taxes were at 8 per cent 
of GDP, more than twice the rate of direct taxation (UN 2015).  Under 
neo- liberalism, Egypt developed two economies over its territory – one 
national and the other extra- national – with very few welfare- promoting 
linkages between them. To have arrived at the point where value usurpa-
tion undermines basic subsistence, Egypt lost two principal wars,  entered 
into the Camp David Accords and introduced a process of economic 
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liberalisation, beginning roughly in 1980, which eviscerated the nation 
of its nationalism. Instead of a post– Camp David peace dividend leading 
to development, Egypt experienced a slide into misery: hence, the title 
for this chapter. All along, Egypt was paying the imperialist conqueror 
tribute derived from the resources that would have otherwise strength-
ened its development, especially the living security of its working class 
and, by implication national security. 
 In this chapter, I posit that the process of social disarticulation under way 
in Egypt is related to the broader goals of US- led imperialism in Africa and 
Middle East, to which a weakened Egypt, situated in the US- led imperialist 
orbit, contributes. Subsequently, fi nancial stabilisation arrangements, such 
as US aid or Gulf funds to steady the exchange rate, are secondary in rela-
tion to the broader goal of US- led imperialist hegemony. Because of the his-
torical surplus value and other value transfers (through the indigence of the 
working population, primary resource transfers and also through the prema-
ture death of people by imperialist policy and aggression), which continue 
to be wrought by commercial exploitation, forfeiting a money premium in 
the form of anesthetising US or Gulf aid so as to consolidate the power of 
Egypt’s comprador class is insignifi cant when compared to the circuitous 
returns stemming from the disempowerment of Egypt. Commercial exploi-
tation is not restricted to capturing individual slaves and putting them to 
work; it is about driving the whole nation into a condition of slavery. In 
between fomenting civil strife and stabilisation, imperialism opted for pro-
cesses that would pre- empt any nationalist class restructuring that would, 
by implication, re- empower the working classes of the African/ Arab con-
tinents. US- led hegemony and the extraction of value by violence wrought 
upon the African/ Arab region released tremendous cheapened resources 
for imperialist grab. In a nutshell, a disempowered Egypt experiencing 
lumpen development buttresses imperial rents more than an Egypt develop-
ing by industrialisation that would have otherwise empowered its working 
population. 
 As of late, the Egyptian uprising occurred in an epoch of crisis in human-
ist philosophy and its ideological progeny, socialism. The absence of interna-
tionalism in working- class ideology and the decline of worldly socialist utopia 
may condemn the already puny Egyptian left along with its progressive social 
agenda to failure or to an existence on the margin of society. 
 The argument for the descent of Egypt from the days of its socialist 
accomplishments into a model of lumpen development will be structured as 
follows. The fi rst section provides a glimpse into Egypt’s economic history 
with an emphasis on the transition from a socialised to privatised econ-
omy. In the section entitled ‘Recent Empirical Observations’, the present 
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economic woes and mainstream fabrications are exposed. Section three 
follows the rise of merchant capital and the consequent necrotrophic rela-
tionship between the private and social spheres. Section four deals with the 
diffi  culties facing the transition from uprising to revolution. Section fi ve 
covers the issue of how the crisis in socialist ideology blocks revolutionary 
transformation. With an ever- higher velocity of exchange value circulation 
forcing technological innovations to compress time and space and to shift 
a socialising factory fl oor into cyberspace, the Closing Comments suggest 
that the conditions for another insurrection are already forming. To invert 
Althusser’s aphorism:  the future may no longer last a long time, and the 
success of the next revolt will be tied to how the policies of the alternative 
popular model will be received contingently upon the strength of socialist 
ideology. 
 A Glimpse into Economic History 
 Egypt’s recent economic and social history could be split into two phases: a 
socialised phase of high and equitable growth, which ended in the late 1970s, 
and a neo- liberal period of inequitable growth beginning shortly thereaf-
ter. Although standards of living are historically determined, the post- 
independence period, as mentioned in the  previous chapter , represented a 
better model of development and growth (World Bank 1995, Bush 2004). 
The Arab socialist states in particular outperformed the other AW nations 
in employment creation, output per worker, and average real growth (Refer 
to the annex to  chapter 1 ; also a cursory review of the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) would bear similar results).  Egypt’s growth exhibited a 
lower average in the neo- liberal phase, but it remained high relative to other 
developing countries (developing world average of about 4 per cent as per 
the WDI).  As calculated from national sources, the real per- capita growth 
rate was closer to 4 per cent under the Arab socialist period, then fell by 
almost half to 2 per cent between 1985 and 2000 (these national fi gures 
concur with those of the WDI); it subsequently rose to slightly more than 3 
per cent over the last decade prior to the uprising (2000– 2010).  One ought 
to note the population growth rate was higher around the 1960s. By 1960 it 
was at 2.8 per cent, but it fell to 1.6 per cent in 2010, while the rate of new 
entrants into the labour market also declined from about 1990; it expectedly 
dropped at a lower rate than that of the population growth rate, accord-
ing to the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 
(CAPMAS). The socialist phase comprised a tightly controlled economy 
with concentrated spending on social and industrial projects fi nanced prin-
cipally by national means; all the while Egypt was in a state of war with 
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Israel until 1978.  The neo- liberal phase, principally the post– Camp David 
Accords phase, represented a period of reliance on the free market, uncondi-
tional openness and social debilitation. 
 Initially, it was Sadat’s  infi tah (openness, which involved the gradual lib-
eralisation of the trade and capital accounts) that caused the exchange rate 
to fall and prices of basic necessities to rise, while wages rose sluggishly 
without catching up with infl ation (CAPMAS, various years).  The  infi tah , 
which immediately began to pauperise the working class, was blamed on 
Nasser’s autarkic policies, debt related to war, 1 and the impossibility of 
fi nancing welfare in view of Egypt’s allegedly ‘feeble’ current account posi-
tion.  However, the current account position was not weak.  The data in the 
Annex to  chapter 1 shows that the rates of dependence on foreign savings 
and rate of debt service were lower on average prior to 1980.  The terms of 
trade for Egypt (export to import price levels) held steady until 1980 and 
then began to decline principally in relation to deindustrialisation, the rising 
importance of primary product export and a global open- trade environment 
pressuring downward the unit labour cost of tradable goods. 2  The balance of 
payments diffi  culties that were encountered as a result of the 1967 and 1973 
wars were off set by rising geopolitical aid (dependence on foreign saving was 
lower as seen in the Annex to  chapter 1 ).  The bulk of the debt, which was 
minimal in the late 1970s compared to later external debt developments, 
was owed to the Soviet Union and denominated in the national currency 
at concessional interest rates, or partly repaid through barter agreements 
(CAPMAS, various years). The eclipse of the Soviet Union (1990) and the 
rise of  laissez- faire ideology further shored up the drive for the  infi tah . Sadat’s 
 infi tah , however, did not only target price liberalisation, free trade and capi-
tal movement, but it was also about reversing socialisation, restructuring 
social classes and relinquishing state sovereignty to a class fully integrated 
 1  The cost of war of the 1967 with Israel was overly exaggerated to prepare the stage for 
openness.  In the collection of articles entitled ‘The Egyptian Economy in a Quarter 
of a Century 1952– 1977’, Issawi (1978, 8) estimates the losses of the 1967 Six- Day War 
to be between 20 and 24 billion Egyptian pounds, nearly fi ve times the actual GDP 
in 1967. According to the WDI, there was almost a 1 per cent real growth in GDP 
in 1968. The damage to the infrastructure was minimal and the war materiel was 
replaced by Arab and USSR funding. It is highly unlikely that an economy could have 
sustained such losses to infrastructure and GDP and still maintain a positive growth 
rate in the year after. 
 2  The terms of trade are calculated price levels of exports and imports from the Penn 
Tables (Feenstra et al. 2015). The slope of the trend line between 1952 and 1978 is fl at, 
showing no decline. As of 1978, the trend line exhibits a downward slope, implying a 
deterioration in the terms of trade. 
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with global capital.  The terms of surrender, not so discreetly embedded in 
the Camp David Accords, unlocked the value spigots of the Egyptian social 
formation for draining down. The neo- liberal ‘openness’ paradigm became 
the conveyor belt of war booty. 
 Prior to the Camp David Accords, Nasser’s social reforms, land reforms, 
universal healthcare and free education in a country that had ranked poorly 
on the development scale under King Farook, catapulted the nation into 
the modern age (Haseeb 2002).  Growth of literacy, life expectancy  and real 
incomes soared in the fi rst 15 years of the Nasser revolution (Haseeb 2002). 
In the collection of articles entitled ‘The Egyptian Economy in a Quarter of 
a Century 1952– 1977’, published in 1978 by the Egyptian Society for Political 
Economy, several authors critique past performance, but it was nowhere 
near the scale of the disaster that unfolded under neo- liberalism. Translated 
excerpts follow: 
 1.  Although military spending rose signifi cantly between 1964 and 1975, pri-
vate consumption was not undercut and steadily rose between 1952 and 
1977 (Altayib 1978). 
 2.  Altoukhi (1978) attributes the success of employment policy in the Nasser 
period to high investment in industry, metallurgy and construction accom-
panied with a planned programme to educate graduates in economic 
activity foreseen to expand in the future. 
 3.  In industry and agriculture, Ibrahim (1978) notes signifi cant improvements 
in agricultural production per acre as result of Nasserite land reforms, 
 4.  Handoussa (1978) disparages the accusations of ineffi  ciency levied against 
public- sector management of industry and proposes that in terms of social 
effi  ciency criteria and real value contribution to the economy, social gains 
and protection, the public sector scores high on the effi  ciency scale. 
 In 2013, illiteracy, which had been on the way to being eliminated under 
Nasser, reached 26 per cent for people over ten years of age (UNESCO 
2015). In 2015, CAPMAS stated that poverty and illiteracy were on the rise 
in Egypt with ‘the vast number of poor concentrated in the south of the 
country with as many as 43.7 per cent of the population living under [the] 
poverty line’. CAPMAS has also revealed that illiteracy among poor fami-
lies has increased to 41 per cent. 3 Khamis estimates real adult illiteracy in 
 3  See also:  Egypt:  Population Growth Overtakes Literacy Rise, IPS Inter Press Ser-
vice News Agency, March 12 2010.  http:// www.ipsnews.net/ 2010/ 03/ egypt- 
population- growth- overtakes- literacy- rise/ , viewed March 2015. Poverty and 
illiteracy on the rise in Egypt: new study Ahram Online, Tuesday 13 September 2011, 
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2015 at 50 per cent. 4  Although the quality of health and educational services 
was being degraded, Abernethy (2000, 42) claimed that US aid had lifted 
the quality of health and primary education to the top ranks of the Third 
World. 5  This sort of blatant mendacity misled many about Egypt’s real state 
of development. 
 During the  infi tah (beginning early 1980s), the share of manufacturing 
shrank under the combined assault of low- priced imports and petrodollar 
infl ows,  which incidentally lowered the exchange rate in ways that could have 
boosted competitiveness had industrial capacity risen. However, offi  cial sta-
tistics indicate a fall in the share of industry from 22 per cent in 1970 to 16 per 
cent in 2013 (UNIDO, various years). 6 In the early stages of the  infi tah , remit-
tances from the Gulf exchanged on the black market had much higher pur-
chasing power and created a work model of earning without eff ort. In 1976, 
the dollar black market rate exchanged for fi ve times the offi  cial rate. 7 The 
same engineering position in Kuwait, for instance, paid several times more 
in terms of purchasing power in Egypt. There were more Egyptian pounds 
chasing fewer goods or goods rationed by the war eff ort when national capac-
ity was being neglected. Prices rose, and Egypt’s socialised housing, subsi-
dised transport and fi xed- price food staples were thirsting for more resources 
(Abdel Fadil 2000).  By the late 1970s, the dual exchange rate was coming 
undone as a result of the huge quantity of petrodollars circulating in the local 
economy, and national money creation rose to meet the conversion demands 
drawn on the black market in favour of foreign wage earners and importers. 
The process of deconstructing the protected basic consumption bundle itself 
 http:// english.ahram.org.eg/ NewsContent/ 1/ 64/ 21158/ Egypt/ Politics- / Poverty- 
and- illiteracy- on- the- rise- in- Egypt- new- st.aspx, viewed September 2015. 
 4  S. Khamis spoke of the declining knowledge economy in Egypt at the NUS- MEI 
Media Conference on 3 September 2015 
 5  United States aid to Egypt is principally military aid with the remainder fostering 
intelligence platforms that contain resistance and inculcate defeatism (Haseeb 2002). 
 6  One ought to caution that apart from balance of payment fi gures, the data is quite 
distorted. Labour productivity in the manufacturing sector for the year 2007 shows 
Egypt’s data to be fi ve times higher than Syria’s, and Oman’s about seven times higher 
than Egypt (UN 2014, 12), when in fact the diff erence between Egypt and Syria is 
minimal while Oman is far less industrialised, yet it possesses a high dollar- revenue- 
yielding petrochemical industry that is highly capital intensive. Egypt’s manufacturing 
share, at 15 per cent, appears much higher than Syria’s, at 5 per cent, because the 
capital- intensive and high- dollar revenue of foreign- owned fi rms in Egypt raise the 
share of industrial value in national output. But both, the faulty method of measure-
ment linking productivity to dollarised output instead of to national real currency and 
the ownership composition of globally integrated fi rms in Egypt artifi cially boost the 
numbers. 
 7  Discussion with economist Mohamad Dowidar, of Alexandria university. 
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could not have been achieved without the complicity of vast sections of the 
regime’s bureaucracy. 
 Two historical circumstances assisted Sadat and his class in rolling back 
development.  One was the half- hearted nature of the Nasser revolution, in which 
Egyptian workers did not fully partake in the political process of social reform to 
later safeguard progressive achievements – the general case for all Arab socialist 
states.  Harry Braverman was somewhat prophetic in 1959 when he stated: 
 Nasser’s regime is certainly a dictatorship masquerading as a revolution, but it 
is also a dictatorship fulfi lling some of the obligations of a revolution, and ini-
tiating the trends and processes which will make for more revolution in Egypt. 
So long as the military can eff ectively substitute itself for the social struggle, 
keep the pot boiling, and give at least the impression of forward motion, it can 
hold sway. If it falters, the dispossessed nobles and landowners are on hand to 
take over again, with imperialist help, unless the Egyptian working class and 
peasantry have in the meantime so matured as to be able to make the Nile 
Valley the scene of Africa’s fi rst experiment in socialism. (Braverman 1959) 
 This is not to say that there were no mass resistance movements oppos-
ing the initial neo- liberal steps.  In 1977, working people in Cairo rose up in 
a bread riot, but the rebellion was brutally crushed by the army. The revolt 
was centred in Cairo and not organised nationwide. The detachment of the 
working class from direct political representation through autonomous insti-
tutions under Nasser facilitated the process of quelling the uprising.  Nasser’s 
measures to shore up national security were used to undermine the combined 
security of the nation and its working class. 
 The second more decisive circumstance that crushed Nasserist sociali-
sation was US- led imperialist war and intervention. After Egypt’s second 
major military defeat to Israel in 1973, the encirclement of its armies and 
the Israeli threat of non- conventional warfare, the daunting weight of impe-
rialist military forces stacked against Egypt became even greater. Fearing 
to follow a strategy of arming the working class to conduct people’s war-
fare, which might turn the army against the rising bourgeoisie, the sacrifi ces 
required to redress the imbalance with imperialism were grossly exaggerated 
by the Sadat- reared intellectual elite. Resistance was said to be futile, and 
‘peace’ with Israel was adumbrated as a bright future of plenty when, in fact 
it became a veneer under which the spoils of imperialist victory in war were 
stealthily withdrawn from the national economy. 
 Egypt’s experience with modern Western imperialism began with the 
short- lived Napoleonic conquests, and later the British conquests of the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century that terminated the Egyptian textile and 
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other embryonic industry, which employed nearly 40,000 wage labourers 
around 1840 (Lutsky 1969). The British removed barriers to trade that would 
later erode prospects for the take off  of any nascent industry, which marked 
the fi rst phase of Egyptian industrial decline (Duri 1969). 
 In fact, the era following the Camp David Accords that surrendered Egypt 
to US- led imperialism signifi cantly resembles the late nineteenth- century 
period when taxes (imperial booty) collected from Egypt went to service 
Ottoman debt and pauperised the population, leading to the Orabi Pasha 
revolt (1882). Around 1880, prior to the Orabi revolt, Egypt had to deliver 
a million pounds in yearly taxes to service Ottoman debts (Lutsky 1969). 8 
 Modern neo- liberal policies siphoned resources as if they were a tax by colo-
nial fi at. The Camp David Accords’ ‘peace dividend’ was only forthcoming 
in terms of aid consolidating comprador rule, maldistribution policies, and a 
higher rate of privatisation and expropriation, which have only exacerbated 
Egypt’s economic problems.  The positive rates of ‘growth’ (as measured in 
mainstream economic terms) witnessed since 1980 – nearly 5 per cent real 
average growth over 30 years (1980– 2010) – do indicate the existence of a div-
idend; but this was a privatised growth benefi ting the comprador and US- led 
fi nancial capital and conversely lowering the incomes of the working class. 9 
 It is not so straightforward to point out a surplus drain from Egypt to the 
US- led empire when the United States has provided Egypt with around two 
billion dollars in aid annually since 1979. One may say that as of 2011 the US- 
sponsored Gulf funds pumped into Egyptian reserves and capital fl ight have 
been signifi cant, but the upshot of these fl ows is unimportant to US- led capi-
tal. However, one may also add that the value wrought from cheapened wages 
and the blocking of Egypt’s indigenous industrialisation eff ort is historically 
signifi cant. This value may be roughly signifi ed by the trend in the gaping 
divide (opening scissors) 10 between capital and labour shares, or by measuring 
  8  Abdel- Malek (1968) relegates the rise of the Egyptian bourgeoisie to the Napoleonic 
law of 16 July 1798, which allowed Egyptians to own land, and to the step taken by 
Mohammad Ali to distribute two million acres between 1813 and 1816 to state offi  -
cials. The Orabi Pasha military insurrection was ignited by higher taxes cutting into 
the wages of the military offi  cer class and capitalized on popular discontent to combat 
the British. Although the army putsch of Sisi in 2014 drew strength from popular dis-
content, it enacted a process of comprador class re- strengthening that cemented ties 
with imperialism. 
  9  This could be said in two other ways: fi rst, the rate of income maldistribution out-
stripped the growth rate or, second, the rate of profi t outgrew the rate of growth. 
 10  When viewed along a trend, the declining share of labour vis- à- vis that of capital 
looks like opening scissor blades with the former dipping and the latter rising, signify-
ing (albeit within the national boundary) the size of their value shares in the social 
product. 
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the fall in labour’s income share in relation to the rise of capital’s share and 
the outfl ow of national assets to the international fi nancial markets. The esti-
mates of the distribution of the income pie in Egypt indicate that labour share 
has fallen from a high plateau of nearly 45 per cent between 1963 and 1975 
to a low plateau of 25 per cent between 1996 and 2008 (ILOSTAT 2009; 
Marquetti and Foley 2011). Since 2008, an average infl ation rate of about 10 
per cent and non- indexed wages have further lowered labour share. 
 Yet, these nationally bounded estimates do not do justice to the broader 
picture of value transfers to US- led empire, especially circuitous transfers 
from the rest of the region and the globe as a result of the weakening of 
Egypt. It may be worthwhile to underline that about two- thirds of US aid 
to Egypt since 1979 was destined for military purposes, and much of the 
remaining third went into research aimed at ideologically buttressing the 
comprador’s hold on power  – basically intelligence platforms to conscript 
the intelligentsia:  e.g., as in social research into what would cause a revo-
lution and whether the political alternatives would bring back any form of 
working- class representation to power (Sayed 2003, Sharp 2015). Firstly, it 
is relevant to recall that Egypt was a major Arab and African power, and its 
contributions to the Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) and national liberation 
struggles were weighty. Its subordination requires a weakening of national 
development, which circularly leads to working- class and national insecurity. 
US- led imperialism requires a dependent and passively consuming Egyptian 
working class that will not re- empower itself by gains in knowledge and living 
standards associated with rising productivity (Amin 2015). US- led imperial-
ism also requires an Egypt subdued such that it will not question the pillage 
of Africa and the AW or rethink the practice of Arab regionalism. By the 
time of the uprising in 2011, the state of degradation in social assets as a result 
of imperialist grab in Egypt and, more pertinently, the losses sustained by 
Africa and the AW as result of unfettered liberalisation since 1980, attest to 
the signifi cance of value usurpation and the forgone opportunity of develop-
ment if a nationalist Egypt had exercised more power on the regional level. 
 In the past three decades, Africa and the AW could not have seriously 
bettered their development (no matter how they tinkered with macroeco-
nomic variables) partly because of the distorted balance of forces resulting 
from Egypt’s co- option.  Even when the African and the AW economies grew 
by rising commodity prices between 2000 and 2010, the growth was hol-
low or devoid of developmental gains. 11  In Egypt, particularly, the growth of 
 11  In the essay ‘We Must Address Political Economy of Growth without Development 
in Africa’ 23 October 2015 by Jean- Luc Stalon’, one spots an excellent example of 
how the UNDP, similar to other international capital- linked institutions, jumps at 
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privatisation hit a delicate point involving the basic right to healthy nutrition 
with the rolling back of land reforms in the early 1990s (Bush 2015), which 
released a mass of property- less labour from the land only to meet the real-
ity of shrinking industry, productive capacity and decent jobs (more on this 
perverse transformation in  chapter 5 ). 
 If security imparts development, which it tautologically does, then it is 
understandable why for the last 30 years the AW and Africa have experienced 
lumpen development. A process of accumulation by colonial wars of encroach-
ment that had receded after independence took hold once again over much 
of Africa and the AW beginning in 1979, immediately after the Camp David 
Accords. The decades of the 1980s and 1990s are known as the lost decades for 
sub- Saharan Africa and the AW. One explanation for this poor performance 
may follow from the fact that the neo- liberal context altogether was outper-
formed by the state intervention measures of the postwar years. However, the 
average negative per capita growth rates for these two decades (negative 2 to 
3 per cent as per the WDI) and the faulty distributional mechanism that took 
hold of these economies once the commodity boom arrived in 2002 cannot be 
simply relegated to some global statistic when wars and dislocation were tearing 
at these continents.  Egypt’s shift to the side of the United States, and the impe-
rialist encroachment process, were partly the cause of the Congo holocaust 
and the invasions of Lebanon and Iraq, among other disasters. Events may 
so progress such that the insatiability of US- led capital will soon devour other 
nations, as is happening in Yemen. As world integration with the Arab economy 
became less based on trade in manufactured goods and more on the export of 
raw materials, class cross- border alliance between comprador Arab classes and 
US- led capital became yet more fortifi ed for the simple reason: the comprador 
depended more on the international market for wealth accumulation. 
 The bonding process of cross- border ruling class alliances is not simply 
economic, but also sociological, involving the falsifi cation of old development 
experience, the resurrection of royal symbols and the creation of new repre-
sentations arising out of the neo- liberal school to solidify the economic bond. 
Under neo- liberalism, the Arab state gradually morphed into a security 
the opportunity to mollify the cause of African de- development by citing nearly every 
secondary symptom of imperialist aggression, its history and its modern forms of 
aggression. What he really wants is to raise taxes, increase revenues and, worse of all, 
get population growth restrained, which is, in the context of fracturing states, a form 
of demographic engineering that usually occurs by inter-communal violence. The 
imperialists’ bombings and interventions, pauperising policies and arming civil wars 
and genocides, destruction of states like Libya are a statistical outlier of sorts, one 
presumes. See  http:// www.theeastafrican.co.ke/ OpEd/ comment/ Address- political- 
economy- of- growth- without- development- Africa/ - / 434750/ 2910370/ - / t1s6bdz/ - / 
index.html, viewed 3 January 2015. 
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apparatus with less and less of popular consent arising from social invest-
ment. Figuratively, the head of the state could be reduced to the head of 
the internal security ministry. The ideological apparatuses of the state would 
mostly tout the ideal of free markets and the inherent backwardness of local 
culture, which is allegedly to blame for the failure to meet the lofty goals of 
modernity. In personifi ed institutions of this sort, economic growth that gen-
erates wealth would not trickle down, certainly not in substantive amounts 
to improve welfare. The guiding light and partners of the comprador class, 
the Bretton Woods institutions, were much like Egypt and other Arab states 
undemocratically governed (namely, governed by the United States and 
Europe); these institutions knew very well that Arab states were nothing but 
vessels for impaired working- class participation and, hence, incapable of 
eff ecting socially stabilising redistribution or peaceful democratic transitions. 
Their cant of the possibility of Egyptian or Arab ‘good governance’ was part 
of the bonding exercise they undertook to boost the ratings of their partner-
ing regimes. 
 Capital’s international institutions projected an image of goodness upon 
imperialist partnering regimes by implying that good governance by these 
regimes – whose formation was guided for precisely the opposite purpose – 
was a possibility. The ideological grip of capital through administrative 
machination suppressed any sign of serious intellectual challenge from the 
heterodoxy. In one example of such clampdown, a 2009 UN report that 
hinted at the depth of the crisis before the Arab Spring was blocked before 
publication. In one paragraph of the report, the study highlighted the diff er-
ence between the concepts of crisis in the developed world and the AW. 
 There is a Eurocentric tone to the word crisis in an underdeveloped region that 
has had the highest rates of confl icts globally. In the totality of existence, which 
is called underdevelopment, where wars and displacement rage in countries 
like Iraq, Sudan, Yemen and Palestine, and where after some three decades 
of high positive growth rates nearly a third of Egyptian children suff er from 
malnutrition, the word crisis has little or no meaning for it is an everyday 
occurrence. […] But, the case may be that if economic wealth for the more 
developed world can be created by non- economic factors, by dispossession and 
dislocation of peripheral formations, then that could mean that the creation 
of wealth in the centre is positively related to pauperisation of the periphery. 
If even remotely or partially true, then the road to peace should begin here. 
(UN 2009) 
 In explaining the modus operandi of developing conditions and the rela-
tionships that were driving them, a published summary of the above report 
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(the summary appeared fi rst, after which the report was in small part bowd-
lerised, but more generally suppressed), which had gone through to publica-
tion despite the many hurdles, noted the following. 
 Certain Arab countries have been locked into a particular orbit of de- 
development. De- development depends on the extent to which the interplay 
between national and international forces allows for the retention of a bigger 
share of the social surplus in the national economy for the sake of industrializa-
tion and development. Certainly, cross- border class ties have come into play, 
facilitating the process of surplus usurpation. The development of the region 
in relation to security is therefore an outcome of the multi- tiered power struc-
ture; the continuing fl ux of international relations has thus far situated many 
Arab countries on the dispossession side of capital accumulation. Of the two 
paths of capital accumulation – accumulation by commodity realisation and 
accumulation by dispossession – the region is subject to the diktat of the latter 
process. (UN 2009) 
 And as to how this Arab/ African de- development became distinguished 
from other Third World processes: for reasons of diplomatic discretion, the 
report shies away from naming the hegemony of American imperialism in 
the region and the brutality of its sponsored dictatorships that accounted for 
the collapse of development. Analytically, the report stresses imperialist over- 
determination in general, and how the terms of power preceded the making 
of the terms of trade. 
 Terms of power in lieu of terms of trade off er us a new perspective for analys-
ing the determinants of the autonomy structure of Arab States. Those terms of 
power are determined by the interplay of national comprador forces and inter-
national forces within a context in which capital accumulation, rent- seeking 
and profi teering are predicates of, and hold primacy over, nationalistic forms 
of social organizations. Security arrangements in the Arab region are rarely 
the result of domestic developments or even of regional developments; they 
have to be understood in the context of the international division of political 
power, of which the AW represents the periphery. The geostrategic importance 
of the area has meant that the international powers have, to a large extent, an 
interest in determining its security arrangements and thus its autonomy over 
its own policy. Such a focus on the international roots of the security arrange-
ments in the AW does not, however, negate the eff ect of domestic and histori-
cal factors. Nevertheless, it provides a rudimentary framework which enables 
these factors to be distilled and reorganized for a better understanding of the 
issues. (UN 2009) 
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 As the report notes, the reasons for the pervasively poor developmental 
showings can best be understood from the standpoint of imperialist power 
relations. Foremost among these relationships is the set of social relations 
geared toward generating divisiveness along constructed and imperialisti-
cally funded identities that diff erentiate working classes. The condition of 
decaying global labour solidarity had reached such a low point such that the 
Muslim- Copt clashes of the 2011 revolt mirrored the ideological retreat of 
universal labour. A principal contradiction with capital was diverted into an 
inter- working class confl ict, yet the ‘romantic’ left never questioned how, with 
such rifts, the political upheaval will be capable of socially restructuring the 
power of the dominant class. 
 In a context devoid of the political power of the working class, it is not so 
much the eff ectiveness of monetary or fi scal policy that shapes the develop-
ment outcome; rather it is the national ownership of such policies; such policy 
autonomy is missing in the case of Egypt and the broader AW. In Egyptian 
monetary policy, the history of growth in money supply shows that money 
expands principally to satisfy foreign exchange demand or the demands 
of wealthier individuals who will enjoy the benefi t of the convertibility of 
national currency into dollars at fi xed rates. The evidence for class- biased 
credit expansion is jointly supported by the extensive rise in credit to the pri-
vate sector, the growth in the share of the less liquid elements in the money 
supply as proxy for (around 13 per cent average yearly growth between 2010 
and 2011 as per the WDI) the informal dollar- peg policy and the skewed 
income and wealth distribution that increasingly favours the moneyed class. 
 As happened elsewhere when fi nancial or speculative bubbles build, the credit 
from central banks infl ates the wealth of fi nanciers. 
 Prior to the  infi tah , it would be moot to speak of money- supply growth 
leading to infl ation in a protected and semi- closed economy in which most of 
basic consumption was satisfi ed by local means. In a sheltered economy with 
dual exchange rates, as Egypt was in the Nasser period, the money supply 
grew by the pressure of credit demand stemming from within the national 
economy and the targeted supply of credit that the central bank produced 
in relation to the requirements of the fi ve- year plans (Sayf al- Dawlah 1965). 
National money demand was satisfi ed by the issuance of local currency and 
credit, whereas the demand of foreign exchange was controlled by the state, 
which observed an adequate level of national reserves to stabilise the fi xed 
exchange rate. Recalling that this was an economy of price and capital con-
trols in which the excess or shortfall of the money supply was addressed via 
open market operations conducted namely at the national level, infl ation was 
tackled by price control, while the treasury soaked up excess money supply. 
In actuality, there was a dual system of exchange rates whose manifestation 
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was multiple markets with multiple interest rates; that is as if there were mul-
tiple currencies, some for national use that are not traded internationally and 
others for external use. The purpose of these multiple interest rates was to 
fi nance domestic investment by domestic means and to protect the necessary 
consumption bundle from infl ation. In Arab socialist Egypt, this was all the 
more possible because imports (much of which were military materiel bought 
with cheap loans from the Soviet Union) represented a low 20 per cent of 
output. Until 1973 the rates of imports were lower than 20 per cent as per 
the WDI. As of the mid 1970s the share of imports rose and its composition 
changed with time as more of the basic consumption bundle began to be 
imported (Abdel- Fadil 2000). 
 When in the early 1980s petrodollars infl ows (Gulf- generated remittances 
and US aid fl ows) raised the supply of local currency, and the constraints on 
price, trade and capital control eased, signifi cant amounts of dollars seeped 
into the private sector. The exchange of dollars into Egyptian pounds to 
appropriate assets in the newly liberated market jolted the coordination by 
which the demand for goods and foreign exchange would not aff ect everyday 
commodity price infl ation. The fl ood of dollars raising the supply of national 
currency on the local market forced an initial fi xed exchange rate devaluation 
in 1980. As the prices of basic necessities to the consumer began to rise, wages 
followed lethargically, but never caught up.  The signifi cant real wage decline 
occurred in the few years prior to the 2011 uprising. 
 As imports supplemented national production by the early 1980s, the price 
rise was not so much attributable to more money chasing fewer commodities 
(real wages of the working strata did not rise suffi  ciently to off set infl ation 
given the absence of organised labour), but to price mark- ups as result of 
limiting local production and freeing licensed imports. Immediately after the 
fi rst relaxation of import restrictions in the early 1980s, there were no short-
ages in basic goods (Amin- Ahmad 2007);  but the removal of subsidies on 
national production, along with a monetary policy that shifted credit away 
from publicly owned industry and agriculture toward the private sector, also 
rearranged value transfer from the working class to the comprador class. 
 Empirics and Financial Short- Leashing 
 It is diffi  cult to reconstruct an empirical macroeconomic profi le of Egypt 
given both the inadequacy of neoclassical market measures when applied 
to developing formations and the high degree of inaccuracy in the data. 12 
 12  The Keynesian accounting identity does not designate/ separate consumption (as in 
all that is consumed, including government and investment goods) between labour 
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 Mubarak’s successive governments, in cahoots with the World Bank and the 
IMF, concealed the deteriorating social conditions by reporting a rosy eco-
nomic picture.  The easiest way to view this is to assess the progress of the Gini 
index as reported by Egypt to the World Bank or as it appears in the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database and compare it with another exist-
ing measure. Whereas the Gini index as reported by the WDI implied that 
Egypt was as egalitarian as Austria, and its income distribution remained 
stagnant over time (as viewed in the WDI on 8 March 2014),  the income ine-
quality index constructed by James Galbraith (UTIP 2008)  shows that Egypt 
was becoming more unequal over time: by the start of the uprising it had one 
of the highest rates of inequality in the world. 13 But the Gini fi gures are no 
haphazard falsifi cation. Fabricated fi gures related to progress achieved under 
neo- liberalism run through the whole gamut of social variables and provide 
the grounds for the policy edifi ce that has so far contributed to the uprisings. 14 
 Just prior to the 2011 revolts, only around 5 per cent of Egyptians were 
reported to be living in abject poverty at below one dollar or so a day (AMF 
2009). The fi gure was revised upward to nearly 20 per cent following the 
uprising (AMF 2012). However, anthropological research in the countryside 
reported that the impact of agribusiness biasing changes in land- tenure law 
on dislocation was signifi cant, and that poverty rates were on average ris-
ing (Ayeb 2012).  According to H. Kishk of the National Centre for Social 
and capital, and foremost, it does not measure the contribution of labour to value 
added, which mollifi es the objective conditions upon which the returns to labour and 
capital follow. For long, the Egyptian growth rates, which were relatively high for 
some three decades, refl ected two measures: (1) the growth rate was mostly the profi t 
rate of capital, and (2) a signifi cant share of the profi t rate arose from the consistent 
lowering of the wage rate. 
 13  In Guerriero (2012), estimates of  the labour share falls from 43 per cent beginning in the 
mid-1980s to 29 per cent in 2011. The ILO fi gure for the wage share is at 25 per cent (ILO-
KILM 2011). Also, the extended Penn Tables as arranged by Marquetti and Foley (2011) 
show the labour share to have fallen to 25 per cent by around 2010. The notion that the 
GINI remained constant while labour share and poverty rates were rising is ludicrous. 
 14  The misrepresentation of data by international organisations in order to embellish the 
performance of US- allied regimes can at times take a turn into the phantasmagorical. 
UN (2014, 17) reports that average yearly wages in Egypt measured in dollars rose 
from $2,500 in 2006 to $8,133 in 2012, as in the real wages nearly trebling in a span 
of six years. Between 2011 and 2012, the dollar- denominated yearly wage nearly dou-
bled as it rose from $4,609 to $8,133. Roughly, at this rate of growth in average dollar 
wages, a worker will be earning $2 million after 40 years of work. The report:  Bul-
letin of Industrial Statistics for Arab Countries, Eighth Issue , is forwarded and signed by 
the undersecretary general for the AW and can be downloaded here:  https:// www.
unescwa.org/ publications/ bulletin- industrial- statistics- arab- countries- eighth- issue, 
viewed 12 March 2016. 
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Research in Cairo, by 2012 more farmers were neglecting the land because 
successive changes to land- tenure laws made them feel landless. Kishk (2012) 
also brings up the issue of lower prices and revenues wrought from the sale 
of locally produced crops, which disincentivised working on the land. At any 
rate, Egypt, as do most Arab states, imports nearly half of its basic foods 
(cereals) and is the biggest wheat importer globally (FAO country cereal bal-
ance sheet 2015).  For Clark (2001), this makes it (and others) vulnerable to 
US- initiated economic political pressures and food embargoes. Given the 
shortage of food stocks, sanctions similar to those imposed on Iraq between 
1991 and 2003 would, within 90 days, bring Cairo’s 12 million people to the 
brink, of whom 10 million are in real poverty (Clark 2001). As will be seen in 
 chapter 5 , food production has fallen further since 2001, and the peasantry, 
eff ectively dispossessed by law No. 96 of 1992, which undermined tenancy 
security, made a gradual exodus from the land.  The news item that uncovered 
the hollowness of supposed growth came at the end of 2009 when UNICEF 
noted that despite a number of positive economic indicators, Egypt has a hun-
ger problem and that nearly a third of all children are malnourished (IRIN 
2009).  Despite this grim picture and the fact that informal- sector employ-
ment is above 50 per cent (poverty employment is not really employment), the 
offi  cial unemployment rate was reported at below 10 per cent (Hassan 2008). 
Fabrications, both systemic as a result of the Keynesian accounting identities 
and blatant, as in data doctoring, are the ideological mainstay of the compra-
dorial class and its international allies. 
 Moreover, although comparatively signifi cant (at around 5 per cent annu-
ally over 30 years), Egyptian economic growth came to depend increasingly 
on raw material export and foreign sources. Prior to the uprising, Egypt was 
exporting 500,000 barrels of oil a day, worth nearly 15 billion dollars a year 
in 2010 (OPEC 2010a).  Over the last fi ve years, average workers’ remittances 
were as high as 6 per cent of GDP, and  tourism provided an even higher rate 
of around 10 per cent (IMF- IFS various years).  Egypt attracted more than 40 
billion dollars in foreign direct investment (FDI) between the years 2005 and 
2009 – which, incidentally, is high relative to the rest of the African continent 
(UNCTAD- WIR, various issues). 15  The country also recorded huge market- 
capitalisation growth rates; over the fi ve years prior to the 2010 uprising the 
average yearly value of the stock market was anywhere between $80 and $100 
billion, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2009). 16  Public 
 15  According to the Central Bank of Egypt, total FDI in Egypt for the fi rst three quarters 
of 2011 was only $376 million, compared with the annual infl ow for 2010 of $6.4 billion. 
 16  Portfolio infl ow to Egypt over two years 2008– 2009 was $1.8 billion (IMF- IFS vari-
ous issues). 
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debt as a percentage of GDP went down from 100 per cent in 2005 to around 
75 per cent in 2010 (WDI 2011). 17  The current account defi cit relative to nom-
inal GDP was also insignifi cant at just 1 per cent during the penultimate year 
before the uprising. Just prior to the uprising, Egypt’s dollar reserves covered 
nearly a year of imports, and the infl ation rate went from around 18 per cent 
in 2006 to 10 per cent at the end of 2009.  Offi  cial unemployment stood at 9 
per cent (ILO- KILM 2010). But these were exactly the fi gures that concealed 
lumpen development and the building social disaster. 
 Egypt has steadily liberalised investment, ownership restrictions and trade 
and capital fl ow barriers. It further liberalised trade by doing away with many 
of the quantitative or quota barriers and high tariff  levels (Ikram 2006).  The 
onset of heavy liberalisation was ushered by the Paris Club in 1991 in return 
for a $20.2 billion debt write- off  (Human Rights Watch 1991).  By 2000, 
the primary balance resulting from cuts in social spending for an expand-
ing population showed a modest surplus of 1.64 per cent (Ikram 2006, 175). 
The working class was subjected to fi scal and monetary austerity, whereas the 
comprador class reaped the benefi ts of double standards in macroeconomic 
policy expansion. 
 A Synopsis of Macro Policy 
 The state eff ected a two- pronged macroeconomic policy: fi rst, credit fl ows 
to the wealthier class fi nanced in part by foreign sources and a diminution 
of resource fl ows to the working class, which refl ects the shrinkage of social 
spending or the austerity associated with addressing an alleged budget defi cit 
(balancing the primary budget); 18 and,  second, an implicit or explicit dollar- 
peg regime that exhausts national moneyed capital, which could otherwise be 
destined to the working class (building national reserves and servicing debt at 
the expense of the bread- and- butter basket). 19 This dualist policy refl ected the 
 17  Like many of the other economic concerns, debt politics assumes a subsidiary position 
to the imperialist politics of containment in Egypt. In November 1990, Egypt sought 
to renegotiate the terms of its debt with the Paris Club, but its request was declined in 
view of its failing to pursue further liberalisation. In February 1991, rewarding Egypt 
for its position on the invasion of Iraq, the United States wrote off  $6.7 billion, the 
Gulf states $7billion and the Paris Club $20.2 billion, or half its debts (Human Rights 
Watch 1991). 
 18  I would like to thank Korkut Boratav for his insightful remarks on this section. 
 19  While infl ation rates tax the working class by reducing the purchasing power of 
wages, the higher nominal profi ts appropriated by the bourgeoisie are exchanged 
at fi xed rates for the dollar from the drawing down of reserves. This is literally a tax 
on the poor and a subsidy to the rich. In a rough sketch: the single buyer of imports, 
who happens to be the single seller to the national market, raises prices and pushes 
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dichotomy between the national productive economy and the internationally 
integrated comprador and fi nancial sector. 
 The supply of credit is used in a pernicious manner. The rate of reduc-
tion in the labour share is partly determined by the degree to which social 
spending programmes are cut to meet servicing the internationally imposed 
debt.  The pegged exchange rate also requires a contraction of the supply of 
money destined to the working class, which tallies with the reduction of real 
wages. As elsewhere and under open capital accounts, the interest rate is kept 
artifi cially high to secure the balance between savings and investment, con-
trol infl ation and achieve balance of payments equilibrium. Although under 
standard circumstances, if the interest rate falls either savings will be insuf-
fi cient, or infl ation will start to rise, or the balance of payments will slide into 
defi cit. In cases of political uncertainty such as Egypt’s, the interest rate is 
merely indicative of the risk premium. The key driver of economic stability 
is not the gradation of the interest rate, but the political guarantees that the 
United States off ers – through the Gulf as well – to support fi nancial and 
political stability. Another point of departure from the standard in Egypt is 
that high interest rates over long periods are associated with regressive dis-
tributive shifts and fi nancial and balance- of- payments crises (similar to what 
is in Argitis and Pitelis 2001, Chang and Grabel 2004). Interest rates have to 
remain high in Egypt on account of openness and risk. Monetary policy has 
no relevance on consumption given the almost non- existent fi nancial market 
for the working class. The policy of reducing wages raises the share of capital 
in the social product, and money supply (that of capital) is determined by 
its own rising transaction demand. The bank deposits- cum- transactions of 
the capital class are what drives the creation of money.  Pushed by openness, 
monetary holdings jumped from 33 per cent in 1971 to 90 per cent in 1983 
and have remained high since, mirroring the shift in income maldistribution 
(WDI, various years). In Egypt, the correlation between high interest rates 
and maldistribution or shortfalls in foreign currency is observable, but at 
the same time, it is spurious. The failure of industrial policy, capital account 
openness and risk, along with the primacy of shifting political forces against 
labour cause income inequality. The principal transfer mechanism hinges on 
stabilising the exchange rate via cuts to wages and social spending. 
 Patnaik (2009) explained that under a supply constraint, a rise in govern-
ment borrowing will more than proportionally raise private surplus ‘through 
infl ation up, for which the state prints extra cash, which means the nominal profi ts 
of the merchants rise. However, because of the fi xed exchange rate that the state has 
to back by depleting its national reserves, the much higher amount of extra cash is 
converted into a fi xed amount of dollars as a result of the pegged exchange rate. It is 
not the individual who is corrupt; it is the structure of resource fl ows itself. 
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profi t infl ation squeezing out forced savings from the workers’. As the govern-
ment borrows to spend ‘in a situation where the scope for raising output and 
employment was limited, if government expenditure rises, then there would 
be infl ation that would squeeze workers’ consumption, and simultaneously 
boost profi ts’ (Patnaik 2009).  A higher supply of money for which there is not 
adequate economic activity, would raise prices of workers’ consumption goods 
while the savings and the share of profi ts of the fi nanciers who had initially lent 
the state would increase. 20 The capital class benefi ts from higher levels of nomi-
nal GDP and returns on fi nancial assets.  Although the fi nancial class should 
not fear infl ation or a worsening balance of payments causing currency depre-
ciation, as spending by borrowing appears to be in its own interest, it none-
theless loathes the idea that the state can boost the economy on its own and, 
consequently, people may perceive capital’s role as unnecessary. This is a socio-
logical explanation that advances the premise that capital’s quest for control 
ranks higher but is not contradictory to fulfi lling its profi t motive over the long 
run. However, in Egypt, the capital in question is neither national nor nation-
alistic. There is an Egyptian capitalist class immersed within imperialism as a 
secondary relationship. Employing the same sociological relationship of control 
before profi ts, imperialism performs a tightrope act between the looting that 
debilitates Egyptian labour and the aid that keeps Egypt  barely afl oat for it to 
circuitously extract value by the power emanating from Egypt’s containment. 
 However, infl ation is never an abstract monetary phenomenon, and it must 
refer to a composite measurement of prices that always denote specifi c aggre-
gate measures of commodities’ prices (Weeks 2014). Historically tracing the 
workings of infl ation on wealth shares in Egypt one fi nds that infl ation did 
indeed reduce labour share and the real wages and, conversely, raised capital’s 
share by the real growth rate and, obviously, by the lost share of labour from 
the social product (in value terms and signifi ed in money). That is pretty much 
what has happened elsewhere in the developing world where labour lacks the 
muscle to fi ght capital; but here one must add, there are higher rates of abjection 
alongside an ideological assault aimed at hollowing the culture of resistance. 
 In the present epoch, the Egyptian working class is not represented politi-
cally by any real form of political organisation of signifi cant weight. As such, 
 20  In crude estimates for sake of illustration: Only 30 per cent of the total money sup-
ply created by the central bank between 2000 and 2010 met the moneyed demands 
of the labour force; that is additional nominal money supply with which they bought 
their necessities (WDI various years). Roughly 50 per cent of all new money cre-
ated between 2000 and 2010, an estimated 70 billion $ went to service the moneyed 
demands of a tiny capitalist class as it shifted money abroad at fi xed exchange rates 
supported by national reserves or boosted the price of its national assets via specula-
tion and the building of bubbles. 
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it does not present an economic alternative of its own.  Its lower real wages 
and declining share of GDP should decrease demand and lower prices, but 
they do not.  The fact that prices rise when workers’ demand is lower can only 
be attributed to ‘imperfect’ 21 markets and monopolies that mark up prices 
to consumers and, concomitantly but less frequently, as a result of the dollar 
peg and rising world food prices. If the money supply destined to the work-
ing class and wages shrink, prices may be expected to decline; however, the 
workers’ consumption basket includes a combination of demand- determined 
and cost- determined prices, and the fact that prices tend to rise implies that it 
is monopolistic decisions that are leading the price hike. The rising price level 
of basic necessities in Egypt originated in a policy of worker pauperisation 
concealed behind a monetary phenomenon. The fact that infl ation began to 
taper down in the few years before the uprising could only mean that poverty 
levels were skyrocketing. 
 Despite infl ation, one notices that prior to the uprising of 2011, the 
exchange rate held steady and sometimes when fl oated, it rose slightly. The 
value of the infl ated national assets of the wealthier class remained fi xed in 
terms of dollars. A comprador class that controls the government fears neither 
infl ation nor a worsening of balance of payments because austerity against 
the workers generates the tax revenue to off set the costs of stabilising the dol-
lar assets of the rich.  These forces are at play, and the working class is engaged 
primarily in terms of how it can be regimented and, secondarily, in terms of 
the loot that is drawn from its right to decent living. A looted class devoid of 
resistance ideology is the aim of US- led imperialism. 
 The dual macroeconomic policy in an open capital account context with 
pegged exchange rate is a resource- allocation mechanism. When the price 
level is derived from the product market and the nominal wages are fought 
for by organised labour, infl ation becomes relevant to the unorganised work-
ing class and it acts as a supplement to state tax policy. Infl ation- targeting 
monetary policy was accompanied by spending cuts on projects that would 
expand employment (fi scal contraction) and frequently resulted in a primary 
 21  Perfect markets in which there is free competition and free fl ow of information in an 
even playing fi eld context do not and cannot exist. These are simply logical categories 
without a remote reference in reality. It is a purely Neoplatonic concept. What exists 
in actuality is a state of fl ux in which monopolistic competition varies in degree of 
intensity and according to the hold (primarily ideological, but also refl ecting the real 
organisational power of capital) of the corporate structure on the state. The concept 
of perfect markets is a deliberate misnomer to create the illusion that free markets lead 
to an ideal state or a state perfection. A more adequate name for such a market would 
be the hypothetical market that may assist in illustrating a dynamic point but cannot 
be basis of departure for theoretical construction. 
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budget surplus. Debt creation to expand the resources available to the capital 
class for investment and short- term speculation raised their asset prices and 
profi ts by more than the amount of initial spending and its associated debt. 
The gist of the monetary policy was to index the profi t rates to infl ation, but 
not the wage rate, or to augment short- term profi t rates in the private sector 
and to force the working class to pay for it through infl ation of wage goods. 
The money signifi cation of the wealth pie, the total value in the economy, 
expands in terms of dollars fi xed against the national currency by lowering 
the share of the working class in total income. Thus, in the fl ux that underlies 
the making of social conditions for the creation of relative or (inclusive or) 
absolute surplus value, it is the latter conditions that have come to portray 
more of the Egyptian capital- accumulation dynamic. 
 Until the uprising, the trends in selected macro variables such as infl a-
tion, unemployment, defi cits and so forth were exhibiting an improvement. 
Despite this World Bank- assessed quasi- crystalline economic performance, 
Egypt could not be fl aunted as a model of neo- liberal success (as in the rac-
ist motto ‘the golden boy of Africa designated for Tunisia’), as was Tunisia. 
From the time when the  Economist Intelligence Unit in 1993 dubbed Egypt as 
‘Bangladesh on the Med’ in one of its fast- sell journalistic scoops, the country’s 
poverty levels remained glaringly visible to visitors and locals alike. Crude 
estimates situate the 2010 real wage at half of what it was in the early 1990s. 22 
Brawls outside a Cairo bakery when bread prices rose in 2008 led to the deaths 
of many and made major headlines (Slackman 2008). 23 Egypt is one of the 
few countries in the world where rising food prices have resulted in immediate 
fatalities.  When disguised hidden unemployment and underemployment are 
considered, the real unemployment rate in Egypt would easily be several times 
the offi  cially published rate – poverty employment included (more than 50 per 
cent of private sector employment is in the informal sector). With the economy 
often recording negative growth in output per worker, energy consumption 
 22  These are estimates provided informally by the UN regional offi  ce for Western Asia. 
The article ‘Egypt wait a generation to eat (2008)’, a commentary by a World Bank 
offi  cial, recommends that Egyptians should wait a generation before the eff ects of 
growth begin to benefi t the poorer population. This was a time when reserves stood 
at a record high of $31 billion, privatisation was afoot, subsidies were being removed, 
price of staples rising sharply in a short period and real wages falling. EGYPT: Can’t 
Wait a Generation to Eat, by Adam Morrow, CAIRO, Mar 26 2008 (IPS),  http:// 
www.ipsnews.net/ 2008/ 03/ egypt- can39t- wait- a- generation- to- eat/ (viewed 2 Febru-
ary 2015) 
 23  Fifteen deaths in the bread queues were reported. There was general shortage, panic 
and confusion, and many incidents occurred. There was not enough subsidised bread 
to meet demand (Slackman 2008). 
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rising only by the rate of population growth (WDI various years) and highly 
productive sectors like manufacturing shrinking in size, the rate of eff ective 
units of labour contributing to production (the kernel of productive employ-
ment) could only fall. The broader swath of the labour market was not about 
the exchange of labour services for a wage; employment was a rigged game in 
which cronyism and consent were reproduced by a combination of clientelism, 
coercion or repression. Gradually, the rift resulting from over- regimenting 
the labour process and restraining national capital expansion widened until it 
burst open in the uprising. The igniting moment came as a result of ideologi-
cal disarray within the ruling circles and loss of control over key areas of state 
functions. Imperialism had noticed the institutional fatigue, the alienation of 
all social groups from the political process and the overall senility of politics, 
yet it had not moved to stabilise Egypt. As soon as troubles broke out in 2011, 
the comprador scrambled to blindly snatch and dollarise national wealth with-
out concern for political stability, depleting reserves. 
 More than fi ve years after the uprising the fl ow of funds from the Gulf 
states and other sources has failed to redress the dwindling of Egyptian 
national reserves. Reserves fell by around $2 billion a month in October, 
November and December 2011 and in January 2012. Since February 2012, 
reserves have fallen by around $600 million a month for a total of $15.2 bil-
lion. In late 2012, reserves covered just around three months of imports (UN 
2012). Despite the regime’s enacting limited controls on dollar withdrawals 
from national banks, reserves in 2015 remained low, covering around three 
months of imports. 24 
 The currency stabilisation eff orts resemble the act of fi lling a sieve with 
water. Reserves stood at 3.9 months in 2014 (UN 2015).  But subsequent moves 
to cut spending, raise the interest rate and partially remove subsidies were 
complemented by increasing fl ows and aid from the Gulf, except for Qatar, 
which withheld its aid after President Morsi was deposed.  The situation in 
2015 still depends on fl ows that are contingent upon how the United States 
dictates to the Gulf the necessity to steady Egypt’s balance of payments in 
relation to rising regional tensions (UN 2015). 
 24  Offi  cially, the Egyptian pound has been fl oated since 2003. It was not pegged until after 
the revolt. In actuality, the fl oat was closely monitored so as not to dip into volatile fl uc-
tuations. There were times when the pound appreciated slightly against the US dollar. 
Throughout 2010, the Central Bank led a gradual depreciation of the pound. The cur-
rency depreciated from LE5.5/ $ to LE6.0/ $ during this period (the last of the Mubarak 
regime). If this depreciation trend had continued, the pound’s level today would have 
been around LE6.6/ $ ( just below actual offi  cial rate of LE6.75/ $). However, this grad-
ual devaluation policy was abandoned in February 2011, and the Central Bank in eff ect 
pegged the national currency to the US dollar within a narrow range, around LE6.0/ $. 
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 Since 2003, the infl ation rate grew at a yearly average of around 10 per 
cent. In the two years after the uprising, the infl ation rate registered an aver-
age of 11 per cent growth yearly. As noted, the underlying causes of infl ation 
are unrelated to shortages of goods in the local market. For the most part, 
prices rose in relation to monopolised imports on essential and non- essential 
goods. Real wages fell in line with the minimal power exercised by politicised 
trade unionism.  Since the uprising, the growth rate has taken a setback. It 
was 0 per cent in 2011 and 1 per cent in 2012 (however, having grown around 
2– 3 per cent as a result of considerable Gulf cash infl ows, it began to rise 
slightly again (UN 2015). These are the lowest rates of growth recorded since 
1978, the year in which Egypt entered into the Camp David Accords. In the 
eight years prior to the 2010 uprising, the Egyptian economy grew at an aver-
age of around 6 per cent yearly. This growth was also underlain by consider-
able oil and geopolitical rents (US aid and remittances). 
 Development- wise, as noted, neo- liberalism was an epoch of inequita-
ble growth and de- industrialisation along the forced removal of peasants 
from the land without the creation of suffi  cient (decent) jobs to absorb them. 
Account taken of the advance in technology over time, the output capital 
ratio in the period 1960 to 1970 was estimated at a range of 1.1, whereas for 
the decade of 1998 to 2008, it fell to a median range of .95 (Marquetti and 
Foley 2011). Investment per worker, measured at constant prices, rose by an 
average of 9.2 per cent every year from 1963 to 1979, and nearly stopped 
growing (.08 per cent growth) for the years 1981 until 2008, unchanging from 
its earlier levels (Marquetti and Foley 2011). Obviously, after 2011 and the 
collapse the same rate would be negative. In addition to the higher output 
per worker, these estimates clearly delineate the dynamic effi  ciency of the 
socialist economy. 
 According to the Estimated Household Income Inequality (UTIP 2008), 
the index of inequality declined at a rate of 1 per cent yearly from 1964 to the 
late 1970s – roughly the end of Arab socialism – and then rose at the rate of 
1 per cent during the Sadat– Mubarak years (UTIP 2008). Linear projections 
on the Texas Income Inequality database show that by 2010, Egypt would 
have had one of the highest rates of inequality globally. 25 
 Mainstream assessment of Egypt’s performance often neglects the fact 
that although the population growth rates were rising, investments in total 
(and in agriculture in particular) were declining and creating fewer decent 
jobs. The demographic argument, which often posits ‘Egypt as a rich land 
 25  I recognise the diffi  culty of using the absolute measure of the value of the coeffi  cient as 
an indication of inequality, but I am interested in movement along a trend, in which 
the systemic data error is less distortive. 
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that nonetheless has many people beyond its carrying capacity’ (Abernethy 
2000, 42), assumes that macroeconomic policies have remained dynamic and 
nationally based. It is rather an ill- informed position as well because macro 
variables such as growth, job creation and population synergise in terms of 
rates of growth and not as fl at levels. Under healthy macro dynamics, high 
population growth becomes a blessing. Arguments of this nature completely 
miss the point that under Arab socialism the economic policy was nationally 
controlled and served national social interests, as opposed to imperialistically 
controlled under neo- liberalism. 
 During the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) short hold on power (30 June 2012 
to 3 July 2013), the previous regime’s social and economic policies stayed put. 
Monetary policy implicitly depends on a dollar- pegged national currency, 
which varies in relation to the US monetary policy stance and, as such, 
remains outside the purview of the Egyptian government. The Central Bank 
of Egypt may intermittently resort to increasing the interest rate with the 
avowed purpose of stemming the fl ow of funds and stabilising its national 
currency. But because of the high degree of risk at home, the interest rate is 
not the variable that is locking in resources. What is stabilising the national 
economy and preventing it from going into a tailspin is the political assent of 
the US administration to the positions and practices of the Egyptian regime. 
Moreover, the reasons why the national currency would fl ow out or stay at 
home have to do with the perception of risk, which is mainly how the United 
States grades the performance of the Egyptian regime and the ease of con-
vertibility and fund transfers abroad, rather than the minor impact of the dif-
ference between world and national interest rates. Since 2012, the Egyptian 
banking sector’s deposit amounts have surpassed its loan amounts (UN 2014). 
Banks mainly lend what remains in funds after transfers abroad to the public 
sector (government bonds). In view of the paucity of loans extended to the 
private sector and the wide latitude of trade and capital account openness, 
policy interest- rate change would not infl uence Egyptian domestic demand 
(fewer loans to national businesses were on off er). With unstable conditions 
lingering, commercial banks continue to prefer government bonds/ bills to 
private lending. By the way, this is the same rationing of fi nance to the private 
sector conducted under Mubarak, but because of the higher recent risks, less 
credit is aff orded to the national private sector. 
 The Necrotrophic Relationship 
 Unlike the data reported by UNIDO on the share of manufacturing in total 
value added, which is close to 16 per cent, the share of manufacturing as 
reported by the Arab Monetary Fund in 2011 lies slightly below the 10 per 
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cent mark (AMF 2011, 79). The share of manufacturing in GDP for the AW 
is lower than that in all other developing regions except those in sub- Saharan 
Africa (World Bank 2011).  The AW share of high- technology exports from 
total manufactured exports is at around 2 per cent, on par with sub- Saharan 
Africa (World Bank 2011a).  The quality of investment in Egypt moved away 
from high- productivity capital to what is referred to as  FIRE (Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate)  or low productivity capital (UN 2008b). The pro-
ductivity of capital declined from a ratio of 1.1 in 1963 to .9 in 2008 as per 
Marquetti and Foley (2011). The share of private investment in total invest-
ment went from below 10 per cent in the early 1980s to over 50 per cent in the 
years preceding the uprising (WDI, various years). Meanwhile, the rate of the 
tax contribution of the private sector fell while the share of waged private sec-
tor labourers went down in relation to GDP (UN National Accounts, various 
years).  The private- sector share of income steadily rose while it continued to 
tie its national assets to the world dollar market and/ or as comprador capital 
shifted its moneyed assets to international dollar- denominated capital. 
 Seen from its social side of consuming and allocating resources, capital 
edged ever closer to a full- scale mercantile mode of accumulation. Much like 
fi nancial capital, merchants eschew the drudgery of industrial productivity 
and reinvest little back in society. Merchants proper do not earn their profi ts 
from the infusion of knowledge in production; hence, bettering the skills and 
incomes of workers is not represented in their scope of activities. Because 
of the high- risk environment, the internationally integrated merchant class 
 qua comprador also exacts high borrowing costs on short- term loans while 
remaining more or less liquid to bail out at short notice when crisis sets in. 
The whole of the economy mimics the high velocity of exchange associated 
with hot money (money capital could fl ow out quickly, busting the economy). 
 The window of opportunity in which both merchant and fi nancial capi-
tal drain the national economy is determined less by the degree of national 
economic stability or rising demand and more by imperialist acquiescence 
to regime practices. Recalling: so long as US- led capital consents to regime 
stability, the geopolitical rents will be on hand to cushion its fi nancial short-
falls.  Also, the merchant mode of accumulation is ‘growth’ without expansion 
of the productive capacity or a re- skilling of the labour force. Together these 
processes disengage huge sections of the labour force and, in a time of global 
socialist ideological retreat, relinquish the social and ideological space to an 
imperialistically sponsored civil society (Islamist aid organisations funded 
with Gulf petrodollars), which disguise anti- labour functions as charity. 
 Around the sixteenth century, when the world began to abandon mer-
cantilism and engaged in productive investment, integrating commerce 
with industry, a cultural step forward was taken. ‘Culture’ here does not 
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refer to folk or elite tradition but to the universal store of humanity’s knowl-
edge that has accelerated via the engagement of science in technological 
application. By contrast, what has occurred in Egypt under neo- liberalism 
is the gradual disengagement of national industrial capital from commerce, 
after which the latter activity became the dominant mode. Reversion to 
mercantilist modes was accompanied by cultural regression and loss of 
socialized knowledge. 
 Merchant capital exhibits worse outcomes on development than the typical 
comprador class of Latin America. Whereas a comprador class and a nation-
alist bourgeoisie diff er in terms of whether the sphere of accumulation and its 
circuit are nationally or internationally linked, the merchant– capitalist class 
in Egypt is more fully fused with international fi nancial capital because its 
concrete activities depend more on the security provided by US- led impe-
rialism. After more than three decades of snatching national resources, not 
only in terms of the sturdiness of the sociological relationship bonding it to 
fi nance capital, but also in terms of dollarised losses, this class loses little from 
forfeiting its production base in the home economy. It does  not run a branch 
plant economy at the behest of multinationals resulting from the maturity of 
the life cycle of the product as did Latin American comprador (central capital 
shifts commodity production to the periphery after it ages at home and leaves 
a comprador in charge to repatriate profi ts). At least in such an instance, 
factories would be springing up at a higher rate in Egypt, which is not the 
case. Merchant capital’s principal activity is to tap into national resources 
(national assets and foreign exchange earnings) by ephemeral investment/ 
speculation, devalorisation of national assets, and the sale of imports to the 
national economy. 
 In this depressive cycle, undervaluing people, not their labour power but 
the actual humans, as if they were low- priced commodities became part of 
the shift to the merchant mode and its attendant value usurpation process. 
Capital as a social relationship regulates its metabolic rate of reproduction in 
relation to the cycle of value destruction and value creation (Meszaros 2005). 
The context in which this activity occurs is neither the result of individual 
agency nor the will of some reifi ed agency that runs history. Increasingly, 
dominant modes of thought relegate historical agency to ‘bigger than life’ 
individuals or to static structures whose elements are catalogued in a given 
unrelated order without the objective determinations of actually existing his-
tory (Meszaros, 2011). In addressing past and present developments in the 
AW, mass media is awash with Arab presidents or kings, bigger than history, 
who often parade as clowns, or with explications of social phenomena clas-
sifi ed as separate historical instances or emanating from non- existent ‘past 
cultural’ phenomena. 
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 For instance, jihadists are either a product of the just- here- and- now or they 
simply relate to separate reconstructed instances in pre- capitalist history that 
explain their revival. They are not portrayed as a sequel to ‘irrational’ but 
purposeful violence under capital. As to the clowning part of Arab leaders, all 
one has to do is observe the hilarious performance of the two post- uprisings 
presidents in Egypt (Morsi and Sisi):  they inherited a crisis existing within 
the context of a larger global crisis and guided by the same neo- liberal drivel 
and ‘peace with imperialism cant’, which had initially intensifi ed both the 
national and the global crises. It is not likely that any president kowtowing to 
the imperialist line would appear as anything other than a clown.  This has 
to be understood from a value formation and destruction optic in which a 
country the size of Egypt serves value making via commercial exploitation. 
 Unless they shake off  the imperialist yoke, all they can do is prostrate or trade 
the inhumane embargo on Gaza (in part among other things) for a few more 
month of borrowed foreign savings. 
 That mainstream’s history is reduced to structure devoid of social rela-
tions or just infl ated personas is not naïve; it is how the conventional social 
science adopts fascist platitudes as the science of imperialism.  For Meszaros 
(2011), ‘without understanding the true character of the hierarchically 
articulated structural determinations of capital’s increasingly more destruc-
tive societal reproductive order, with its organic system in which the parts 
sustain the whole, and vice versa, in their now paralysing circular reciproc-
ity, there can be no signifi cant improvement in these times’. The main-
stream analysis writes off  history as the dialectic of the discontinuous and 
the continuous exercised by social humans and the objective (real) social 
relationship in which they have entered. The social nature of the world into 
which human beings are born, its class institutions and other social organi-
sations – legal or political – that have for so long oppressed working people 
and against which working people struggle cannot be overlooked because 
the historian cannot feel the social relationship or shake hands with it. 26 To 
reigning ideology, the men and women that make history are biological and 
not social. 
 History to Egypt is the hunger, the potential famine and the forthcoming 
drone or robotic/ drone wars that Egyptians can neither shake hands with 
nor canoodle. This is not the ‘elephant in the room,’ but is the room itself, in 
which the destruction of nature and human lives is necessary for the repro-
duction of the social relationship and the productive power of capital. To use 
a higher- order generalisation for the sake of perspicuity, capital is nothing less 
 26  More sophisticated concretisation reduces capital to business networks or, in facile 
fashion, confounds a symptom of the relationship of the capital class for capital itself. 
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than the corrosive self- consumption of humanity and nature that serves nar-
row private interests and creates negative social outcomes as opposed to the 
banality that new technology replaces old technology and imparts progress as 
in  Schumpeter’s famous (1942) ‘creative destruction’. 
 Uprising or Revolution? 
 For an uprising to transmute itself into revolution, class restructuring should 
translate political gains into social gains. When the power position of the 
working class weakens, and benefi ts do not accrue to the labouring masses, 
the revolution succumbs. Two salient cases characterise the Arab uprisings. 
The fi rst is the war condition case of Yemen, Syria and Libya, where the 
off ensive to replace a single comprador class with traces of nationalism into a 
state with several compradorial classes reigning over multiple territories was 
carried out by outright Western military intervention. The second case, rep-
resented by Egypt and Tunisia, is the initial rise of Islamists to power, which 
occurred without perturbing the class structure of the  ancien regime .  Despite 
the fact that social conditions worsened after the uprising, ideological Islam 
and the despondency attendant on post- uprising failure appear to have low-
ered the threshold at which peoples’ distaste for their condition leads to revolt 
on one hand, and reorganised the ruling class standing in the power structure 
of the state on the other.  Furthermore, the initial Islamist commandeering of 
the Egyptian uprising led to the re- domination of old bourgeois ideology, of 
which Islamic ideology is the corporatist epitome (corporatist is not simply 
the subjugation of the state to corporate interest  – it is rather a higher degree 
in the coordination of capital’s power through the state as a result of deeper 
crises, which involves inhumane measures to discipline the working class; 
and, as Lenin (1902) pointed out, this could occur because bourgeois ideol-
ogy is far older in origin than socialist variants, is more fully developed, and 
has at its disposal more imperialist support and immeasurably more means 
of dissemination. 
 In addition to the overarching neo- liberal ideology, which practically 
shuns all alternatives like a jealous god, the state as an organ of class rule 
was left intact. The state’s ‘public power’ (of which the deep state is a recy-
cled off shoot), its armed men, prisons, coercive institutions of all kinds, state 
bureaucracy and a state machinery that has become perfected under capi-
talism could not have been revamped because the substance of the rising 
forces was anti- proletarian (Lenin 1916).  There was not even a farcical elite 
circulation à la Mosca: the same faces in public offi  ce remained unchanged 
(for an illustration of Mosca’s elite theory see Bottomore, 1964).  In Egypt, 
it can safely be stated that there was neither a successful political transition 
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displacing the merchant- capital- led class nor a redistributive social revolu-
tion.  The turn from the MB to the military putsch is a nominal change in 
which the army or real power broker, as foretold by Abdel- Malek (1968), had 
really never left the political scene. 
 James Petras’s position that the United States sacrifi ced the dictator to save 
its class ally has been borne out by the course of events so far (Petras 2011b). 
 During the uprising and afterwards, the United States continued to inject 
funds to stabilise the situation (DNE 2011). The United States has invested 
nearly $100 billion in the Egyptian military (conservative estimates capital-
ised at the annual interest rate of 5 per cent would sum to $96.5 billion, unad-
justed for infl ation) and security apparatus since the Camp David Accords. 
 As soon as they ascended to power, both the MB and the upper ranks of the 
Egyptian military readily declared that they would abide by the terms of 
Camp David. For the broader masses, these accords were landmarks of sur-
render under which national security and development parted ways and both 
were lost. 
 The Brotherhood’s rise to power did not emerge as a revolutionary spur 
of the moment. The organisation was part and parcel of the rule of the com-
prador class, which later grew into the fully fl edged merchant– capital class 
(Amin 2015).  Sadat, following the 1977  ‘Bread Revolt’, selectively released 
malleable anti- Nasserite ‘brothers’ and the regime has cohabitated with them 
ever since (Awadi 2004, Amin 2015). 27 The only signifi cant organised group 
prior the uprising was the MB (Amin 2015).  On the policy side, fi rst the MB 
and later the Sisi regime have sanctifi ed existing distributional mechanisms. 
In every aspect, the process of accumulation continues to be one of disposses-
sion and dislocation. Under the MB, the policies of the  ancien regime were not 
reversed or adjusted; rather, they gained momentum (UN 2012). The deso-
cialisation of policy and the displacement of labour, either by the import of 
labour- saving technology or by extra- economic means, accompany growth in 
the relative surplus population. In the meantime, the fervour of Islamisation, 
at fi rst, and the revolutionary zeal experience during the July demonstrations 
in 2013 died down and were followed by despondency and arrests of politi-
cal opponents. In addition to repression, the restructuring of the ideological 
instruments of the state to promote a higher dose of pragmatic coexistence 
with imperialism continue to postpone resurgence. In all the preceding, one 
 27  The Egyptian critic of political Islam, Farag Foda, had accused Sadat’s secret police, 
 Moukhabarat , of grooming and orchestrating the rise of Islamism in the universities 
and the countryside to combat the leftist and Nasserite movements opposed to his 
pro- American openness policies. Foda was assassinated on June 8, 1992, by a radi-
cal Islamic group.  http:// www.almasryalyoum.com/ news/ details/ 964111 (viewed 15 
June 2016) 
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may recall the hypothesis that is being developed upon: insofar as value trans-
fers are directly or circuitously materialised in the forms of imperial rents for 
US- led capital, these presuppose an Egyptian satellite state or a debilitated 
social formation under the aegis of the imperialist power nexus. 
 Uprising without Socialist Ideology 
 The Tahrir Square event and everything that came afterward appears as 
tragedy without a trace of farce or comedy. The romanticism of Western 
left discourse about the uprising is incapable of building an alternative ideo-
logical model. The daily dependency of the working class on the despotic 
power structure for earning its keep is not replaced by a system of social-
ist convictions commensurate with people’s sacrifi ces and longings for long- 
term social security. The presence of labour– aristocratic elements within the 
ranks of the Egyptian left, principally as an appendage to Western Marxism 
but also to some extent developing nationally under the aegis of merchant 
capital, breeds the sort of consciousness that drops the alternative of armed 
struggle from the national agenda and capitulates to the illusion of change 
by liberal democracy. The unthinkably ludicrous part of the picture is that 
of democratising in the presence of malnutrition with reactionary Islamists 
leading frequent armed attacks against the state and robbing the left of its 
disgruntled working class. The material basis of social democracy and its 
labour aristocracy rest mainly in the pillage of the working classes in the 
Third World that are partly funnelled by ‘democratic’ concession to Western 
working classes. Bourgeois democracy is synonymous with the reasonability 
side of capital, its states, institutions and ideological structure, which through 
wage, bribes and identity diff erentials sows just the right amount of division 
amongst labour. 
 In distinguishing between inter- Western working- class schisms and 
Western- developing world working- class rifts, questions of degree matter. 
The very idea that any value, in qualitative, quantitative form or as a social 
relationship (the state of being of value), working its way toward the centre 
via capital’s stabilising relationship of bourgeois democracy, its capital’s key 
mechanism of resilience, is as relevant as the signifi cation of value occur-
ring as a result of the diff erence between the premature deaths as a result 
of neo- liberalism, poverty, wars and mortality (death in the absence of mor-
bid causes) as put forth by Sutcliff e (2006).  The shorter peripheral life spans 
are signifi cation of diff erential value transfers between North and South. 
Undoubtedly, Arab and African survive with so little, and their lives are 
extinguished way before the historically conditioned life expectancy.  The 
hold of liberal democracy on the consciousness of vast swathes of Western 
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workers, which vacillates ideologically between social fascism and fascism, is 
not haphazard. It is rooted in the diff erential and historical value extraction 
from the days of chattel slavery to the present wars of imperialism.  The late 
philosopher Lee- Boggs captured the culmination of lopsided development in 
revolutionary consciousness as such. 
 The next American Revolution, at this stage in our history, is not principally 
about jobs or health insurance or making it possible for more people to realize 
the American Dream of upward mobility. It is about acknowledging that we 
Americans have enjoyed middle class comforts at the expense of other peoples 
all over the world. (2011: 72) 
 As fl ows of imperialism raise the wealth and boost the higher wages of 
central classes, they also underlie the determination of nationalistically based 
class consciousness. This is not to say that central revolutions are not a pos-
sibility through praxis. The problematic of revolution in the centre has to 
be framed in terms of the material grounds forming consciousness and the 
diffi  culties posed by such social conditions. Most developments in Western 
Marxian theory (Western in the ideological and not in the geographic sense) 
when following the resource- fl ow channels, either neglect the social repercus-
sions of imperialist booty or paint it in an incoherent way.  Revisions to the 
Marxian law of value, the state of becoming in the contradiction between 
exchange and use values as observed in the various stages of the class struggle 
(of which imperialist war is the epitome), comes to deal more with how prices 
would revert to value in a fantasy world, without seeing the sociological aspect 
of how nationalism/ sectarianism and politicising cultural distinctions segre-
gate international working people. The rational side of capital, its ideology 
in practice, must hold back the objective grounds for the unifi cation of the 
international working class. In a sardonic critique of the supposedly benign 
prices that will adjust to value leading to ‘even’ development by a ‘progressive 
capitalism’, including the equalisation of wages by the pull of market forces, 
Weeks (1998) notes that ‘while the logic of the law of value implies capitalism 
is progressive, it is relevant here to recall Oscar Wilde’s aphorism that mad-
ness is carrying any argument to its logical conclusion’. 
 That some workers of nations of exceptionalism are ‘rightfully’ richer on 
account of technology and cultural characteristics is an idea that replaced 
the superiority of race with the superiority of culture or machines. The class 
core of the existential linkages, the real value chain that begins with imperial 
assault on the periphery and ends with the product on the Western market 
and, one that unites a child picking cotton in Egypt to a car factory worker in 
Germany, is purposefully hidden from view. Worse yet, it is at times quantifi ed 
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in terms of prices to show that the whole wealth and lives of the Third World 
are insignifi cant. In actuality, value, in its real and qualitative aspect to which 
the toil and lives of peripheral working classes contribute, is appropriated 
by the international bourgeois classes and passed in welfare gains mainly to 
Western working classes (Emmanuel 1972; Cope 2015). A weakened and sub-
jugated Egypt has provided cover for such transfers. Tangentially, I am aware 
of the interplay of forces that shifted austerity to the North, but as I argue in 
 chapter 6 , the threshold for parting with working- class dividedness depends 
largely on how the class struggle mediates the national or the particular into 
the international or universal. 
 In the same way that sectarian politics can arrest the realisation of working- 
class power in the state, Islamic forms of identity that are petrodollar- funded 
slice across Arab and Egyptian working classes. In view of socialist decline, 
current identity politics spawns the inverse of what Lee Boggs (2011) saw in 
the Black Liberation Movement’s extending its struggle to include all sections 
of the working class – an identity- based struggle that grows out of itself. At 
the current conjuncture, the same intermediation between identity and class 
cannot occur because the overarching ideology that was socialism then – and 
from which peoples’ struggles drew strength – has been supplanted by a sort 
of Meta- ideology that is neo- liberalism. 
 The funding and dissemination of these divisive modes of identity, 
such as Copt and various Islamist identities in Egypt, serve the purpose of 
implosion within the working classes: collapse as a class- for- itself followed 
by fragmentation.  The imperialist selection of Islamic politics for this pur-
pose has historical roots in the collaboration of the MB with the British 
in Nasser’s time and later in the US funding of jihadists in Afghanistan 
(Amin 2007). Although in real history it was not Islamic ideologies that 
governed:  ‘they merely expounded God’s opinion’ (Rodinson 1978, 73); 
the mainstream relegates underdevelopment to some undying concepts 
of Islam. However, modern poor developmental showings are better 
understood within their specifi c historical circumstances and as a result 
of the social forces that have shaped them, or as Rodinson (1978) sees it, 
as a result of political declassing rather than religious precepts. Political 
Islamists provide a valuable service to imperialism in that they shift the 
axis of the struggle into reassessing divine moral values behind underde-
velopment as opposed to prioritising the appropriation of a higher share 
of the social product through anti- imperialist struggle. In relation to the 
circuit of capital, and that is what really counts, both, the Islamists and 
Sisi’s regime sanctify the rule of the market even more than does neoclas-
sical economics. In any case, given poverty in Egypt, imperialist- guided 
funding of obscurantism through the Gulf or US aid requires only a small 
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fraction of oil fl ows. At a foundational level, political Islam does not oppose 
Sisi’s comprador capitalism. 
 In peripheral formations like Egypt, the crisis of capital is constantly 
severe and the anti- imperialist struggle as such should have priority over 
internal squabbles in distributional arrangements nationally. National 
security precedes the making of social security, although in the ideal state, 
they complement each other. The struggle is for national autonomy. It is a 
struggle in which an alliance of social classes under the leadership of the 
working class against various forms of imperialist encroachment resurrects 
an inviolability of the sovereign à la Hobbes. At a general, but not exclusive, 
level the point is:  there cannot likely be anything resembling a humanist 
development in formations integrated with global capital via war encroach-
ment without situating the development agenda in an anti- imperialist con-
text. If anything remotely resembling an egalitarian development agenda 
were to be applied under the aegis of imperialism, it would only be to meet 
the objectives of the imperialist ulterior motives of imperialist stabilisation 
measures. 
 In Egypt, the imperialist bargain struck with the local comprador under 
 infi tah expels huge numbers of workers from gainful employment and debili-
tates social security. In risk terms, the weakness of Egypt lessens the calcu-
lated risks for US- led imperialism to penetrate and exploit other dependent 
formations in Africa and the Middle East. The destruction to developing 
social formations releases cheapened human and natural assets and lays the 
social groundwork for the rate of commercial and labour exploitation to hold 
steady or preferably rise by absolute appropriation. When the production 
process depends on a growing global network of cheapened inputs, the most 
vulnerable places in the Third World are deconstructed to be consumed at 
exponential rates conditioned by the lessened power of the global working 
class in relation to rising profi t rates for capital. 
 The fi nancialisation stage of imperialism has integrated multifarious 
concrete capitals whose success is not to be measured only in the quantita-
tive aspect of amassed universal money form or dollars, but more impor-
tantly by the degree to which capital subjugates labour by ideological 
infl uence. 
 The reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, 
but also, at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the rules of the 
established order, i.e. a reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology for 
the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideol-
ogy correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will 
provide for the domination of the ruling class ‘in words’ (Althusser 1994, 104). 
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 If one allows oneself to reason teleologically, the latter (the sociological con-
dition) is a precondition of the former (the economic condition). Despite being 
surrounded by the glitter of ostentatious displays of comprador- class wealth 
contrasted with the squalor of slums, the ranks of peripheral labour aristo-
crats parading under liberalism swelled after 1990. Egypt was no exception, 
especially as many leaders of the revolt expressed anger without any vision of 
transforming the existing order. Modes of bourgeois democratic governance 
in the Western hemisphere, which have mostly arisen as reorganisations of 
the imperialist homeland for the purpose of plunder, became the moral and 
political standard by which the ransacked Egyptian periphery was to live. 
Workers earning poverty wages, or idle people who could not aff ord a decent 
standard of living, had the choice of voting for the old regime or the Islamists. 
 Ideals of democracy without material substantiation, as in command over 
value transfers, mystify the comprehension of social processes and apportion 
blame for de- development to culture, tradition or moral retrogression.  The 
argument that ‘Egyptians did not know any better’ is just about bending the 
moral categorical imperative on the universality of human rights to the utili-
tarian ends of empire.  If Saudis or Egyptians oppress women or infl ict hun-
ger, imperialist mouthpieces would wryly posit that ‘this is just their culture’, 
when in fact such pain is an existential condition, a concrete universal that 
knows no national or cultural boundaries.  With the left lagging behind as a 
result of the erosion and decline of internationalist values, there is a vacated 
ideological space into which imperialism injects the politics of reaction and 
identity that serve its strategy. Imperialism in the epoch of socialist retreat has 
the luxury of choosing its enemy (Amin 2010). 
 In the midst of ideological defeat, the liberal compromise of the Arab left 
became alien to the broadest sections of the masses.  In Egypt, the poorest 
peasantry and working classes voted radical Salafi  groups into parliament 
next to the MB in the fi rst post- uprising election (Bianchi, 2012).  Together, 
Islamists (the Al Nour party and the MB) occupied two- thirds of the fi rst 
parliament after Mubarak. The alternative to moderate fundamental-
ists became the extreme fundamentalists. To express it formulaically – as 
opposed to viewing it as historically contingent – this retrogression ensues 
from a history of decline in industrialism and social development and a drop 
in socialist and humanist values intersecting with the premeditated strength-
ening of the Salafi  doctrine with Gulf petrodollars. Capital’s ideological 
thrust decouples practical modes of consciousness and replaces them with 
modes of reasoning that shift the mythology of good and evil from class con-
fl ict to divine absolutism. A non- existent pre- capitalist or Islamic past is con-
tinuously reconstructed, rewritten and packaged in print as if it is science, 
although no critique of it is acceptable because it is divine, and the fantastic 
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part of the story is that heavenly intervention in worldly aff air assumes new 
heights. The imaginary abounds while the real political force of class van-
ishes in this mystifi cation. 
 The discourse splintering the working classes in the Arab periphery 
applies to the centre with some superfi cial permutations on a basic principle, 
which is always to conceptually confound social class with identity. There 
is no class without identity, but when the real living process by which peo-
ple earn their keep and recreate themselves is said to be rooted in cultural 
practices dating back millennia rather than in everyday material ties, as in 
earning wages to survive, theoretical fatalism comes to presuppose religious 
fatalism. It is not that culture is pitted against materialism; the two are inter-
twined and in a totality in which the determining moment lies at the level 
of the object or the materiality of living conditions (Lukács 1967).  However, 
working- class alliances come apart when the particular circumstances of the 
struggle do not intermediate the general condition:   when Islamist, Coptic 
and other identity politics reduce the struggle to ‘What’s in it for me’? The 
‘me’ here does not include every member of the cultural group, but is the 
false belief each member identifi es with to off set the blatant inequality within 
the cultural group itself. The perception of a universal common good, which 
would lead the individual worker to see the necessity of bringing the local 
struggle against imperialism to fruition to the benefi t of the whole, is lost 
in preoccupation with identity- group precedence or perceived insult to the 
group or its beliefs. 
 As elsewhere in the AW, sectarian or identity- laced divisiveness in Egypt 
is lurking beneath the social plane and being fed by uneven development and 
deleterious dollar funding.  In the same way, the attacks on the Copts during 
the Arab Spring diverted attention from the broader uprising issues, sectar-
ian confl ict can be resurrected when the next uprising looms to abort the 
revolutionary transition. Disaster- stricken and identity- fragmented periph-
eral formations facilitate value transfer and, in a purely analytical sense, con-
tribute more to value formation via commercial exploitation and absolute, as 
distinct from relative, surplus value, although these types of value are not dif-
ferentiable in actuality. Surplus value cannot just be mimicked by the rate of 
exploitation of central productive labour or the central profi ts, rents interest 
and royalties. Where to draw the line between productive and unproductive 
labour in the formation of value must include the issue of commercial exploi-
tation:  the slave- like labour of the Third World, the war industry and the 
ontological conditions for capitalist reproduction that articulate peripheral 
modes of production by violence.  The moment the Eurocentric optic drops, 
the Asian sweatshop working class and the invasion of Iraq consuming a sig-
nifi cant part of its population in the Western- sponsored war industry, become 
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the productive labour whose value is under- signifi ed by the price that ensues 
from the power balances of the class struggle. 
 Destruction of value and the grabbing of value at little or no cost, mostly 
by violent means, is the mainstay of imperialism in the AW and Africa. Value 
seizure from defeated social classes, both within a state or as a result of state 
collapse (in at least one of its value facets) counteracts the tendency of fall-
ing profi t rates identifi ed by Marx. I am focusing only on specifi c mitigating 
factors, for it is beyond the scope of this work to discuss the imbroglio of the 
tendency of the rate of profi t to fall. To be specifi c, the reduction of the raw 
materials costs is one counteracting component of the falling rate of profi t 
(Marx 1894), but the engagement of unpaid or lowly paid labour, war- tied- up 
labour and the huge yet dispensable reserve armies of labour are an a pri-
ori condition of capital (the pedestal that was slavery in Marx’s words never 
parted the scene of capital accumulation). Under commercial exploitation, 
which grinds down the human, material and ecological constituents’ produc-
tion in a peripheral country such as Egypt, the contribution to profi ts from 
imperialist hegemony is doubly eff ective. 
 More so than lowering the costs of constant capital, which in turn may 
contribute,  inter alia , with all the other mitigating factors, to raising profi ts, 
commercial exploitation creates huge reserves of labour that pressure wages 
downwards, including the wages of the central working classes.  Commercial 
exploitation and politically weakened peripheral working classes cement the 
ideological grounds on which capital increases the rate of social inequality 
vis- à- vis legal equality before the state; it pushes waged employment closer 
to forms of slavery.  This decline in social rights is what Balibar (1991) should 
have had in mind when he addressed the making of the terrain for structural 
and diff erentiated racism. 
 In Egypt and the Islamic world, the Islamisation of political culture severs 
working class unity. Waged work under capitalism is social, and the ties of 
labour are organic. The positive- sum game of higher wages resulting from 
the secular trend of rising organic composition of capital and productivity 
moves in reverse when the working class is divided. A  divided class lacks 
the power to obtain higher wages, as became apparent in Egypt prior to the 
uprising when real wages dipped signifi cantly. But ‘organic’ means that the 
setback suff ered by peripheral social classes will also hollow out the power 
of the central working classes, except for the way the organised dimension 
of capital  – its resilience via bourgeois democracy – bribes central working 
classes. Account taken of the rising organic composition of capital, and its 
by- product, continued rising wealth in real history, the concession through 
democracy to workers of the North must undermine the relative share of the 
social product in the South. The hegemony of capital and its favoured political 
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identities ensures that at no time will the organic ties across the globe coincide 
to consolidate the power of global labour. The pizza that was ordered from 
Tahrir Square to be delivered to Capitol Square in Madison is one such coin-
cidence in real time that capital abhors (Benjamin 2011). Imperialist contami-
nation through Gulf and American aid to abort the struggle and reduce the 
ripple eff ect of revolutionary appeal has been under way. Labour aristocrats 
assume diff erent roles, but at a general level their purpose as interlocutors of 
capital is to delude working people with the idea of bourgeois democracy and 
to widen the gap between social being and social consciousness by placing 
identity over class. 
 In Egypt, the determining moment in capital accumulation combines dis-
possession, value grabbing and commercial exploitation bereft of progress in 
national industrial development. Negative productivity growth implies that 
diminishing rates of added value are experienced nationally, and the prof-
its of the ruling merchant class accrue from lowering the share of labour 
and from circulation. ‘Circulation, of the exchange of commodities, creates 
no value’ (Marx 1867), and in Egypt, the greater part of additional value is 
snatched from the life- sustaining resources by which society stabilises itself. 
The dollar space into which nationally grabbed wealth grows necessitates an 
alliance of the Egyptian ruling class with the central classes or with classes 
rooted in the dollar- based international fi nancial structure. On the fl ip side, 
working class alliances across the globe remain brittle. The ideological reso-
nance of pizza- buying for Wisconsin strikers, as a token and symbolic gesture, 
was quelled (Kroll 2011). In any case, if that is the most that happens in terms 
of global labour solidarity, when dislodging capital requires forms of violent 
struggle, the working class is back to square one. Capturing value in Egypt for 
the Egyptian working class necessitates controls on trade, fi nance and more 
egalitarian resource redistribution. The chances that measures of this nature 
would apply without working- class ordained violence in such a strategic place 
are remote. 
 Closing Comments 
 Morsi posited that he needed a hundred days to turn the economy around 
in Egypt (El Sharnouby 2012). Sisi says he needed longer given the com-
plexity of the task, but three years after he ascended to the highest public 
offi  ce (at the time of writing in 2016), policies have not changed, and liv-
ing conditions have not improved (Accorsi and Piazzese 2014). In Egypt’s 
negotiations with the IMF, Sisi’s ruling class is materially inclined to con-
cede to the loan terms. The headlines from Egypt, however, speak of dwin-
dling wheat stock, rising food prices, fuel and drug shortages and a restive 
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population (Abaza 2013; Saleh 2013; Westall and Perry 2013). Qatar slowed 
its fi nancial support for Egypt on the grounds that past disbursements did 
not suffi  ce to relaunch growth, and later withdrew its support for reasons to 
do with the political persecution of its allies in the MB (Doherty and Saleh 
2013). Currently, other Gulf states fi ll the fi nancial gap needed to sustain 
the dollar- pegged currency. Ongoing strikes and civil unrest in several 
cities could spiral into chaos, necessitating the intervention of the armed 
forces (De Smet and Malfait 2015). The conditions for another uprising are 
maturing at the level of working- class dissatisfaction and, more important, 
at the level of ruling- class disarray, which continues to mount. For US- led 
capital, the dilemma lies in not overstretching its military resources as 
the domino eff ect of Arab crises engulfs the whole region, on one hand, 
and stabilising Egypt long enough to curb the intrusions of Russia (China 
behind Russia, too) on the other. The benefi ts of booty from the US surro-
gate sovereignty over the Gulf, at least for the time being, exceed the gains 
from capsizing the Egyptian social formation altogether. 
 Meanwhile, Sisi’s measures of stabilisation include the reduction of public 
expenditure, labour- market liberalisation, further shifts from government- led 
to private- sector- led investment and export- oriented growth.  These policies 
meet the disciplining conditions imposed by Bretton Woods’ institutions, 
which always arrive under the false pretence of poverty reduction: 
 The cause of poverty reduction is best served by more rapid adjustment to fi s-
cal imbalances, rapid adjustment to lower infl ation and external defi cits and 
the use of higher interest rates to achieve these ends, internal and external 
fi nancial sector liberalization, deregulation of capital controls, deep and rapid 
privatisation of state owned enterprises, and, perhaps the strongest unifying 
factor – rapid and major opening up of the economy to trade and foreign direct 
investment. (Kanbur 2001) 
 If one breaks down the eff ect of these supposed poverty- reducing polices, we 
get the following:  reducing spending on social programmes; reducing wages, 
credit and money supply to the working class; opening up trade in food and 
industry to destroy national agriculture and manufacturing; higher interest rates 
to supply credit and hold the national currency steady for the national bour-
geoisie and, lastly: not that privatisation is ideal, but privatise under an uneven 
legal and political structure shifts public assets to be liquidated by the merchant 
class. That is not a theoretical rebuttal. That is what has happened in Egypt and 
elsewhere in the AW. Generally, poor theory must resort to falsifi cation of fact. 
The money trail from such policies is anti- working class. If it is a question of the 
facetious position of waiting long enough for the brilliant outcome to materialise, 
the working class, unlike World Bank staff , has precious little time to wait. 
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 Prior to the uprising, the World Bank commended Egypt for its fast pace 
of reform. Past liberalising reforms, however, did not attract developmen-
tal investment (plant and equipment), sustain equitable growth or create 
enough jobs, as the pre- uprising neo- liberal literature claimed they would (as 
in Dasgupta, Keller and Srinivasan (2002, 90) and Pfeiff er (2000, 113– 114). 
Although the World Bank demands openness, the single most- devastating 
cause of Egypt’s poverty is precisely openness. Had Egypt curtailed openness 
to recirculate its wealth nationally, it would not have lost nearly as much in 
value transfers upward and abroad (to its own merchant class and to the dollar 
domain). The onus of central- bank- funded pegging to the dollar under open 
capital accounts in addition to exposure in food security leaves the country at 
the mercy of US- led capital and its Gulf associates. 
 Just as in the days of Arab socialism, more equitable redistribution, capital 
and trade controls, multiple exchange and interest rates all remain requisites 
to shift the development course from its dependency on handouts into a sui 
generis industrially driven economy. But a reminder: a sounder development 
strategy might undermine US- led imperialist hegemony. With Syria and Iraq 
having fallen and Iran staggering, nearly the whole of the region is fi rmly 
in the grip of US- led imperialist forces. However,  pax Americana is diff erent 
from  pax Romana . In fact, it should be  bellum Americanum . The Roman Empire 
needed stability and population growth to raise tribute, whereas US- led capi-
tal raises tribute via productivity growth and by the selective destruction of 
physical and human assets, especially in vulnerable Third World areas. 
 Already, US- sponsored and petrodollar- funded Salafi  organisations and 
ideologies infi ltrate the lowest segments of society. The stratum of the work-
ing class willing to sacrifi ce the most in anti- imperialist struggle fi nds its 
eff orts diverted into fuelling the prosperity of capital by expanding the justi-
fi cation of the ‘war on terror’ or the destruction of value for profi ts. For the 
time being, the social forces that shape history are those of capital, and the 
conditions of working- class struggle appear much more insurmountable than 
they did before the uprising.  Coming to terms with the iron fi st of the Sisi 
regime that has proven more repressive than Mubarak’s, and with the even 
more aggressively blocked ideological horizon for social change, the partici-
pation rate in the parliamentary elections of 15 October 2015, was as low as 2 
per cent on the fi rst day of voting, with a total participation rate as low as 15 
per cent. 27 The despondency that marked the populace after the failed Arab 
Spring is beginning to hinder the prospects of a socialist resurgence. 
 27  First Round of Egyptian Parliamentary Elections Ends: Early poll numbers show low 
turnout in vote expected to bolster clout of country’s president,  http:// www.wsj.com/ 
articles/ fi rst- round- of- egyptian- parliamentary- elections- ends- 1445281201 (Viewed 
21 October 2015). The Egyptian people have turned their back to the election pro-
cess.  http:// www.raialyoum.com/ ?p=332593 (Viewed 21 October 2015). 
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 For the time being, socialist discourse fails to punctuate in the slightest the 
development debate. However, as the numbing eff ect of neo- liberal demagogy 
wears off , which it will inevitably, another potential popular insurrection will 
gain momentum. The speed of historical time or the time it takes to eff ect 
social change in the information age will increase further and overcome the 
lethargic pace of chronological time. As Marx tellingly put it: 
 The more production comes to rest on exchange value, hence on exchange, 
the more important do the physical conditions of exchange – the means of 
communication and transport – become for the costs of circulation. Capital by 
its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus the creation of the physi-
cal conditions of exchange – of the means of communication and transport – 
the annihilation of space by time – becomes an extraordinary necessity for it. 
(Marx [1877]1973) 
 In Egypt, the circulation of exchange value did not by itself generate an 
expansion in the national means of communication because exchange under 
the dominant merchant mode shuns the creation of value by industrial or 
productivity growth. Advanced means of communication, as is the case for 
much borrowed technology in the Third World, originated abroad. But mer-
chant capital is pure exchange, and an extension of the means of communica-
tion to the periphery follows from the inherent growth in technology globally. 
Just as the fi rst anti- parasitic drugs for malaria reached Africa as English 
cows contracted a parasitic disease similar to malaria for which the English 
pharmaceutical industry had developed a medication, the means of commu-
nication also reached Egypt to facilitate the role of exchange as a spinoff  to 
the product lifecycle. 
 But social media and information technology might also facilitate revolt 
once again. Not that revolutions need an Internet connection to burst into 
the open, but to the extent that revolutionary deliberations escape the control 
of capital as actual struggle plus  détournement (one may extend Debord’s 1967 
notion of using images and revolutionary language to undermine dominant 
ideology), another Egyptian revolt may be dubbed an Internet revolution. 
For that to happen, social space has to collapse into and partly reappear as 
cyberspace. The speed of the modern means of communication had already 
made redundant the socialising factory fl oor of the nineteenth century, which 
arose as the space to conquer for an all- out revolt. The secular trend of faster 
circulation, quicker value usurpation and their attendant speedier informa-
tion exchange found the new platform (factory fl oor) for working class revolt. 
Whether the next rebellion will transmute into a social revolution will pretty 
much depend on socialist ideological spread and development globally. 
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 Chapter 3 
 THE INFEASIBILITY OF REVOLUTION 
IN SYRIA 
 That the Syrian regime had squeezed the Syrian state to an extent that it had 
jeopardised its very conditions for existence is borne out by the recent upris-
ing and ongoing social and political unrest.  The reasons for the ongoing col-
lapse are many. In the literature they oscillate between the purely economic 
to the wholly political, with shades of synthesis in between. To whichever side 
of the argument one leans, the Syrian military in alliance with various strata 
of society is allegedly the perpetrator of the ruin or, literally, the subject of this 
passage of history. But the most relevant overtone of the uprising to date has 
little to do with domestic conditions and more to do with the great tectonic 
collision between the Sino- Russian camp on one side and the Euro- American 
camp on the other. The world appears to be reliving a proxy war for the 
division of peripheral formations, resembling to some degree a pre- World 
War I  scenario. Prior to the uprising, the Syrian regime and its associated 
social class usurped the resources of Syria, deepening its misery and driv-
ing it to the point of uprising, doing so with the tutelage of Western powers 
and World Bank (WB) instructions on liberalisation. Since the uprising, the 
Syrian regime and its associated class, battered as they are, could not have 
remained in power this long without the support of the Sino- Russian constel-
lation. Thus, the discourse that confl ates the Syrian regime with the subject 
of history is a miscategorisation and an inadequate conceptual tool for com-
municating developments in a process. ‘The regime is to blame’ catchphrase 
extracts selective details from the historical process in order to provide a less- 
than- full understanding of the ongoing conditions. It is social science meant 
for an ideologically biased culpability game, or one that exonerates US- led 
imperialism from its crimes against humanity. 
 Tangentially and on ethical grounds, or by Kantian moral equivalence, all 
parties involved in the making of confl ict are implicated. But by an act or rea-
soned position that mitigates the intensifi cation of the atrocities of the US- led 
class and its ideology on a global scale as a result of Syria’s succumbing to the 
US- led imperialist camp and the subsequent deepening of the rule of capital, it is 
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only the Syrian cohort realigned with US militarism that bears the burden 
of responsibility. 
 At the Kantian equivalence stage, the responsibility is not greater for those 
whose acts have worse consequences. Responsibility in that sense is unquanti-
fi able.  In the historical era of monopoly capitalism, whose principal relation-
ship is capital, the ethical challenge is to motivate the issue historically by 
asking what revolutionary act of resistance should be carried out to thwart 
the rule of the US- led capital class, its free market policies, poisonous democ-
racy and human rights cant and accumulation by militarism and fi nance. 
Moreover, given the strategic importance of Syria and the region, this confl ict 
and its outcome have daunting repercussions across the globe. The practical, 
cum ethical, imperative is to situate the Syrian national struggle in an anti- 
imperialist context. 
 The notion that a small military clique in a strategic corner of the globe 
commands history is  prima facie absurd and, in principle, methodologically 
fl awed because it depicts a partially skewed view of things or a falsifi cation of 
fact. Neither Syria, as a political entity, nor the very constitution of its inter-
nal conditions can be said to be primarily eff ected by nationally generated 
forces. As I argue in this chapter, it is not by chance that Syria parted with 
Arab socialism, and that the allocation of the social product to developmen-
tal ends receded after two principal military defeats, in 1967 and 1973; and, 
at any rate, this was an era of global descent into neo- liberalism.  As more 
Arab countries fl ew into the US- led ‘moderate’ orbit (Egypt in particular), 
the regional balance of forces further tilted against Syria. In spite of its pan- 
Arab hubris, Syria’s weakening security position became glaringly obvious. 
In a self- serving manner, which coincided with the goals of US- led imperial-
ism, the regime and its associated class turned the state of defeat into ideo-
logical defeatism and employed it as an alibi to pass more of the ‘pragmatic’ 
concessions that eroded development and enriched the capitalist class. For a 
long time, the Syrian working population tolerated the heavy toll of austerity 
as the price for its anti- imperialist position. The state bourgeoisie, however, 
siphoned off  national resources and betrayed the popular sacrifi ce.  Changes 
to national class formation, specifi cally, the expansion of the culture- medium 
for private- sector growth – the free market incubation context – responded 
to the contiguous demands of US- led imperialism and the ascending Syrian 
bourgeoisie. 
 Since the battle of Maysalun in 1920 – which appears to have been more 
like mass suicide than a military confrontation as a few thousand ill- equipped 
Syrian fi ghters confronted a French mechanised infantry division with aer-
ial support outnumbering them fi ve to one – the creation of Syria and the 
course of its history have been primarily shaped by monolithic extra- national 
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forces. Superior military force still stands out as the foremost component of 
the power structure with which Syria is faced. In this chapter, I argue that the 
determining relationship in recent Syrian history represents a cross- border 
class alliance in which the regime and its class were structural partners of 
US- led imperialism, until the time of the uprising. As is often the case, class 
ties of the leading capital interests supersede national interests. In the shadow 
of a distorted power structure, the Syrian regime and its associated class gul-
libly internalised the neo- liberal cant, transplanted their reproductive base 
to the dollarised global market, and thereby became a class whose material 
and ideological bases are an extension of imperialism. 1 In its latter stages 
of neo- liberal development, the class in charge of Syria became that part 
of the cross- border relationship with imperialism whose realisation in war 
strengthens the US- led imperialist goal of hegemony. It became the class that 
sacrifi ced its own social formation to its former imperialist partner, who had 
already laid down its inauspicious path of class apoptosis. In its desultory 
unity with imperialism, attracted to and then opposing it, the Syrian regime 
and its associated class are secondary in relation to the making of Syrian his-
tory, in which ‘secondary’ means that its capacity to guide events is merely a 
minor derivative of a balance of real global and ideological forces. In its cur-
rent personifi cation, the regime is left to fend off  a concerted global reaction-
ary assault on the national territory. 
 The regime and its associated class are aff orded real, if narrow, margins 
within which to enact and administer a certain state of aff airs, but the 
historical scene, the context itself, was shaped by the results of an inter- 
imperialist struggle for the control of the Middle East. The peculiarity of 
Syria’s weakened security- cum- position- of- sovereignty in a highly strate-
gic region implies that the class in charge was appropriating more of its 
surplus from the geopolitical rents wrung from cross- border relationships. 
Although every national ruling class enjoys some partnership with extra-
national classes, the fact that geopolitical ties determined both the degree 
of fl ows into Syria and the productivity of the leading domestic sectors 
meant that the material basis for national decision- making lay principally 
in these extra- national relationships. The regime and its associated class 
were trading not only goods and services, but also the weight of Syria in 
 1  The state of ignorance gripping the upper echelons of the ruling clique can best viewed 
from the results of the fi eldwork conducted by Matar (2016). She recounts how state 
offi  cials were aghast with the idea that the president studied in the UK, had a British 
wife, and wanted to become European- like in his ways, as in joining modernity and 
leaving behind the legacy of the Ba’ath and its socialism. A shallow invidious emulation 
of consumption patterns typical of developing countries’ elite has always been a sign for 
the onset of a social national catastrophe. 
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the regional security structure, which in 2015 drew an ‘on- the- ground’ 
Russian intervention. That is why, when the regime decided to fully adopt 
the neo- liberal strategy at home, it also went to the extreme of structur-
ally fulfi lling the diktat of US- led imperialism, including its links to the 
CIA’s ‘black- site’ renditions. It is in this interrelated class context that the 
regime’s margin of manoeuvre and autonomy are defi ned. In hindsight, 
as the region falls victim to accumulation by wars of encroachment, Syria 
was predestined to be fl attened by this implacable trend of history. 
 Conventional propaganda acting as received wisdom posits that the Syrian 
regime represents the principal agent of contemporary Syrian history. Like 
the superhuman heroes of Greek mythology, a handful of people in power in 
a supposedly somewhat secluded state are depicted as the evil force respon-
sible for Syrian political and economic disaster, with resonance disturbing a 
global balance of power. In parallel, Syria the nation state itself is reifi ed as 
a prime agent of history, one that was incapable of meeting the challenges of 
democratisation and modernity for ‘inherent’ reasons of corruption, culture 
or a state whose people are innately ahistorical. 
 In reality, neither the regime nor Syria as a state can be said to enjoy any 
signifi cant degree of seclusion from the rest of the world. Once the fact of 
interrelatedness is established, then, one must investigate the determinacy 
in the inter- relationship. The purpose of this chapter is to read the grad-
ual departure of Syria from the framework of Arab socialism and rebut the 
received assumption of history constructed on the basis of personal powers. 
It is to assess recent Syrian history from the point of view of the intercon-
nectedness of the Syrian class structure with imperialism. Equally important 
is to demonstrate through tracing the circuit of capital or critically reading 
an account of recent economic history (insofar as it can be documented), 
that the process of accumulation by encroachment  qua imperialism that is 
headed by US- led capital, is the primary subject of the developments in Syria. 
Unlike most past colonial practice, US- led capital benefi ts more from a frag-
mented, devastated and non- sovereign Syrian society than it does from Syria 
as a cohesive entity. The intermediated relationships of history are the real 
classes, but the real human beings who personify those relationships and their 
respective agencies are couched within the historically given forms of social 
organisation that reproduce the conditions for class rule and value fl ows.  The 
ruling Syrian military- mercantile class, international fi nancial capital and its 
governance structures, exemplify the dominant social forms through which 
the ruling class – the class alliance of national and international agents rooted 
in the dollar material domain – self- realises. It is through these objective and 
impersonal class processes that the exercise of ruling- class power holds back 
necessary social change. 
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 Much has been written about the Assad regime’s early political swerve to 
the right in key historical moments: its containment in 1976 of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Lebanese National Movement 
(LNM); its devolution of resources along sectarian lines; and its participation 
in the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ in the war on Iraq, to name a few.  This chap-
ter, however, mainly focuses on the economic evidence of class collaboration 
between the Assad regimes (both father and son) and imperialism until the 
dawn of the uprising in 2011. The collaboration itself ended in 2011 when the 
US and its allies turned against their partners and decided to bring down the 
whole of the social formation, as they have done in Iraq. 
 Subordinately, this chapter addresses the pattern of value divesture as 
additional proof of an structural class alliance between the Syrian military– 
merchant class and US- led imperialism, as a result of which national devel-
opment faltered, contributing in turn to the rise of a war economy and its 
associated war bourgeoisie, whose essential characteristic is the drawing of 
surplus through inter- communal fi ghting. I follow the evolution of resource 
allocation from the Arab socialist stage to the neo- liberal mode and justify my 
claim that these neo- liberal developments paved the road to disaster on two 
counts:  the international shift in the global environment toward fi nanciali-
sation, neo- liberalism and militarisation; and the inherent tendency of the 
Syrian state bourgeois class to grow into a bourgeoisie proper. 
 A Note on State and Class 
 The case may be that conceptually no state rises above class to occupy the 
driver’s seat of history. However, for Syria, the collapse of class into state is 
more pronounced – that is, without the subtle disguise in bourgeois demo-
cratic or legal institutions of class power in the state. As a deployable concept, 
the Syrian state, innately fraught with contradictions and later unravelling, 
would be less than adequate for capturing the role of social forces in a politi-
cal process. The Syrian state was already on a downward path, which is 
post facto proof of the overbearing weight of class over state.  The fl eeting 
state autonomy that Poulantzas (1978) claimed to have observed, and which 
sustains social reproduction at the behest of capital, vanishes to the point 
where the state reduces itself to a mere instrument of a ruling class continu-
ously subjugated to imperialist pressure.  Capital can assert hegemony over 
society through the state by controlling the destabilisation that results from 
short- term profi teering. However, that function is not an alternative that 
the Syrian ruling class chose; it is imperialism that carries out the strategic 
choices. For the purpose of this chapter also, the subject of history is not 
an analytical interplay between individualistic agency and structure; it is 
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an articulation of classes reconstituted by imperialist aggression.  To eff ec-
tively analyse this articulation, one must recognise the primacy of class  rela-
tionships over classes considered as aggregations of individuals. As already 
stated in the introduction, social classes cannot exist outside class relation-
ships, whether in alliance with or opposition to imperialism. Ruling classes 
are real social relationships in a state of fl ux whose determination, develop-
ment, and growth lie in their capacity to appropriate wealth by means of 
value realisation and dispossession. A capitalist class in the act of expro-
priating the working class is capital accumulation. Relationships between 
classes are co- determined by the social relations of production. In Syria, as 
in many Arab countries, the specifi city of value expropriation by disloca-
tion of direct producers and war came to characterise the social forma-
tion. By these I mean surplus accrued to the ruling military– merchant class 
without rising productivity – a monetisation of natural and social assets or 
as in crushing the social formation to cheapen people and resources. Once 
the circuits of value are opened, the scope of capitalist development into 
which nationally grabbed wealth is to fl ow necessitates an alliance of the 
ruling class with imperialist classes rooted in the dollar- based international 
fi nancial structure. 
 The relationship of the Arab ruling classes with imperialism is only mar-
ginally supported by the surplus seized in money form from their respective 
states. With the obvious exception of the Gulf States, the relatively small 
amount of money capital drawn from Arab nations in general and Syria 
in particular by the ruling military– merchant class is not the primary con-
cern of US- led imperialism. With neo- liberal reforms, whatever Syrian dol-
lar assets existed, they were recirculated abroad and eventually held in US 
Treasury bills. In the Middle East, the core objective of imperialism is stra-
tegic control in order to pressure the rest of the world into submitting to 
imperialism’s political and fi nancial order. By contrast, the objective of the 
Arab ruling classes is to requisition the national accumulation process for 
the purpose of generating and dollarising wealth from the national economy 
itself. More often than not, these objectives do not overlap. Although the 
Syrian military– merchant class and US- led capital co- align their objectives 
when their earnings are tabulated in dollar form, these classes draw their 
earnings from diff ering sources, channels, and practices. Although the dol-
lar joins and universalises two strands of capitalistic social classes, the Syrian 
merchant- inclined social classes remained subservient to US- led fi nancial 
capital because they had to dollarise their capital as they grow – the level 
of submission to imperialism was such that just before the uprising of 2011, 
the dollar could be exchanged for commodities on the streets of Damascus 
(Matar 2016). In this uneasy symbiosis (regime and US- led imperialism), the 
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regime’s class represents the subsidiary partner, while imperialism generates 
its rents from the power it draws by debilitating Syrian working- class secu-
rity and the sovereignty of the very state from which the Syrian bourgeoisie 
arrogates its wealth. Hence the interests of these two cross- cutting partners 
were set to diverge. 
 US imperial rents rise by the degree of strategic control of oil it exercises 
in the Middle East, a process that principally underwrites the dollar as the 
world’s medium of wealth holding (Avramidis 2006, Patnaik 2009).  Always 
within the context of imperialist hegemony, Iran’s relative autonomy under-
cuts the stature of the US empire and its ambition to control the eastern fl ank 
of the Gulf. Although prior to the uprising, the Syrian regime’s relationship 
with Iran was ‘business- like’, Iran’s and Hezbollah’s anti- Israeli positions 
had provided a facade of legitimacy to counteract the growing popular dis-
satisfaction with lower wages and as a result of the regime’s growing share of 
wealth. Post uprising, the stabilisation arrangement that the Syrian regime 
had instilled at the behest of US- led capital withered. In the new phase of 
the US– Iran stalemate, the rules of the game changed. More than just the 
capitulation of the Syrian regime, but the destruction of the Syrian social 
and physical infrastructure was in the offi  ng.  The reintroduction of national 
proxies of imperialism as partners in the formation of the state is the new 
mode of recolonisation in the Middle East. US- led imperialism has devel-
oped a new pathway to colonial conquests:  a weak and fractured state in 
which its political leverage, principally backed by military means, settles the 
political process. As the momentum was building against Iran, a Syria that 
was slowly fragmenting under robber capitalism had to be dissolved. The 
power of US- led capital does not decline with the destruction of Syria and, 
unlike the stagism put forth by the astute socialist website ‘Lenin’s Tomb’, 2 
the Syrian confl ict experienced a single phase:  the phase of war without 
scope for resolution. Given shattered Arab states, the power of US- led capi-
tal measured by the degree of its strategic control is at its peak, threatened 
only by the potential impact of a Russian intervention that is symptomatic 
of shifts in the global power structure. The notion that the US is weakened 
or has failed in the region, and that a revolutionary force in Syria could or 
would erect a pluralist democratic state there (or anywhere in the Middle 
East) is illusory. It is the unease of China and other major developing nations 
in relation to their holdings of unsubstantiated dollar- debts and the anti- 
American measures they exercise that determine whether US- led capital 
weakens or not. 
 2  See ‘The Syrian revolt enters a new phase’; 24 July 2012 (viewed 5 June 2013)  http:// 
www.leninology.com/ 2012/ 07/ the- syrian- revolt- enters- new- phase.html 
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 The Debate on Reforms 
 As usually occurs with the imposition of neo- liberal policies, the Syrian ruling 
class pushed the share and revenues of huge sections of the Syrian working 
class below the historically determined minimum income. They eff ectively 
expanded the objective grounds that contributed to the making of the recent 
uprising. In most analyses, however, one- sided economic causes, without 
grounding in a broader politico- economic context, are presented as the rea-
sons behind Syria’s slide into the abyss. 
 The collapse of Arab socialism is attributed to statist economic practices 
and their alleged outcomes, such as low levels of productivity, resource misal-
location, institutional weakness, debt build- up and foreign- exchange short-
ages. 3 But this is not true. It is as if no one bothered to check the statistical 
facts as shown by the Annex to  chapter 1 .  Only on account of investment per 
worker, which rose to $3,117 per worker in 1980 (measured in purchasing- 
power parity dollars) and later went down to a plateau of $2,000 between 
1985 and 2008, the dirigiste past appears far more advanced than the neo- 
liberal era (Marquetti and Foley 2011).  It was during neo- liberalism that pro-
ductivity growth became negative, unemployment rose, public and private 
institutions exhibited a marked lack of effi  cacy, real wages declined and infl a-
tion rose signifi cantly. 4  The estimated output capital ratio after 30 years of 
 3  This quote from the Economic Research Forum (ERF) captures the gist of the main-
stream message regarding Arab socialism: ‘Import substitution strategy in the after-
math of WWII produced enormous benefi ts in most countries, it also had its limits; the 
ineffi  ciency of bureaucracy and limits of social programs without enough economic growth 
resulted in the switch to liberalisation. Most of these countries liberalised on both the 
economic and political fronts’. See the Economic Research Forum’s publication:  The Post-
Revolutionary Economic Prospects of Egypt ,  http://erf.org.eg/?s=socialism&type=all , undated 
(viewed 2 December 2015). One ought to note that economic growth in this period was 
quite high and, therefore, the ERF is falsifying facts. Moreover, ‘liberalised’, as in loosened 
the wealth supply channels to the bourgeoisies had indeed taken place, but politically, 
judging by the monumental failure in human-rights abuse both in terms of depriving 
people of basic necessities and political representation, seems to be an outlandish remark 
to have been made. What the mainstream dubs as the authoritarian bargain model, the 
exchange of economic benefi ts, welfare and public employment programs in return for 
consent in an anti-imperialist struggle context, was replaced with what one would call 
the authoritarian theft model, which is a combination of immiseration and submission 
to imperialist slaughter. Government spending did not decline under neo-liberalism. It 
rose per capita, but the lax accountability under neo-liberalism for social waste, as in 
ineffi  ciency, also rose to meet the private sector’s appetite that fed off  public spending. 
Also neo-liberal government expenditure targeted the expansion of the repressive security 
apparatuses and the funding of wealth conversion into dollars for the wealthy (UN 2009). 
 4  The Ministry of Finance keeps records of real public- sector wages, which have exhib-
ited a downward trend since 2006 (Barout 2011).  Underscored by a rise in informal 
poverty unemployment, productivity growth is proxied by output per worker and as 
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gradual neo- liberalism and supposed modernisation was at around 1.05 in 
the early 1970s and dropped to a plateau of around .95 to 1.0 from 2000 to 
2008 (Marquetti and Foley 2011). 
 To undermine the credibility of state intervention under Arab socialism, 
public policies are given a life of their own, deemed inherently catastrophic 
and assumed to decay naturally – hence, contributing to social breakdown. 
 However, the social collapse occurred  after the imposition of neo- liberalism. 
The catchphrase ‘running out of steam’ because of so much government 
spending is the tired and empty metaphor that neo- liberals parrot as the rea-
son why Syria shifted gradually to neo- liberalism. Under state dirigisme, and 
until 1980, social conditions in Syria were on average far better than any-
thing experienced afterwards. 
 By about 1990, as a result of the fi rst doses of neo- liberalism a decade earlier, 
the rate of capital accumulation measured by the growth rate began to falter, 
and state- led investment shrank. The neo- liberal solution was as always to raise 
the openness level and, also as always, to substitute public investment for private 
investment. Liberalisation is said to mobilise local and foreign capital and facil-
itate debt- relief loans and other subsidies from the international community 
(Barkey 1992; Richards and Waterbury 1996; Hopfi nger 1996).  Authors like 
Perthes (1995), Polling (1994) and Sukkar (1994) contend that it was basically 
Syria’s economic crisis of the late 1980s that pushed the regime into pursuing 
a market- driven economic order.  But that crisis actually occurred as a result of 
the initial swerve away from the socialist model, relaxing currency convertibil-
ity measures and the decentralisation of economic decision- making. 
 Richards and Waterbury (1996) further posit that economic crisis under 
Arab socialism forces fi scal and political adjustments. They describe the 
move toward market- friendly transitions as being ‘unnatural’ because 
there are some ‘interest groups’ who are benefi ting from the status quo. 
First, the crisis of Arab socialism was not foremost an economic crisis, 
but a political one. However, it is a good starting point for the authors 
to question the behaviour of the bourgeois class as opposed to reifying 
any policy like the exchange- rate policy, for instance. Yet is it not some-
what ‘natural’ for capital to grow exponentially and for the state bour-
geoisie to make the most out of any transition, especially given its grip on 
power? Also, because the state bourgeois class can deploy the initial funds 
shown in the Annex to  chapter 1 , it has been quite low despite higher oil revenues prior 
to the uprising.  The effi  cacy of the public sector is denoted by the declining quality 
of services (Barout 2011).  Infl ation can be retrieved from the World Bank database 
(WDI), however, the real infl ation rate according to Barout (2011) has been consistently 
doctored by the authorities. 
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necessary to convert public assets into private assets, it will secure the most 
for itself in any transition. Similarly, one questions why the authors do 
not probe the macroeconomic context in which bourgeois behaviour pro-
ceeds. Implicitly, these authors assume that there is some ideal state of 
‘perfect’ market competition, ‘pure’ prices allocating resources effi  ciently, 
and a ‘translucency’ of information, which in fact sound as if they belong 
to some religious mythology of sorts. What is ‘natural’ is for capital to use 
its enormous power to devour anything in its pursuit of profi t, and not oth-
erwise. In a roundabout way Richards and Waterbury’s comments bestow 
upon economic policies a life of their own: yes they reify the market and its 
policies and omit the fact that policies intermediate vested interests, which 
are exponentially expanding capital– class interests. 
 In another moralistic condemnation by second- hand moral values condemn-
ing the epiphenomenon of the unethical in market capitalism, Beblawi and 
Luciani (1987) introduce theories of the  rentier state (a government that routinely 
derives a key portion of its income from external rent or export of raw mate-
rial), and consider the state as the principal recipient and distributor of exter-
nal rent in the economy. They describe Syria- like economic transformation as 
being primarily driven by a fall in rent. This fall pushes the state to decrease 
its role and increase the role of the private sector. The state is viewed as the 
main facilitator of economic liberalisation as it responds to economic pressures. 
The liberalisation process happens as an outcome of the interplay of internal 
challenges like economic deterioration, rather than of international pressure, 
or more specifi cally of external political considerations. Probably more so than 
anywhere else, in an Arab context the state is privately owned; the explanation 
is not patrimonialism with a ludicrous personalisation of history but the grip of 
an internationally integrated class on the state, to which real persons in power 
are appended. The devolution of the share of rents to the working class in an 
Arab context principally assumes stabilisation functions, whereby rents drive 
consumption but not do not raise productivity –  save the reported astronomical 
rise in Gulf- state productivity in recent years, which is incidentally not actual 
productivity growth but increased output per worker (the calculation of produc-
tivity includes oil revenue rising as a result of rising oil prices between 2002 and 
2015).  One is prompted to recall that the class for whom stabilisation proceeds 
is determined by the hegemony of its leading partner: imperialism. Although 
the contradiction between the pressures to accumulate and the need to stabilise 
is not easily containable, the fall in rent can be redressed via more egalitarian 
distribution or equalisation funds rather than in heightened political or eco-
nomic repression, the latter of which functions through liberalisation. 
 Rents are associated with nearly all economic activities. Increasing usur-
pation by a transforming capitalist class has always been the practice in 
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peripheral capitalist societies. There were no economic exigencies behind the 
fall in rents to the Syrian state; at the time of transition from Arab socialism 
to neo- liberalism, productive capacity and investment rates were still high in 
comparison to the pre- uprising ones (WDI, various years). There were, how-
ever, political exigencies. Capacity (measured in modern productive capital 
per worker), wealth and their associated rents dwindled as a result of neo- 
liberal ‘free market’ reforms; the persistence of neo- liberalism increased the 
share of the rich in the real- wealth pie that was growing ever smaller 5 . Types 
of rent and the social mode of life developing around them – as in knowledge- 
based to boost productivity or ignorance- infusing by imperialism to boost 
resource grab – assume their state of being depending on whether they are 
anchored in the sovereign industrial space or in commerce and extractive 
activity without much industry tied to the international fi nancial arena. As 
the global ideological shifts of the 1980s dawned, the opportunity for further 
rent- making from a redivision of the national income also opened up (rais-
ing the rents of the ruling at the expense of the ruled class). The wealthy- 
biasing reforms stiff ened the regimentation of the labour process to the point 
where workers would gradually forcibly consent to the social structure com-
ing undone as the transition loomed.  The mainstream rent literature, which 
attributes rent grab to some pathological personal drive rather than to an 
inherent tendency of capitalism, suff ers from an illusory disconnect between 
the formation of social classes and the state. 
 Rents are congenital to a market economy. The idea that Arab rents are 
unearned income when fi nancial rents are a blessing that helps the market 
adjust to equilibrium is not only discriminatory, it undermines what the anti- 
colonial national struggles were all about, which is the ownership of national 
resources by the working class. The short- sightedness of such an approach 
is in the superfi ciality of collapsing rents into their price forms. Imperialism 
does not prop up a comprador class only to amass dollar returns from capital 
fl ows. The real rents that imperialism seeks are in the diff erentials between 
the value that it cheapens with the able assistance of its lackeys and the price 
it pays for the resources. Yet the mainstream cannot see that the operations of 
the law of value defi ning socially necessary labour is not about the manifest 
quantities of labour and their prices (wages), but about the sedimentary class 
power shaping the social conditions for exponential profi t- making. Does it 
 5  Between 2000 and 2010, the labour force participation rate fell from 51 per cent to 
46 per cent (ILOSTAT various years). This is indicative of the high despondency rate 
related to declining job creation rate. Although the offi  cial and rather exaggerated 
average real wage remained nearly steady, the labour wage share from GDP fell by 7 
per cent over the same period. 
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require too much eff ort to see that capital regularly deconstructs unions and 
bombs weaker developing countries to get cheaper wages and resources? 
 In Egypt, Beblawi became prime minister in 2013 as a result of a mili-
tary putsch, but neither the acute moral transgression of his soldiers gun-
ning down protestors nor the asphyxiating foreign exchange crisis could halt 
the rent grab by the Egyptian ruling class.  As I have been at pains to point 
out, ruling classes in the AW are subordinates of imperialism. Hence, to pos-
tulate that falling rents lead to policy switches in favour of more openness 
depends less on what national ruling elites want and more on what dam-
age openness imparts to the imperialistically sponsored regional security 
arrangement. Rents to the state bourgeoisies from external sources and from 
superior domestic economic performance were higher under Arab socialism 
than under neo- liberalism. The cause of the policy switch is not to be found 
in the quantity of rent rising or falling, but in the broader ideological shifts 
and in the level of commitment of the class in power to the national economy. 
 While some analysts stress economic crisis as the main driver of economic 
liberalisation, others point toward political considerations.  Callaghy (1990) 
and Haggard (1990) adopt the view that in authoritarian, state- controlled 
regimes, political considerations precede economic concerns, especially when 
the latter entail higher risks for the political survival of these regimes. These 
authors argue that political logic supersedes economics, as economic deci-
sions end up being governed by the regime’s political considerations.  Taking 
a more synthesising view, Heydemann (1992) contends that the ‘political 
logic of economic rationality dominates’, and that authoritarian regimes 
can actually react rationally to economic crisis, especially when the crisis 
creates a threat to their security. He adds that ‘under these conditions, the 
logic of politics becomes, in some measure, the logic of economic reform’ 
(Heydemann 1992, 15).  In a similar vein, Hinnebusch (2001) posits that in 
Arab authoritarian regimes like Egypt and Syria, the ruling elite’s preoc-
cupation has been to secure both their class interests and regime security. 
This concern has required compatibility and balance between political and 
economic logics. He points out that ‘while a neo- mercantilist regime sub-
ordinates economics to politics, it recognises that national power requires 
a healthy economic base’ (Hinnebusch 1993, 199), because ‘usually neither 
logic can wholly prevail’ (Hinnebusch 1994, 98).  Eventually, if political logic 
does not place itself in harmony with economic logic, then economic crisis 
will unfold.  Pool (1993) also draws from some Arab countries examples of 
how both economic and political imperatives – the latter ranging from politi-
cal uprisings to external intervention – accompany the process of limited and 
partial economic reforms. He adds that political liberalisation in some Arab 
states has been shaped by both economic liberalisation and the ‘tactics and 
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strategy of regime survival’ (Pool 1993, 50).  The transformation is also con-
sidered to be a response to neither an internal economic crisis nor a regime’s 
political considerations exclusively. Rather, it is the interplay of political and 
economic considerations that shapes the transformation process (Niblock 
1993; Hinnebusch 2001; Heydemann 2000). 
 But of course this eloquent  give- and- take model had already crumpled in 
the face of reality – as the uprisings arrived. The mainstream purposefully 
obscures the dominant relationship of US- led imperialism to the ruling com-
prador classes. It just ignores the tidal ideological wave of neo-liberalism that 
is woven into every action of capital and, ‘ right or wrong ’, it is the mindset of the 
class rearranging the measures of value destruction/ creation at the behest of 
the leading global capitalist class. Why emphasise right or wrong? Because 
in the absence of an eff ective organised international labour power platform, 
there is no right or wrong in what US- led imperialism carries out; it makes 
history as it pleases and even its blunders are assets supporting its course of 
development. The most credulous remark I  have heard recently from one 
the above authors (to remain unnamed) in a closed meeting with Chatham 
House rules is that Europe and the United States are at a loss on what to do 
in Syria; they have nothing to with it. The only measure that  took hold is the 
gun of the state security apparatus to off set the disastrous conditions created 
by a ruling class that pawned its national formation to imperialism. The big-
gest economic crisis occurred during the uprisings, and maintaining regime 
stability would have depended on serious reforms steering society away from 
neo- liberalism. But nothing of the sort happened after the uprising. Neo- 
liberalism is more than the economic policies slotted under it;  it is the ideology 
of fi nancial capitalism, which includes  inter alia the call for small government 
and the false dictum that market freedom is social freedom. Realistically, 
so long as links between the international fi nancial market and the national 
economy remain, it is not possible to escape neo- liberalism. Once the circuit 
of value is kept fully charged by open capital fl ows, it is the fi nancial class that 
has the last word. Not that economic crises in developing areas easily lend 
themselves to sequential logical construction; but the distinction between the 
economic and the political may be analytically overemphasised.  It is a politi-
cal consideration, namely control over the labour process, that holds primacy 
with respect to the degree, timing and even targeting of reforms. The labour 
process to be sure is not only about changes to the structure by which direct 
producers sell their labour power to the capitalist or how capitalists translate 
labour power into labour in more advanced technical conditions separating 
manual from mental labour in developed economies or in how super exploita-
tion in the periphery ties to central production, as in  Burawoy (1985),  it is also 
the historical commercial exploitation and the wars of colonial aggression 
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that are the stepping stones of the capitalist labour process. When measures of 
social control over the working class are imposed, the money- form earnings 
of the ruling class refl ect the degree of regimentation and discipline exercised 
over the working class (the capitalist labour process).  When that labour pro-
cess happens to be in Syria, it becomes – in one minor manifestation of it as 
compared to imperial power refuelling – another war of colonial aggression 
dislocating millions of worker- refugees. 
 The regime’s political rationality does not rest solely on internal factors; 
rather, it is the role that Syria plays (in a highly volatile and strategic region) 
that more convincingly buttresses the argument for the primacy of politics. 
But whose politics and whose primacy is it, when the regime is willingly held 
hostage to international fi nancial capital?  As robber capitalism was ransack-
ing Syria under the watchful eyes of the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs), pushing the state into self- destructive confl ict, not a single anti- neo- 
liberal remark was uttered to arrest the unfolding disaster. 
 The story of economic exigencies forcing reforms does not provide a com-
plete picture.  It has been anecdotally said that Hafez al- Assad would insinu-
ate that the regime cared less for the economy than it did for the politics of 
stability: ‘Do whatever with the economy, but leave the politics to us’ . Given 
the wealth amassed by the military– merchant class, such a statement is truly 
anecdotal. In any case, if liberalising reforms transform public assets into 
private assets at a rate that produces a crisis of authority in which the ruling 
class loses its consensus and is no longer leading but dominates by coercive 
force alone (Gramsci 1971), then the anarchy of capitalist profi teering has 
overtaken the rationality of class hegemony through the state. This phase of 
extreme profi teering value- grab was not deliberate Syrian ruling- class sui-
cide.  It was an act of the broader class of international fi nancial capital, to 
which the Syrian ruling class had hitched itself, self- reempowering by destroy-
ing the value of a social formation that might potentially stand as a base of 
action for the Syrian working classes.  But in this era of socialist ideological 
retreat, to draw a parallel from Gramsci (1971, 556), the great masses have 
become detached from revolutionary ideologies, and the crisis consisted of 
the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum 
a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.  The rise of the Islamic State (IS) 
and other fatalistic politics readying the Islamic world for recolonization are 
such symptoms. 
 The post- uprising confl ict put an end to the reasoning that relegated the 
purview of economic decisions to the regime.  Heydemann (1992, 17– 32) 
remarks that only when economic crisis represented a serious issue in the 
sense that it threatened political legitimacy did the regime take measures 
that would serve and safeguard its security.  Moreover, Hinnebusch (2001, 
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116) observes:  ‘Elites can therefore, to a considerable extent, determine the 
pace and scope of reform according to their own goals and interests while 
adapting it to economic and external exigencies’. As Syria suff ered from 
military aviation congestion over its skies in mid- 2016, this nicely synchro-
nised adaptation did not remotely correspond to the way current events have 
unfolded. Economic reforms were subordinated to the political priorities of 
imperialism, including regime security and its economic basis for reproduc-
tion, which had burst asunder. 6 
 I am aware that worsening social conditions may not determine the timing 
of an uprising; what such conditions do is create the objective circumstances 
for that uprising. From 1980 until 2000, Syrian free- market reforms were 
gradual and targeted. Economic liberalisation was conducted under the deci-
sive control of the ruling military– merchant class, and in a way that appar-
ently eschewed threats to the core power structure. Now, despite early reform 
gradualism, we stand confronted with an appalling social and economic 
condition that includes war and the shattering of the territorial integrity 
of the state. In politics, the regime appeared savvy because US- led impe-
rialism tolerated the minor costs incurred as a result of the Assad regime’s 
anti- imperialist posturing. In key regional confrontations and in areas of 
working- class development and empowerment, the regime did not attempt to 
crack the the imperialist- imposed ceiling. 
 This is a matter of historical record. The Syrian military– merchant class 
in charge actually pushed the limits of resource usurpation to the point that 
the state was on the verge of crumbling. In spite of being in a state of war 
with Israel, in which its security foundation was at risk, the Syrian regime 
squandered the economic and political arrangements that in the Arab social-
ist past had safeguarded it and the state.  Although the prospects that Syria 
faces are predeterminedly more violent, the regime did the opposite of what 
Gramsci envisaged for a war of position that would require ‘enormous sacri-
fi ces by infi nite masses of people and a concentration of hegemony and more 
interventionist government, which will take the off ensive more openly against 
the oppositionists and organise permanently the impossibility of internal 
disintegration  – with controls of every kind, political, administrative, etc., 
 6  One is aware of how slow market reforms were in the 1990s and how willing was the 
regime to adapt . In Matar (2016), a senior offi  cial had emphatically pointed out that 
Syria is willing to conform economically in the hope that the United States would allow 
it WTO membership and more political rapprochement. With wars raging in Iraq, the 
World Bank was not so eager to recommend very fast reforms such as those that took 
hold in 2006. Syria’s role as a regional ‘sponge’ that sucks the radical elements that 
spring on the back of imperialist aggression held priority over pushing the economy to 
the brink too quickly. 
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reinforcement of the hegemonic positions of the dominant group’ (Gramsci 
1971, 495).  The historical trajectory of the regime is reminiscent also of Hamza 
Alavi’s point about the excessive practices of a state bourgeoisie, which may 
bring down both the peripheral state and its associated ruling class (Alavi 
1972). But the specifi c historical reason why a Syrian military– merchant class 
in charge of the Syrian state would allow the anarchy of capitalist accumula-
tion to erode its stability is that once this class pursues a capitalist mode of 
appropriation and becomes an extension of imperialism as such, its exercise 
of hegemony through the state is no longer its own; it has relinquished hegem-
ony to imperialism. 
 The Neoplatonic tenets of neo- liberalism (I am aware that Neoplatonism 
may seem a bit strained, but I am using it as in a formal structure of perfec-
tionistic axioms having only remote reference to reality) worked only where 
they were superseded – in the case of East Asia. In capacity- lacking social for-
mations, neo- liberalism wrought havoc wherever it was applied (UNCTAD 
2007).  In Syria, neo- liberalism reallocated resources away from and weak-
ened labour, cheapened its value and weakened national capabilities. It tran-
spires that whether piecemeal or all at once, the neo- liberal mantra, once 
acted upon, delivered a death sentence on Syria as a state residing in an over-
determining international environment over which the United States is will-
ing to undertake nuclear war (US Department of State 2013). The Syrian 
regime misread the essence of imperialist objectives and its own  rapport de 
force with imperialism.  The regime’s stance on the liberation of Palestine, and 
its contemptuous hubris in relation to other inalienable Arab rights (thinly 
camoufl aged under pan- Arab rhetoric) lost their appeal as millions of Syrian 
stomachs were hunger- gnawed, and the  fl ight of the Tunisian president in 
2011 showed the possibility of regime change. The state was unravelling along 
two intertwined axes: fi rst, to serve US- led imperialist objectives and, second, 
as a result of national economic blunders and loss of hegemony by the regime. 
 Monumental Obfuscation 
 The history of neo- liberal reforms and their contribution to Syria’s upris-
ing and war has to be read in light of two interrelated forms of obfuscation. 
 The fi rst and more primary form is about the process by which the Syrian 
ruling class, in charge of a country at war, had deluded itself into applying 
reforms that debilitated its social base and dried up the source from which it 
draws its rents. As it slowly integrated with imperialism, the regime failed to 
understand imperialist motives of greater geopolitical control and, instead, 
believed that its accession into global fi nancial circles could be promoted by 
a combination of rapprochement with imperialism, on one hand, and the 
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transfer of value and dollarised national assets to the centre, on the other. 
 The second form of obfuscation relates to how the regime deployed its tech-
nocrats to numb the consciousness of its population and promote the idea 
that after neo- liberal reforms, the trickle- down eff ect would result in major 
welfare improvements. 
 Syria is an important player on the Middle East stage. It draws geopo-
litical rents by virtue of that position. Because of frail defences, it acquired 
the status of a front- line state against Israel by Arab League consensus and, 
subsequently, received signifi cant aid from other Arab countries. The Assad 
regime (father and son) played both sides of the capital divide, drawing rents 
from national as well as international spheres, with its own merchant- class 
roots swaying innately toward the larger spaces of US- dominated fi nancial 
capital. After all, when capital outgrows its national economy, it can only 
head toward the safety of US Treasury bills. The neo- liberal bent gradu-
ally shifted the basis of accumulation of the state bourgeoisie from national 
industry, protected and controlled by the state, to one of wealth drawn from 
higher capital share and imports for sale on the local market. The diminution 
of national industry became a corollary of import- led growth and the implicit 
terms of war losses to imperialism.  To boot, the Syrian state’s role in CIA ren-
dition/ torture programs, its participation in the First Gulf War, and its later 
furtive role in squeezing Iraqi resistance, are landmark pro- US- led imperial-
ist positions. But the most important contribution the regime provided to the 
military face of capital was to furnish it with the conditions for prolonged civil 
strife in Syria. 
 The Assad regime was colloquially dubbed the ‘let’s make a deal’ 
regime. In its early stages, the balance of power of the Cold War created 
the medium for its survival. In the post– Cold War era, the regime lingered 
because there was no imperative to immediately end Syria as a social for-
mation by an invasion, as was done with Iraq.  Its developmental process, 
however, was incapacitating and self- defeating; the regime’s repression 
hollowed out the participation of the working class in politics and, in terms 
of military capabilities, it was literally defenceless. In other words, Syria 
was doing itself the kind of harm on which imperialism gazed with gloat-
ing  schadenfreude . 
 Whereas the Sino– Russian strand of capital required a foothold in the 
Middle East and a more or less sovereign state in Syria, the Assad regime was 
drawn toward the United States by a drive to secure its loot in US- controlled 
fi nancial markets. Earlier in 2000, Iran and Russia had practically written off  
their debts to Syria in an eff ort to further consolidate their regional positions, 
but the wealth of the military– merchant class was becoming increasingly 
dollarised.  At the same time, the Syrian military– merchant class promoted 
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private banking and fulfi lled World Trade Organisation (WTO) standards 
despite Syria not being a member of the WTO. Syria’s WTO membership 
was opposed by the United States and Israel until months before the uprising, 
when the United States gestured its approval of Syria’s reform progress and 
off ered the country observer status (WTO 2012). 
 US- led imperialism had a broader goal, certainly exceeding Syria’s $40 
billion income (approximate fi gure for the year 2007 in nominal dollars as 
per the WDI), its pre- uprising GDP. The regime’s strategy failed to peer 
beyond the facade of the money form and to understand the essentiality of 
confl ict and dislocation in the AW to expanding the resources available to 
capital globally: fi nancialised rents and socialised value or idle resources at 
the disposal of capital. Syria is part of the global expanded circuit of capital 
which, through subjugation, involves the transformation of global value and 
surplus value into profi t, and the transfer of value from the South to North 
according to the low prices paid for goods produced by cheaper labour in the 
South (Lauesen and Cope 2015).  The power of imperialism and its ability to 
destroy and create value spans the planet; rising rates of exploitation- cum- 
profi t are the result of the total global capital accumulation process. Both 
idle and productive assets are elements at the disposal of capital, and both 
organically contribute to accumulation. This integrated relationship is a con-
dition of being, or an ontological condition, for humanity under capitalism. 
Retrogression and idleness of resources have been the trademarks of an Arab 
region that is more like a surplus depository for the more active dynamics of 
production in other parts of the global South. The agencies of the imperialist 
class, which create the context in which private capital can boost its earn-
ings, infl uence the ragged conditions in insecure states, slowing the rhythm 
of industrialisation and preparing the stage for higher potential earnings 
through militarisation. The ultimate sovereign in the AW, under the guns of 
imperialism that, as always, are the  ultima ratio regum (the fi nal argument of 
kings) is US- led capital incarnate in the comprador classes kowtowing to its 
directives, its drones and the dozens of US military bases strewn around the 
region. 
 Not that oil is un- strategic, but the hype surrounding the strategic rel-
evance of oil doubly contributes to the social and political underpinnings 
of global accumulation: fi rst, by keeping all those without strategic con-
trol uneasy with respect to an abrupt halt of oil supplies and, secondly, by 
heightening militarism and increasing global transaction risks, hence rais-
ing the rents through rising risk premiums exacted by the US- led dollar- 
based fi nancial order. The uncertainty surrounding the safety of the oil 
supply is fi gured into the costs of fi nancial transactions worldwide. The 
dislocation of the pauperised Arab masses by war and indirect colonisation 
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resituates the balance of forces whereby the money form and its associ-
ated fi nancial system present themselves as real and symbols of power. As 
market crisis sets in, the imperialist power progressively disengages more 
of the social material in the Third World for resource- grabbing purposes. 
This power also fragments and appoints itself as a proxy sovereign in order 
to reproduce the terms of trade and price ratios in its favour. The enigma 
that the cost of imperialist wars exceeds the monetary returns from certain 
ex- colonies occurs because exchange prices are not set by benign mar-
ket conditions, but by the fact that powerless corners of the Third World 
cannot negotiate the price at which they valorise their assets. Imperialist 
wars of recolonisation, especially in the strategic Middle East corner, keep 
the world tense and create the disastrous social conditions that implicate 
global production in the destructiveness wrought upon the AW (more on 
this in  chapter 6 ). 
 Value as a qualitative category is created by the totality of physical and 
human material and relationships available to capital, of which the human or 
crucial element creates the additional surplus value. The dislocated billions in 
the Third World – let us say the huge tranche whose income is only 5 per cent 
of world income – by their very poverty form part of the material relationship 
of capital. The real and ideological pressures that the pauperised and politi-
cally disempowered Third World masses exert by reducing production costs 
via cheapened primary resources and lowered wages are critical for profi t- 
making. Their successful emergence, by contrast, would damage the progress 
of private appropriation by selective and necessarily uneven capitalist develop-
ment. Their debilitation by war entails a weakening of their states, such that 
imperialist military intervention potentially may at any time tip the internal 
balance between national forces in its favour. Syria is in such a condition. 
 The imperialist goals had more to do with undermining the state than 
did the tribute channelled from Syria to international fi nancial circles via 
neo- liberal policies. Syria’s role to US- led imperialism was a  prophylactic by 
which it warded off  imperialist competitors. The leaders of the regime were 
historically predisposed toward the war process, and given the intensity of the 
reactionary assault, there was no option but war. In one early gaff e indicat-
ing the mindlessness of key regime fi gures, the notorious Assad cousin Rami 
Makhlouf said in a  New York Times interview that Syria protected and will con-
tinue to protect Israel from Al- Qaida (Ha’aretz and Reuters, 2011). During 
the early stages of the uprising, the regime attempted to bribe the workforce 
by raising salaries, or to appease the Islamists by appointing Islamic bankers 
to government positions and allowing women teachers the  niqab . One ought 
to note that a remarkable myopia concerning the regime’s balancing act vis- 
à- vis imperialism took hold in the years preceding the uprising, but not with 
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respect to the regime’s class and its international ties: for the imperialist class 
the war was healthy. 
 More so than that of his father Hafez, the regime of Bashar (since his 
accession to power in 2000) and the class associated with it infused the cul-
tural sphere with the rhetoric of neo- liberalism and began to speedily dis-
sociate itself from a relatively planned and heavily state- interventionist past. 
 Initially, the reforms were confi ned to raising private investment and to erod-
ing the subsidies attached to the basic consumption bundle delivered to the 
working population. But, gradually, the glitz of these reforms began to be 
visible in ostentatious displays of wealth on the part of the upper echelons of 
society. The gains to the military– merchant class in terms of control over the 
labour process, regimentation and repression also rose as socialist work ben-
efi ts (shorter working hours) were transformed into a more stringent Third 
World sweatshop environment. 
 Most reforms were predicated on the rise of private investment. However, 
in view of uncertainties beyond the instantaneously foreseeable, the private 
investment rates did not rise suffi  ciently to off set public investment and the 
total rate fell (on average, the investment rate fell from 25 per cent in 1981 
to 20 per cent in 2010, WDI various years). In addition to the uncertainty 
that would dampen ‘animal spirits’, it was unlikely given the paucity of pri-
vate fi nance that the private sector would succeed in driving up investment 
rates. Private undertakings piggyback on public investment and, peculiarly 
in Syria, privateers expand public fi nance via their hold on the state to meet 
their own private ends. The latter case is what occurs in every fi nancialised 
economy, but the process in Syria was personalised.  With low oil prices hold-
ing steady until 2002, real growth rates were on average around zero, and 
unemployment fi gures reached the two- digit level (UN 2008). Growth would 
only pick up when oil prices regained momentum in 2003, and this growth 
was both jobless and inequitable. 
 Despite this malperformance, the Syrian regime deployed its technocrats 
to promote liberalisation and to subordinate and control the social process 
for wealth- grabbing purposes. In 2008, when the fi nancial crisis overtook the 
planet, the interlocutor of the ruling social class in government announced 
that their economy was spared and that some $11 billion in investment was 
forthcoming from abroad. 7  This was a period in which stunted growth in 
children under fi ve had reached 28 per cent (UNICEF 2013). 8 Instead of 
 7  See  http:// www.alwatan.sy/ dindex.php?idn=128939&fb_ source=message (viewed 7 
January 2013) 
 8  See At a glance: Syrian Arab Republic,  http:// www.unicef.org/ infobycountry/ syria_ 
statistics.html (Viewed 9 September 2014) 
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arresting these reforms when their initial dose failed, the regime intensifi ed 
the neo- liberal arrangements, freeing more resources for transfer into private 
ownership.  To invert Waterbury’s remark, it was ‘natural’ for the regime and 
its class to continue with the reforms because, in a context of openness that 
could neither be regulated nor abide by nonexistent free competition, the 
regime and its class were the prime benefi ciaries. 
 Veering steadily away from national industrialisation, the regime was 
shredding the virtuous circle productivity growth/ welfare, self- reliance and 
its own support base. 9  The regime snuff ed the fi rst Damascus Spring (around 
2000) and cloaked its neo- liberal bent with the ‘social market economy’ pro-
posal of Syrian economist and politician, Issam Al Za’im. Evidently, there 
was nothing social about these reforms, and Al Za’im was very critical of 
the process (UN 2007). 10  In the latter phase of neo- liberal reforms under 
Bashar, the regime lifted price controls on basic commodities, removed most 
tariff  barriers, and further freed the capital account. In one indication of the 
primacy of labour’s subjection to capital, the regime lifted subsidies on cer-
tain essential commodities, including heating fuel (upon World Bank advice) 
but dispersed cash handouts in lieu of subsidies on account of targeting and 
rationing spending. Despite the fact that the cost of subsidy was lower to the 
state than the cash disbursement, the aim of this policy was to humiliate and 
subjugate the workers . 
 The price of staple commodities rose, and the infl ation rate jumped on 
average to more than 10 per cent from 2006 onwards (the Central Bureau of 
Statistics of the Syrian government – CBS various years). 11  In the absence of 
autonomous labour organisation or trade unionism, the corresponding rise in 
wages was inadequate (Ernesto 2011).  By the time of the uprising, the regime 
had signifi cantly privatised some swaths of previously nationalised agricul-
tural land, widened the income gap, dealt a blow to national industry and 
promoted import- led growth (Matar 2016).  Typically, poverty rose and public 
health and education plunged in both quality and delivery capacity (Shaoul 
2010). 12 
 The Central Bank stabilised the national currency with reserves, so that 
locally amassed wealth denominated in the Syrian pound could be con-
verted into dollars at a stable rate to the advantage of the military– merchant 
 9  Although the fi gures vary from source to source, the share of manufacturing from 
GDP in 2011 had declined to 4.6 per cent (UN 2014). 
 10  Expert Group Meeting on Employment Policies and Economic Development in 
Countries Including those Emerging from Confl ict 19/ 12– 20/ 12/ 2007, Damascus. 
 11  See  http:// www.cbssyr.sy/ index- EN.htm (viewed 3 October 2013). 
 12  See ‘Multidimensional Poverty Index’ (MPI), 2011. Online:  http:// www.ophi.org.uk/ 
wp- content/ uploads/ Syrian- Arab- Republic1.pdf (viewed 1 January 2012). 
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class. When the currency is pegged to the dollar, drawing resources from 
the national economy to steady the currency represents a form of subsidy to 
the national- money holders – an eff ort to stabilise their wealth in terms of 
dollars.  By the end of reforms, and just prior to the uprising, unemployment 
was still rising and real wages were at half their 2006 level. 13  The process of 
diverting resources away from the interests of working people reached the 
point in 2009 that nearly 71 per cent of Syrian workers were earning less 
than S£13,000 (approximately $274) monthly when the average household 
expenditure on food alone was estimated at S£14,000 (approximately $295) 
per month (CBS 2009). This decline in living standards occurred in a coun-
try where the BBC had reported in the early 1980s that average purchasing 
power was exceptionally high as compared to other countries in the same 
bracket of development. 
 The Syrian Regime: Transformation by Successive Defeat 
 Unconditional openness in a developing context  wastes wealth , either through 
affl  uent consumption or by diverting capital abroad at prices dictated by the 
more powerful players in the global markets. Open capital and trade accounts 
are the gateway by which the military– merchant class converts national 
wealth into dollars and integrates fi nancially into the global fi nancial struc-
ture. How much the outfl ow of the social product in money or commodity 
form is constricted by policy or, conversely, how much is diverted into waste 
in either idle savings or exorbitant consumption, are expressions of the degree 
of working- class autonomy in and command of the social product. A higher 
degree of protection and socialisation in Syria refl ected the extent to which the 
state as a sovereign entity erected the necessary safeguards to link development 
to national security concerns. These are gross benchmarks that apply to all 
fragile states developing under conditions of war or the threat thereof. Defeats 
in war and weakened national security impose their terms of surrender, either 
directly by incorporating the victorious party into the composition of the state 
(as did Paul Bremer in Iraq), or structurally, with gradual liberalisation. Both 
reveal at once the regime’s proclivity and its supplication to the enemy. 
 Recall that in the case of Syria, it is not the Syrian outfl ows per se that are 
of concern to US- led capital, but the value drawn from the security arrange-
ment in the Middle East, to which Syria contributed. Imperial rents are 
drawn from the strategic control of an oil region. A cursory reading of the 
economic history of Syria reveals the close correlation between the allocation 
 13  Gross estimates based on calculations conducted on data provided by the Syrian Cen-
tral Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 
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of the social product to working- class needs and the degree of security and 
sovereignty enjoyed by Syria in relation to the balance of forces with Israel 
and the United States. As consecutive defeats took their toll, the social class 
structure and political rhetoric shifted to accommodate the allocation of the 
social product away from working- class living and, hence, weakening national 
security. The agency that is Syrian class formation lurks only in the shadow 
of greater imperialist forces and, as such, it is more of an object rather than a 
subject of history. 
 Post- Independence Syria 
 Syria became independent on 17 April 1946.  After its defeat in 1948 by a 
newly established and Western- armed Israel, and a period of political tur-
moil resulting in the downfall of President Shishakli in a 1954 coup, a state 
of normalcy emerged, and the only free parliamentary elections in Syrian 
history took place in 1955.  Despite being dominated by more conservative 
elements, the elected parliament undertook several socialising measures that 
protected the rights of farmers against eviction, redistributed some state land 
to peasants and enacted the law of social security.  This parliamentary experi-
ence was soon to end with the creation of the United Arab Republic on 22 
February 1958. Although short- lived, the unity experience entrenched social-
isation. Apart from the establishment of agricultural, residential, and con-
sumer cooperatives, the newly founded Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian 
Reform confi scated unutilised land and established a number of agricultural 
cooperatives and collective farms run by peasants (Chouman 2005). 
 The United Arab Republic ended on 28 September 1961  and, in 1963, 
the Ba’ath rose to power in a coup d’état. The immediate steps of its National 
Revolutionary Command Council included nationalising all banks, lowering 
the ceiling of maximum land ownership, nationalising education, and erect-
ing tariff  barriers meant to protect local industry and agriculture.  In the year 
1965 socialisation measures reached their peak (under Prime Minister Yussuf 
Zuayyin).  This was a period of massive socialisation in land, industrial sector, 
textile industry, pharmaceutical industries, food production, electricity and 
cotton.  It was also a period in which direct redistribution to the poor was ini-
tiated: subsidies and price caps were introduced, and all imports and exports 
were to be conducted through the state.  The main targets of macroeconomic 
policies were full employment, exchange- rate stability and socialised health 
and education.  The expansion of the public sector to encompass all economic 
activity represented the prime objective of this regime.  The private sector, 
constituted by construction and contracting, tourism and craftsmanship, was 
relegated to a minor position trailing the government plan.  In typical Soviet 
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style, the fi ve- year plan envisaged the transfer of ownership of production and 
distribution from the private to the public sphere. It also envisaged a depar-
ture from a profi t- oriented economy toward an economy based on societal 
welfare. This epoch constituted the heyday of security and post- independence 
achievements (Chouman 2005). 
 The Beginning of Decline 
 Syria’s defeat in the Six- Day War of 1967 represented the fi rst turning point, 
one which would restructure the internal class formation in a way that 
was amenable to the diversion of the social product away from working- 
class and national security interests.  In Yussuf Zuayyin’s words: ‘We knew 
that Hafez Assad’s ascension to power came as a result of the 1967 defeat 
and arrangements related to Security Council resolution 242’ (as quoted 
in Ismail, 2010). 14 In November 1970, Hafez al- Assad assumed power. As 
a fi rst step toward the reshaping of the socialised allocation mechanisms, 
under Article 14 of the new constitution, he decentralised the devolvement 
of state revenues to departmental heads and enshrined the right to personal 
and individual private property in the new constitution. Eff ectively, he per-
sonalised the handling of state funds and began to reverse an earlier trend 
meant to supplant all forms of private property in production. Syria gradu-
ally moved from a high output capital ratio investment, high- growth- rate 
phase into a lethargic phase leading to collapse (WDI growth data shows 
that the period 1960 to 1980 exhibits 2 percentage points more per- capita 
growth than the period 1980– 2010; and in spite of the fact that from 2002 
oil exports pushed growth rates to a high level between 2002 and 2011). 
 The new class in power, dominated by Assad and his clique, began a two- way 
process of resource usurpation refl ecting piecemeal capitulation. In one devious 
measure, Hafez Assad relegated the right to exchange national for foreign cur-
rencies to various heads of departments in the government. In the mid- 1980s, 
the scramble to exchange the national currency for dollars in neighbouring 
markets – driven by merchant- class motivation rather than a need to import 
necessities – resulted in hyperinfl ation and the collapse of the price system. 15 
 14  A similar point was made by Hussein El Shafei’i, vice president unde Nasser, about 
Anwar Sadat becoming president as a result of international pressure on Nasser to 
choose him as vice president after the defeat of Egypt in the Six- Day War of 1967 (El 
Shafei’i interviewed by Aljazeera in August 2002). 
 15  Syria had a national exchange rate against the dollar that it chose itself and thereby 
allowed it to control the amounts of national currency being exchanged by its citizens 
for dollars. However, its global transactions, what it buys from the outside world, were 
determined by the market exchange rate, which is set in neighbouring markets. 
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Merchants seeking the scarce dollar on the national market resorted to smug-
gling their paper wealth abroad by means of regime patronage. While Syria’s 
national currency fl ooded the neighbouring markets, national reserves were 
being depleted to stabilise the neighbouring market exchange rate. As national 
money was sent out, the central bank chased it with its dollar reserves to bring 
it home. The dollar reserves dwindled, putting further downward pressure on 
the national currency and lowering its exchange value. The diff erence between 
the offi  cial rate and the market rate skyrocketed, and the state needed more 
Syrian pounds for dollars to satisfy import expenditures. The national money 
stock grew many fold under the pretext that national departments needed to 
import mainly production goods denominated in dollars, but money traders 
demanded more and more Syrian pounds for dollars. In spite of the fact that 
consumption needs were nearly fully satisfi ed by internal production, the lower 
exchange rate had pushed costs of essential inputs upwards and drove prices up 
across the spectrum of domestically traded goods. This process was the doing 
of a state capitalist class dumping the national currency in search dollars and 
the initial act of socialist deconstruction. 
 The drop in Gulf aid during the 1980s as a result of Syria’s support for Iran 
in the Iran– Iraq war, was not signifi cant and was also nearly compensated for 
by Iran and other remittances. The aid may have been thinner, but the remit-
tances were higher (CBS 1980– 1990).  In any case, this is a faux argument 
because even if aid had risen, the leakages from money smuggling were rising 
at such a rate that no reasonable amount of aid would have kick- started the 
Syrian economy again. Because of Syria’s political alliance with Iran, Arab 
transfers fell from $1.8 billion a year between 1979 and 1983 to $500 million 
between 1986 and 1988 (Hinnebusch 1993, 188; Drysdale 1982, 7).  However, 
Iran compensated Syria for its losses, especially those related to transit fees 
on oil from the Iraqi– Syrian oil pipeline (Perthes 1992, 57). In 1982, Iran 
supplied Syria with a million tons of free crude oil and up to 5 million tons 
at reduced prices (EIU 1989– 1990, 32). One is reminded that, since many 
in the top ranks of the regime could simply carry out their exchange of dol-
lars for national currency at will – especially as top- ranking military offi  cers 
carried bigger hauls of national currency across the borders at the behest of 
merchants – the exchange rate sank along with the growing personalisation 
of public institutions. 
 Oddly, the causes of infl ation in the mid- 1980s were attributed to a mon-
etary policy that tallied with the lowering of the budget defi cit (Sukkar 
1994). The rising defi cit, although remaining manageable, was an eff ect and 
not cause, since initially the money supply was rising to satisfy the foreign- 
exchange demands of state apparatchiks.  In other words, the money stock 
rose to meet the desires of those in a position of power who, under the new 
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constitution, were granted a laissez faire deal with the money supply. It leads 
nowhere to speak of money supply leading to infl ation in a protected and 
closed economy in which most basic consumption is satisfi ed by local means. 
Rising money supply is symptomatic of infl ation but not its cause.  In a closed 
economy with dual exchange rates, as Syria’s economy was then, money sup-
ply grows by the pressure of transaction demands in the national economy, 
demands that are satisfi ed by the local currency (the non- tradable sector) and 
by the demands of foreign exchange in relation to national reserves (the trad-
able sector). A dual system of exchange was construed on the basis of a dual 
exchange rate, as if there were dual currencies, some for national use and 
others for external use. The purpose of these multiple rates was to fi nance 
domestic investment by domestic means and protect the consumption bun-
dle from infl ation.  In Syria, this was all the more possible because imports 
represented a low 20 per cent of output (an average rate under Arab social-
ism, in which the import of Soviet weapons at low interest rates or through 
barter were signifi cant), the capital account was strictly controlled and the 
ratio of tradable to non- tradable goods was low. Thus, when the general 
price level rose, including the prices of basic necessities to the consumer, it 
was not because there was more money chasing fewer commodities (there 
were no shortages in basic goods); rather it was because monetary policy 
targeted value transfer from the working population to the nomenklatura 
through infl ation 16 . One can simply imagine the whole picture as such: as 
infl ation rates rose and the labour share of income fell, the remaining portion 
of income went to the ruling class, which then converted part of its growing 
share of income to dollars. Pursuant to this debacle, the president’s brother 
emerged abroad, after being pushed into exile, with enough capital to fi nance 
the fi rst Arab news satellite channel. 
 The early failures resulting from resource usurpation under Assad’s 
restructuring were predictably attributed to the faults of the socialist 
past. However, as already noted, statistical evidence shows that in the 
 16  In crude estimates for sake of illustration: Between 2000 and 2010, the state created the 
equivalent of an additional 26.5 billion $ in national currency, which was exchange-
able at a fi xed dollar rate of about 52 Syrian pounds. The estimated money supply 
required to meet the transaction demands of the labour force is estimated at roughly $ 
4.9 billion. With the trade account being almost balanced as a result of high oil prices, 
and excluding an estimated 8.9 billion allotted to other government and investment 
demand spending, a net addition of 12.5 billion dollars was available for the capital 
class to meet its demands for national funds that could be easily translated into dol-
lars. The monetary policy actually accentuated the income diff erences and the class 
divide in society because the assets of the rich were price-infl ated. A millionaire hold-
ing excess Syrian pounds becomes a real dollar holding millionaire. The real weapon 
against the working class and the key to this policy is the open capital account. 
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socialising age Syria grew at a much faster rate than in the liberalising 
age.  GDP per- capita growth rates in Syria registered 3 per cent dur-
ing 1964– 1974. This rate then dropped to 0 per cent during 1975– 1995, 
a period characterised by gradual economic liberalisation (World Bank 
2009).  The prosperity of the socialist past was alleged to generate its 
opposite in low investment rates, high unemployment rates, inf lation and 
the sharp decline in growth rates. Privatisation, downsizing the public 
sector, subsidies and removal of price caps were the alternatives being 
readied in the background. The circuit of real wealth or value was shift-
ing from working class to ruling class as a result of these policies.  The 
regime was keen to lay blame on the socialist experience, whose top 
leadership perished in Assad’s jails. Yet the early reforms were carried 
out as if somehow the working population was oblivious to the auster-
ity that came with market reforms.  To use a socio- psychological phrase, 
the working class appeared subliminally distracted by defeatism, and the 
price of defeat was such that it had to accept national resource divesture 
as an act of patriotism. 
 The empirics of resource transfers in the Syrian economy expose the shift 
in social wealth away from the productive base and working class consump-
tion into resource fl ight and affl  uent consumption patterns. These corrosive 
policies began with the liberalisation of Hafez Assad’s ‘corrective’ move-
ment in 1971. Measures that assigned a limited role to the private sector 
were advanced selectively and gradually out of concern that a strong revival 
of the private sector would bring about anti- regime mobilisation by the old 
bourgeoisie and the bazaar class, which were dominated by Islamic politics 
and backed by Saudi Arabia. The cliche was a private sector may generate 
demands for greater political participation and more political liberties from 
the déclassé bourgeois class (Gambill 2001).  The struggle with the Muslim 
Brotherhood between 1977 and 1982 was another reason for the slow pace of 
liberalisation under Hafez Assad (Hinnebusch 2001). Assad was not against 
rooting development in the private sector, but it was the old traditional dama-
scene class that he was against. This class had to partner with the military– 
merchant class or leave the scene, whereas the professional, wage- earning 
middle class, whose petty ambitions were not contained by Cabral- like radi-
cal socialist measures, and who remained the main benefi ciary of the socialist 
policies of the 1960s with the public sector providing employment, became a 
gradual loser as of the mid- 1980s. 
 The early liberalisation measures increased the role of the private sec-
tor, allowing it to operate in areas previously restricted to the public sector. 
By 1991, Law No. 10 purported to provide incentives for greater domestic 
and foreign investment. Couched in the law were lenient profi t repatriation 
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measures, unprecedented facilitation of imports,  tax exemptions on corporate 
profi t for a seven- to- nine year period and the removal of restrictions on trans-
fers of foreign exchange (Matar 2016). In 2002, the regime adopted measures 
of partial liberalisation of trade and pricing policy, abolishing the last rem-
nants of the policy of import substitution. In 2007, the regime removed price 
caps, lowered subsidies on basic consumption items and raised the prices of 
basic agricultural products. Under the false alibi of the social market econ-
omy, the full gamut of openness was undertaken. This was a blatant case of 
capitalism parading under the logo of socialism. 
 The Empirics of Cosy Pragmatism 
 Although Syria’s liberalisation started in the early 1970s, it was not until the 
early 1990s that it received an offi  cial proclamation. The need for change 
at that time was expressed in terms of the need for economic pluralism ( al- 
ta’adudiyyah al- iqtisadiyah ) (Hopfi nger and Boeckler, 1996). This term was used 
in most of Assad’s offi  cial statements and refers to the regime’s eff orts to unite 
the public and private (a mixed sector) and bring them into the service of the 
‘national economy’ ( al- iqtisad al- watani ). 
 In the early 1970s, Hafez Assad introduced corporations of the mixed- sector 
type into tourism and agriculture.  Limited trade liberalisation was introduced 
by opening up to the conservative Arab states and to Lebanon in particular. 
Authorisations (subject to a quota system) were granted to licensed importers 
of previously prohibited goods (Hopfi nger, 1996). Customs duties on about 
190 products imported from neighbouring Arab countries were lifted entirely. 
Moreover, restriction on the importation of a wide range of manufactured 
goods was reduced and called the ‘exceptional imports system’.  Restrictions 
on cross- border movement of capital were eased, and the opening of bank 
accounts in foreign currency for nationals and foreigners was also permitted 
(Perthes 1995).  These reforms coincided with the Syrian army’s role in quell-
ing the rebellion of the nationalist movement in Lebanon and constraining the 
more radical elements of the PLO.  During the 1980s, the private sector was 
allowed to retain 50 per cent of its foreign- exchange proceeds (later raised to 
75 per cent). These proceeds were then allegedly used to import necessary raw 
materials and industrial inputs needed for industrial and agricultural produc-
tion. But, as Matar (2016) has shown, the import structure gradually changed 
toward consumption and luxury items.  The number of private retailers grew 
from 72,000 in 1974 to 99,000 in 1981 (CBS 1975– 1983). 
 The early liberal set of market- oriented reforms favoured the commer-
cial bourgeoisie, as distinct from the industrial entrepreneurs. The easing 
of state regulation created a new commercial bourgeoisie intertwined with 
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the regime, or a military– merchant class. The exchange rate decree of 22 
April 1980 was a gesture to the merchants, by which they were allowed to 
acquire their foreign exchange at a lower market rate. However, in addition 
to devolving the responsibility of handling foreign exchange to government 
departmental heads, allowing merchants to convert part of their national 
currency at favourable rates, was another factor that escalated price infl a-
tion in the mid- 1980s.  The quantities exchanged were not as signifi cant as 
hauling cash in army lorries to nearby Lebanon, but the measure served to 
cultivate segments of the bazaar class.  Moreover, merchants limited the sup-
ply of raw materials, machinery and assembly kits and sold them instead on 
the black market (Barout 2011). The merchants, to the detriment of the indus-
trialists, smuggled from Lebanon more goods that competed with the prod-
ucts of the industrial bourgeoisie (Lawson 1984). The regime further assisted 
the wealthy merchants by gradually introducing selective custom and tariff  
measures until they were all lifted in 2006– 2007. In contrast to the buoyant 
mood at the chamber of commerce, the mood was sombre at the industrialist 
union in Damascus just prior to the uprising (Matar 2016). Although relaxing 
import restrictions pushed prices up, the profi t margin of the merchants was 
secured (Mora and Wiktorowicz 2003; Longuenesse 1996; Lawson 1989). 
 In 1985, the value of the Syrian pound in Beirut (the neighbouring market) 
dropped from 10 S£/ $ to 18 S£/ $, and continued to slide thereafter (Sukkar 
1994, 27). In 1986, a new ‘encouragement’ rate for non- commercial transac-
tions was introduced and set close to the free- market rate of 22 S£/ $ (Perthes 
1994, 58). At the end of 1987, the pound was offi  cially devalued from 3.95 S£/ 
$ to 11.2 S£/ $. In order to curtail the contraction of the Syrian pound, in 
September 1986 the government introduced Law No. 24, which imposed severe 
penalties on smuggling national currency. The principal smuggler was Assad’s 
brother, Rifaat, who hauled excess Syrian cash to purchase dollars at the neigh-
bouring markets (Robinson 1998, 163). Merchants also benefi ted and played 
around the multiple exchange rates. For instance, many items that were bought 
at the offi  cial exchange rate of 42 S£/ $ were then sold at the free- market rate 
of 50 S£/ $. The diff erence was pocketed by the merchants (Robinson 1998). 
 While offi  cial fi gures recorded infl ation at unprecedented levels of 60 per 
cent in 1987, up from 36 per cent in 1986, unoffi  cial fi gures reported infl a-
tion as more than 100 per cent in 1986 and 1987 (Sukkar 1994, 28). Toward 
the end of the 1980s, this was coupled with offi  cial currency devaluation 
(only the offi  cial rate) in order to alleviate the pressure on budget defi cits 
resulting from fi nancing the huge gap between the state- sponsored rate and 
the market rate. The cumulative eff ect of lower productivity levels, a trade 
defi cit, budget defi cit and infl ation precipitated a stagfl ation crisis from 
which Syria did not recover.  The number of public- sector industrial workers 
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decreased from about 141,000 in 1985 to 139,000 in 1988, and the number 
of workers in the public construction sector decreased from about 155,000 to 
138,000 in the same years (Perthes 1992, 44).  While state employees, farmers 
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 Figure 3.1  General Price Level Index for 1960– 2010, General Price Level on the 
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 Figure  3.2  Income inequality index for some available years between 1987 and 
1995. A higher score on the y- axis represents higher income inequality, while the 
x- axis represents the years.
 Source : Estimated Household Income Inequality Data Set, UTIP 2008 . 
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redistributed income upward, merchants acquired more wealth (Najmah 
1986, 323– 324). 
 Regarding unemployment, the growth rate of the population was high 
as of the 1940s, reaching 3.2 per cent in 1960 and tapering down to 1.9 
per cent in 2014 (CBS and WDI various years). To ascribe high rates of 
unemployment as of the mid- 1980s onwards to demographic growth whose 
rate has tapered down is false.  The point is that the rate of job creation 
declined under liberalising reforms. In terms of proportions, and that is 
what matters at the macro level, growth receded and went to areas that do 
not generate decent or high- productivity jobs. Capital productivity did not 
change, meaning that growth was of the low- technology type. The fertility 
and growth rate of the population were falling steadily; hence, the sup-
ply pressure was diminishing along a time trend. In summary, this could 
only mean that market reforms cracked the growth- job creation nexus that 
existed under Arab socialism. 
 The available data on wages and prices show that while public sector nom-
inal wages rose by about 300 per cent, retail prices rose by approximately 600 
per cent from their 1980 level (Perthes 1992, 43). The infl ationary momen-
tum, as can be seen from  Figure 3.1, continued building long after the mid- 
1980s.  Figure 3.1 also shows that the rate of infl ation rose in tandem with the 
degree of liberalisation. It intensifi ed in the last decade prior to the uprising. 
In the absence of wage indexing to the general price level,  infl ation acts as an 
indirect tax and shifts wealth to the ruling class. 
 Meanwhile, from the scant data available on income distribution, 
 Figure 3.2 reveals that income inequality nearly doubled in the period rang-
ing from the mid- 1980s to the mid- 1990s,  implying that the reduction in real 
wages as a result of infl ation was signifi cant: scaled projections using trend 
analysis imply that the gap had widened still further by the time of the upris-
ing. The share of wages out of national income declined from 40.5 per cent in 
2004 to 33 per cent in 2009 (Marzouk 2011). 17 A gross estimation accounting 
of income maldistribution using the category ‘compensation to employees’ 
from Syrian national account data reveals that it was less than 30 per cent of 
the national income at the time of the uprising (CBS 2011). 
 Another large upward income redistribution occurred as a result of ris-
ing oil revenues. The 1990s witnessed the exploitation of new oilfi elds in the 
northeast and southeast of the country (Butter 1990).  The origin of oil pro-
duction dates back to the mid- 1970s when oil exploration and extraction were 
permitted to foreign companies on the basis of shared production. During the 
 17  The falsifi cation of data can hinge on the surreal. While real wages were falling under 
pressure from infl ation, between 2006 and 2010, the UN (2014) reported that the 
yearly average wage rose by nearly 75 per cent in fi ve years: from $1,549 to $2,690. 
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1980s, Shell discovered a string of fi elds and continued its exploration with 
other US– European consortia in diff erent areas of Palmyra, Deir Ez- Zur and 
the Euphrates basin (MEED 1996). Oil production picked up in late 1986 at 
a rate of 60,000 barrels per day (bpd), which gradually increased to 200,000 
in 1989 and to 300,000 in 1991 (MEED 1996). Major companies, such as 
Shell, France’s Elf Aquitaine and Tullow Oil of Ireland were active during 
the 1990s (MEED 1996). Foreign oil companies were permitted to use market 
exchange rates instead of the offi  cial rate. Similar agreements were extended 
for the exploration of gas in the newly discovered fi elds in the course of the 
1990s (MEED 1996). 18 
 An estimated 380,000 barrels were extracted daily during the 1990s and, 
as a result, oil export revenues rose to $2 billion in the mid- 1990s (AMF 2002). 
Between 1994 and 2000, Syria produced approximately 565,000 bpd. Production 
reached its peak in 1994 at 600,000 bpd, after which production levels tapered 
down. Pre- uprising production levels are estimated to have been 440,000 bpd in 
2006 (OPEC 2007) and post- uprising levels are unknown because of IS control 
of oil fi elds. In another gaff e, the regime alleges that fi gures related to oil rev-
enues are supposedly part of national security and, hence, confi dential; however, 
importers report the amount of oil produced and the costs, which would make 
it straightforward to estimate such revenues. It is absurd to see such a state of 
decline in technocratic knowhow in Syria, a country that once boasted intricate 
input– output models and extensive data collection under Arab socialism. 
 Accelerated Reforms Beginning in 2000 
 Syria’s economy never really recovered from the 1985 negative shock. Even as 
oil windfalls boosted the national accounts, the misallocation of resources and 
rising imports were retarding the social impact of rising oil revenues. As a result 
of openness, Syria became more vulnerable to internal or external economic 
shocks. More resources were diverted to low output- to- capital ratio activities – 
with the exception of oil. The falling investment rate in plant and equipment 
and basic infrastructure undermined indigenous productive capacity. 
 A summary of the facts reads as follows: infl ation had been rising since the 
mid- 1980s, unions were coopted by the regime, the share of wages was drop-
ping, and the economy moved from public investment- led industrialisation to 
surplus capture as rent and a commercial mode of economic activity.  Just prior 
to the uprising, most commercial exchange was bereft of a national industrial 
origin. Industry’s share shrank to a quarter of its value in 1970 (UNIDO, 
various years). Particularly disconcerting is the fall in the composition of 
 18  For an overview of Syria’s oil sector, see EIU (2008)  Country Analysis Brief  –   Syria . 
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industrial machinery imports, particularly die and mold, between 2000 and 
2010, which clearly denotes a decline in autonomous industrial knowhow 
(UN- Comtrade, various years). 
 The Bashar regime decided to confront the social problems that its neo- 
liberal reforms had caused – by enacting more intensive and comprehensive 
packages of neo- liberal reforms. 19  However, this time around, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) was called upon for advice (Barout, 2011). 20  The 
regime lifted nearly all remaining caps on capital and trade account controls. 
 Customs duties on imports for local manufacturing activities were drastically 
cut,  and laws that had restricted foreign- exchange operations or transactions 
for almost 17 years prior to the uprising were also abolished. In 2003, Bashar 
issued Legislative Decree No. 33, which rescinded Decree No. 24 of 1986 and 
Decree No. 6 of 2000, which had de jure limited foreign exchange dealings 
in the private sector. Decrees No. 6 and No. 24 were de facto superseded 
because Investment Law No. 10 had provided investors with exemptions from 
restrictive foreign exchange laws ( The Syria Report  2003). 
 The promulgation of the banking law in January 2001 authorised the estab-
lishment of private banks for the fi rst time in 40 years. Since 2001, six private 
banks have been established in Syria: Bank of Syria and Overseas (BSO), 
Bank BEMO, Bank Audi, the International Bank of Trade and Finance, 
Arab Bank and Byblos Bank. Their combined deposits were estimated at $3 
billion in 2007 (Moubayed 2007). There were few restrictions on foreign bank 
operations: 51 per cent of all banks were to be owned by Syrian nationals or 
companies, and 25 per cent of bank shares had to be controlled by Syrians 
(Matar 2016). These privileges were usually granted to the new bourgeoisie, 
rather than to competitive market bidders (Matar 2016). Along with private 
banking, the Syrian Stock Exchange began operating in mid- 2009 as part of 
the plan to spur the money market. 
 Prominent fi gures from the new bourgeoisie were major shareholders 
in these banks.  For instance, leading businessmen such as Rami Makhluf, 
Nader Qalai, Issam Anbouba and Samir Hassan were the founding share-
holders of Byblos Bank ( The Syria Report , 2010). As to whether these private 
banks have expanded the availability of fi nance to private and public inves-
tors to facilitate the undertaking of new investment projects, the answer is no. 
 19  As early as 2002, the late Issam Al- Za’im cautioned about the consequences of private 
sector reform noting that Syria remains in a state of war and the shrinkage of the 
public sector would have dire consequences. See his lecture on ‘Strategy for Reform 
in Syria’, early in 2002,  http:// www.mafhoum.com/ syr/ articles_ 02/ zaim/ zaim.htm 
(Viewed March 20, 2015). One may add that as of 2007, the reforms resembled the 
shock therapy that was applied to the Soviet Union, but with worse consequences. 
 20  Also refer to IMF’s  Article IV Consultation Reports for 2009a and 2010. 
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The recent performance of these private banks proved that they have been 
involved in usury- like transactions as distinct from fi nancing industrial and 
developmental projects (Barout 2011; Matar 2012). 
 In 2003, the United States invaded and colonised Iraq, and Syrian 
exports to Iraq, which had risen via contraband trade during the 1991– 2003 
embargo, fell drastically. The negative consequences of the war on Iraq fur-
ther dampened the performance of the Syrian national industry. The imme-
diate collapse of Iraq cost Syria about $2 billion, of which half were gains 
from the oil pipeline between Syria and Iraq (Spindle 2005). As revenues 
from exports fell, capital infl ows from Iraq rose via remittances and fl eeing 
capital as a result of rising resistance to American occupation. Infl ows from 
Iraq rose from $457  million in 2004 to $803  million in 2005 and to $1.3 
billion in 2006 (IMF, 2009).  Moreover, remittances from Syrian expatriates 
(mainly in the Gulf ) are estimated to have reached $820 million in 2007 and 
$850 million in 2008 ( The Syria Report , 2008).  Syrian debts, meanwhile, were 
on average and throughout Syria’s modern history relatively low.  Syrian net 
debt to Russia was relatively small and also serviced at concessional interest 
rates. The Central Bank of Syria stated that Syria’s external debt stood at 
$6.5 billion in 2007, representing a mere 20 per cent of GDP, and that debt 
service amounted to a mere 7 per cent of total export revenues. In terms of 
macroeconomic ratios during 2000– 2010, there was a declining debt service- 
to- debt ratio, higher infl ows to GDP rates, and higher savings- to- GDP rates. 
 In spite of this superfi cially sound picture, spiralling infl ation kept on eroding 
the purchasing power of working people. The real growth rate was on aver-
age 6 per cent for the nine years prior to the uprising (WDI various years). 
Roughly, the profi t rates of the ruling class were a cumulative 6 per cent 
on total income since 2002 in addition to money- form value snatched from 
the working class as a result of infl ation and the declining wage share from 
income, and the historically accumulated surplus from immiseration of the 
working class. 
 But where development counted most, in the area of jobs creation, this 
oil- driven growth yielded little. There was certainly huge informal poverty- 
jobs creation but no count of decent jobs creation versus jobs destruction in 
the pre- uprising decade.  Given the shrinkage in the public sector, where real 
wages took a nosedive, and the swerve away from industry, it is very likely 
that decent jobs destruction may have exceed decent jobs creation.  The prin-
cipal activity buoying growth was the value added from the sale of additional 
imported goods on the local market. Imports as a percentage of GDP rose 
from about 30 per cent of GDP in 1980 to nearly 40 per cent in late 2000 
(averages calculated from WDI, various years). With a ban on public- sector 
expansion in place along with jobless growth (as in decent jobs), real Third 
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World type unemployment soared, principally in the form of disguised or 
underemployment (ILO, various years). 21  Ironically, the regime attempted 
to place the blame for rising prices (infl ation) on the pressure Iraqi refugees 
exerted on demand. However, there was no shortage of supply in the essential 
items (Matar 2016),  and the causes of infl ation, a redistribution tool already 
in use for nearly three decades (beginning 1985), were to be found in two 
interrelated subsidies for the military– merchant class. The fi rst was the build-
ing of national reserves to support their dollar wealth holdings;  the second 
was the removal of price caps, which had in the past disciplined the drive 
for higher profi t rates. Prices were liberalised while sustaining the subsidy 
to inputs that businesses employed in production, such as energy and labour 
costs. In summary, there was a circuit of value signifi ed in money form that 
had favoured the ruling class, which stemmed from a declining labour share 
(as a result of absent labour representation and infl ationary pressure), rising 
profi ts from commerce (as it had supplanted the market space previously 
occupied by national industry) and, ultimately, the money profi ts in Syrian 
currency traded for dollars (at fi xed exchange rates supported by the revenues 
of the state). 22 
 Misallocating Resources 
 In every measure of the circulation of capital and the spigots of value, the 
evidence points to ruling- class usurpation. Income maldistribution, deindus-
trialisation and demobilisation of real resources abound. Engrossed in the 
neo- liberal framework of its imperialist partners, as in losing an ideology of 
its own, Assad’s class completely dropped the gradually relinquished many 
 21  Unemployment data as calculated by the Central Bureau of Statistics is of very poor 
quality. When Syria intensifi ed its cooperation with the World Bank in 2007 follow-
ing the heaviest dose of reforms, the unemployment rate in Syria was said to have 
declined from 12 to 8 per cent, and the unreasonable cause that was given by the head 
of the bureau was that seasonal employment in olive- picking lowered the unemploy-
ment rate permanently. 
 22  To illustrate with the teleology of macro- accounting: while the poor paid more for 
goods as a result of infl ation, the profi ts of merchants rose in nominal terms as a result 
of so many more Syrian pounds circulating in the economy. Although there are so 
many more Syrian pounds, the exchange rate, instead of falling under managed fl oat 
conditions, stayed put as the central bank drew from its own reserves and exchanged 
the same amount of Syrian pounds for dollars. Since it is the rich that hold most of the 
excess Syrian cash, and it is they who exchange it for dollars, such policy taxed the 
poor through infl ation and taxed the state as it converted the same amount of cheaper 
Syrian pounds for the same amount of dollars and, hence, transformed what should 
have been nominal wealth to real wealth and literally gave it to the merchant classes. 
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forms of national security, including the sort of development that would have 
bettered the living conditions and empowered the working class against impe-
rialism. There are two premises to keep in mind: (1) imperialism is a dynami-
cally aggressive relationship that would not forfeit a moment, which would 
allow it to bring down Syria’s security foundation that includes its develop-
mental capabilities; and, (2) in view of the highly unequal balance of forces, 
it is necessary to rely on popular resistance and forms of guerrilla warfare, 
which require a betterment of the conditions of the working class and already 
had proven worthwhile in the AW and elsewhere. Moreover. the consistent 
misallocation of resources off ers proof of structural collusion between the 
Assad- led class in Syria and US- led imperialism. 
 The Assad- led class became a structural partner of US imperialism, a 
partner that manoeuvred between the poles of placating pan- Arab populism 
and heeding the hegemony of US- led capital. This class also became a dis-
posable scapegoat whose participation in the weakening of its own social 
formation enhanced the power standing of US- led imperialism. The Assad 
regime represented the political form of a state bourgeois class whose process 
of transformation was co- determined by shifting global ideological currents 
supressing state autonomy and its inherent tendency to widen its scope in 
material reproduction. Its historical affi  nity for world capital progressively 
exceeded its commitment to its own national working class. More decisively, 
however, the successive Arab defeats, which were particularly Syria’s, were 
not one- time losses. They were major events whose impact was ideologi-
cally deployed to destroy the spirit of resistance. In much the same manner 
as a Syrian soldier who would have to remove military insignia in order to 
enter the Quneitra region per the 1973 armistice condition, impoverishing 
the working population stripped Syria of its ideological symbolism or real 
momentum for confrontation while attenuating its real sovereignty. 
 The social reforms carried out in the 1950s and 1960s allowed Syria to 
develop the internalised value cycle of a nationalistic formation, which eff ec-
tively combined security and developmental goals in preparation for defence 
against Israel’s superior military capabilities. In the atmosphere of the Cold 
War, Hafez Assad’s regime walked a tightrope of gradually de- socialising Syria 
without causing undue domestic instability. Although the regime’s relationship 
to society was one of capitalist accumulation through the state, the state as 
capital’s organised dimension disciplined excesses that endangered national 
bonds. The Assad  père ’s regime assessed Syria’s security capabilities (of which 
Syria’s level of development was part and parcel) in terms of the calculated risks 
they would pose in tilting the balance of forces in a way that would not pro-
voke imperialist belligerence. In any case, the population was fi lled with anti- 
imperialist ideology lingering from the anti- colonial struggles, and no Syrian 
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leadership would have been able to walk in the footsteps of Sadat as early as 
1978. All the while, the regime did not incite a pre- emptive Israeli or American 
strike, as did Iraq. It drew some of its rents from its role in the regional stability 
arrangement – Arab and Soviet aid. The regimes of both father and son may 
have resorted to asymmetric measures of confrontation, but these, all the same, 
were not of a serious nature. In crucial issues such as the relationship to the 
Lebanese and Palestinian resistance organizations and closer ties with Iraq, the 
regimes well knew where the imperialist taboos lay. One may note that these 
Assad regimes also contained, absorbed and maintained records of revolution-
aries from Kurdistan, Palestine and other internationalist groups that would 
have grossly disequilibrated an otherwise tense regional environment. It was 
convenient for imperialism to have a ‘pragmatic’ fi gure in Damascus and, at 
the same time, keep a track record of certain revolutionary movements. 
 Tangentially, one may suggest that if a more restrained form of profi t- 
making from a growing industrial base had taken hold, the distribution of the 
social product would have progressed less inequitably, and Syrian welfare could 
have been better. However, it is a dead end to posit such a hypothetical question 
when the real forces that shape development are as militaristic as the US- led 
strands of imperialist fi nancial capitalism. Between putting Syria to work or 
setting it ablaze, the imperialist choice could not have been clearer.  US- led 
capital’s secular tendency to war- making combined with the Russian interven-
tion in Syria is as close as one gets to igniting a global confl ict, which, in view of 
the dictum that all arms races end in war, remains a very real possibility. 
 From where we stand, any past moment, relation or property of the social 
condition in Syria appears to explain the uprising. In this overdetermina-
tion, the principal social force that laid the grounds for blind accumulation in 
Syria, with a regime that combined absolute political and economic power, 
has been the imperialistically set undercurrent of history – the tidal wave of 
neo-liberalism. Other moments, relations and activities must be understood 
within this broader context in which the probative condition is the ideologi-
cal victory of US- led capitalism.  Prior to the 1990s, the World Bank’s advice 
was circumspect in relation to how market reforms aff ect the stability of 
Syria (Barout 2011). Yet after the 1990s, as the region entered full speed into 
an accumulation by war mode (as in the string of wars burning across the 
Middle East) and the military– merchant class itched for dollar wealth after 
its experience in Lebanon, the WB upped its market mantra for Syria. By 
1990, the clique in close association to the regime controlling much of the 
market, the ‘whales’ of the market as they have become known in common 
usage ( AlHitan in Arabic), was plain to see. This was no fair playing fi eld plat-
form and pushing for further reforms would certainly entail social maladies. 
This synchronisation of WB reform with war destabilisation cutting across 
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the region could not have been haphazard. It need not be thought of in facile 
terms of personally orchestrated manoeuvres, as in the mainstream’s simplis-
tic conspiracy theory approach as opposed to its alleged value neutral science. 
Classes do not work that way. Classes as the interrelated relationships whose 
ideologies institute platforms of actions that primarily reproduce the condi-
tions for the dominant class by formal and impersonal means also reinforce 
the conditions for the promotion of that class. I do not want to dwell upon the 
silliness of magnanimous mainstream personal agency, which is more like 
a psychological illness than social science; all I will say here is that if there 
were such ingenious good- willed and pope- like characters, why would there 
be such an objective, impersonal and horrid history for so long and in a class- 
society context. Liberalisation policy in Syria, slow measures at fi rst and then 
abrupt in its latter stages (2006– 2007), would inevitably resemble the shock 
therapy introduced in post- Soviet economies and the ensuing calamity. 
 As the assets of the class in charge of development in Syria came to be 
denominated in dollars and circulated in the dollar- based fi nancial system, 
the regime’s structural partnership with international fi nancial capital grew. 
The value of dollar deposits in Lebanese banks alone was estimated at $5– 6 
billion in 2005. 23 In the fi nal stages of this process of integration with world 
fi nancial capital, US- led imperialism dumped its Syrian class ally. As the 
Syrian regime moved away from the last remaining safeguards of Arab 
socialism (dubbed regulation, as if freeing the market does not regulate it in 
favour of the ruling class) to neo- liberalism, the rate of transfer of value from 
the working class to the military– merchant class heightened the threat to 
national security and stability.  The turnaround of the revolt, as mentioned 
earlier, was sparked by the loosening ideological hold of the ruling class on 
the state. More so than in less- strategic countries, Syria’s descent into neo- 
liberalism is a form of war- booty galore, not because of the wealth looted from 
Syria, but because of the imperialist power repositioning, as will be explained 
in  chapter  6 . The pre- Assad Ba’ath had consistently represented a state 
bourgeoisie that safeguarded but disciplined capitalist relations during the 
absence of a viable national bourgeoisie in the immediate post- independence 
days. However, it had also stubbornly upheld a populist anti- imperialist posi-
tion and, in that sense, there was a a roundabout incorporation of the work-
ing class into the state. The Assad regime decoupled the working class from 
 23  Monthly, 2011.  Syrian Deposits in Lebanese Banks: Between Myth and Reality! 11 Octo-
ber 2011.  Available at  http://www.information-international.com/info/index.php/
themonthly+/articles/682-syrian-deposits-in-lebanese-banks-between-myth-and-reality 
(viewed 3 February 2014). The amount of deposits by Syrians reported to the Bank of 
International Settlements was $ 4,618 in 1991 and rose to $ 25,991 billion in June 2008 
(IBS Table A6),  http://www.bis.org/statistics/bankstats.htm (viewed 2 July 2014). 
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the political process. However, it could not depoliticise a working class that 
revolted at a time when US and Saudi- led ideology and funds had nearly 
taken over the ideological space of the Islamic world. 
 Closing Comments 
 When the actual personifi cation of the military– merchant class, duped itself 
into believing that the pittance earned by fi nancial capital from conduct-
ing trade with Syria or capital outfl ows from Syria was all that imperialism 
sought, it succumbed to the myopia of dependent capital that often spells its 
own demise. It foolishly clung to the notion that US- led imperialist forces 
would be satisfi ed with the tribute drawn from the Syrian regime’s adher-
ence to neo- liberal policy when, in actuality, imperialism draws far bigger 
rents from the rest of the world as a result of its hegemony over Syria or 
(now) from a weakened or broken Syria.  On the opposition side, the major-
ity were outright allies of US-led imperialism. The moment the war began, 
the articulation of warring factions that history or the international balance 
of forces had provided, became the new social relationship governing devel-
opment, and Islamists who had composed the minority inside Syria prior 
to the war became the conveyor belts of war funding and making. Others 
in the opposition were so naïve that they thought they could remove Assad 
from power and end the war with Israel as their neighbour. The theory of 
imperialism is principally a war theory, the core of which is that capital 
wrests power, destroys value, undervalues existing peripheral assets, and 
grabs resources in order to maintain its rates of profi t. The war in Syria 
destroyed the social and physical structure and left the country weak on the 
security front. 
 Imperialist war is not a process that the political establishment of capital 
can arrest unless there is eff ective working-class opposition. War and technol-
ogy are alien to the working classes, endogenous to capital, or fall outside the 
immediate control of the dominant social classes themselves. To draw future 
policies or construct a modern Syrian history and policy framework without 
fi rst positing wars and dislocation amounts to a formal eff ort without a refer-
ent in reality – a sort of theory of effi  cient history modelled after the phantasm 
of effi  cient markets. Victorious imperialist wars have tempered the ideology 
of resistance to the demands of capital and convoluted it into a form of self-
fl agellation via Islamism. Much like the fantasy that the adversaries of the 
Syrian regime promote about the  doux- commerce nature of fi nancial capitalism 
and the possibility of a democratic transformation in Syria, the Syrian regime 
itself was extolling the virtues of free markets and the imminent transition of 
Syria into a new Arab economic tiger.  However, situated in a region where 
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most politics are  realpolitik - like and war and the heightened threat of war 
represent principal tributaries of capital accumulation, the Syrian military– 
merchant class believed that with the services provided to imperialism in 
stabilisation, rendition, and anti- development, these acts together would 
ensure its leading- class accession into the global fi nancial club – a sort of 
class promotion in the international division of wealth. However, times 
and technologies are changing. The mercantilist mode – selling goods and 
stocking cash – is quite diff erent from a mode which requires ever- higher 
quarterly profi ts from an exponential capital- production process that has to 
partially shred to pieces its human and natural inputs. The Syrian military– 
merchant class misconceived the main contradiction as that between Syria’s 
meagre fi nancial wherewithal and the share of US- led imperialism from 
Syrian dollar fl ows. As will be detailed in  chapter 6 , the real contradiction 
is between variants of capitalist forces:  between US- led capital and Chinese 
and Russian capital that falls under the hammer of the US dollar and con-
sequently strives to partly escape such US hegemony by weakening the US’s 
hold on Syria. 
 The opportunity to tear asunder the Syrian social formation following 
the 2011 Arab revolts was unmistakable. The imperialist cohort wasted no 
time and sacrifi ced the weakest chain in its structural alliance, the Syrian 
military– merchant class  – and with it, its historical receptacle, Syria. The 
drawn- out process of destabilisation in Syria reinforces capital’s control and 
the particular share of the US- led fi nancial elite vis- à- vis the other circles of 
capital. Wars that extend control via the devastation of security in vulner-
able peripheral states also expand value beyond the customary value- creation 
mechanisms. Longer working hours for Syrian workers are insignifi cant 
compared to the absolute consumption in the devastation of war of Syrian 
lives – a form of commercial exploitation. For US- led imperialism, the Syrian 
uprising was an opportunity to restructure the Syrian formation into a loose 
social mass in which the central state exercises little or no autonomy at worst, 
or prolongs the state of confl ict at best. 
 The dominant mode of imperialist control in the AW is not meant to articu-
late the social formation by the medium of the state, trade and capital fl ows, 
but one where a state is engineered to promote the dissolution of the social 
formation itself. It is a way to wither the political representation of periph-
eral working classes and, conversely, an inexpensive form of colonialism. The 
perception that the United States is weaker as a result of leading unsuccessful 
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan is fallacious. It may have weakened as 
a result of rising China, but not as a result of destroying huge swaths of the 
Third World. The devastation left behind by US invasions retrogresses the 
development of working people and writes off  their potential threat. Moreover, 
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the profi ts of the global fi nancial class have been steadily rising in spite of the 
2008 fi nancial crisis. Wars contribute to fi nance, and the US- led fi nancial 
class draws imperial rents in inverse proportion to the degree to which states 
in this oil- rich region relinquish sovereignty over their fate and resources. 
 A cross- border US- led class alliance practises war on the more vulnerable 
states to mould the social confi guration into the form required for undervalu-
ing human and natural assets. That is how victory and/ or defeat are to be 
assessed from a class perspective (as opposed to hallucinogenic nationalism) 
and not by the cakewalk of advanced armies into semi- starving nations, such 
as what happened in Iraq. The semblance of a weakened US is misleading 
because the capitalist class deploying the state to serve its ends is stronger as 
a result of militarism. Capital is a single whole to the extent that the dollar 
integrates specifi c capitalist classes or mediates concrete processes of wealth 
creation into an abstract one through the dollar. The fetish of national divi-
sions fl ourishes in the soil of imperialist divisions over resource grabbing; but 
beyond the mystique of the fetish, as the working class bears the burden of 
war, it is the working populations in poorer nation states that lose the most. 
A consistently losing working class is one that is being pushed into a position 
from which it cannot exercise its social destiny as a subject of history. There 
are no ‘ahistorical peoples’, as in the chauvinist language of imperialist social 
science:  there are peoples devastated by imperialist wars, who if they had 
their say, would prefer to stay out of such European history. 
 In times of severe crisis and war, the state outdoes itself as the political 
medium by which capital is reproduced. The scope of business for the military– 
merchant class of Syria was within Syria. US- led fi nancial capital engages the 
region as whole (save the Gulf), not for what it can draw from it in money- form 
gains, but for its debilitation. Value relations, to be sure, precede the money- 
form making. These are two diff erent modes of accumulation for two incongru-
ous social classes that meet when their wealth coincides in the dollar, but that 
part company according to how much the immiseration of the Syrian working 
class contributes to the hegemony of US empire. In this dialectic, many of the 
physical beings of the Syrian military– merchant class will perish if Syria con-
tinues to perish. This was the juncture at which the Syrian regime went too far 
against its own working classes and against its own interests. It has not yet come 
to the recognition of the unavoidability of armed confl ict and the necessity of 
war to US- led imperialism. But all along, this un- nationalistic class had misdi-
agnosed the imperialist drive for war and acted as a surrogate to US- led capital 
and let the Syrian state be imperialism’s medium of repression and exploitation. 
 To recap, Syria is no ordinary Third World country. It has already 
extracted some unusual vetoes from China in the UN Security Council and 
is undergoing a Russian military intervention.  For long before the uprising, 
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 the Syrian military merchant class drew its strength from the very defeat of Syria , and its 
gradual integration with imperialism over time culminated in deepening the 
objective grounds for the revolt. The overwhelming fi repower of imperialism 
bolstered the defeatism that the Syrian ruling class needed in order to pass 
off  its reforms under the veneer of pragmatism. Defeatism provided the ideo-
logical alibi to forego the goal of combining development with security objec-
tives. It is within this context that imperialist international institutions, armed 
with a toolkit of neo- liberal policies, began to feed the regime’s self- delusion 
of unrestricted freedom in pursuing its class interests. US- led imperialism’s 
dominant ideology harnessed the blinkered subordinate military– merchant 
class to undertake the task of self- termination. 
 Sanctimonious cant derived from international law pervades the discourse 
on the Syrian crisis. Meanwhile, the war rages, moulding Syria into a shape 
possibly amenable to other future wars in the region.  While US- led imperial-
ism, its liberal Arab intellectuals and its labour aristocracy speak of human 
rights and democracy, the allies of US- led imperialism in the region channel 
weapons and jihadists to Syria (Sanger 2012), many of whom are the rejects 
of Europe, whose prisons exhibit a more than higher proportion of Muslim 
immigrants. It would stand to reason that the language of resistance to out-
side jihadist aggression and US- led imperialism in particular, as opposed to 
second- hand sentimentality, represents a more appropriate angle for address-
ing the Syrian issue.  To speak in Mao Zedong’s language of national lib-
eration wars, the contradiction with US- led imperialism is the principal 
contradiction, while the contradiction with the regime is secondary (Mao 
1937). Politically, the language of resistance is about building sovereignty, 
communal security and national defences. In economic terms, it is about rein-
stating protectionism, multiple exchange and interest rates and capital con-
trols. In a nutshell, it is the delinking from the international fi nancial market 
that ensures the recirculation of value within the national economy, which 
was practised under Arab socialism. For that, a cohesive and sovereign state 
in Syria is a rudimentary requirement. The fi ght in Syria is a national libera-
tion war that requires odd alliances against the imperialist- funded jihadists 
in order to reinstate Syrian state integrity. US- led imperialism stands against 
autonomous peripheral states more so than do other variants of capital, such 
as the Russian or Chinese versions. More important, the inter– major powers 
rivalry is a window for Syrians and other working populations to exercise a 
certain level of autonomy. The compass of praxis has never swerved from 
targeting the appetite of the US’s appetite for war. These are real priorities, 
as opposed to one- sided analytical priorities, to make; however, one point 
is for sure, a weakened state in Syria supervised by US- imperialist drones 
strengthens the tentacular grip of capital, not only in Syria, but over a planet 
fast being biologically extinguished by the excesses of capitalism. 
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 Chapter 4 
 IRAQ – THEN AND NOW 
 In the two decades following 1958, Iraq leapt from being a country that exhib-
ited one of the highest income inequality and illiteracy rates in the world, to a 
country with an impressive record of human and social development, includ-
ing a narrowing gap in earning disparities (Todaro 1979).  Economic and 
human development indicators also attested to faster- than- usual improve-
ments in health, educational and social conditions (AMF various years). That 
was Iraq then. 
 When, in Geneva in 1991, US Secretary of State James Baker III warned 
Tariq Aziz, the deputy prime minister of Iraq, that Iraq would be bombed back 
into the Stone Age, he probably meant that the United States would deprive 
the Iraqi civilian population of the right to security of person, water, health, 
shelter and, more generally, the requirements for decent living. 1  In 2015, Iraq 
has become a war- plagued and divided territory, and  its fi rst prime minister in 
the Paul Bremer government of 2003, Ayad Allawi, has recently declared that 
‘the Iraqi people are longing for the days of Saddam Hussein’. 2 This is Iraq  now . 
 Between  then and  now , hundreds of thousands have died as an immediate 
outcome of the fi rst US aggression in 1991, the ensuing embargo and the all- 
out invasion and subsequent colonisation. The war’s impact fragmented Iraq 
as a state. There are territories that are ethnically or sectarianly cleansed 
under a nominal republic.  According to a 2011 report, nearly ten years after 
the fall of Saddam’s regime, and with oil revenues that have increased nearly 
tenfold as a result of rising oil prices,  more than a  million orphaned children 
 1  Iraqis Endure Worse Conditions than Under Saddam, UN Survey Finds, by Chris 
Shumway,  The Standard , 18 May 2005; and, Daily Living Conditions in Iraq dismal, 
UN survey fi nds, UN News Centre. (see recent article entitled ‘Food Shortages Gnaw 
at Iraqis’ Stomachs, Morale’ Louise Roug,  Times Staff  Writer, 16 June 2005, under-
scores the horrifi c conditions in Iraq. And according the article, ‘Shrinking subsidised 
rations are blamed on corruption, security problems or the US’. Another UN article 
sways in that very direction, asserting that conditions in Iraq at present are worse than 
they used to be. 
 2  Iraqis long for the days of Saddam Hussein,  http:// www.raialyoum.com/ ?p=379712 
(viewed 26 January 2016). 
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remained abandoned in the streets of Baghdad (Aljazeera 2011).  Rates of 
birth defects where depleted uranium- laced artillery rounds were fi red in US 
bombardments are signifi cantly high (Al Sabbak 2012; Halliday 2013); what 
is not so unusual, given how sensitive Iraq is to US- led imperialism, the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) covered up Iraq’s nuclear nightmare (Ahmed 
2013).  The electric- power crisis has lingered since 2003, and a government 
report prepared by the advisers to the board in the prime minister’s offi  ce 
estimates that Iraq loses billions of dollars annually due to the power crisis 
( Shafaq News 2013). 3 After the 1991 bombing devastation and the subsequent 
embargo, electric power was restored only few months later and with only 
national means managed by the government of Saddam Hussein.  On the 
distribution- of- income side, labour’s share of national income is estimated 
at a pitiful 11 per cent, one of the lowest recorded levels globally (Guerriero 
2012). 4 
 Apart from its Hollywood- style monster movie spectacle, the IS is no 
anomaly in the region; it nourishes its raison d’être by mauling international 
law, erasing recognised borders and setting up an ethnically ‘pure’ govern-
ment. However, because Muslims inhabit many pluralistic states around the 
globe, the IS media impact is giving the jitters to the foundations of the mod-
ern state system. De- facto, the IS carries out a colonial- hate agenda similar to 
past forms of cultural imperialism, with the object being to rupture continuity 
with the indigenous past. IS measures include the erasure of nationalist iden-
tity, destruction of historical sites and the cultural heritage, especially in Iraq 
and Syria. The IS’s heightening terror, deeds and rhetoric, would not harm 
an imperialist capital that principally grows by militarisation such as that 
of the US. 5  Moreover, whereas material- and human- consuming war rages 
across huge swaths of the region, US- led imperialism acquired a positive 
 3  The Maliki government in Iraq has removed much of the macroeconomic data and 
historical time series that were available on the World Bank’s WDI database. Obvi-
ously, the fi gure given above is exaggerated and driven by political mudslinging. The 
losses from waste and rechannelling funds destined to revive electric power are signifi -
cant. 
 4  The last year in the sample used by Guerriero is 2009. According to the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation. the last estimate given for the labour share from national 
income was 21 per cent for the year 2004 (ILOSTAT 2016). This is a very low esti-
mate and indicates extreme income inequality. Since 2004, labour has splintered over 
unreachable territory and conditions have deteriorated so much that measurements 
have become impossible. Iraq has removed much of the past data it has provided to the 
World Bank. 
 5  The fragmentation of Iraq along purist identity lines represents a threat to many 
multi- ethnic states. States, such as Russia, face a disconcerting nuisance that may seep 
through the fundamentalist pipelines. 
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development in the establishment of a de facto ally in the Iraqi Kurdish 
region – another loyal land base from which its military arm can further tilt 
regional battlegrounds. Iraqi Kurdistan has long been an American launch-
ing pad of aggression against the Iraqi state, and according to emerging anec-
dotal evidence, the ruling Iraqi Kurdish class had toyed with idea of erecting 
a statue of the late Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon in Irbil. 
 Under the aegis of US- imposed governments, rising Iraqi oil revenues 
have funded and entrenched social- identity divisions that so far have pro-
duced more sorrow than solace. They did so through the US- reconstructed 
Iraqi state and its sectarian constitution after the 2003 occupation. To be 
sure, sectarian identity itself has no being or ontological being of its own; 
it is a political relationship defi ned within particular circumstances of the 
class struggle and in a historically determined social formation. As such, 
it was constituted by the colonially engineered state and  not as result of its 
pre- capitalist historical origins (Amel 1980). Even though feudalism was the 
womb in which sectarianism was conceived, modern sectarian identity is a 
product of colonial production relations as opposed to pre- capitalist relations 
because it is the form in which the colonially spawned bourgeoisie exercises 
its class power (Amel 1980). 
 In the new sectarianism of Iraq there is much that resembles the past in 
form, as the names of Islamic saints ( Walis ) and past symbols reappear anew, 
but almost nothing in content. More so than any other reconstruction of 
identity, the current Sunni– Shiite sectarian phenomenon defi es the dialec-
tic of continuity and discontinuity. Whereas, in a dialectical relationship the 
past is sublated, negated and preserved simultaneously, the literal extrica-
tion of nearly all contrarian sources of knowledge in Iraq and the erection 
of an unfalsiable science of sect or ethnicity, put in place an identity whose 
ridiculously mythologised content bears only the remotest resemblance with 
the past. With the unchecked reconstruction of identity, divinities, saints and 
godlike imams are on record to have joined the battles of the sectarian wars. 
The assentation – the simultaneous discontent and obsequiousness of some 
under Saddam – has been replaced by unquestionable consent in which sec-
tarian bonds and goals justify ethnic cleansing, at scales previously unseen 
in the region, by adherence to faith (autonomism- like). With Paul Bremer’s 
constitution designating the control of the social product and oil revenues to 
Shiites, the condition for permanent civil strife were securely put in place. 
The sect- sprung bourgeoisie reconstitutes itself via the sectarian rent channel 
and a higher share of the rent often arises on the basis of inter- sectarian war. 
 The combination of secluding identity myth from critique by repres-
sion, dependency on sectarian war income for livelihood and an individual 
or collective security that obtains from the sect or sub- sect have circularly 
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supported the post- American war condition. One has to note that competi-
tion for loot around the sect drives a self- dividing structure; there are many 
new inter- sect divisions that were unheard of before. Obviously, while the 
AW rebelled against abjection and for civil liberties during the Arab Spring, 
in Iraq, the sectarian divide pre- empted the grounds for revolt. Iraqi workers 
are suff ering worse conditions at the hands of their ruling class, yet they fi ght 
each other instead of fi ghting their oppressor . 
 In what has become a small world in real time, the supposed US war on 
terror, a ‘positive externality’ to capital as a result of the war on Iraq amounts 
to an assault on the achievements of working people and their civil liberties 
everywhere. In imperialist power terms, which is the overarching condition 
for the continued worsening of the status quo as a result of rearing inter- 
communal confl ict dressed in sectarianism, the debilitation of Iraq and Syria 
strengthened American– Israeli hegemony over the region.  Israel has now ‘the 
strongest army from the Indian to the Atlantic Ocean’ and most Arab armies 
are ineff ective (Yadlin 2015). 
 Not only in terms of the rising profi t rates of the corporate– fi nancial sector 
and the ideological power of US- led capital that had allowed it to suppress 
its own working class wages and segment it, but also in the demonstrable 
scare- eff ect arising from its ability to destroy a country and set it on a path 
of permanent implosion, the Iraq campaign has not downgraded the rank-
ing of the US empire.  If anything, the rise of China may have been stunted 
as a result of instability in Iraq, an area upon which it exercises little control. 
US- led imperialism, which includes Israel as the regional thrust point, is now 
interwoven into the governing structure of Iraq and the Gulf states – as much 
as was any colonial power in the past.  An implosive Iraq, subjected to NATO 
fi repower and deprived of sovereignty, not only boosts US leverage over the 
region and the globe, but beneath the perception of power it is also a process of 
destruction of physical and human value, a process that disengages unwanted 
resources from an oversupplied global production circuit. The costs of US 
and Western aggression – couched under the rubric of humanitarianism – are 
more than off set by the dual leveraging mechanism of re- establishing power 
via the demonstration eff ect, or from the destruction of value that recompose 
value relationships in capital’s favour. The US has to demonstrate its ability 
to control or to easily win against a potential adversary, which drives the 
fi nancial world to the safety of the US market. Stripped bare of falsehood, the 
prices and the sums of fi nancial resources they amount to are the signifi cation 
of the operation of the law of value in territories like Iraq, whose destruction 
reduces the control of Iraqi people over their wealth, and their labour and 
resources (the Iraqi people’s) would be assessed in terms of imperialistically 
determined prices. After the imperialist- sponsored siphoning of the bulk of 
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national wealth, the remaining resources are insuffi  cient for the Arab labour-
ing classes to maintain a minimum historically determined standard of living. 
The law of value, the tailoring of concrete labouring conditions that go into a 
labour process to the terms of exchange, spans the acts of consuming people’s 
labour power in production to literally consuming people in wars. This law 
of value underpins the emergence of the dollar- form as the signifi cation of 
the ultimate power symbol and has continually favoured US- led capital. As 
Rosa Luxemburg posited (1913), militarism is a domain of accumulation; but 
what was not added by her emphatically is that the consumption of human 
beings in war is itself part of the reproduction of capital.  Unlike the targeted 
killing of fascism, US imperialism is racially and culturally indiscriminate in 
its process of war as the exercise of power and the representation of power. 
 As is discussed in the concluding chapter, there are endless ripples to impe-
rialist assaults. But just as a prelude: wars on embargoed and starving Iraqi 
working people have served to maintain US control of oil supplies through 
direct military presence further stabilised a fi nancial order in which the dol-
lar remained the world reserve currency and wealth- holding medium; rein-
forced militaristic, religious and ultranationalist ideologies globally, helped 
compress the global wage, raised the dollar money supply by the trillions in 
costs that fi nancial capital held in US debts,  taxed the US working class and 
reduced its share of income , tested new war technology and improved old 
technology and, ultimately, allowed US- led capital to hold at bay ascendant 
and competing capitalist powers. In addition to following the descent of Iraq 
from its socialist period, which is blatantly obvious given its catastrophic con-
dition since 1991, this chapter addresses some issues related to the causality of 
war and depicts the occupation of Iraq in relation to the imperialist objective 
of undervaluing Third World assets and raising imperialist rents.  This chap-
ter examines Iraq’s occupation in terms of accumulation by encroachment, as 
per Lenin’s defi nition of imperialism (1916). 
 Causation 
 On a superfi cial or media- traded level, the supposed cause of the two wars 
(in 1991 and 2003) with Iraq swings between the dictatorship of Saddam and 
the aggression of an American empire. These explanations are working- class 
stultifi cation eff orts that respond to or shape impulsive community moods. 
Causality in history is multifarious. On the surface, how evidence is inter-
preted and classifi ed in assessing causation is closely attached to the values 
and interests of diff erent social classes. A victorious empire may write the sali-
ent version of history as it wishes, but in the existing crisis of the imperialist 
class order, can any version of a victor’s history closely refl ect the historicity 
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of events? All that is required to answer a question of this nature is to see 
why mainstream historiography overlooks war making as the  raison d’être of 
the institutions and cultural heritage of capital. In the complex and fl uid 
structure of history, there is a set of connected and determining relationships 
around which all other relationships congregate (Luckacs 1919; Carr 1961). 
 The materially foregrounded and principal relationship in the totality of the 
historical moment is imperialist aggression. Imperialist assault and its related 
consequences are a cut above all the other causes; they are the gyroscope 
steadying global accumulation. They underwrite fi nance and, subsequently, 
intertwine themselves ideologically into the subaltern nodes of prevailing 
consciousness as defeat turns into resignation and sinks into the national  état 
d’esprit of the conquered. The very weakness of the peripheral national struc-
ture becomes itself an incentive inviting further aggression. Low calculated 
risks on account of weak self- defence or internal confl ict that mounts to resolve 
the crisis lessen the calculated risk of further imperialist aggression. After 
starving and bombing Iraq between 1991 and 2003, the country’s defences 
cracked. Iraq’s initial bombing and later occupation were dubbed cakewalks. 
Moreover, as soon as the trappings of the American- instilled political order 
began to take shape, Iraq’s medium of self- reproduction as a social forma-
tion became intercommunal confl ict. 6 Whereas it required the second- largest 
US military build- up since World War II to occupy Iraq in 2003, all it takes 
since the beginning of sectarian violence in 2006 is a small division fi ghting 
alongside an Iraqi military faction to tip the internal military balance one 
way or another. 
 In a developing- formation context, working- class consciousness transpires 
according to the forms of resistance the class undertakes vis- à- vis imperialist 
aggression (Larrain 1994). Analytical reasoning or pedagogy, as in telling 
people to do what is good for them, is subsidiary to consciousness emerg-
ing from praxis in the course of class struggle. How diff ering class positions 
are practiced and realigned against imperialism in national liberation strug-
gles – which subjugate identity to class – is how a national working class tran-
scends itself through internationalism. However, more than a decade after 
the invasion, the positioning of various national (sectarian, communal) forces 
in Iraq is less against imperialism and more against one another. Mediating 
these national struggles into a common anti- imperialist position is not an out-
come that Iraqis can achieve alone; the state of the struggle worldwide and its 
 6  The United States owes the ingenuity of the application of the sectarian state model 
in Iraq to France’s introduction of the confessional political order in Lebanon in 1920. 
The sharing of power and rent through the state between various sects created the 
permanent conditions for civil war in Lebanon. 
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ideological bearing on Iraq determine whether revolutionary fi res will fl are 
again. The Iraqi working classes overcoming their American- imposed divi-
sive identities is synonymous with their reclaiming the channels by which 
their bourgeoisie reproduces its wealth or with knowing that national libera-
tion cannot be achieved while in the grip of US- led imperialism. Obviously 
exposing/ targeting the sectarian cleavages that underlie the position of the 
bourgeois class as an infi ghting relationship subordinated to US- led impe-
rialism as a result of its own weakness is the process that could conceivably 
allow the working population of the country to climb out of the current quag-
mire. The Iraqi bourgeoisie is the auto- confl icting historical process by which 
diff ering bourgeois instituted in sectarian form relate to each other through 
violence reared by US- led imperialism. It is possibly the weakest form that a 
bourgeoisie can assume to protect its national interests and, hence, must exist 
in least sovereign states. The sectarian war line is the principal characteristic 
and appropriation mechanism of the Iraqi bourgeoisie. 
 Tangentially, even though the Iraqi state is in a shambles, the Iraqi people 
remain ‘historical’ regardless of the Eurocentric adage that ‘people become 
historical through the state’. All peoples are historical through their forms 
of organisation and resistance, irrespective of whether the state adheres to 
imperialist ‘standards’ of statehood. A  state is just another form of social 
organisation, albeit the one recognised as a society’s central institution and 
whose historical function is the practice of its mediated sovereign rights. Any 
social form of organisation on the periphery (or for that matter in the impe-
rial centre) is historical according to the degree of its anti- imperialist struggle. 
The legacy that people are historical only through a European- defi ned social 
form is a leftover from the European ultranationalist past of the nineteenth 
century, which arose via the genocide of many supposedly ‘ahistorical’ people 
who are no longer physically around, but whose spirit of resistance will con-
tribute to the demise of the moribund European state system. 
 The study of history has gone through several phases of development 
(Mészáros 1995). In the distant past, divine interventions or mythical heroes 
were valid interpretations of historical development. Historiography has 
moved further away from these accounts as it began to assess how common 
will and human volition could be eff ectively translated via political media 
and organised political action – epitomised in the political party or the state. 
 That was Hegel’s historiography, the height of idealism, wherein the state 
incarnated the ultimate ethical form of spiritual self- realisation. The investi-
gation of history then moved from the development of ideas to the Marxian 
notion of development in social relations and their attendant state of con-
sciousness rooted in the development of material conditions. The way society 
reproduces itself, anchored in its relations of production, became a starting 
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point for analysing historical processes that few could avoid.  Scholars were, 
knowingly or unknowingly, having a discussion with Marx since the incep-
tion of such materialist explanations (Mészáros 1995). 
 Materialist explanations of history, and especially of war, did not begin 
with Marx. Of course, materialism predates Marxism.  For instance, in the 
mid- eighteenth century Jean- Jacques Rousseau (1762) addressed the strains of 
economic want and war: ‘[E] very people, to which its situation gives no choice 
save that between commerce and war, is weak in itself’. For Rousseau, it is 
that materially founded weakness that spurs war.  Pre– Industrial Revolution 
aggression occurred because of scarcity in food or the basic needs of soci-
ety, or a crisis of underconsumption. As underproduction visibly turned into 
overproduction by the time of the Industrial Revolution, underconsumption 
crises were more and more relegated to social and maldistribution reasons 
rather than to natural causes. However, Marx’s theory of crisis describes 
more than just an economic crisis of overproduction. For Marx, capitalism 
is born faulty and persists in permanent social crisis. Anarchic accumulation 
and blind competition in the pursuit of profi t run amok; maintaining profi t 
rates, extracting surplus value by imposing scarcity of basic goods and under-
consumption, and war making are all interrelated facets of the social relation-
ship that is capital. Specifi c historical circumstances trigger a recurrent fall in 
a system inherently predisposed to crisis. 
 Marx’s descriptive of the anarchy of production, his ‘accumulate, accu-
mulate! that is Moses and the prophets’, could be extended to the twentieth- 
century monopoly age with a twist: as the transfer of value through commercial 
exploitation from the periphery dips, developed- formation crises become more 
acute, and their resolutions may entail more aggressive wars. This is the sort 
of aggression that recreates the conditions for the free or cheaply priced appro-
priation of human and natural resources; as emphasised all along, it is a re- 
enactment of early forms of commercial exploitation that included slavery, but 
that re- enactment now not only engages labour or resources at lowly costs, but 
also engages labour in war and soldiering with the purpose of extinguishing 
their lives  Unlike the fast- recurring cyclical economic recessions of the nine-
teenth century, the lower frequency of economic cycle downturns in central 
economies during the monopoly age stems from the stabilising eff ect of higher 
wealth wrought by the historical surplus value and the degree of market power 
and cartelisation, which allow profi ts to soar (unused surplus) and delay the 
onset of new technology or innovation that writes off  the costs of old tech-
nology (Perelman 1999). 7 Strategic control of peripheral resources often goes 
 7  Monopolies hold prices at a level that allows them to earn extra profi ts and cover 
the costs of investment. However, when new technology lowers prices, the ensuing 
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unmentioned, but it is the foremost constituent of political power, from which 
all forms of power follow, including market power. In a system originating in 
violent expropriation, it is the ‘power’ in the market power that counts. Capital 
expands by expanding markets and by wars that cheapen or disengage inputs, 
or that strengthen it (capital) as a social relationship. The resolution of the con-
tradiction arising from the need to meet the rising requirements of the rate of 
accumulation and the necessity to compete with other circles of capital in grab-
bing a bigger share of the colonies often involves war making (Lenin, 1916). 
 The slogan ‘the US has to protect its way of life’ is possibly the sole ration-
ale available to the leading capitalists; it is now often invoked as pretext for a 
just war, when in fact under international law (the UN Charter) there exists no 
such rationale. As to the triggering of wars, many of the incidents in history 
that have sparked military confl icts are either premeditated or fabricated; 
concocting the occasion to start a war is a standard practice. This further 
evokes the question of how an American working class can be so weak so as to 
be drafted into war. Both the US and Iraqi working classes are victims of the 
war to varying degrees, but the wage share of the US working class relative to 
the sinking wages of much of the Third World has historically risen in rela-
tion to imperialist conquest (Davis 1960; Emmanuel 1972; Cope 2015). I must 
caution against an absolutism in conventional wisdom that always sees the 
Third World as a horde of Stone Age barbarians who are better off  only as a 
result of handouts from Western capitalism. To be sure, subsistence income is 
a historically determined condition. 
 US- led capital is a cross- border class alliance that includes many of the 
social classes linked to it through fi nancialisation or downstream produc-
tion processes. In addressing this issue, account must be rendered of the state 
of revolutionary consciousness weakening under systematised violent and 
neo- liberal assault since the early 1980s and the resultant alienation within 
American society (Larrain 1979). In view of the crisis in socialist ideology, 
the same old concerns for job security preoccupy a majority of the working 
class. Precarious contracts are the standard market practice of the current 
era, and workers are said to be traumatised (Standing 2011; Bellofi ore 2012). 
The strength of capital’s ideology reproduces alienation from the self and the 
community simultaneously; these are processes that are devolved by the state 
(Althusser 1971; Meszaros 1970). The ethos of ‘every man for himself’ grips the 
social mind, ripping it away from itself and its social context; eventually, the 
social sickness deepens to the point that while the war rages, people watch the 
stock market’s response to the bombing raids (an inference from Pappenheim 
revalorisation and disengagement of non- performing capital tends to accentuate the 
depth of the fall in the business cycle (Perelman 1999). 
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1959). The vulnerability of wage labour to market conditions is a relationship 
that holds above all others in a crisis- laden labour process.  Precarious work-
ing and contractual conditions, resulting from weakening unionisation and 
labour’s shrivelled political clout in the United States underwrite the distorted 
balance of power between labour and capital locally and globally.  The putative 
legal or free- exchange relationship between the free labourer and the owner 
of capital, which conceals beneath it a process of unequal power, resurfaced in 
successively dehumanising forms at recurrent downturns in the business cycle 
as acute forms of wage slavery. The inter- diff erentiated American working- 
class order, made up of such identities as Blacks, Latinos, ‘working class’, mid-
dle class and so forth, is also a sectional whole in relation to the international 
working- class order. The remaking of the two- party system itself is not only 
a refl ection of missing socialist alternatives to labour, but it is also a product 
of the imperial rents that steady the share of labour in American society. In a 
world of each class for itself, the equilibrating factor in maintaining the stabil-
ity of sectional working class politics, or the subordination of the working class 
to capital, is a product of imperial rents. 
 The destitution of labour is more dismal in developing countries, and capi-
tal often indulges in the consumption of the labourer together with his or 
her labour power in shorter time spans. Even the nominal appearance of 
level playing fi elds and fair trade (as in free wage labour) is blighted in a 
Third World context such as Iraq’s. Acute inter- working- class divisions in 
least- developed countries and the threat of imperialist intervention frequently 
coalesce to arrest any possible realisation of a universal political expression. 
 To borrow Lukacs’s aesthetics’ imaginary, American capital has projected 
its uglier image onto the periphery in material form (Lukacs 1919).  Of the 
many facets of global integration, it is this ability of advanced capital to clone 
its more repressive traditions in the Third World and simultaneously sub-
ject its own labour force at home to a barrage of mythology that severs the 
organic links of the global working class. In the present epoch, imperialist 
wars against the poorest people on the globe are less and less questioned by 
the working classes of the Northern hemisphere. 
 The large US professional military and the government’s capacity to issue 
large amounts of debt that can be paid off  by foreign funds accrued on the 
basis of imperial expansion can ease the task of moulding American public 
opinion to withstand the cost of war. Unlike in days past, imperialist armies 
lose comparatively fewer soldiers, and the public pays less; it watches the war 
on the screen as if it is a video game (Cui 2005). 8  US- led ideological assault 
 8  The case can be such that even as the fatality rate declines, the rate of severely damaged 
survivors rises. The cost both fi nancial and social is more and more widely recognised 
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also targets the Arab population to extinguish any budding forms of revolu-
tionary consciousness. It especially targets any consideration of real meas-
ures involving the control of oil or any even partially autarkic policy of more 
equitable distribution that might lock in national resources. The method by 
which it has been pursuing this goal, however, involves a show of brutal force 
that is meant to snuff  the spirit of resistance in addition to continuing the 
Islamisation of identity since the colonial days. On the surface, the assault 
is combined with ‘Western democracy’ cant defl ecting blame back on the 
‘inherent despotism of Arab culture’. 
 In that regard, Israel’s disproportionate use of massive violence, the lat-
est of which are the wars on Gaza, is not haphazard; Israel acts as the role 
model for the United States when it wishes to silence certain forms of dissent, 
as in the ‘shock and awe’ and other unsightly forms of overkill strategies. 
The imperialist purpose is to demonstrate the futility of resistance given 
the highly uneven military balance of forces.  Two weeks before his assas-
sination by Israeli missiles, Hamas leader Abdul- Aziz Al- Rantisi copied a 
slogan from George Habash, which could be roughly translated as: ‘We are 
winning because our people’s resolve to carry out the struggle is unwaver-
ing’. 9 Soon afterward, Al- Rantisi was assassinated. Any strand of revolution-
ary thinking that opens a window of hope for the dispossessed has to be 
cut short. 
 Subduing the ‘Arab’ in neocolonial parlance does not mean swaying the 
affi  nity of the subject toward US imperialism. In terms of second- hand psy-
chological emotions, there is more sadomasochism in imperialism than aff ec-
tion or empathy. Although one would avoid farcical mainstream refrains of 
hearts and minds: the real battle for the heart and mind is not to be won by 
changing the moods of the broad Arab masses toward the United States; this 
cliché was aimed at sections of Western audiences whose memory of imperial-
ist pillage is extremely short- term or one whose predisposition is fed with the 
systemic racism that trails from the colonial era. As much as it can, war prop-
aganda moulds the Western working class into support for war making while 
as the physically and psychologically mutilated keep coming home to the United States 
from the endless wars. However, these sacrifi ces to the sectional class order imply an 
adjustment to the distribution of the share of labour within the working class. The 
oscillation between some measure of free healthcare and abolishing abortion rights, for 
instance, will have no bearing on the bipartisan policy of imperialism, but it will buy 
into the devotion of lower- income segments of the American working classes to their 
national identity. The pattern of capital’s ideological strength versus the concession 
made to labour is the dynamic stabilising of the allegiance of the mainly white Ameri-
can working class to imperialism. 
 9  Article appeared in Al- Quds London, fi rst week of April 2004. 
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it instils a belief in the uselessness of resistance in poorer peoples abroad. 
Winning people over is not accomplished on the basis of international demo-
cratic debate, for no such democratic platform for debate between peoples of 
the world has come into being yet. 
 US- led capital’s ideological assault triumphs by converting real human and 
political issues such as ethnic cleansing or the dispossession of the Palestinian 
people in 1948 into a theocratic question and a war rooted in mythology. 
 The conversion of fi ction into reality can be observed as the US House of 
Representatives received the speech of Benjamin Netanyahu on 24 May 
2011 with 29 standing ovations, in which two particular accolades (standing 
ovations 15 and 16 respectively) cite biblical references and a 4,000- year- old 
bond of Jewish people to the Jewish land. In mystifying real issues, impe-
rialist ideology is assisted by three seminal allies in the region: Israel, Iran 
and Saudi Arabia – seminal, in the sense that none of the ultra- nationalist 
or theocratic ruling elites of these entities object to the dealings of the free 
market and the reign of capital.  For all the hostility expressed toward Iran 
by US political leaders, there is no essential antagonism, or a contradiction, 
based on one country’s desire to socialise private property, between  Iran and 
the United States, as was shown earlier in the destruction of the Iraqi national 
formation when the post- Saddam imperial administration made the decision 
to divide and further conquer by disenfranchising the largely Sunni Iraqi 
Ba’ath party while privileging the Shia population and religious parties, a 
move that Iran backed with money and military support in the sectarian 
fi ghting that followed. Wahhabism would not have expanded to the scale it 
has, had it not been for American- and Iranian- backed Iraqi Shia militias 
ethnically cleansing Baghdad and other Sunni regions – events largely tel-
evised by Aljazeera and other mainstream channels to fan sectarian hatred 
and boost the ratings of capital through inter- working- class confl ict. The war 
on Iran, if and when it occurs, would not be for market- expansion reasons, 
but more about the destruction of value and value grabbing. Additionally, all 
three regimes (Saudi, Israeli and Iranian) seek legitimacy, partially or wholly, 
via the religious identity channel that has a built- in tendency to collide with 
its surroundings. 
 In international law, war is virtually unjustifi able, and the law itself cannot 
reconcile with virulent forms of nationalism. The United Nations Charter 
permits war in self- defence and only after approval from the Security Council. 
 Not so long ago, lifeboat ethicists or ‘survivalists in a world of scarcity’, as 
opposed to ‘a world of abundance and togetherness’, introduced the phrase 
‘protecting our way of life’ as a premise that justifi es waging war or sinking 
refugee boats at sea to ensure that Western formations are not burdened with 
extra costs. As often repeated by the US administration, the pretext for the 
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invasion and occupation of Iraq was to protect the ‘American way of life’. 10 
Iraq, not by the type of regime it had and not because of Saddam Hussein, 
but by its very formation and constitution as a viable state was assumed to 
threaten the way of life of the United States and some of its Western allies. 
Iraq was not going to invade the great white north, but by developing and 
industrialising and empowering its working people it would have weakened 
the channels of imperialist rents to the centre. Pentagon scenarios of plans 
to invade Iraq were drawn up during the Cold War, according to which US 
attack planes concealed under Saudi sands will depart from bases in Saudi 
Arabia and prepare for the invasion of Iraq. One of the generals in charge 
of such simulations admitted that because the USSR was still around, the 
chances of a nuclear holocaust had deterred this desire of US- led capital. 11 
Intolerance of even semi- sovereign states in the Middle East underpins the 
relentless intervention and destabilisation. 
 The post– Cold War ideological victory of capital furnished it with a free 
hand to promote the ‘American way of life’, the most visible facet of which 
is the seclusion of the rich in gated enclaves with private security guards 
or more generally, in building walls along the national borders  – a fortress 
America for the richer folk. Davis’s (1960) explanation of such expansionism 
rests on an ideology of a frontier Eden or an American history unfolding by 
manifest destiny, the idea of the uniqueness and superiority of Americanism 
as a frontier ideology, a frontier developing by unhampered capitalism at 
the expense of Native Americans and later other peoples around the world. 
 The United States has been a net global debtor in money form for over four 
decades, but a leading economic and profi t rates growth hub for the planet. 
As the successor empire to European empires, it also enjoys vast power and 
historical surplus- value privileges that include all the measures of genocide 
and slavery that blocked the development and industrialisation of the Third 
World. Foreigners hold an increasing share of US government debt;  the four 
major Asian central banks ( Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan) alone 
hold over $5 trillion (Hudson 2010, 444).  The backing of all this US debt 
requires the consolidation of hegemony over oil states to counterbalance the 
money debt (Avramidis 2006; Patnaik 2009). 
 The pursuit of oil implied that the policy space of many sovereignty- 
weakened developing Arab states was diminishing. Historical structures – the 
 10  A search for ‘protect way of life George W. Bush’ will produce nearly 2 million hits on 
Google. Not all of these of course are George W’s, but many are. 
 11  Interview with an American General responsible for war simulation against Nica-
ragua and Iraq, Public Broadcasting Service, PBS.  http:// www.pbs.org/ newshour/ 
extra/ debate/ iraq.html viewed 12 May 2009. 
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inherited political superstructure, the social geography and the politics, espe-
cially anything related to the sheer weight of the US- led security arrange-
ments and fi repower, just weighed like a nightmare on small developing 
states. States like Iraq, Syria or Egypt could no more infl uence the global 
decision- making process than a village idiot can infl uence a town council. 
The potential of a failed state has come to represent the fate of nearly all 
Arab nationalist bourgeois classes or socialised states of which, once more, 
Iraq represented a model of independent nationalism, with certain socialist 
traits. In fact, unlike Syria and Egypt, being constantly at war, Iraq could not 
have opted out of Arab socialism even if it wanted to. When it was bombed, 
sanctioned and invaded, it still had its fi ve- year plans, subsidies and free social 
services. 
 At no time since 1958 (Iraq’s real independence from British rule), when 
Iraq was catapulted into the Soviet orbit, has it been at ease when slotted in 
between monarchical Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the buff er state, Jordan. 
A quasi- socialist, anti- American and anti- Israeli state wedged in the midst of 
these allies of US- led American capital would enjoy little chance of stability. 
 Abdel Karim Qassim (1958– 1963), Iraq’s fi rst president, brought the Kurdish 
leader Mustapha Barzani (1958) back from exile in the Soviet Union, and 
within only few months, the latter resumed a protracted war against succes-
sive Iraqi governments supported by the United States and the Shah of Iran, 
which ended with the fall of the Bakr- led Iraqi government as it ceded its sov-
ereignty over Iraq’s only waterway (Shat Al- Arab) to Iran (in the 1975 Algiers 
Treaty). 12  All along, the Iraqi communist party, which was later to support 
the American assault on Iraq in 1991, couched narrow sectarian and ethnic 
agendas under communist hubris and, eff ectively, fought the idea of closer 
Arab integration under the pretext of an ‘ultra- left internationalist’ agenda. 
Kowtowing blindly to the moderated Soviet position,  from the recognition 
of the partition of mandate Palestine to supporting the United States in its 
war on Iraq, the Communist Party of Iraq had placed itself objectively in a 
collaborative position with US- led imperialism, on the basis of the vacuous 
position that all nationalisms contradict their internationalism. 
 The Arab integrationist project (opposed by Qassim and the Iraqi com-
munists), insofar as it potentially led to the formation of the anti- imperialist 
alliance  qua the United Arab Republic (UAR) joining Egypt and Syria in 
a single state (1958), represented a much bigger threat to the state of Israel 
and to US interests than did the Qassim– communist alliance.  For the United 
States, Qassim was considered neutral in foreign policy. In economic policy, 
 12  United Nations Treaty Series No. 14907 Iran and Iraq Agreement concerning the use 
of frontier watercourses 1975, and Algiers Agreement of 6 March 1975. 
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he certainly did not attempt to socialise, as Nasser did extensively in Egypt 
and Syria, or nationalise oil interests. 13 While Israel acquiesced to Qassim, 
the United States was uncomfortable with the support he received from the 
communists and placed more emphasis on the containment of potential com-
munism. Communications between the US embassy in Baghdad and the US 
Department of State in 1959 show that the United States was comfortable 
with Qassim’s neutrality, but worried about the reach of the communists 
within his government. 
 Qassim’s evident resolve to achieve internal stability and adopt eff ectively 
neutral stance in foreign relations must contend with persistent regional and 
world tensions and with inherent instability of Iraq’s political, cultural, reli-
gious and ethnic make- up. Our hopes for measurable progress toward relative 
stability and genuine independence are riding on shoulders of one man, whose 
judgment regarding key factor of Communism is still open to question. (US 
Department of State 1959) 
 From post- independence until the end of the Iran– Iraq War, albeit to the 
dissatisfaction of US- led capital and its allies in the region, Iraq remains in 
a constant state of war. Trying to cut losses in the early stages of the war 
with Iran, the Iraqi regime attempted to seek a truce with an intransigent 
Iranian clergy as early as the fi rst year of the war, but to no avail (Taqi 2008). 
Much to the dislike of US imperialism, the most viable institution in Iraq, 
the military, emerged stronger from the Iran– Iraq war and, more signifi cant, 
backed with a military industry that might potentially violate the ultimate 
taboo by redressing the balance of forces with Israel. Following the US inva-
sion in 2003, disbanding the Iraqi military was a top priority on the neo- 
conservative agenda. The fi rst trigger for imperial assault was Iraq’s eff orts 
to escape the Iran– Iraq war legacy by attempting the impossible, namely to 
redraw Middle East borders and challenge the foundation of the colonially 
bequeathed security arrangement by annexing Kuwait. By premeditation or 
coincidence, that was a welcome opportunity to the victors of the Cold War. 
 Analysing Iraqi history from the wrong starting point – the point of vilify-
ing and demonising Saddam Hussein – intentionally or not, provided cover 
for the invasion. By reducing the country to a man, it became easy to destroy 
the Iraqi social formation through the false rationale of the man’s authoritar-
ian rule. This should expose the class whose values are being served in the 
explanation of historical causality. Many Western liberals have fallen victim 
 13  Law No. 80 of 1961 promulgated by Qassim only expropriated the non- operating 
concessions of the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) (Dougherty and Ghareeb 2013). 
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to the erroneous methodological approach of congealing historical develop-
ments into the person of an ‘insane’ or ‘evil’ dictator at the helm of power 
in a small developing country.  Many liberals, including Noam Chomsky, 
would criticise US foreign policy and Saddam simultaneously, confl ating two 
separate issues existing on distinct planes of thought, and thereby justifying 
the invasion. Speaking in 2002, Chomsky said that Saddam ‘is as evil as 
they come, ranking with Suharto and other monsters of the modern era’, 
which draws an image in the public mind that all measures are justifi able 
against him, including an invasion of ‘Saddam’, who also happens to be Iraq 
(Chomsky 2002).  In 2015, when asked about ISIS (what I have referred to as 
the Islamic State all along), Chomsky’s answer was that ‘the US and Britain 
invaded Iraq, a major crime that created the background out of which IS 
grew and developed’ (Chomsky 2015) . When the liberal moves from the per-
sonalist propaganda to the more adequate macro picture of history (the back-
ground) to explain the reasons for the rise of IS, the historical background 
becomes the US invasion – no longer the evil dictator.  However, when devel-
oping further a picture of the ‘background’, Chomsky begins to select and fal-
sify the facts. He continues: ‘Iraq had already been virtually destroyed, fi rst of 
all by the decade- long war with Iran in which, incidentally, Iraq was backed 
by the US, and then the decade of sanctions’. (Chomsky 2015). Although Iraq 
emerged stronger after the Iran– Iraq war, the falsifi cations here are many, 
including no less than that Israel supplied weapons to Iran to continue the 
war; that before the war, Iraq complained about several Iranian transgres-
sions upon its sovereign territory; that Iraq was Soviet allied and armed; and 
that Iraq was the most important secular anti- Israeli state in the region. 
 But let us select a slightly earlier point in history (the background of 
which Chomsky speaks), such as the toppling of Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 
(Abrahamian 2012) and the reinstatement of the Shah and his repressive rule 
by the United States and Britain. This intervention laid the groundwork for 
the rise of the fi rst Islamic state in Iran, a state whose constitution and exten-
sion into neighbouring countries follows the sectarian line. Iraq complained 
to the UN Security Council about Iranian incursions into its territory, but its 
real worry was the sectarian violence in the South led by the parties of the 
now-governing structure. Also let us consider the reactionary elephant in the 
revolutionary room: the Iranian clerical regime brutally suppressed and, in 
many instances, massacred the socialists upon assuming power (Vahabzadeh 
2010);  it provoked sectarianism in Iraq and Lebanon as early as 1981.  The 
other side of the story is that Iraq was eff ectively a Soviet- armed satellite 
and not a Western one. It was not the handshake with Donald Rumsfeld 
that would turn Saddam into a Western puppet, which was more of a staged 
Hollywood manoeuvre than relevant history. Given the eff ectiveness of 
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Hollywood- style politics, much of mainstream social science should be slotted 
under fi lm critique or acting and not history.  The Soviet Union was already 
wary of Islamic Iran’s anti- communist backlash and its sectarian inroads into 
its own multi- ethnic society.  Baghdad was the most radical anti- imperialist 
and secularist city in the AW and its destruction was an imperialist ‘must’. 
 The ‘background’ of which Chomsky speaks was altogether the creation of 
the United States, including the Gulf states lending to Iraq and the channel-
ling of weapons through Israel to Iran to prolong the Iran– Iraq war. The war 
itself was the value- restructuring relation that imperialism groomed at the 
behest of capital. 
 If the history of wars can be explained by the insanity of George W. Bush 
or Saddam Hussein, then a universal mental asylum would be the functional 
objective of the peace movement. Systematic human- rights violations origi-
nate in a system of social relations that the United States propagates on a 
global scale. The Iraq war is class- determined (Parenti, 2003). The argument 
against Saddam and the argument for war on Iraq are separate.  Giving the 
United States a free hand in Iraq is a very serious breach of human rights inas-
much as it breeds the very cause of human- rights violations on a global scale 
by reinforcing the war- induced international division of labour. Although, 
by its very essence, Iran is not anti- imperialist, international working- class 
support for the country ensues from the point of forfeiting another lucrative 
imperialist war opportunity for the United States, if it decides to bomb. The 
United States goes to war because its capital must reproduce itself by devour-
ing new territories, resources and people, by destroying to rebuild on its own 
terms, by hegemonising the social value relations that are the backdrop of 
production and by controlling and holding off  would- be competitors for the 
seat of empire. Imperialism is a mutating power relationship that is nurtured 
principally by violent aggression. These are the same old motives of colonial-
ism, which are grabbing and undervaluing Third World assets. 
 In the legacy of the Middle East and its background, there is so much left 
over from World Wars I and II that it becomes unreasonable to assign histori-
cal agency to the post- colonial state as a state per se or, more ludicrously, to 
the heads of those states.  Ipso facto , ample evidence from the post- uprisings 
states or the trail of collapsing states that the Arab Spring left behind, suggest 
that the territories laid out as states by intercolonial compromise have stag-
gered under sustained imperialist assaults that have progressively enfeebled 
their agency. 
 The British occupied Iraq from the end of the World War I until 1958. 
 Some may argue that it was formally independent, but the British ambas-
sador (circa 1935)  related an encounter with Prime Minister Hikmat 
Suleiman which, besides clearly showing the immense degree of British 
THE UNMAKING OF ARAB SOCIALISM
176
176
infl uence in Iraq, also refl ects the weakness of the prime minister’s char-
acter. The ambassador informed the Foreign Offi  ce of how he told Hikmat 
Suleiman very sharply that his manners were bad. ‘When […] the time 
came to tell him what was thought about it [the Government’s desire to buy 
arms from- non- British sources] by all in London, I was in some diffi  culty 
because I had, as it were, to hold him up with one hand and hit him with the 
other. I hit him, nevertheless, and the blow was hard – because I took him 
by surprise. Hikmat was very near resignation and we came to the verge 
of a complete break when he dined with me a few nights later and I had to 
give him a jolt about the way the Ministry of Defence (Iraqi) was behaving. 
When he called on me the next day, he told the Oriental Secretary that, if 
I meant to hit him again, he would walk out and not come back’ (Tarbush 
1982, 143– 144). The British ambassador was slapping the Iraqi prime min-
ister at almost every encounter, very much like the reported incidents of 
ministers in the ‘sovereign government’ of Iraq who were slapped by US 
Marine Corps offi  cers after the 2003 invasion. 
 Apart from the major landing in Basra in 1941 to quell rebellious Prime 
Minister Rashid Al- Kilani,  the British landed in newly independent Kuwait 
in 1961 to aid the state from annexation by the Qassim regime. Palpably, the 
third major landing occurred in 1990, once again to protect Kuwait from 
annexation by Iraq.  The partition of the Middle East by the Sykes- Picot 
(1916) Agreement left its indelible imprint at every juncture of recent history. 
If states are, partly or coincidentally, a form of expression of a people’s right 
to self- determination, then it is safe to say that none of the Arab peoples have 
commonly or, at least by majority consensus, decided on what they are or 
what they wanted to be. In hindsight, Arab history is the socially sicken-
ing transformation imposed by the superior military power of imperialism. 
History continues to be imposed by the shackles of an unequivocal US- led 
military advantage. 
 In hindsight, the successful blitzkriegs of the Israeli army will suffi  ce as 
proof of a balance of power favouring Israel. But one may ask what about 
‘in between Arab- Israeli wars’:  Were the Israelis always that far ahead 
of the Arabs in military capacity? Two small paragraphs from the 1958– 
1961 archives of the State Department illustrate the point. The fi rst ear-
marks Israel’s military superiority and the second shows how the United 
States contrives to cover up Israel’s acquisition of weapons- capable nuclear 
capacity. 
 Undersecretary McGhee expressed understanding Israel’s apprehensions aris-
ing from its exposed position but commented US has great respect for Israel’s 
military competence and estimates it as being match for some time to come 
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for any Arab combination. He remarked US has no evidence beyond propa-
ganda statements that Arabs contemplating military move against Israel. He 
also pointed out that any drastic increase in Israeli armament, particularly to 
more sophisticated weapons, would likely result in corresponding increase in 
UAR possibly leading to uncontrolled escalation which might add to rather 
than decrease instability in region. (Department of State 1962) 
 Israel’s New Atomic Reactor: The Ambassador told the President he believes 
we can accept at face value Ben- Gurion’s assurances that the reactor is to 
be devoted to peaceful purposes. An inspection of the reactor by a qualifi ed 
United States scientist can be arranged when the United States wishes, if it is 
done on a secret basis. Overt examination and announcement of the result to 
the world will require greater eff ort, but could be done. [2 lines of source text 
not declassifi ed] Reid suspects that very few people in Israel knew of the devel-
opment’s true character, possibly not even the Foreign Minister, Golda Meir, 
until it hit the headlines. (Department of State 1961) 
 With respect to the latter statement and the docile way the United States 
addresses Israel’s nuclear capabilities, it is relevant to contrast this language 
with the embargo and other threats the United States makes concerning the 
current Iran nuclear facilities. Hypothetically, the United States would not 
object to Iran possessing a few nuclear warheads; the real worry of empire in 
the region is not the degree of destructiveness that developing- country weap-
ons systems display, it is working- class rule.  It is democratisation through 
empowerment of the working class via political and social rights enshrined 
in a state, or in mass class- wide organisation and revolutionary ideology that 
really brings capital to its knees. The type of democracy the United States 
pushes down the throats of the working population is partial and selective, 
the image of its own democracy in its age of slavery and genocide of natives, 
which continues to be reproduced by mainly white voters afraid to lose privi-
lege from integrating with the world working class or from compensating 
theirs and the victims of their class ancestors. 
 These pseudo- democratic measures exclude huge sections of the pop-
ulation from representation even though they appear to be represented 
through the voting system. Standard explanations for undemocratic pro-
cesses may cite the absence of an unbiased fl ow of information, the lack of 
provision for basic needs making social groups vulnerable to manipulation 
en masse, biased institutions of legal and social rights, a constitution that 
actually creates sectional groupings as states within a state, a voting pro-
cedure that permits the rigging of the process in favour of ‘free market’ or 
US- leaning candidates, but most of all, the brittle condition of the state. 
All these ills are found in Iraq and, together, they obliterate the remotest 
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possibility of a democratic process. The imperialist US- led consortium 
needs to continuously destabilise the Iraqi social formation and, as such, it 
must ensure itself the right to count the votes. 
 If questions of degree were to matter, then the degree to which the balance 
of forces is tipped against the Iraqi working population should necessitate a 
new reading of how capital harnesses the resources of underdeveloped Arab 
social formations. Equally relevant, the features of imperialist practice dif-
fer in this region, insofar as the entente prevailing during the Cold War was 
breached when the UN Security Council was bypassed for the purpose of 
invading Iraq. That was a rare exception to the rule and, nonetheless, an 
exceptional explanation of the articulation and the mode of integration of 
this region with world capital is warranted. 
 Empirical Note on the Impact of the War 
 The economic impact of the US- led war on Iraq was a world- signifi cant 
event. There is considerable evidence in the rates of asset destruction to sug-
gest that past wars in the AW have had long- lasting global economic and 
developmental consequences. The term ‘supply shock’ entered economic text-
books after the 1973 Arab– Israeli war.  The Arab boycott, a defensive meas-
ure against extending Israeli colonisation, was used to demonise Arabs.  The 
rise of petrol prices at the pump could not have had such ample ramifi cations 
on infl ation had Western governments used a diff erent tax regime to absorb 
the oil price hike. But already by the mid- 1970s the monetarists were call-
ing the shots and allowed runaway infl ation to raise interest rates, raise debt 
burdens, blame Keynesian welfare- intervention, and boost the ideological 
grounds for imperialist expansion.  This was the beginning of the neo- liberal 
assault on working classes: taxing the central classes and warring against the 
developing world. 
 The global recovery from the 1990 recession was, in part, based on the 
US- led massacre of Iraqis in the 1991 invasion (the massacre was mimicked 
by the phrase ‘shooting fi sh in a barrel’). The aggression of 1991 occurred 
at a time when the global economy was still staggering under an incomplete 
recovery, and military spending boosted economic performance. Since then 
one still hears of further ‘regime change’ that may still widen the potential for 
disaster and, in an auxiliary way, factor the instability into dollar- based inter-
national fi nancial transactions.  Foster (2006), who is quite reserved in matters 
of forecasting, says that that the ‘doors of hell’ have been opened as a result of 
Iraq’s occupation. Looking at all the regional wars around the time of writing 
in 2015, he was right.  Internationally, the undercurrents according to which 
many major powers opposed the US- led destruction and then invasion of 
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Iraq remain unchanged, as can discerned from the ongoing Sino- Russian rift 
with the United States and Russia’s direct involvement in Syria. 
 As a result of continued intercommunal confl ict, contemporary social 
circumstances in Iraq are disastrous in spite of the high oil revenues since 
2003. The Kurdish region, which escaped the full trauma of war as a result 
of its fi fth- column alliance with the US, appears to have been willing ‘to 
sacrifi ce its own people as long as Western and Turkish corporations could 
fi ll the coff ers of its leadership’ (Vltchek 2016). Since 2014, unemployment 
in Iraqi Kurdistan had reached 50 per cent along with rampant poverty 
(Vltchek 2016).  As early as 2003, top oil- company executives told the United 
States they will not make large investments in Iraq while the security situa-
tion remains so dangerous. In meetings with high- ranking US offi  cials, they 
have also expressed concern about the lack of political legitimacy for the US- 
backed authority in Iraq (25/ 07/ 2003- FT.com). Fatefully, the reason why 
Iraqi oil capacity was weaker than Iran’s prior to 1958 is also assigned to 
political instability (Tarbush 1982). The fact that American oil companies 
are averse to handling the current risks is not so relevant to the United States 
when compared to the benefi ts of writing off  Iraq as a state and the power it 
musters, which underwrites the seignorage of the dollar. 
 Regionally, no matter which way things go, the AW economies have 
already borne the brunt of the aggression as a result of increased regional 
tensions and violent spill- over eff ects because of their geographical proxim-
ity as one national formation after another was disrupted and splintered. 
 The invasion of Iraq was also a further assault on the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and, by implication, through power 
restructuring, against direct producers of primary commodities everywhere 
(IWA, 2003). OPEC lost much of its ability to price crude when oil became 
listed on the futures market in the mid- 1980s. Direct- supply conditions now 
only minimally infl uence the price, since it can be determined vis- á- vis other 
listed futures. Moreover, war or warlike conditions, which leave exporting 
states with narrow margins within which to manage their own supplies, force 
them to relinquish price determination to American fi nancial markets. With 
heightened confl icts, the longer- term growth prospects in the AW may also 
be determined by a combination of high tensions and low to moderate oil 
prices as has been the case since 2014. Until now, it was possible to off set dire 
economic consequences with high oil prices; however, increased insecurity 
implies that much of the oil revenues will go to stabilisation eff orts, or worse 
yet, be sucked into the implacable capital- fl ight syndrome.  
 It is really superfl uous to bring into the picture the great strides made by 
Iraq prior to 1980. As shown in the Annex to  chapter 1 , the average yearly 
growth rates were closer to 10 per cent. However, the present Iraqi economy 
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is a product of three wars, stringent economic sanctions and years of iso-
lation. Macro relationships are dictated by war exigencies. Available data 
on Iraq shows that economic performance has been extremely poor since at 
least 2000.  Despite its oil- export revenues – estimated at nearly $700 billion 
between 2004 and 2014 (OPEC various years)– Iraq’s productive capacity 
is in shambles. Its government currently reports little data: it is an incapaci-
tated economy, and its ability to produce data has been stunted. Also, the 
regime does not want to show the present imperialist- sponsored state in a 
bad light. The Iraqi state has no control over large stretches of its own ter-
ritory.  Widespread poverty and a huge number of people lacking adequate 
access to basic services and resources such as clean water, food, health care, 
electricity, jobs and sanitation, continue to prevail.  The destruction of Tikrit 
and Ramadi in 2015 show that the Iranian- backed militias, the Iraqi state 
and the United States through its air cover continued the same old forms of 
Sunni cleansing under the pretext of fi ghting IS (Susannah George, for the 
Associated Press, quoting a United Nations report in 2016). The Sunni– Shiite 
divide, which so carefully groomed by US- led imperialism, is the goose that 
lays the golden egg for capital. 
 Between 2000 and 2004, Iraq’s GDP at constant prices is estimated to have 
been growing at an annual average of negative 10 per cent and recorded a fall 
to $15,474 million in 2003, the year of the invasion, down from $20,861 mil-
lion in early 2000 (UN 2005a). In a comparison with other Arab countries, 
Iraq’s GDP per capita in 2003 ranked second lowest to Yemen’s (UN 2005a). 
In 2014, GDP per capita stood at $2401 (WDI, 2014). GDP per capita at con-
stant prices (2000) was estimated at $836 in 2001, declined to $745 in 2002, 
and to $567 in 2003. It is estimated to have risen again to $884 in 2004. 
One year after the invasion, daily per capita GDP did not exceed $2.40 per 
day and  unemployment rates, according to offi  cial statistics, hovered at the 
two- digit level (28.10 per cent in 2003, which is said to be underestimated 
and disguising a measure of about 60 per cent). Should underemployment be 
considered as well, the degree of underutilisation of the labour force becomes 
more ominous: underemployment alone adds another 23.5 per cent to the 
unemployment rate (UN 2005a). Unemployment had increased massively fol-
lowing the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the de- Ba’athifi cation (fi ring past 
regime supporters from the public sector) measures from state institutions. 
 Predictably, given these fi gures, Iraq’s human development indicators are 
low, for the obvious reason of war. By the time of the invasion, the World 
Food Programme 2003 Survey (UN- WFP 2004)  that covered 16 out of 18 
governorates shows that  one in fi ve Iraqis (or 4.6 million out of an estimated 
22.3 million) suff ered from chronic poverty , and that 60 per cent of the popu-
lation has been relying on monthly food rations. Moreover, 36 per cent of all 
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children (1– 5 years old) living in extremely poor households are chronically 
malnourished. The national average for chronically malnourished children 
of this age group was 27.6 per cent (UN- WFP 2004). 
 Personal security and living conditions in Iraq after the 2003 US- led inva-
sion and occupation have deteriorated at alarming rates; a select picture is as 
follows: 
 (1)  The presence of the American off ensive, ongoing kidnapping and crimi-
nal gangs were creating huge chaos and lack of security in the country. 
 (2)  UNDP’s ‘Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004’ estimates that more 
than half of the population have lived below the poverty line, where the 
monthly median income of households (constituting an average of 7.8 
people) has declined from $255 in 2003 to $144 in 2004 (about half a 
dollar a day per person).  Add to this the ongoing deterioration in health 
services with a lack of accessibility to drugs and the ruin of hospitals and 
health centres. 
 (3)  Moreover, illiteracy has become a major characteristic of the poor and 
extremely poor: 40 per cent of adults in extremely poor households, and 
30 per cent of adults in poor households, are illiterate.  Life expectancy, 
which was around 65 years in the mid- 1980s, went down to 58 years dur-
ing the nineties, while the world’s average during that period settled at 
66 years (UN 2005a) . 
 (4)  Another report issued by the US Congress at the end of June 2004 stated 
that only one governorate in Iraq has access to 16 hours of electricity per 
day as compared to seven governorates one year before the invasion. 14 To 
date, power shortages still plague the disconnected country. 
 (5)  On 22 May 2003, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1483, lift-
ing sanctions on Iraq, phasing out the six- year- old UN oil- for- food pro-
gram over six months (the program ended on 21 November 2003), and 
designating a UN special representative to assist Iraq in its reconstruction 
eff orts. On 27 May 2003, the US Treasury lifted most US sanctions on 
Iraq, thereby implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1483. How-
ever, in spite of hundreds of billions spent on reconstruction, conditions 
remain baleful. Initially, total Iraqi long- term reconstruction costs were 
estimated at $100 billion. Several times this amount was spent, yet recon-
struction stagnated. In one example of how reconstruction is carried out, 
in November 2003, the US. Congress authorised $18.2 billion for Iraq 
 14  The report referred to the testimony of Samer Shahata before Congress on 15 June 
2004.  http:// www.academia.edu/ 6753825/ Congressional_ Testimony_ Iraq_ Public_ 
Opinion_ Toward_ the_ United_ States 
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in a supplemental allocation aimed at boosting Iraqi development, but 
only 3.3 per cent of the pledged amount was spent, and much of that was 
diverted into military- related expenditure, away from priority needs and 
reconstruction. In one instance of fl agrant US- sponsored fraud, a plane-
load of some 363 tons of cash ($12– 14 billion) transferred to Iraq went 
missing in 2004. 15 
 The economic battering during the sanctions and war years: the investment 
rate fell from 30 per cent in 2000 and maintained an average of around 15 
per cent after the invasion. The Iraqi economy suff ered from continuous dete-
rioration in output throughout its recent history. It also exhibited low levels 
of investment and consumption, high unemployment, high infl ation, erratic 
deterioration and fl uctuation of the foreign exchange rate (UN 2005a).  GDP 
in constant 1990 prices atrophied to negative 66 per cent in 1991 (war losses) 
and to negative 22 per cent in 2003 (UN- Statistics Database 2005). The eco-
nomic situation in 1991 was in a depressive state due to the imposition of 
UN sanctions. GDP per capita grew at about negative 1 per cent during the 
eighties and about 0.5 per cent during the 1990s. GDP per capita shrank 
from $2,200 in the late 1980s to about $488 in the mid- 1990s before recover-
ing slightly to an estimated $750 in early 2000 ( Table 4.1 ).  Not only did Iraqi 
GDP collapse, but the value of the Iraqi dinar started spiralling downwards, 
mainly due to sanctions. In the early 1980s, the offi  cial exchange rate was set 
at ID1 = $3.2, which then collapsed to ID1 = 0.0006 (or $1 = ID1,674) by the 
middle of the 1990s. In October 2003, a new Iraqi currency, the ‘New Iraq 
Dinar’ (NID) replaced the old dinar, and today, the NID hovers at around 
$1 = NID2,000. This deterioration in the currency and the shortage of the 
domestic supply of goods, though possibly the least devastating result of the 
war given the human toll, added to its problematic conditions.  Prices grew at 
an average annual rate of 13 per cent in 1995– 2002 as compared to 264 per 
cent in 1990– 1995 ( Table 4.2 ). 
 Production by Sectors:  Between 1990 and 2003, the fall in GDP was 
also spread across various economic sectors. The oil sector was hit hardest. 
Compared to 1989, oil output fell by 95 per cent and slightly recovered by 
1997, but never to its past levels ( Table 4.3 ). Moreover,  Table 4.4 shows that 
mining and manufacturing shares from GDP, which includes the oil industry, 
 15  How the US sent $12bn in cash to Iraq and watched it vanish. Special fl ights brought 
in tonnes of banknotes, which disappeared into the war zone,  http:// www.theguard-
ian.com/ world/ 2007/ feb/ 08/ usa.iraq1 Investigation Into Missing Iraqi Cash Ended 
in Lebanon Bunker,  http:// www.nytimes.com/ 2014/ 10/ 12/ world/ investigation- 
into- missing- iraqi- cash- ended- in- lebanon- bunker.html?_ r=0 
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 Table 4.1  Major economic and social development indicators in the economy over 
selected years 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003
GDP at constant 
1990 prices (in 
millions of US$) 
UN- Stat
15,517 23,478 42,441 31,633 38,356 10,107 17,782 14,952
Population (in 
thousands)
9,440 11,124 13,238 15,585 17,890 20,536 24,086 27,139




External Debt (in 
billions of US$)
125.0







 Source :  Central Bank of Iraq; Statistical Bulletin; June 2003; Yearly Bulletin 2003 
 Table 4.2  Infl ation and market exchange rates: 1990– 2003 
CPI 1988=100 Infl ation % Rate of Exchange 
(ID per US$)
1990 161 4
1991 462 187.0 10
1992 849 83.8 21
1993 2611 207.5 74
1994 15462 492.2 458
1995 69729 351.0 1674
1996 59021 - 15.4 1170
1997 72610 23.0 1471
1998 83335 14.8 1620
1999 93816 12.6 1972
2000 98486 5.0 1930
2001 114613 16.4 1929
2002 136762 19.3 1957
2003 182741 33.6 1936
 Source : Central Bank of Iraq; Statistical Bulletin; June 2003; Yearly Bulletin 2003 
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retreated from 33 per cent in the late 1970s to reach 22 per cent in the 1980s 
and 3 per cent in the 1990s. On the other hand, non- oil sectors remained 
quite stagnant in the years following the 1991 war, in which agriculture 
picked up mostly to constitute 8.5 per cent of GDP during the 1991– 2000 
period, as a result of the national attempt to boost food supply and dodge the 
embargo. Manufacturing resumed its activity, but not at the same rate prior 
to the 1991 war. It fell to 6 per cent in the 1990s due to lack of spare parts 
under the embargo ( Table 4.4 ). 
 As a result of Paul Bremer’s post- occupation policy of openness in 2003, 
these shares of industry and agriculture have fallen further, and to make 
things worse, the IMF stepped in to liberalise. In its fi rst economic review 
of Iraq in 25 years, the International Monetary Fund stated that it ‘believes 
that the medium term economic outlook for Iraq is satisfactory provided 
the expansion in oil production goes according to plan and world oil prices 
remain favourable. The IMF, however, fears signifi cant downside risks to this 
favourable medium- term outlook, particularly as oil prices are subject to a 
great deal of uncertainty and the political transformation of Iraq has not 
reached its conclusion. It therefore believes that it would be important to bol-
ster this scenario with additional revenue measures, particularly by raising 
the prices of domestic petroleum products. Along these lines, the IMF urges 
the authorities to quickly reduce government subsidies for petroleum products 
to free up revenues worth as much as 30 per cent of GDP’ (IMF 2005). The 
IMF has not loaned signifi cant mounts to Iraq. By 2004, the anti- Baathist 
and sectarian war eff ort was afoot as assassinations  en masse , especially tar-
geting scientist and former military cadres by Shiite militias, adumbrated a 
bleak future for the nation. Recommending the removal of a few billion dol-
lars’ worth of subsidies intended to relieve the misery of confl ict in a country 
whose occupation had cost several trillion dollars is indicative of the extent 
to which the social immiseration  cum political disempowerment of the Iraqi 
working class holds priority for imperialism over short- term pecuniary goals. 
What other purpose does it serve to call upon a state that is being robbed 
 Table 4.3  Gross Domestic Product at 2002 prices by sectors (in millions of US dollars) 
1989 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Crude Oil 16,637  808 1,063 1,112 1,084 973 5,768
Non- oil 7,420 2,108 2,328 2,191 2,024 2,126 1,962
Total Industries 24,058 2,916 3,391 3,303 3,108 3,099 7,730
 Source :  MEES Debt, Construction and Economic Diversifi cation, Reconstruction of Iraq 
12/ 7/ 2004 
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by sectarian war, advising it to shrink its spending on the poor, other than 
shifting the national industrial economy into the inter- working class confl ict 
mode economy? The idea of cutting costs is not about the optimal choice 
of factors like labour in a mathematical operational problem taught to eco-
nomics students. This tenet is a sacrosanct class position that says the human 
toll resulting from cost reduction is justifi able in order to satisfy a positivist 
effi  ciency criterion based on maximising profi ts fi rst. The  modus operandi over 
time implies that the pressure resulting from lower prices and demand neces-
sitate labour and other cost reductions in order to maintain profi ts continu-
ously. In the developing world, such a course of action attenuates the share 
of wages for the working class; however, in parts of the developing world: it is 
about encroachment- war making.  
 Unemployment: Recent offi  cial estimates of unemployment are at around 
16.4 per cent (WDI 2014); the fi gure does not include the IS- held territory 
 Table 4.4  Estimates of GDP and selected components at constant 1990 prices (in 
millions of US dollars) 
1980 Rate 
(70– 80)
1981 1990 Rate 
(81– 90)










33.68% 5419 9280 22.88% 1474 516 438 3.41%
Manufactur-
ing
8.43% 3693 3389 11.70% 2463 1007 840 6.46%










3239 5.86% 3281 3464 7.16% 1520 6156 6368 26.47%
Other 
activities
9844 18.61% 11235 11356 30.09% 6160 3908 3887 22.78%
GDP 42441 100.00%34811 38356 100.00%12995 17782 19120 100.00%
 Source : UN Statistics database 2005 (Overlapping statistics involving double counting that do 
not necessarily add up) 
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or the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KAR). In 2003, a survey by the Iraq 
Ministry of Planning showed that 28.1 per cent of the economically active 
population, excluding the KAR, were unemployed (COSIT 2004).  The 
female unemployment rate is strikingly higher than that of the male rate, 
with 30.2 per cent for the former and 16 per cent for the latter, and it remains 
so (COSIT 2004, ILO 2014). 
 Recent Oil Production: From 2004 until 2013, oil exports rose; oil rev-
enues constitute around 50 per cent of GDP on average (WDI, various years). 
Historically, production peaked in December 1979 (3.7 million barrels per 
day) and in July 1990 (3.5 million barrels). Although under occupation, all 
ministries were looted, major rehabilitation in the oil infrastructure was 
undertaken and crude production averaged around 2 million barrels per day 
in the fi rst 10 months of 2004, which was helpful in making Iraq exports rise 
to 1.5– 1.7 million barrels (ISRB 2004). In 2015, oil production is at 3.1 mil-
lion barrels per day (OPEC 2015). During the war, seven Iraqi oil wells were 
set on fi re, out of around 1,500 total wells. In this context, one major chal-
lenge in maintaining oil- production capacity is Iraq’s battle with ‘water cut’ 
especially in the South, due to the damage from the incursion of water into 
oil reservoirs. 
 Addendum to oil in Iraq: One cannot speak of oil and Iraq just in passing. 
Oil, the black liquid that gushes out of the ground and burns in northern Iraq, 
was known in ancient Mesopotamia as the eternal fi res of the gods.  According 
to Durant (1935), when Alexander entered Babylon in 331 BCE he tested the 
black liquid on a young boy by setting him ablaze to examine whether it could 
be used for military purposes; an ominous beginning indeed. Oil, of which 
there are huge cheaply extractable reserves in Iraq, is not the sole reason for 
the colonial drive, but it certainly raises the stakes for imperialism. Oil mat-
ters to US- led capital for its strategic control value and, secondarily, for its 
money value. Oil is paid for in dollars, and it is the United States that issues 
the dollar. The United States is less aff ected by higher oil prices; however, 
net importers are.  World oil demand, particularly from China and India, is 
on the rise. In fact, the GDP per unit of energy used in the low- and middle- 
income countries rose over the past decade, growing at three- fold that of the 
high- income countries (WDI, various years).  Policies of increased fuel effi  -
ciency along with lower- cost fuel- consuming machines (cheap, fuel- effi  cient 
cars) have increased demand for more of the cheaper machines and thereby 
have counter- intuitively raised demand for oil. Although each more effi  cient 
machine consumes less oil, as there are more of the fuel- effi  cient machines, 
together they consume more oil (Foster 2010). That is not to say that fuel- 
saving technologies were unsuccessful. They were successful, but not to the 
point at which strategic global energy policy changed and oil demand began 
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to be curbed ( World Watch 2005). 16  The oil energy content of every dollar of 
GDP in the developed world is half of what it is in the less- developed world. 
But the use of oil derivatives in innovative products and the value added asso-
ciated therewith have steadily increased. The wedge between the price to the 
direct producer and what the retailer earns has widened over time, implying 
greater gains for the Western hemisphere.  Klare (2008) argues that the record 
growth in the 1990s was less ‘new economy’ and more ‘cheap oil’. 
 Although there was a decline in the rate of use of oil as a source of energy 
in the more- developed economies (the demand level stayed constant), the 
energy strategy of the United States did not signifi cantly shift away from fos-
sil fuel. Its shale- oil output lessened its dependency on outside sources for its 
own consumption, but its strategic control dependency (the crucial part of oil) 
remains. It is relevant to note in this context that the rise in oil prices since 
2002 is principally caused by the infl uence of speculation rather than a by 
shortage of supply (Ghosh 2011).  The Saudi intervention in OPEC (as early 
as 1980) at the behest of US- led capital delinked oil prices from the control of 
the direct producer to further deepen the divide between actual production 
conditions and fi nance. Once fi nancialised, oil pricing falls more under the 
purview of US market deliberation rather than developing country control. 
Pricing on the basis of Arabian light crude came to an end in 1985 when 
OPEC’s cartel power receded as a result of weakening autonomous Arab and 
other socialist states. At one point during the 1990s, Kuwait’s returns from 
its fund investment in fi nancial markets were as much as 35 per cent of total 
revenue (Fasano 2000). 
 Iraq and the Ugly Face of Globalisation 
 Globalisation for the AW is minimally about information- age technology, 
the global village and free trade; it has been more about the belligerence of 
US- led imperialism. Besides continued dependence on oil exports, declin-
ing manufacturing and productivity growth, wars have engulfed most of the 
region since the invasion of Iraq. Plunges in development and undesirable 
externalities distinguish the region.  For the few successful countries in East 
Asia, globalisation meant the ability to disperse production, design and dis-
tribution around the world under the command of big capital, which (glo-
balisation) becomes eff ectively private appropriation from both gains in the 
development of productive forces and from the expansion and exploitation 
of low- tech processes in the developing world (Andrews 2000). To drain the 
 16  Oil is the single- largest source of energy, accounting for 37 per cent of global energy 
production.  http:// www.worldwatch.org/ features/ security/ tf/ 3 
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surplus from developing countries via the import of cheap raw materials or 
through super- exploitation remains necessary; but, on its own, it was never 
suffi  cient to revitalise accumulation on a global scale. Imperialism is fi rst 
about power, then about forced expropriation, per the degree of calculated 
risk ensuing from aggression upon developing countries, or for organised cap-
ital, the imperial rents that will off set the costs of intervention. 17 
 In the 1980s, Western capital began to intensify the moving of parts of its 
production steps, certainly those with lower technological requirements, to 
the developing world. This also meant the creation of an industrial working 
class in many parts of the Third World, but the new structure of technology 
was more labour- saving than during the early phases of Industrialisation, 
meaning that much unemployment was also being created. Whereas, for 
most of the twentieth century the industrial working class was concentrated 
in the developed world, between 1980 and 2010, the industrial working 
class in the Third World more than tripled in size (ILO- KILM 2014), and 
it continued to grow – more on the crisis of proletarianisation under war 
conditions in  chapter 5 . Sweatshop labour market conditions in the devel-
oping world contributed, in addition, to low oil prices during that period, 
sending corporate profi ts to their highest levels between 1990 and 2000 (Li 
et al. 2007). 
 In the very same period, in security- weak states – in Sub- Saharan Africa 
and the AW – economic development and the average level of human devel-
opment declined. Despite slightly rising Arab oil revenues, many of the rel-
evant development indices regressed, and a little over half the population was 
barely making ends meet (UNDP- AHDR 2003). 18 Globalisation is not the 
extension of capitalism to the Third World, because the ugliest forms of capi-
talism already exist there. It is the process by which more advanced capital 
in the developed countries harnesses or disengages assets and less- productive 
capital in the developing world, to the requirements of its higher pace of accu-
mulation. In consistent overproduction crises, characterised by underutilisa-
tion of capacity and superfl uous labour, such requirements partially involve 
destroying human and natural assets. 
 17  In the relationship of organised to disorganised capital activity, it is always a seri-
ous possibility for capital to pursue a path of mass destructiveness as the ideology 
of neo- liberalism frees the reins of the bourgeoisie to pursue its ambitions for profi t- 
making to a higher degree of contravention of international law and institutions than 
observed at the present stage in history. 
 18  The oil price declined and stayed low between 1981 and 2002. During this period, 
Arab countries increased production to off set the falling oil price; so revenues dipped 
initially in the early eighties but picked up later. However, it is also during this period 
that resources and wealth became increasingly channelled via the private sector. 
IRAQ – THEN AND NOW
   189
189
 Capital, which is by defi nition a social relationship centred on private 
expropriation of socially produced wealth, tends to lend itself to being rea-
soned or understood because its agents are motivated by vested self- interest; 
it is not an incomprehensible irrational whole driven by erratic or emotional 
whim. Where the interests of capital are greater, the risks are greater, the 
returns are greater and, therefore, the politics are ferocious. Currently, 
nowhere is this relationship more evident than in the case of Iraq, the AW, 
and one may add, Central Africa, including the DR Congo. Sitting on a huge 
reserve of fossil fuels, Iraq has been condemned to receiving the wrath of US- 
led imperialism, because imperialism’s control of strategic energy resources, 
upon which much of the rest of the world remains dependent, gives it power. 
 Thus, whereas in the more autonomous parts of the Third World the busi-
ness of globalisation has been only proletarianisation and re- engaging labour 
in some form of peace- time employment, in the AW and Iraq, in particular, 
the old equation still holds: more colonial devastation equals more imperial 
control and rents, and more war- related employment; hence, the creation of 
a war- indigent proletariat.  Over the decade 2000– 2010, little foreign direct 
investment has gone into manufacturing activity in the AW (UNCTAD- 
WIR, 2012).  Trade structure by commodity groupings barely budged, and 
oil represented on average about 50 per cent of regional GDP (UN 2005a)  – it 
remained just as high in 2009.  Much of foreign investment has focused on 
raw material extraction, primarily oil. Nothing has changed in the policy 
of Western capital toward the AW, except that Israel, the old regional gen-
darme of Western imperialism, is stronger and has a freer hand. The impasse 
for the AW is huge, and social consciousness is under attack by a combi-
nation of Gulf- Islamist ideology and funding, which under the careful eye 
of imperialism employ the identity- based ‘othering’ that Iranian- sponsored 
Shiite militias in Iraq had provided for sectarianism to fl ourish. There are 
no formal solutions to such an impasse. There are, however, practicable solu-
tions. To use the standard socialist ideological reply for now: these solutions 
spring from the revolutionary struggle of working people for autonomy and 
self- reliance. 
 Let me begin by posing a series of immediate refl ections from facts. To 
varying degrees, Arab ruling classes are alien to the Arab masses, and exter-
nal pressures result in their fl ight toward Western protection. In addition to 
this class attachment to Western capital, which already shuns any form of 
developing nation power through regionalism, there can be no common Arab 
political agenda because the wealth is commerce- derived and its distribu-
tion is so skewed that smaller players will lose to the few big capital hold-
ers. In their day- to- day survival strategy, the overwhelming majority of Arab 
regimes have relied more on imperialist backing than their own hegemony 
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via the state. Hence, political stability came to depend more and more on 
repression and less and less on welfare functions, civil liberties and the forma-
tion of consensus through debate.  Democracy in a developing formation is 
about the real human rights, the rights of the working class and its right to 
a decent living standard, economic and social development and, decisively, 
its right to self- determination. The latter is a condition that is suppressed by 
imperialist assault in one form or another. 
 If globalisation becomes in one aspect the fruition of capital concentration 
as capital further integrates the periphery, then no culture can be immune 
to the incursion of globalisation. The universalisation of capital in the dol-
lar form along with homogenisation of diverse commodities and services 
accompanies acute diff erences in concrete labour conditions – the chain of 
value starts from the luxury of Western intellectual or high- tech labour to the 
dreadful conditions of child labourers and child soldiers. Less pay and more 
work in Third World sweatshop conditions does not capture the darker side 
of the global labour process.  The labour process gauged in terms of the law 
of value the historical making of refugees, death related to war and famine 
and the engagement of Arab and African workers in the war enterprise of 
imperialism, is the process by which life is squandered to meet the condition 
of exchange for profi ts with cheaper inputs. While the industrial proletariat 
was growing in the Asiatic and Latin continents, the war- indigent proletariat, 
has also grown as a result of the pressure that an exponential global growth 
imposes upon the reformulation of the power structure and its related social 
condition of production. These deteriorating living and social conditions also 
coincided with the absence of internationalist socialist ideas that unite work-
ing people.  In the subjection of the culture of resistance to defeat under neo- 
liberalism, the assault of the victor’s ideology splinters the resisting ideology 
into several self- defeating identity forms of political practice. Military defeat 
reinforced cultural defeat and the creation of defeatism in sectional identity 
politics. As is blatantly clear from the Iraqi case, minor intra- working class 
diff erences were magnifi ed into causes of intra- working class war. To under-
mine the cultural eff ects of imperialism, the ascendancy of the old symbols 
of capital in new meaning and forms, one must undermine capital as means 
of control, especially in times of severe crisis. The protracted crisis in Iraq, 
including the war of its working class with itself, has not been able to draw 
international support to undermine the means of control of capital. The 
imperialist conduit by which Iraq is globalised, the apathy of other working 
classes enhancing their lots via the power emanating from the destruction of 
Iraq, further grinds down the unity and resistance of the Iraqi people and 
inculpates, not only capital, but also huge sections of the international work-
ing class in the Iraqi disaster . 
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 In one facet of this form of control through globalisation by violence, capi-
talism as an accumulation process also needs to contribute to the detach-
ment of the working classes from each other and the creation of conditions 
for fetishist consumption demand.  It has been doing so very eff ectively with a 
culture of consumerism that has sunk into public psyche as if it were biologi-
cally determined. The other side of Marx’s ‘accumulate accumulate, that is 
Moses and the prophets’ is ‘consume consume’ . This Veblenian competition 
for conspicuousness in consumption as a social role model is diffi  cult to dis-
lodge because the demonstration of wealth is also a demonstration of power 
(Davis, 1957). Even the Caliph Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi of IS had a Rolex 
wristwatch on display during his fi rst publicised sermon. Consumerist emula-
tion for status forms the psychology of a consumer class that sees in affl  uent 
consumption its  raison d’être or an end in itself that defi nes its own existence. 
This culture debases many of the cultural values of reasonableness and mod-
eration, especially as it intrudes into conservationist agrarian societies. It fol-
lows the edict of capital as it pushes to eradicate deeply encoded values that 
enshrine the conservation and preservation of nature and replaces them with 
rising alterations in consumption patterns refl ecting the high frequency of 
shifting communal and personal power patterns in society. These patterns 
tally, not with human needs, but with the many infl ections of power and 
status recurring in the social order. One may fall back on Debord (1967) and 
posit that capital’s means of control are not to be found only in its capacity to 
physically repress, but more pervasively, in every aspect of social life as it dis-
places much of human interaction by introjection into objective spectacular 
forms of exchange.  However, Lukacs (1919) remains clearer and more perti-
nent in his explanation of such perversions, in the sense that capital imposes 
its alien value system upon society. The cost- cutting measures at any expense 
are such value systems.  As working classes absorb capital’s falsehoods and 
place short- term stabilisation arising from inter working class divisions above 
internationalism and its immediate- term gains, many would stand by the 
wayside as Iraq collapses. Such is the depth of capital’s malignancy. 
 In a Fanonian manner (Fanon 1967), dislocated or déclassée working- 
class Arabs distinguish themselves culturally and invoke their indigenous 
symbols of struggle. Given the inward social implosion, many of the ideo-
logical guises of resistance that have taken shape under neo- liberalism are 
socially regressive, especially invoking selective religious text to undermine 
the rights of women.  Internationalist defeatism spawns national defeat-
ism.  Instead of particular identities being mediated in a general humanity, 
rival social identity groups jostle for a position of imperial favour. From 
the very outset, colonialism and later imperialism bred the Islamist– Salafi  
alternative to socialism. Although politically, Islamism may appear to 
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be at loggerheads with imperialism from time to time, its doctrine of the 
free market and of absolute right to private property match those of neo- 
liberalism – and probably surpass them. Ultra- Islamism  qua terrorism of 
the IS type also creates a cheap rationale for permanent war. At this victo-
rious juncture in its history, imperialism wants to fabricate and choose its 
enemy at low cost (Amin 2010) – an enemy whose fi nal function is to put 
in place a system of social relations that reinforces capitalist accumulation 
processes and fuels wars. The social regression and the terror hype arising 
out of Iraq have relegated some of the bourgeois democratic achievements 
in the West to the history books. The replacement of Western liberalism 
by forms of authoritarian practice resembling Islamic- Salafi sm represents 
a more welcome and solid ideological basis for the reproduction of Western 
capital itself. 
 The virtuous ideological spiral between the IS, Iranian- backed Shiite 
militias and imperialism is foundational. Paradoxically, the United States 
bombing IS boosts the popularity of IS among much of the disenfranchised 
working class and declassés in the Islamic world. Imperialism, from the very 
outset, has fostered its own convenient brand of anti- imperialist pseudo- 
resistance, such that, even if Arab countries win more independence and 
gain more sovereignty but remain governed by Islamists, the long- term losses 
incurred socially as a result of self- repression will not spread development. 
 Saudi Arabia’s culture of social exclusion is a stark example of vast wealth 
alongside lumpen development. Ultra- Islamism sets off  a process of labour 
dehumanisation that causes working people to infl ict reverse development on 
themselves. 
 This brings us to the question of the resistance landscape.  French com-
munist circles (circa 1960) discussed whether in undeveloped Arab or African 
formations, a specifi cally communist party was an appropriate vanguard for 
the conditions in which struggle is to be taken up (Maggio 2013).  The debate 
arose because Third World- ist communist- party elitism and lack of rapport 
with local culture relegated pro- Soviet parties to the ranks of a subculture 
within society. The notion that somehow the struggle for communism as 
such is better suited to European society is social chauvinism and literally 
has nothing to do with Marxism. The Western working classes’ affi  liation 
with the bourgeoisie is more than modernity and literacy; it occurs through 
the welfare state, which is its material medium of partnership with capital. 
The same could be said of the material affi  liation of communist parties in 
developing countries as a consequence of their position within the class struc-
ture: as part of the working class whose capital- defi ned characteristics assign 
to it a higher share of wages, say because of education (inter- working class 
diff erentiation). Pro- Soviet Arab parties have also enjoyed class privileges 
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correlated to their affi  liation with the Soviet Communist Party, which also 
entailed many other benefi ts. 
 As the pace of uneven development quickens, bridging the working class 
divide nationally and internationally has become more diffi  cult.  Arab organic 
vanguards, as per Gramsci (1971), have become scant.  The dialectic that 
relates working- class cultures across national boundaries has come undone. 
The support of central working classes to their Third World counterparts is 
more tepid than ever before. The West’s facile approach to environmental 
degradation has prioritised fl ora and fauna over malnourished children in 
Iraq and elsewhere. From the 1970s on, central workers’ privatised pensions 
and savings became part of capital. The objectives of social democracy in 
the battle against capital fell in line behind nationalism.  In the international 
division of labour, the toil of one developing- world working class has been 
increasingly converted into the loot of another developed- world working 
class. The callousness of the richer working classes toward spilt blood in the 
colonies increased and, on the fl ip side, certain anti- internationalist forms of 
resistance in the Third World also started to grow. Some ethical works have 
gone so far as inculpating the Western working classes in war crimes against 
working Arabs for the established reason that they have voted for leaders who 
opted for war time and again (Neumann (2002) apportions no blame, but 
rightly speaks of a shared humanist responsibility to arrest the confl ict). 
 Yet as the world comes closer together in real time, the social and political 
struggle will inevitably bring world labour together. However, at this restruc-
turing conjuncture, the resolution of a serious inter- working class contradic-
tion is being eschewed by labour.  Frank (1982) was prophetic in seeing the rise 
of working- class fragmentation as a result of the spiral of lacklustre socialist 
success and the rise of reclusive nationalisms and identities arising from the 
attenuated forcefulness of national liberation (Frank 1982). ‘Religious convic-
tion mixed with nationalist sentiments proposing no systemic resistance to 
capital are likely to grow in the coming years’ (Frank 1982, 165). The dynamic 
of such failure lies in watered- down ‘socialism’ or compromised resistance, so 
that as any conceding anti- capitalist movement growing over time by the 
handout of capital, lends itself to being manipulated by capital. An opposition 
to capital with a diluted internationalist component will have its tactics and 
strategy of resistance moulded into a framework of submissive social democ-
racy.  In this epoch, austerity plagues the North while wars and famines are 
on the rise in many corners of the South, as if in synch.  There is a defi nitive 
positive correlation amongst the various sections of the working class globally. 
However, labour is being suppressed by capital at exactly the intermittent 
moments at which their convergence could be actualised  – capital inter-
venes to make sure that labour does not organise across national boundaries. 
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The crux of the issue is in the theoretical and ideological compromise to 
capital, which frames the struggle in a way to overlook the organic links of 
labour and the unifying conditions of struggle on a planet governed by the 
same capitalist forces. 
 Every class culture internalises and philosophises its life processes. If the 
social scene today appears to be polluted with reactionary elements, the selec-
tion from Islam of tenets that assist the population to spiritually cope with the 
monolithic onslaught of imperialism without anti- systemic resistance should 
not represent an anomaly.  Obscurantist Islam is not only the off spring of cap-
ital but also of an anti- Soviet labour aristocracy, which moralised the posi-
tion of the Afghan mujahidin in terms of a war of national liberation. In the 
United States – the so- called middle- class could not possibly have disengaged 
from the Reagan- sponsored mujahidin war because it had already put into 
place the Reagan administration. The ‘let us elect someone to go to war and 
then dissociate ourselves from the war crimes’ is how a class lays the ‘moral’ 
grounds for its own continuity. Al Qaeda originated in that campaign and, 
wanting US forces out of Afghanistan while the country has been destroyed 
and set on a continuous war path, is another victory for US- led capital. It 
is just cheaper to leave, but the cause of value destruction goes on while the 
ideological demonstration eff ect of the barbarism of the ‘others’, the Afghan, 
the Muslim and the Arab, is an ongoing imperialist bonus trumpeted across 
cultural studies in almost every university. The root of the matter is that the 
justifi cation for the initial aggression and its ramifi cation have imparted a 
multi- tiered ‘good’ for US- led capital and its associated working or ‘mid-
dle’ class – the invasion boosts imperial rents from which a certain payoff  in 
wages accrues to the central working class. The US middle class will continue 
to earn a slightly higher wage diff erence ( just like that of a foreman, slave 
catcher or prison guard) as a result of the cheaper wages, resources and inputs 
that the devastation to the Afghan and the Iraqi people and others imparts to 
the global power and accumulation structure. 
 The harsh and highly unequal conditions of the struggle will necessitate 
the galvanisation and redeployment of all social forces in Iraq and elsewhere 
into an anti- imperialist stand.  The key element to the ideological turnaround 
is theoretical realism, as in seeing the particular condition in relation to the 
whole picture, which is one of ruin (Marcuse 1965; Baran 1961).  The inter-
locking of the national struggle with the necessity to defeat capital globally and 
more or less simultaneously is the practical process that can restore socialist 
ideological strengths. It will delink the growth of anti- capitalist organisations 
from the growth of capital, not by bypassing capitalism, which is impossi-
ble, but by letting resistance develop at the intersection in capitalist relations 
whose process of negation breeds capital’s self- destruction. Positioning the 
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socialist assault on the intensifi cation of inter- capitalist contradictions is one 
step by which the self- negation of capital leads to restoration of labour. A lucid 
statement during the anti- occupation struggles, one that summarises the pri-
ority of anti- imperialism in Iraq, is the following. 
 The battle of the Iraqi people is the battle of all movements, peoples and 
nations fi ghting for their liberation from the imperialist world system led by 
the US. Therefore, we have to fi rmly rally behind the Iraqi resistance. If we 
are able to support their struggle to smash the US attempt to build a puppet 
regime and to eventually drive out the invaders, it will result into a victory for 
mankind. It will not only give new momentum to the struggle of the Palestin-
ian and Afghan people, but will lead to a new off ensive of the liberation strug-
gles all around the world. (Al- Basrah 2004) 
 Some demonstrations against sectarianism in Iraq have come to the fore 
lately (Issa 2015). Sectarianism and reactionary identity politics only appear 
to have run their course. The breakup of their hold as the ideology of the Iraqi 
ruling class requires much resistance. That said, resurgence is unlikely with-
out other contingent internationalist factors, especially the working classes of 
major formations aligning with the embryonic Iraqi resistance. 
 Sellers (1976) notes that far from being the world’s lifeboat, America and 
the West, lacking any new self- understanding, will turn out to be the world’s 
 Titanic , dragging down with them the remainder of global society. As to how 
it will be possible for the developing world to accept any Western values (as 
in gender- related rights or the alleged democratisation of Iraq) when it is 
being pillaged by the West, Sellers attaches the condition ‘that America and 
the Western world must reinvent themselves as partners and not enemies of 
humanity, and only then can such healthy American cornerstones of demo-
cratic experience, know- how, and voluntary association come to be accepted 
by the rest of humanity as gifts no longer suspect’ (Sellers 1976).  However, 
unless the material or value channels, the war and poverty infl icted upon the 
Third World, which feed America and the Western world are exposed, it is 
unlikely that such a turnaround in working- class consciousness could ever 
be possible. In the double act of alienation, which provides the grounds for 
callousness, and the imperial rents that partly buttress central wages, it is dif-
fi cult to outmanoeuvre the organised dimension of capital that is the watchful 
eye over capital’s stability and rule.  A slight hint of rising central working- 
class awareness invokes a compromise that reins it back to the ‘nationalism 
it merits’. The socialist approach becomes practicable only if the American 
working classes realise that their ties to world labour supersede their ties to 
capital. 
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 The most discrete task of all remains in diff erentiating which ‘values are 
suspect’ and which ‘are not’ in the context of a US- led imperialism that can-
not by defi nition reinvent itself and become a partner of humanity. Not that 
there is a systematic theoretical approach that explains the pragmatic, or do- 
as- you- go, US- led imperialism; however, let me just cite a few of the intellec-
tual trappings that arose during the Vietnam War that may serve to illustrate 
the imperialist drive. The United States adopted three conceptual frame-
works for dealing with weaker Third World countries: containment, nation 
building and the totalitarian approach.  Here is James Peck’s wry description 
of what is meant by this language. 
 The reverse side of the containment policy was the ‘total penetration’ approach 
to foreign aff airs, ‘diplomacy in depth’. Assist the elites of underdeveloped 
countries to ‘modernise’ their societies, demand ‘reforms’ that undercut the 
appeal of revolutionaries, and link such nations with the ‘international com-
munity’. Then revolutionary solutions and ‘communists’ will lose their appeal. 
It was, in essence, the Freud plus Santa Claus concept of foreign relations. 
Persuade countries that underdevelopment was  sui generis to the society instead 
of part of a world system which sustains it or an immediate American presence 
which reinforces it. And then portray a benevolent, gift- giving US bestowing 
technical assistance for the benefi t of others. (Peck 1970; 60– 61) 
 Prior to the invasion of Iraq, there was, in the choreography of war, a 
meeting of the absurd, the pedantic and the ludicrous. I will illustrate with 
examples of all three instances in that order. 
 The Absurd : The Project for the New American Century recommends build-
ing US defences (off ences really) to the point at which the United States will 
be capable of conducting multiple types of warfare, probably involving tacti-
cal nuclear weapons. ‘The United States must retain suffi  cient forces able to 
rapidly deploy and win multiple simultaneous large- scale wars and also to be 
able to respond to unanticipated contingencies in regions where it does not 
maintain forward- based forces’ (Donnelly 2000). As a result of eff ective armed 
resistance to the US forces on the ground in Iraq, the current Obama- run war 
is indeed multiple- stage warfare, but mostly involving drones and aerial bom-
bardment and not many ground troops. Resistance works, but Iran’s early role 
in backing mainly Shiite militias in Iraq thwarted its advance. 
 The Arcane : Lee Harris, a little- known journalist, wants ‘the Arabs to not look 
the United States in the eye’ because had it not been for the United States, 
that oil under their sands would be useless. Also:  the Arabs cannot earn 
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US dollars, buy weapons, and fi ght the United States with those weapons. 
The pedantry appears in his essay ‘Our world historical gamble’, where a 
war is necessary for the betterment of the human spirit á la Hegel:  ‘War is 
the state of aff airs which deals in earnest with the vanity of temporal goods 
and concerns’. Or, better still, the ‘war with Iraq will constitute one of those 
momentous turning points of history, in which one nation under the guidance 
of a strong- willed, self- confi dent leader undertakes to alter the fundamental 
state of the world’ (Harris 2003). It is, to use the language of Hegel, an event 
that is world- historical in its signifi cance and scope. Such world- historical 
events, according to Hegel, are inherently  sui generis  – ‘they break the mould 
and shatter tradition’ (Harris 2003). Just as Shiite or Sunni militias deploy 
an Ibn Khaldun- like tribal social solidarity (Asabiyya) as a rallying point for 
their populations to unite in war, Harris is choosing a few mystical phrases 
from Hegel denoting a form of ultra- nationalism in which what is good for 
the nation  qua tribe is good for its citizen irrespective of where that citizen 
is situated in the class structure. He has borrowed the motto ‘what is good 
for General Motors is good for America’ and dressed it with the old jargon 
of German idealism. This approach is an admixture of tragedy and farce, 
because Hegel is presented wrongly, made inaccessible and also quoted out 
of context. 
 The Ludicrous : In October 2002, the former commander of US military opera-
tions in the Middle East, General Anthony Zinni, explored some of the pos-
sible scenarios of a war on Iraq. He listed ten conditions that when realised, 
would represent the best possible outcome. These ten conditions were: ‘fi rst, 
the coalition is on board; second, the war is short; third, destruction is light; 
fourth, Israel stays out of it; fi fth, the street is quiet; sixth, order is kept; sev-
enth, the burden is shared; eight, the change is orderly; ninth, the military 
is not stuck; and last, other commitments are met’. ‘That is an easy list’, he 
added. ‘If we design our strategy and tactics based on this,  everything will work 
out’. (Zinni 2002).  Everything worked out as planned indeed. Plan or not, given the 
nearly uncontested hegemony of the United States and its neo- liberal ideol-
ogy, whatever it does works, because there is no one of import to say that it 
did did not work; everything works in favour of the uncontested hegemon – 
unless one anecdotally counts the egos of moralising academics, which are 
extremely potent. 
 Not all the war party was that obtuse. The best example of American 
shrewd but unsagacious pragmatism stands out in the many occasions the 
word ‘process’ pierces through the avalanche of media drivel. In one of the 
best examples of sober posturing, a prolocutor for the CIA, when asked what 
he thought of the ‘peace process’ in the Middle East, commented: ‘Let us not 
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get hung up on the word peace, all we want going is a process’. 19 Why I would 
like to stop at such a statement is to demonstrate the ‘do- as- you- go’ imperialist 
strategy of US- led imperialism. There are no fi nal goals, the very process or 
act of destruction or deconstruction to politically emasculate developing peo-
ples in the AW and Africa is itself the goal. The process by which the stature 
of empire is reasserted through war, and by which capital is requisitioned, 
is in reality the promulgation of violent dislocation to reassert imperialist 
power.  In  America Right or Wrong , Lieven (2004) makes the point that tracing 
America’s war history on a secular trend shows that neocons are no aberra-
tion, and the fact that George W. Bush was re- elected for a second term, was 
a natural outcome of dominant class politics. 
 Closing Comment 
 When Netanyahu was drumming up support for the Iraq campaign, his mes-
sage was ‘If beaten, the Arabs surrender’.  As it turns out, in every society, 
there are social classes that surrender and others that do not. Simplifying 
social confl ict into the Shi’a– Sunni divide is really judging a historical process 
of defeat by its symptoms – sectarianism is a symptom of defeat repossessed 
by the bourgeoisie in its act of reproduction. The mainstream defi nition of 
class is too static to capture the fl ow of historical conditions in relation to the 
material mode of appropriation.  The rupture between social condition and 
identity, as experienced in societies infl icted with sectarianism, is a result of 
imperialistically sown defeatism. 
 The struggle against sectarian fragmentation in Iraq represents a chal-
lenge for most progressives as the new colonial surgeon’s scalpel will not stop 
at Iraq (Belqaziz 2003). Iran has so far contributed to the status quo. The area 
of primary interest for Iran is not North, near Pakistan, or South in Lebanon. 
It is the Gulf, where control of commerce and oil revenues welded an Iranian 
ruling class to ‘theocratic’ politics. The Gulf is where the wealth resides, and 
extracting it requires political leverage. However, Iran’s making inroads into 
the AW via Shi’ism is playing right into the hands of the US’s plan to chip 
apart the region along sectarian lines. Iran has already facilitated US aggres-
sion in Afghanistan, and at the advent of the US invasion it even armed and 
sent into Iraq the Badr brigades. In the past, refusing to end the war with Iraq 
by divine élan, Khomeini had, knowingly or unknowingly, favoured US- led 
capital’s interests. Iran has delayed all- out resistance in Iraq to US- led empire 
by keeping a large section of devout Shiites at bay while US occupying forces 
suff ered losses in the so- called ‘Sunni triangle’. This is not the result of a 
 19  Interview with PBS on the  McNeil Lehrer News Hour , 30 January 1990. 
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personal score to settle with Saddam, it is a social- class act. It is the result of 
the Iranian ruling classes’ vested interests in expanding control and negotiat-
ing their position with the United States. 
 Deconstructing a nation and rebuilding its institutions in a way that 
guarantees the loss of the indigenous population’s control of its oil requires 
aggression at all levels, including the splitting and fragmenting of the Iraqis 
and the creation of a pro- occupation proxy army; or, better yet, keeping 
Iraqis embroiled in a constant state of war. Popular resistance against 
imperialism, however, will dent the war drive of global accumulation.  If 
Hobsbawm (1994) turns out to be right – that no people can be ruled by 
a foreign power against their will as per the lessons of the twentieth cen-
tury – then what has been construed as war booty for US- led capital may 
turn out to be its nemesis. Where the United States has positioned itself 
to win the big prize – a regional arrangement that further buttresses the 
oil/ dollar nexus  – resistance will quicken the reversal of fortunes.  As it 
has often been remarked, Fukuyama (2005) was again quick to prejudge 
history when he presumed that US foreign policy seemed destined to rise 
or fall on the outcome of a war about which everything would be regret-
ted.  There is not much to regret so far for the US- led capital class. To 
date, international resistance to imperialism remains weak. Across history, 
arresting cultural development in Mesopotamia, as in the Mongol sacking 
of Baghdad in 1258, appears to be symbolic of setting back all of human 
development. Until an  élan of uncompromising internationalist ideology devel-
ops from the womb of the current struggles and speaks the language of 
internationalist solidarity to working people, things can only go on as they 
are: from bad to worse. 
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 Chapter 5 
 THE PERVERSE TRANSFORMATION 
 As mentioned in the Introduction, this chapter addresses the socialisation 
of labour by neo- liberal means, while the fi nal chapter examines socialisa-
tion of labour and resources by means of war. The making of wage labour at 
ever- faster rates under neo- liberalism is a common characteristic of the AW, 
and the chapter will examine the issue for all Arab countries. Why should so 
much attention be paid to the dislocation and pauperisation of labour since 
the heydays of Arab socialism in particular? Labour power is the principal 
input into production, and the labourer is both subject and object of accumu-
lation. An understanding of the formation of the labour process through the 
development of the law of value is rudimentary to understanding the whole 
process of resource disengagement under neo- liberalism. 
 More than three decades ago, many envisaged a signifi cant rise in the 
industrial workforce in developing countries (Amin 1976; Wallerstein 1979; 
Frank 1982; Arrighi 1982; Abdel- Malek 1963 and 1985).  Since then, the rate of 
proletarianisation globally has soared. In 1950, industrial workers from devel-
oping countries composed roughly 30 per cent of the total industrial labour 
force. In 2010, industrial workers from developing countries represented over 
80 per cent of the global industrial labour force (ILO- KILM, various years). 
 In China and the few other newly industrialised Asian economies that enjoy 
a margin of autonomy in policy, the majority of the newly evicted peasants 
have moved into high productivity- cum- rising- wage employment. The social-
ist legacy of China had enshrined certain labour rights that were diffi  cult to 
undo by the rising capitalist class and that resulted in a steady rise in Chinese 
labour wages (Weil 2010). For most of the world, however, the transformation 
has been perverse (Patnaik 2015), and most new wage- labourers either become 
unemployed or are engaged in low- productivity/ poverty- wage informal jobs. 
 The AW falls into the latter category. Between 1980 and 2010, the share 
of rural to total population in the AW dropped from about 60 per cent to 
around 40 per cent. In absolute terms, an estimated 70– 100 million people 
moved from the countryside to urban centres within the Arab region. 1  While 
 1  The estimates vary signifi cantly depending on the method of measurement and the 
counting of commuters to Cairo. Many daily commuters to Cairo have moved from 
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this exodus was occurring, the regional rate job creation was falling , and the 
share of labour in the form of wages fell to around a quarter of national income 
(Guerriero 2012; ILO 2014). By 2007, the Arab League declared that more 
than half of the Arab population was living on less than the two- dollar per day 
benchmark (AMF 2007). The absolute poverty fi gures (the one- dollar or so 
benchmark), which were always shown as low prior to the Arab Spring in 2011, 
were adjusted upward after 2011 (AMF 2012). For a fl eeting moment after the 
Arab Spring, it was diffi  cult to conceal the truth about the depth of poverty. 
 Under neo- liberalism, basic food production per capita as per the defi -
nition of the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) was decreasing, 
and food imports were rising. Around half the population in the AW was 
spending more than half of its income on food (WB 2011). When specula-
tion reached the commodity market and basic food prices rose in 2007, more 
people joined the ranks of the extremely poor.  The agricultural sector was 
shrinking relative to the economy.  The productive economy, in turn, was de- 
industrialising and retreating relative to oil revenues and geopolitical rents. 
The deconstruction sustained by the productive sectors under neo- liberalism 
was almost as devastating as war in terms of its social impact.  When neo- 
liberalism could not infi ltrate and suffi  ciently hollow out the development 
of society, imperialist war completed the job, as was the case of Libya, Syria 
and Iraq. Massive dislocation and disengagement of real resources, particu-
larly human resources, mark the neo- liberal episode of Arab history. In this 
chapter, I examine the key component of capital’s sustainability: its command 
of the labour process through dispossession. I discuss the impact of the neo- 
liberal transformation on the intensifi cation of the proletarianisation process 
and the subsequent devalorisation of work through the political disempower-
ment of the working class. 
 In order to achieve this, I briefl y examine how the class of neoclassical 
models, dual- economy models in particular, are unfi t tools for explaining the 
process of proletarianisation in the AW.  Dual- economy models purport to 
provide an explanation of migration from the less- developed rural sectors 
in terms of choice and in relation to modern- sector wages. However, in an 
Arab context, the rationale for migration on the basis of individual choice 
between two competing sectors is irrelevant. Moreover, the very idea that an 
individual or a family residing in rural areas is aff orded the luxury of choice is 
insidious doctrine rather than a refl ection of historical facts. Whatever choice 
was available to the individual was subordinate to the choice that was made 
rural areas far away from the centre of the city to other rural areas around the city, but 
ones that still count as rural areas. See more in United Nations (2008a),  The Demographic 
Profi le of Arab Countries Ageing Rural Population . 
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by the comprador class in respect to social and macroeconomic policies. The 
comprador class in charge of development in the AW had a choice between 
a neo- liberal pattern that universalises and usurps national wealth to be 
later valorised in dollars, and a strategy based on the recirculation of wealth 
and the redeployment of real resources for development within the national 
economy. It chose the former. By doing so, it set in motion a whole dynamic 
that accelerated the disengagement of direct producers, especially from the 
land. Peasants and farmers were forcibly dislocated; the choice left to any 
individual was that of bare survival. The alternatives aff orded the individual 
in the neo- liberal policy context are further narrowed down, by successive 
violent encroachments on the rights of working people, to two wretched con-
ditions: the abjection of the countryside or the misery of urban squalor. 
 Although analogies between dual- economy models and structural theories 
of migration (those that originate in a Marxian framework) are possible in 
that they both consider the initial disparity in the constitution of the rural 
and the urban sectors, their diff erences, however, are conceptually irreconcil-
able. 2 Whereas in the former, the price mechanism allocates resources effi  -
ciently between sectors, in the latter, price becomes one of the many causes by 
which the less- developed rural economy falls permanently into a peripheral 
orbit in which its already disadvantaged position worsens. The price of labour 
(the wage rate) becomes an instrument of repression. For Marxist- type analy-
sis, the premeditated pauperisation of the periphery is generally followed by 
an outfl ow of labour.  In this chapter, I show that a more pertinent explana-
tion of Arab proletarianisation rests in understanding how the unrestrained 
immiseration of Arab working classes under neo- liberalism, often degenerat-
ing into social collapse, is part of the objective process of reproducing global 
capital through neo- liberal policies and imperialist politics. 
 Choice Versus Structural (Marxist) Theory 
 The received theory in migration literature postulates that a potential 
migrant coming from conditions of unemployment or underemployment in 
 2  I am distinguishing between structuralism and Structural- Marxism, but at the same 
time, it is diffi  cult to juxtapose or compare a fl uid historical process (Marxism), shaped 
by a contingent and recurring articulation of social forces, with a static or formal model 
like that of neoclassical economics. So, for the sake of perspicuity, the structuralist side 
of Marxism provides a window from which the comparison could be broached. Struc-
tural Marxism is actually the radical dependency of Samir Amin and Andre Gunder- 
Franck, which diff ers from the Latin American structuralist school.  Larrain (1989) 
provides a complete breakdown of such diff erences. Meanwhile, as will be seen, I will 
try to do justice to both schools when informing about their theoretical content. 
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subsistence- like farming conditions chooses to migrate because the actual or 
the expected wage and or amenities in the modern sector are higher than 
those of the rural sector. That people would choose to migrate in order to 
improve their lot in life appears at fi rst sight as too vacuous a proposition 
to be debated. Yet the whole of the neoclassical edifi ce attempts to situate 
migratory phenomena on the availability of choice and on prices related to 
higher productivity in the urban areas.  Productivity growth in the AW has 
been more often than not negative, and the mass of unemployed relative to 
the capacity of the economy has become too large to be absorbed under the 
conventional effi  ciency criterion (KILM 2012).  The notion that ‘choice’, as in 
having multiple options, plays a role in situations in which people have only 
the choice of survival is a malevolent diversion. It is also meant to promote 
the neoclassical fairy tale construction that there are two sectors, a rural and 
an urban, which have entered into a trade relationship from which they both 
stand to benefi t. 
 Any trade relationship is also a social relationship. Money- form gains or 
losses to any sector or social class conceal beneath them a social structure 
engaged in production.  But this is no symbolic process of production (as in 
neoclassical economics); it is a real metabolic process in which resources, 
including the labour resource, are consumed in the course of action. By 
ratcheting up its power over rural areas, urban capital draws on a pool 
of labour whose social cost of reproduction was borne by the hinterland; 
capital thus grabs an underpriced resource to whose formation it did not 
contribute. Capital, in its pursuit of profi t, must recreate these conditions 
for cheap inputs in the countryside by all means available. Labour is not 
cheap but is made cheap by a process of political repression and dispos-
session, which also entails constructed diff erential gradations within the 
non- owning working class (recreating identity diff erences) and, hence, 
the socioeconomic heterogeneity of labour. The received theory that the 
accumulation of capital has a built- in tendency through trade expansion 
and technological improvement to homogenise the returns to labour is not 
determined by better machine quality, but by the balance of forces between 
capital and labour (Sherman and Meeropol 2013).  For Marx, although the 
market tends to equalise wages, the political exercise of capital holds pri-
macy as it exerts counter- pressure in order to fragment labour, otherwise 
capitalism would be digging in its own grave far too quickly (an inference 
from Marx 1867). 
 Under neo- liberalism, free trade and open capital accounts allow values 
to more readily assume a universal character reincarnated in the dollar as 
the universal wealth- holding medium.  Making developing countries food 
dependent and underpricing their assets in their own national currencies 
THE PERVERSE TRANSFORMATION
   205
205
before their conversion into dollars implies a further diff erentiation of the 
developing working class from the central working classes. The assault on the 
rural sectors of the developing AW is part and parcel of the fragmentation 
process necessary for extraction of higher surpluses from these peripheral for-
mations and, conjointly, it deprives labour of some of the grounds upon which 
it can potentially organise itself as a viable political alternative. An extreme 
analogy of surplus drain resembling such situations would be the case of com-
mercial exploitation based on slavery or of colonial wars of depopulation on 
the periphery. 
 The violent aspects of the proletarianisation process, as it occurred in the 
English countryside two or more centuries ago, were dubbed by Marx as 
primitive accumulation. The proletarianisation of the English labour force 
by ‘expropriation of the immediate producers which was accomplished with 
merciless vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the most infamous, 
the most sordid, the pettiest, and the most meanly odious’ (Marx 1867), 
resulted in the maturing of capitalism and the reign of European capital 
as a social relationship globally (Wood 1998). At the beginning of the last 
century, the proletarianisation process on the periphery was adduced from 
development by encroachment, the foremost facet of which was colonial-
ism and postcolonial wars. Encroachment by war or otherwise is when the 
colonists commandeer the political structure of the colonies. Such a form 
of primitive accumulation was more vicious under colonialism and resulted 
in massive global dislocation and pauperisation in both absolute terms and 
relative terms; relative to the historically determined standard of living 
(Lenin 1916). 
 For the majority in the Arab working classes, the choices were between two 
below- decent- subsistence living standards. The historically relevant choices 
were not made by each individual at any one point in time. As they turned 
away from dirigisme and Arab socialism, the social class in power decided to 
introduce violent and nonviolent measures and policies aimed at eroding the 
very basis of the reproduction of rural life.  For countries developing under 
the onus of confl ict, such as Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Libya, Somalia 
and Sudan, the process of expulsion from the home village was material-
ised in outright aggression, as millions of war- displaced people sought safer 
shelter. In the absence of military occupation or war, trade openness trea-
ties,  displacement laws dispossessing farmers, like Egypt’s Law 96 of 1992 
(Bush 2015)  and macro policies allocating resources away from agriculture, 
served to uproot the peasantry. Since 1980, the share of investment in Arab 
agriculture in total investment has fallen continuously, reaching a low of 5 
per cent by 2009 (ALO 2010).  In Egypt, within a decade, the share of agri-
cultural investment in total investment fell from around 10 per cent to about 
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4 per cent (see  Table 5.1 ) (Bush 2007).  The rates of malnutrition among chil-
dren in Egypt and Yemen reached 30 and 45 per cent respectively in 2009 
(IRIN 2009). On October 16, 2015, UNICEF reported that half a million 
Yemeni children face starvation. 3 War and violence since 2011 have magni-
fi ed the malnutrition problems. These were the results of a concerted and 
deliberate policy aimed at reconstituting social values for grabbing value by 
all possible means. 
 These displacement measures were not a one- time occurrence from which 
policymakers would soon move away; they were reproduced continuously in 
real time. The rationale for pursuing displacement stems from the heart of 
the neoclassical method and its broader ideological form: neo- liberalism. The 
neoclassical approach postulates that income diff erences prompt individuals 
to move, hence, allocating resources effi  ciently. It also attempts to expand 
the set of incentives that attract migrants by introducing a variety of other 
explanatory factors such as the appeal and amenities of cities; at any rate, 
these non- price incentives also become symbols in an equation and amount 
to a price explanation or, anyway, to benefi ts that can be priced. Reducing 
complex reality to a quantity encapsulated in a price does not answer the 
question of  why people move, particularly because prices are themselves an 
outcome of social relations, which had already included personal and socially 
intermediated decisions. Was it the intermediated ruling class decisions in 
the sphere of politics that erected the conditions for the prices to assume a 
certain nominal value, which is the primal decision behind migration, or was 
it the decision of the peasant, whose life is determined by these ‘given’ prices? 
Obviously, the peasant is a price taker and not the consortium of ruling capi-
tal is the price maker. 
 3  http:// www.reuters.com/ art icle/ 2015/ 10/ 16/ us- yemen- security- chi ldren- 
idUSKCN0SA28W20151016 








 Source : National Planning Institute, Egypt Arab Republic, 2009 . 
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 Some more sophisticated neoclassical techniques trace back individual 
migratory decisions through time (as in work history surveys). But time can-
not be dissected, and individual responses, which are studied at some particu-
lar point, do not constitute history. As has often been said, projecting diff erent 
slides taken at diff erent points in time onto a screen does not reproduce his-
tory nor does it recreate the fact that there was a subject of history: that is, 
the social class in power that was furnishing the conditions for migration by 
purposefully expelling farmers via neo- liberal policies or war. This is not to 
say that a class can be reduced to a person plotting in secrecy somewhere to 
infl ict these crimes. Such simpleton clichés running wild in academia are 
themselves the products of class power. A class is the weight of history, the 
ideology and the institutions. There is no conspiracy in what it does. The 
global institutional power platforms are already biased against the weaker 
national working classes and nations and a product of colonial history. Neo- 
liberal ideology says it clearly and in colloquial parlance:  liberalise or free 
your resource channels, yet for this ‘freeing’ to work, your dictator who hap-
pens to be part of the global fi nancialised class has to be a good governor. 
This is not a lie; it is a fi ctitious remedy. But one thing is clear, the ideological 
thesis instituting the context for individuals to act contains information, as in 
foreknowledge, of the consequences of such actions. The ‘powerful’ need not 
hide their intentions. 
 Although there have been a variety of critiques levelled at the neoclassical 
approach, it remains seminal to migration research.  The price- or- choice theo-
retic framework does not study migratory phenomena because it reconstructs 
a false reality based on a summation of individual decisions.  Apart from its 
composition– fallacy problem (adding diff erent qualities), this approach does 
not probe the social history behind the decisions.  Any reference to the devel-
opment of the migratory phenomenon in real time may implicate the social 
class whose ends the neoclassical discipline serves.  Neoclassical economics 
actually studies something other than the migratory phenomenon; its subject 
is an arithmetical concoction that bears no relevance to the fact that social 
interactions like evictions, confl icts, negotiations and bargains subjected to 
power politics, actually construct prices. If the neoclassical discipline pursued 
the development of migratory phenomena in real time, specifi cally as a by- 
product of the agency of the institutions of capital, and rationalised them, it 
would inevitably have to question two sacrosanct mainstream concepts: fi rstly, 
the terms of trade and its power structure underlying the making of the price 
system; and, secondly, the systems that interact with irreconcilable contra-
dictions inherent in social formations.  The neoclassical perspective has, at 
whatever cost, to overlook the crux of the issue of proletarianisation, which is 
the necessary creation of socialised (deprived of its means of production) and 
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cheapened wage labour.  By analysing reality away, it avoids incriminating 
the class in power to which it is subservient. The neoclassical object of study 
becomes individual choice in a fi ctitious world of free competition, volun-
tary unemployment and scarcity – as to what it labels distortions, the infi -
nite externalities; for these there exists a price vector that clears their infi nite 
submarkets. 
 However, these distortions are actually the fullness of reality that one 
should refer to when addressing migration. In the neoclassical frame, the fl ux 
of market power and its related departures from an ideal but non- existent 
condition of equal marginal magnitudes, the so- called distortions are actual-
ity; they are priced and subsumed under a general equilibrium framework. 
If there was a conspiracy on a grand scale, it is not in explaining how the 
‘democratic’ states of the North so frequently commit massacres or genocide 
in the colonies; it is really how could it be possible that so many prices of so 
many externalities could be so ‘right’ such that the infi nitely intricate social 
system gravitates to equilibrium. This is not just a misunderstanding of the 
concept of equilibrium borrowed from physics and applied to economics, 
where the mathematics would convey a diff erent account of the economics, as 
in Mirowski (1989). 4 It is also not on account of an analytical philosophy that 
distinguishes between the objects of social and natural science; such as an 
atom, which is the object of chemistry that does not think for itself, in the lat-
ter, while, in the former a human being, the object of social science, would be 
where he or she is today because of where they plan to be in the future. The 
designation of the object of science as more complex does not make econom-
ics less amenable to knowability or less of a science than physics just because 
it takes longer to explore its laws of development. One can dwell on this point 
but, as a rule, overly analytical and ahistorical approaches lapse into positiv-
ism. Mathematics or physics inevitably become queens of the sciences . 
 The development of the various branches of sciences are interrelated, and 
emulation in methods of thought has been taking place since the earliest 
stages of social development. For instance,  Aristotle noted the seminal cycli-
cal movement of social systems and ascribed the causes of decline and fall to 
lack of equality and justice. 
 4  The use of concepts such as entropy, thermodynamics, Gibbs Free Energy and other 
complicated mathematical equations would only serve the purpose of illustrating a 
social condition if it relates the micro conditions to their macro environment in a 
specifi cally historical fashion. In other words, without the historical mediation of the 
particular in the general – that is how agents organise to shift their social conditions – 
we end up replicating the inanimate atomic structure in society, as in treating human 
society like a bunch of atoms. As such, this would be more bamboozling ideology than 
science. 
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 Equality consists in the same treatment of similar persons, and no government 
can stand which is not founded upon justice. For if the government be unjust 
everyone in the country unites with the governed in the desire to have a revolu-
tion, and it is an impossibility that the members of the government can be so 
numerous as to be stronger than all their enemies put together. (Aristotle 2014, 
 Politics , book 7) 
 Would such an observation describing cyclical movements not render all 
the science that followed since a borrower from philosophy? Indeed, it 
would; but the reason of demonstrating the point with the passage from 
Aristotle also serves an additional purpose, which is to demonstrate the 
inevitable instability and changing content of social systems. Whether as 
a result of injustice or high social entropy, a complex capital- dominated 
system fraught with contradictions will be explosive at one point in time. 
Its stabilisation rests on exogenous intervention that includes co- opting of 
the central and other working classes or redressing profi t rates with colonial 
or imperialist plunder. Theoretical reproduction of this changing reality 
in thinking, the relation of thought to reality, must deal with categories of 
dialectics connected with words, such as social classes, composing modes of 
production, employing wage- slaves via a process of commodifi cation under 
capitalism, and so forth, rather than with words, themselves, as in supply, 
demand, equilibrium and marginal productivity (historically transcendent 
generalisations); it is the logical development of categories, the discovery 
of the historically relevant phenomena, ‘which is guided by the relation in 
which the elements of the analysed concreteness stand to one another in the 
developed object, in the object at the highest point of its development and 
maturity, that discovers the mystery of the genuine objective sequence of the 
formation of the object, of the moulding of its internal structure’ (Ilyenkov 
[1960] 1982). The relation of words with words only, or one- sided abstract 
theory, will also remain abstract unless its mediation in the concrete or 
the thought process by which we relate to historically determined relation-
ships fundamentally changes the nature of the concepts with which we are 
dealing (categorical understanding as opposed to positivist empiricism). 
However, in such realism there are no noumena or unchanging ideas across 
time that suddenly come to life as by- products of themselves and not by the 
action of social agents in historically defi ned terms, erecting both new con-
ditions and the new ideas to correspond to these conditions. Each historical 
phenomenon merits its own explanation by following its development in 
history and deriving, through intellectual practice, new forms by which we 
uncover its laws of motion or how things come to be. Systems change, their 
relations become wholly new and what was for instance a social product 
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derived by submission to the lord’s will under feudalism, becomes a social 
product derived from adherence to market rules under capitalism. In the 
latter case, subject to the edicts of the market and profi t- making, the extra 
social product that society produces by advanced technology (scale eff ects) 
requires pricing the labour power below what is needed for the labourer to 
maintain a decent standard of living or, often the premature destruction of 
the living labourer. The surplus product now varies with the varying out-
lays delivered to the working class as wages. Thus, under the new mature 
stage, which is capitalism, supply, demand and productivity still exist, but 
their content, their laws of motion nesting in the contradiction of a social 
system arising from the commodifi cation of life itself, is now diff erent. All 
commodities are moneyed, including labour power, in a system ridden by 
overproduction crises set against the necessity to appropriate higher and 
higher profi ts at the expense of the price of labour power (wages of the inter-
national working class) and the living security of the working class. Such a 
system cannot be understood by the epiphenomena of supply, demand and 
their related price- sums; it is best understood by following the interrelated 
development of historical  qua class forces that shape production (supply), 
consumption (demand) and exchange over time. 
 The reproduction of the dominant ideology and its neoclassical off shoot 
occur mainly by de- historicising social science either by stressing discontinu-
ity: things are just as they are now; or by emphasising formal or unrealistic 
continuity: humans love to consume insatiably across all history. To disen-
tangle Marxist method, the last stages of development can be understood not 
by abstract concepts that exist in the mind only, but by following the devel-
opment of a specifi c condition in time as it shifts from undeveloped (abstract 
form) to developed (more concrete form) through a specifi c law of develop-
ment. In this rationalisation of historical facts in relations to each other and 
to historical determination within a totality, the logical explanation coincides 
with the historical; ill- defi ning historical categories and omitting the primacy 
of contradiction in social dynamics will necessarily lead to a distorted concep-
tion of the essence of the capitalist system. 
 Moreover, fi tting the real (the distortions as per the neoclassical frame-
work) into the formal representation (perfectionist markets) may be admis-
sible for the sake of logical illustration, but only when the initial assumptions 
denote historically specifi c phenomena as opposed to theological- like catego-
ries of perfectness such as the quasi omniscient and omnipotent economic 
agent. But neoclassical assumptions are trans- historical, or at times only bio-
logical, such that at this level of generalisation, they reference or refer back 
only to themselves.  As shown by Weeks (2014), the principal assumptions of 
neoclassical economies such as scarcity, perfect competition and voluntary 
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unemployment and so forth are false: for instance, commodities are scarce for 
many without income, but almost never for the rich or on account of short-
ages; freely competitive markets and voluntary unemployment are chimerical 
assumptions that are elevated to the standing of science when they have no 
referents in phenomenon. Just by making power relations and diametrically 
opposed contradictions central assumptions of the commodity world, logical 
ends hold by the determinacy of social relations and their related agencies, 
but not as a result of the market as  deus ex machina . 
 To bring the discussion back to an Arab context, no markets, perfect or 
imperfect, can display a signifi cant social role in the national Arab forma-
tion when imperialist assaults, robbing working classes of their self- rule, 
destroying their social capital assets and creating conditions for continuous 
pauperisation sets the logic and the conditions for development. Markets – in 
the common usage of the term, as in the institution founded to mediate the 
exchange of namely peacetime commodities – work as addenda to war or to 
the highly realisable potential for war. 
 A Comparison with Marxist- Structuralism at a Glance 
 In the neoclassical framework, the scenario for the wage- pull theory com-
prises a rural or less modern sector with its associated rural income – a fi rst 
wage, and a modern sector producing manufactured goods with an associ-
ated second wage, which is on average higher than the rural income. Hence, 
people migrate. What this scenario hides is a process that resolves social con-
tradictions in favour of capital or the more powerful social class. The wage, in 
more evolved capitalism, acts as the measure that refl ects a distorted underly-
ing class and power structure (powerful urban versus weak rural). However, 
in the neoclassical formal setup, wages are determined by marginal produc-
tivities, and each social entity, rural and urban, is supposed to enjoy the same 
power- standing vis- à- vis the other. Atomised individuals enjoy level playing 
fi elds, irrespective of their means and position in society. Such is the imagi-
nary world from which neoclassical theory is derived. These asymmetries 
are what really needs to be explained. The asymmetries, moreover, are both 
innumerable and unquantifi able, and reducing them and incorporating them 
into the formalised mathematical framework leads to theoretical sloppiness 
instead of academic rigour. By choosing the epiphenomenon of price, the neo-
classical method designates a symptom as what is historically relevant instead 
of looking at the social forces that shape the conditions for the recreation of 
labour. The method neglects history because it would then have to deal with 
value, as in the value that mothers impart by bringing to life and caring for 
labourers as well as all other work that creates labour; and the method does so 
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for a very straightforward reason: to stultify the working class and its poten-
tial intellectual allies. 
 In the Marxist– structuralist analysis of migration, the wage diff erence, as 
a symptom of class relations, no longer embodies the allocation mechanism 
behind the movement of workers; it is the structural diff erence, the power 
and development levels, between a modern centre and a rural periphery and 
the ensuing relation of unequal exchange that motivate migration. In this 
approach, the level of wealth is determined by productivity, but the wage 
share is determined by labour’s political power. The degree of repression, 
including the hegemony of capital, has a bearing on the social division of 
labour and the function of each class in material and social reproduction, as 
well as on the distribution of social wealth and the form and amount of rev-
enue accruing to each class. In this framework, the individual’s prerogative to 
migrate is being dictated by the deliberately worsened conditions in the rural 
sector and is, therefore, subsequent to the workings of capital, which create 
not only the demand for labour but also the conditions for its supply. 
 As the degree of economic integration between mainly rural and developed- 
urban economies increases, the process by which uncompetitive economic 
entities in the rural structure get sifted away picks up speed. What remains 
in the developing and mainly rural area after its permeation with the scale- 
cheapened commodities of the modern sector is but a remnant of an infant 
industry that has been able to support its costs and survive in a changing 
economic environment. The wages that are taken to represent rural wages, 
particularly when conducting empirical tests of migratory cases at the macro 
level, are the wages paid by this surviving pre- modern industry: the wages of 
agricultural hired hands, of repair- and service- shop employees, small family- 
run handicraft shops and so forth. However, in reality these are the wages of 
a subsidiary industry continuously adapting and keeping pace with the new 
capitalistic condition and, therefore, they are modern enclave wages paid and 
redistributed within quasi- subsistence farming communities. In the analyti-
cal context of the neoclassical wage- based model, these wages should not be 
diff erent from an industrial enclave wage in the urban centre. The wages that 
should in actuality characterise the rural wages represent the share of income 
of the broader and, namely, subsistence farming entities. These incomes are 
partly constituted in kind (the part of the consumption bundle produced by 
local means) and partly in measurable money form (which goes to pay for that 
part of the consumption bundle that is bought on the market). In the case of 
the AW, farmers came to depend more on goods paid for in currency for their 
consumption as the squeeze on land lowered the portion of the consump-
tion bundle produced by local means, and the conditions for displacement 
became pronounced (Kishk 2012).  For instance, less and less of the dietary 
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intake of the peasants in Egypt was produced on the farm. As a larger share 
of food was bought at world market prices and as the costs of daily living rose, 
the peasantry undertook a gradual exodus from the land (Kishk 2012). In 
this ongoing process of displacement resulting from increased economic and 
political subjugation, rural or developing- area labour relinquishes private 
production means and joins the ranks of wage labour. 
 From the Marxist– structuralist perspective, the movement of labour from 
the rural to the urban sector is foreseen as a result of growth in the pro-
ductive forces along with expulsion measures and the proliferation of foreign 
capital or merchandise that entails a profound destabilisation of the struc-
ture of the peripheral/ rural economy. The intrusion impacts the old methods 
of farming and manufacture, thus generating a mass of unemployed. This 
process of social restructuring accelerates as the state intervenes with violent 
and non- violent measures aimed at the complete extirpation of traditional 
small farming and cottage industries. The violence that the state exercises 
could be direct or fomented indirectly by accentuating inter- rural diff erences. 
 Forced farm foreclosures and evictions, massive rolling back of land reforms 
and other objectionable measures are put to work in the creation of additional 
members of the proletariat.  This latter outcome is a modern re- enactment 
of Marxian primitive accumulation, which in ‘its historical genesis […] only 
means the expropriation of the immediate producers,  i.e. , the dissolution of 
private property based on the labour of its owner’ (Marx 1867). The roots 
(essence in dialectics) of this expropriation  – the socialisation of labour as 
capitalism creates its ‘grave diggers’ – are the same: the appearance, the rates 
of expropriation and the violent measures, their modern manifestation, these 
correspond to the vitality of fi nancial capital or its higher velocity of exchange 
drawing the context for faster dislocation.  Private property, as the antith-
esis of social, collective property, exists only where the means of labour and 
the external conditions of labour belong to private individuals (Marx 1867). 
The modern rate of wage- labour making is not simply related to uprooting 
peasants from the land. It is a process and a question of degree by which the 
higher rate of dismantling all forms of labour autonomy, from bringing down 
the already established institutions of social security  in Western formations to 
the making of refugees in the South, redress a constant and deepening crisis 
of capital accumulation. 
 So far, I have established the following for the Marxian approach: The 
encroachment of capitalism into the periphery socialises labour and produc-
tion. That is to say, the dissolution of private peasant forms of property paves 
the way for turning private farmers into social wage workers. This shift in 
the labour process accentuates the material basis of the class contradiction 
because it also enlarges the scope for private appropriation (there are more 
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labourers to exploit at cheap rates). Seen as continuous and growing practice, 
the release of additional wage workers onto the labour market further sup-
presses an already low Third World wage, thus shifting the unequal trade 
relationship more to the advantage of the centre; as such, it increases the rate 
of surplus drain. This is a tendency inherent in capitalism, the outcome of 
which is contingent upon the power of the working class in the class struggle. 
 Neoclassical Chimera 
 The shortcoming of the neoclassical method is that it considers forms of 
thought from the standpoint of a formal framework and it ignores the his-
torical content that they may express. 5 It considers paradigmatic suppositions 
in rigidly isolated forms and not in their interconnection, motion, and devel-
opment (Davis 1983). For instance, in the theoretical explanation given for 
labour migration in a dual economy model à la Harris- Todaro, or in the price- 
incentive migration models that have appeared since, all that emerges is that 
labour moves because of a diff erence in expected wages or other related prices 
making part of the expected revenue stream of the potential migrant.  If at any 
moment another important cause prompting labour to move is discovered – 
and there are undoubtedly innumerable causes – then wage– price incentives 
leading to equilibrium falters. Of note in these models, variables other than 
wages also appear symbolically, once modelled that is, in the form of a price. 
Because there is a virtually infi nite number of social variables that prompt 
labour to move in diff ering real conditions, the price- based explanation as a 
supposedly rigorous system of thought collapses: a case of crude empiricism. 
 As in any other equilibrium approach, including a Nash equilibrium in which 
the infi nite submarkets must all clear somewhat together, it so happens that 
such a scenario is fairy tale. Short of changing the vacuous assumptions that 
individuals seek profi ts or utility, if at any time a theory becomes founded on 
 5  Unlike the common usage of form and content to mean something relating to the 
outside and inside, respectively.  Form and content are philosophical categories that 
originate with Hellenistic philosophy and were further developed by Hegel (1830). The 
content is defi ned as the set of social relations that are particular to a given historical 
process. The form originates from the form of thought or idea; but here it means a par-
titioned historical characteristic and seminal component of content, the mediation of 
which into content represents the universal law which is common to social formations 
with diff erent historical processes: e.g., the law of value, wage- labour transformation 
etc. In Hegel’s logic, a law arises when the content becomes transmutable into form and 
vice versa. This transformation has its equivalent in the concept of becoming, which 
is the diff erentiation of the genus. In Marxian terms, it is  the mediation that results from 
the actual development of an object historically . Often the categories of form and content are 
confused for essence and appearance; for an illustration, see Stace (1984). 
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the erratic elements of crude empirics, the moment the empirical observation 
changes the theory itself has to completely change. There is nothing wrong 
with revamping theory to assimilate newly found facts. But this neoclassical 
theory is stillborn because it is founded upon non- existent assumptions put to 
work in a formal or ahistorical framework. This is not about the breakdown 
of transitivity, or the grandiose idea that the individual in the supermarket 
whose taste for an apple bestows upon it the value that underwrites its price, 
or the assumption drawn from the dieting advice that the good sensation from 
eating sweet cakes declines after the fi rst two bites; 6 it is about removing the 
fact that economic conditions of any sort is a power exercise within a histori-
cally  periodised timeframe. The neoclassical framework is also a theory at odds 
with initial facts because it pins all its structure on trans- historical platitudes; 
people may always produce and consume, but the ways and reasons for doing 
so diff er across time, and so these behavioural assumptions are only similar at 
a superfi cial level of generalisation or by quantifi cation. 
 It is not a theory of  anything to begin with, because all it posits is that there 
are people out there who want to make money and be happy across history, 
and they do so with price signals (wages are the price of labour) that lead to 
social welfare and effi  ciency. Through quantifi cation and generalisation, the 
similitude that is expressed in common denominators provided by unit of 
measure, the outward manifestation of quality reduced to a symbol, may be 
ascribed to a variety of conditions across time and space. For instance, the 
labour that leaves the home economy is expressed as the number of workers, 
which is a product of its own momentum over time and also its interaction 
with other variables such as poverty at home or wages abroad; but that num-
ber tells us nothing about the social forces that distinguish migrant labour as 
impoverished wage labour. I am not saying one cannot sum over the same 
unit of measure; I am noting that a theory explaining the social forces behind 
social transformations cannot be reduced to quantifi cations that conceal the 
particularity of each variable and its social decision- making process. 7 
 6  The blatant shortcoming of such drivel is its narrow scope of application to higher class 
or richer regions; it applies only to areas where ‘cakes’ and choices between cakes are 
available. But its appeal as a device for luring people, especially social science students, 
to the notion that capital generates wealth, is a powerful co- option tool. Central capital 
does generate wealth, but it must also reduce its costs by demolishing the assets and 
political will of working peoples in the lower echelons of its own working classes and 
the Third World. The necessary concomitance of war and misery with capitalism is not 
haphazard or the product of very frequent mad errors. They are the systemic product 
of capitalist class relations and their dominant ideologies. 
 7  There is a self- diff erentiating process within and between social or economic vari-
ables; they are a product of themselves and they aff ect each other by qualitative 
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 Changes in labour practices and profi t- seeking under capitalism consti-
tute a diff erent story from place to place, not to mention in diff erent pre-
vious epochs such as the feudal or the mercantile. In the present epoch of 
overproduction crises, it involves the purposeful destruction of assets, includ-
ing human assets, while producing with economies of scale; more and more 
goods are produced for continuously lower costs to meet a demand dampened 
by wage suppression. 
 Modelling can of course serve to spell out complex realities. Models can 
be better specifi ed algebraically if economic growth is explained,  inter alia , in 
terms of the forceful expulsion of labour, the necessity to cheapen labour costs 
by the most egregious means available to capital, or the utter obliteration of 
labour power,  which is in great part the death rate in imperialist wars  or their 
ramifi cations in social ills and hunger. The assumptions of such modelling 
techniques would for instance relate individual agency to its mediated politi-
cal agency within a context of class power whose contradiction, necessar-
ily but not exclusively, sets the background for the individual to act. Hence, 
what would be modelled in these overdetermined contradictions where cause 
is eff ect and vice versa is the social contradiction itself as the subject and 
the universal category whose realisation in heterogeneous elements can be 
reduced and quantifi ed for didactic reasons. Obviously, historical uncertainty 
cannot be modelled without reduction; reduction to fi t the development in 
mathematics has often been a tool to mask over real processes by the main-
stream. But the falsifi cation of conventional modelling lies more with defi ning 
the subject as the abstract individual and not the dominant class relation-
ship; a migrant from Syria escaping bombs or another from a hunger- stricken 
region fl eeing the wrath of his or her ruling class’s neo- liberal policy is as 
much a subject of history as lunar eclipses. Still, for self- diff erentiating and 
self- negating social conditions, models that better specify their subjects can 
only momentarily adumbrate real processes. 
change. As such, this state of contingency a priori omits the possibility of modelling 
becoming theory. This is more than just time incoherence generating an unpredict-
able shift in time series data. It is about the resultant vector, as per Engels, of all the 
historical forces in their course of development realising the state of becoming, which 
is capitalism. Moreover, the mainstream choice of dissecting the social state of aff airs 
by overlooking social contradiction also omits the model as such from serving merely 
as an illustrative tool. So it is not only that some variables were overlooked and that 
theory requires their inclusion in a continuous process of falsifi cation to stand on bet-
ter grounds, or that it is the quantitative relationship of variables to each other that 
would count as theory; it is in failing to account for the dynamics of history: that is 
the subject of history – which social relationship is doing what by means of which 
intermediated agency. 
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 One may further enquire about the interconnections of systems and their 
development, and how they correspond to the story of rural or urban- sector 
relations in the neoclassical dual models. The categories of low technical 
development and low marginal productivity pre- exist in these models. They 
are given assumptions without a historical basis. Little is known about how 
this poor rural performance came about or why there should be an intercon-
nection between this particular rural and urban sector. Why is the rural sec-
tor becoming poorer when modern means of farming can be scale- economies 
and modern just like any other industry? Why is there need for exchange, 
apart from an individual making a choice to migrate? In fact, the sociohis-
torical conditions that  ex ante create the necessary environment for migration 
are absent. To say that the policy and welfare implications for both rural 
and urban systems are the cause of price- based explanation under a dual-
istic framework is again not plausible, as in actuality, for welfare and policy 
implications to be inferred, there has to be fi rst an explanation of how prices 
are formed and why exchange occurs.  If one posits that the individual’s deci-
sion to leave conditions of near starvation in the countryside and move to 
the metropolis is really a ‘choice’ – in other words, if one reduces economics 
to physics as a positive science and completely neglects the fact that human 
beings require a historically defi ned level of subsistence – then in this rather 
fascist sense, choice, which is the single choice of migrating, exists.  Dispensing 
with sizeable populations so that the market can clear the glut of labour will 
not explain why this exchange came to be, but it can explain why the wel-
fare of a certain class or ‘race’ of humans, posited as diff erent from human-
ity because of inherent cultural or ‘genetic’ qualities, depends on dispensing 
with some other humans. In actuality, depleting the hinterland of its labour 
reserves and swelling the urban areas with formerly rural urban poor occurs 
as a result of exponential growth in the more powerful sectors that draws in 
the politically weak sectors and uses them or, more often, abuses them for 
their resources, including human resources. 
 Just as important, precious little knowledge is imparted by these mod-
els about the relationships within a sector that necessitate any relation of 
exchange with the other sector. The sum of all the actions of all the migrants, 
their decisions to move, observed empirically signal something about wors-
ening conditions in the rural sector. However, the migrants are reacting to 
overbearing historical conditions that engulf the rural sector. The migrants’ 
escape also implies that they could not have determined the direction of 
development in their home sector. In other words, they have little leeway 
in improving rural development, because if they had any political leverage, 
their conditions might not have worsened.  The subject of rural- sector history, 
the class in charge of its development, remains unknown to us in the voodoo 
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of neoclassical economics. Besides, to assert anything about the rural sector 
from the movement of one of its strata (say the migrant group) is to forget 
that its movement depends on the amalgam of social forces present within it, 
especially the role of the landed class and its alliance with the urban bour-
geois class. Although over- determination (In a totality in which cause is eff ect 
and vice versa, the particular rural condition is best explained in relation to 
the general capitalistic condition) always prevails, one cannot construct the 
symptom, which is forcible dislocation, as the cause of migration. 
 A theory as a system of thought that is meant to capture and explain changes 
and transformations has, at a foundational level, its own methods of building 
abstractions. The construction of the abstract can be an aspect of the particu-
lar historical condition or a one- sided, trans- historical, more or less common 
behavioural– biological aspect. 8 It can either be that people under capitalism 
depend on the market for survival or that people breathe, consume food and 
work. The latter premises, which are conditions for any state of being across 
time, constitute a genus of behavioural assumptions in the neoclassical dis-
cipline. The method by which the neoclassical school operationalises these 
hypotheses is actuarial. It measures, in terms of the price form, the response 
of policies; in this particular instance, the policies one has in mind are aimed 
at deconstructing the old forms of life and property in the rural sector. In that 
sense, the mainstream method is akin to an insurance company’s search for 
the premium that has to be developed to calibrate the fl ow of labour that will 
satisfy capital accumulation.  However, when prices are considered as instan-
tiations of class and power structure – the workings of the law of value – then 
the actuarial side of neoclassical economics ceases to explain much. For a 
theory to be pertinent in a given period, it has to be capable of generating a 
view of the whole, a universal, which is also the sum of diverse phenomena. 
It is about following the process of reality’s self- diff erentiation and designat-
ing the social forces that propel its movement (that is why I can say the sum 
 8  On one- sided abstraction I follow Ilyenkov’s (1960) elaboration of the Marxian defi ni-
tion of the abstract. The abstract is not a trait or a characteristic common to a social 
condition across time. It is an aspect of the social condition within a determinate his-
torical period. The abstract is not a trans- historical aspect or property of the sensuously 
concrete, but rather the contrary; the sensuous concrete proves to be only an abstract, 
one- sided ‘embodiment’ of the universal. ‘This inversion, by which the sensibly con-
crete is regarded as a form of manifestation of the abstract and general, instead of the 
abstract and general being regarded on the contrary as a property of the concrete, is 
characteristic of the expression of value. At the same time, it makes the expression of 
value diffi  cult to understand. If I say: Roman law and German law are both law, which 
is self- evident. If, on the other hand, I say: the law, which is an abstraction, is realised 
as such in Roman law and in German law which are concrete laws, the connection 
between the abstract and the concrete becomes mystical’ ( Capital , vol. 1, 771). 
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of diverse phenomena). 9 For theory to do this, its defi nition of the abstract 
is best when it represents social development in motion as a result of social 
interaction and contradiction and not some denominator (as in how much 
one ‘eats and enjoys oneself’) common to living humans across recorded his-
tory. An alternative method of theory can be carried out by historical inves-
tigations substantiated with a formal reasoning of the social forces shaping 
development. This allows for diversity in unity, the concrete as it assumes its 
state of becoming by the law of motion or the abstract, borne by the histori-
cally specifi c dynamics of social development (as in the cheapening of labour 
power, itself the abstract or the law, being a necessary measure under capital-
ism coming to fruition in rising proletarianisation, or the concrete). What is 
general and theoretical is the historical specifi city of the class struggle, which 
defi nes the dynamics of concrete value relations that culminate in prices – 
themselves the  abstract manifestation of value. 
 At a further remove, a theory would address the relation of the whole to 
the individual: how agency is devolved from the whole to the individual and 
their mutual relationship. In the neoclassical method, the individual’s agency 
fuels the migration process. The individual  qua worker, however, is faced with 
a worsening economic situation resulting from the actions of hegemonic capi-
tal; he or she can respond only by moving or not moving from a situation to 
which he or she did not necessarily contribute. Individual agency functions 
to change the bequeathed historical structure of capital via its intermediated 
forms of political organisation. Individual agency is not the utility- maximising 
part of  homo economicus , as in getting satisfaction from a sandwich; it is the indi-
vidual as political relationship mediated into mass political practice. Rural 
workers’ exercise of power, for instance, could be gauged by the degree of 
 9  Althusser (1968) had remarked that there are no philosophical traces of Hegel in Marx, 
otherwise Marx becomes Hegelian through and through. That is just philosophical 
and not logical; Marx’s method is owed to Hegel. However, the rigour of philosophi-
cal Marxism originates from a rupture with Hegel’s epistemology. ‘Marx rejected the 
Hegelian confusion which identifi es the real object with the object of knowledge, the 
real process with the knowledge process. Marx defends the  distinction between the  real 
object (the real- concrete the real totality, which  survives in its independence ,  after as before ,  out-
side the head and the  object of knowledge , a product of the thought which produces it in itself 
as a thought- concrete, as a thought- totality, i.e., as a  thought- object , absolutely distinct 
from the real- object, the real- concrete, the real totality, knowledge of which is obtained 
precisely by the thought- concrete, the thought- totality, etc. Marx goes even further and 
shows that this distinction involves not only these two objects (thought and real), but 
also their peculiar production processes’ (Althusser 1968). Ilyenkov (1960) preceded 
Althusser and distinguished between the production process of a given real object, its 
historical development and the production process of the object of knowledge, which 
takes place through the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete in thought. 
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improvements wrought as a result of equalising their rural development with 
other sectors. 
 In view of the urban- rural disparity and the  post facto evictions, the rural 
migrant is unlikely to be a politically empowered historical agent. It is by 
defi ning the forces mustered by the relevant historical subject (the ruling 
capital class) for the creation of deteriorating social conditions in the coun-
tryside that one moves a theory away from the impertinent into the ade-
quate. Addressing the issue of why any new development in a relationship 
between two heterogeneous systems (rural and urban) should necessarily 
arise points to a historically determined universal pattern of development 
under capitalism. As noted above, capital whose wealth is the heap of com-
modities as self- expanding value reproduces the conditions for its own 
expansion by dispossessing the direct producer; but dispossession itself 
assumes so many forms that the phenomena arising from this process of 
dislocation are as heterogeneous as actuality itself. One does not arrive at 
the general law (the universal in theory) by seeking common characteristics 
in the outcome of dislocation, for there are none unless one quantifi es the 
many forms of abjection dislocation results with the same measure. The 
universal is the necessary but not exclusive act of dispossession as engen-
dered by the dominant social relationship of capital. More particularly, 
in relation to the question of migration, theory has to probe the depth of 
the relationship of exchange of labour services for money wages between a 
rural and an urban sector and the contradiction that the migration process 
mediates. It is then that one fi nds that the universal or law in proletarianisa-
tion is the social contradiction between the stratum of private peasants (or 
semi- proletarianised farmers) and a growing capitalist production process 
hungry for cheap inputs. 
 A Non- Price Explanation of Proletarianisation 
 While criticisms of neoclassical method are many, some areas of relevance to 
the conditions of proletarianisation in the AW have to be addressed so that 
concerns over the false primacy of the price system are put to rest.  In the 
Marxist approach, the conditions for the transfers of labour are an undercur-
rent of development. Each social entity has its own economic content and, 
therefore, path to development. Some eject many private labourers from the 
land while others evict them at slow rate. The rate of expulsion depends of 
the rate of consumption of the internal constituents of production, namely 
labour power, and the countervailing political organisation of labour, namely 
the peasantry. 
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 The process of the practice of prevailing ideology, here of neo- liberalism – 
to counterpoise the Marxist method, as the idea or form becomes content 
in the process by which the theory of development policy has a certain 
outcome in development  – relegates much of the developing world to a 
less- than- favourable position vis- à- vis a developed world. Behind that pro-
cess is a relation of unequal class and power structure from which unequal 
exchange arises.  In the language of pure Latin American structuralism (the 
original frame of dependency theory), the development of a world capital-
ist economy has led to its division into a centre specialising in the produc-
tion of modern industrial goods and technical innovations, and a periphery 
engaged in the production of raw materials and food. The terms of trade or 
the ratio of export to import prices for the developing countries is worsen-
ing, which in turn, leads to part of what is created in the periphery being 
drained into the centre.  For Prebsich (1950) and Furtado (1964), unequal 
development principally refl ects the unevenness in the technical basis 
between the developing and the developed world. However, the Marxian 
tradition posits that the technical disparity between the developing and 
developed countries is secondary to the sociological relationship of capital, 
which creates the necessary political environment, ideology and institutions 
in developing countries to serve the interests of central capital and ensure 
access to Third World resources. Here is Marx on this issue. 
 As soon as capitalist production takes possession of traditional agriculture, 
the demand for an agricultural labouring population falls absolutely.[…] This 
source of relative surplus population is thus constantly fl owing. But the con-
stant fl ow towards the towns pre- supposes, in the country itself, a constant 
latent surplus population, the extent of which becomes evident only when its 
channels of outlet open to exceptional width. The agricultural labourer is 
therefore reduced to the minimum of wages, and always stands with one foot 
already in the swamp of pauperism. (Marx 1867) 
 The dynamic of the radical dependency theory of development is quite 
diff erent from simply positing two disparate structures coming in contact 
at a point in time. For radical dependency, fi xing the exchange relation-
ship, tinkering with prices, does not thwart the drive to dispossess labour. 
It depicts the process of proletarianisation as an ongoing historical condi-
tion necessitated by wealth making from central accumulation by indus-
trialisation.  A characteristic example of lumpen Third World development 
and its impact on labour is provided by Frank, a leading radical fi gure of 
this school. 
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 The development of industry in Saõ Paulo has not brought greater riches to 
the other regions of Brazil. Instead, it converted them into colonial satellites, 
de- capitalized them further, and consolidated or even deepened their under-
development. There is little evidence to suggest that this process is likely to be 
reversed in the foreseeable future except insofar as the provincial poor migrate 
and become the poor of the metropolitan cities. (Frank 1966) 
 This industry developing in Saõ Paulo is characteristic of much of what is 
developing throughout the underdeveloped world. This development assumes 
its course through growth in the investments of multinational corporations, 
or through the opening of local markets to foreign commodities. The demand 
for cheaper labour and the conditions that lead to increasing the number 
of migrants from the rural to the urban areas follow this cross- border capi-
tal concentration. One ought to recall that this is not a hydraulic relation 
(mechanical- like), but a contingent value relationship in which underdevelop-
ment is considered in view of the historically determined wealth and  rapport 
de classe . 
 The wage, in the Marxist- structuralist view, is ancillary to the basic propo-
sition of diff erent economic structures with disparate technical bases enter-
ing into a relation of unequal exchange. This is not because the individual 
or the wage mechanism falls to some secondary or unimportant position, 
but because in this context the individual responds to changes in the socio-
economic environment that are formed independently of his or her immedi-
ate will. Whereas in the neoclassical method the individual is the nucleus of 
action or the undisputed agent, in the radical approach, it is the social human 
being, whose political decision coagulates in class power, that is the agent in 
the historical context. There are two diff erent types of human beings that 
we are dealing with, social humanity and  homo economicus ; the latter does not 
confront the burden of history. From a radical perspective, the whole of the 
social formation, its political mass in international relations and autonomy, is 
its historical agency. 
 In mainstream models, the rural and urban sectors involved in exchange 
exhibit a functional and positive relationship to one another: they just trade, 
without ulterior motives. In the radical framework, these sectors are united in 
an antagonistic relationship. The formation with the stronger power and tech-
nical base integrates and subordinates the one with the weaker technical base. 
 The culturalist label of ‘traditionalism’ applied to the rural sector is not the 
reason for its weaker position. Rural areas may still exhibit traditions that lin-
ger from the past, but vestiges of yesteryear also linger in modern urban soci-
eties. There is no quantitative threshold for a preponderance of pre- modern 
folk tradition that defi nes a formation as capitalistic or non- capitalistic. The 
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same also goes for the rate of unemployment. A high or low rate does not 
designate the degree of capitalism. Capitalism is a historical stage, of which 
capital is the seminal relationship. Weakened Arab rural formations were 
incapable of withstanding the assault of imperialism, and the peasantry as 
subject of history made no signifi cant contribution to bettering its own devel-
opment. As such, the rural and peripheral areas are not independent, nor 
do they fall beyond the range of capitalist power and weaponry. The peas-
ants, like their urban working- class counterparts, per Marx’s maxim in  The 
Eighteenth Brumaire , are ‘making history but not as they please’. They become 
reservoirs of additional resources or wage workers in waiting. Capitalism’s 
higher rates of underemployment and poverty- level rural employment are a 
manifestation of the permanent social crisis of capital.  Full employment of 
labour under low- productivity conditions does not run counter to the way 
society has expanded its output.  Capitalism in the hinterland operates in a 
colonial mode – to requalify: the transfers of labour by migration are the nec-
essary outcome of an intensifi ed joint comprador– imperialist assault intended 
to either permanently disengage resources or to cheapen them to be reen-
gaged at a later stage. 
 To wait for the fruition of the transformation attendant on expanding 
commodity exchange in order to categorise a rural formation as capitalist is 
a misunderstanding that views capital as a stock of commodities rather than 
a social relationship. The contradiction between the private forms of appro-
priation and the social forms of production dictates the subjugation of rural to 
the urban sector and is often reproduced by violent political means. The rural 
and urban sectors do not require commodity exchange to be united; they  ex 
ante have class politics and imperial hegemony to coercively unite them. 
 It is otherwise in the colonies. There, the capitalist regime everywhere comes 
into collision with the resistance of the producer, who, as owner of his own 
conditions of labour, employs that labour to enrich himself instead of the capi-
talist. The contradiction between these two diametrically opposed economic 
systems manifests itself here practically in a struggle between them. Where the 
capitalist has at his back the power of the mother country, he tries to clear out 
of his way by force the modes of production and appropriation based on the 
independent labour of the producer. (Marx 1867) 
 There is no hybrid mode of production, half capitalist and half pre- 
capitalist. The higher number of oxcarts side by side with modern lorries 
does not make half or quarter capitalism, as if capitalism could only be meas-
ured against ‘Swiss- like’ machinery. There is a capitalistically developing 
rural formation characterised by poor technical advancement, one whose 
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evolution depends on the dynamics of the leading class or class alliance in the 
more central capitalist areas. The peasantry is part of a working class whose 
income is derived from the politically determined labour share of income. 
The uprooting of peasants and their conversion into social wage- labourers 
(socialisation) ensues in relation to pauperisation and the necessary expansion 
of the reserve army of labour – a corollary to the expansion of the broader 
relationship of capital. However, in organic and interdependent accumula-
tion, the rural sector is not of secondary rank just because it constitutes such 
a low percentage of GDP. Without the sublation (simultaneous negation and 
preservation) of the hinterland, the historical resilience of capitalism suff ers. 
The rural sector serves as a reservoir of cheapened resources, a reproducer 
of labour power whose value outlays are borne by the working class, and a 
repository for capital contingently upon the reign of socialist ideology. In this 
unity of diff erent social forces, the tendency is for the ruling class alliances to 
form and to regulate the labour process and its attendant proletarianisation 
to the demands of capital accumulation. 
 In the AW, up until independence in the mid- twentieth century, the econ-
omy was mainly rurally based. After independence, circa 1950 and until 
1980, the apparent structural transformations, specifi cally those associated 
with uprooting the peasantry, occur at a rate that is positively dependent 
on the rate of the imperialist- hijacked national capital accumulation. The 
national economy grows less by productivity growth that may boost wages 
and more by grabbing a higher share from cheaply employed workers; hence, 
more labour is drawn from the rural areas to cheapen wages. The Arab 
socialist economies invested heavily in agriculture to stem the outfl ows of 
labour from subsistence farming. The capitalisation of agriculture had impli-
cations for both national and regime security: cash crops and food security 
buttressed the national economy, and the lower rate of peasant fl ow to the 
cities attenuated the growth of shantytowns and urban poverty that would 
have threatened the regimes. 
 Under neo- liberalism, transforming the population into a reserve labour 
pool in subsistence farming and later into wage labour (mostly engaged in 
impoverished urban employment) incurred the additional cost of disar-
ticulating the rural areas  – creating a two- tier rural stratifi cation with a 
parasitic class integrated as consumers with the centre through the price dif-
ferential of returns on exchange rates denominations.  What was new under 
neo- liberalism is that the rate of labour dislocation followed the demands 
of national capital as well as international fi nancial capital. The Marxian 
category of the reserve army of labour includes all persons of working age 
capable of working, but unable to work because the economy does not gener-
ate suffi  cient employment. 
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 Then, as now, the colonies and later the peripheries produced huge num-
bers of labourers.  ‘But in the colonies […] the absolute population increases 
much more quickly than in the mother- country, because many labourers 
enter this world as ready- made adults […] and the law of supply and demand 
of labour falls to pieces’ (Marx 1867). Marx wrote this in reference to the 
many persons forcibly shipped to the colonies or those many of the colony’s 
rural population transformed into bonded labour and, hence, violently put 
to work.  In more recent times, technological advancement and the changing 
post- independence balance of power (relative autonomy in the periphery) in 
addition to the importation of labour- saving technology, meant that unlike 
days past where all the labour was absorbed in low- productivity, slave- like 
agriculture, a signifi cant proportion of new entrants into the labour market 
became permanently disengaged from production or eked out a living in low- 
productivity work in urban areas. More particularly, Arab  deindustrialisa-
tion and the reduction of public- sector employment and or public investment 
also lowered the rate of decent job creation.  The global crisis of overproduc-
tion further implied a cheapening of labour, not simply on the basis of the 
rule of large numbers (too many people willing to work), but also and more 
importantly on the basis of a larger redundant workforce whose very abjec-
tion cheapens its market- priced labour power even further. The hundreds 
of millions wallowing in poverty, demonstrating the worthlessness of labour 
as they are aggressed upon and perish prematurely, serve further the inter-
twined purpose cheapening and disempowering labour. More so than before, 
the sordid prospect remains that in the demonstration of imperialist power 
there is not a number of dead from war and famine that would cause global 
labour shortages. 
 In most of the developing world, the proletarianisation process gained 
momentum circa 1980 with the onset of the neo- liberal age; but in much of 
that world, wage labourers were created without decent wage- paying jobs 
(Wallerstein 2011). Exponential growth entailed a higher rate of repression 
and exploitation of labour. As value became universalised in the dollar – fi nan-
cialised and with profi t reported quarterly – drearier conditions of labour in 
production intensifi ed.  The initial stages of the production chain, the stage of 
producing the raw material where often violence prevails in the developing 
world, wrought the worst of the contradictions of exponential growth and 
immiserating exploitation. Increasingly, the subsistence side of the declining 
rural economy became a social support mechanism for the peasant who is a 
potential wage earner but is unlikely to ever fi nd a decent wage- paying job. 
The failure of the rural sector to deliver suffi  cient social support raised the 
spectre of crisis, especially as corporate land grab and cheaper food imports 
from the North degraded the basis for local sustenance and reduced the share 
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of the consumption bundle created by local means (Kishk 2012).  In addition 
to expulsion by violence, the cross- sector ruling class enacted the laws infl u-
encing lower amounts of food produced for immediate consumption by the 
farmers and, subsequently, incentivising their removal from the land. 
 Autonomy and sovereignty rest upon the command of the working class 
in the state and the amalgam of living and national securities. Depriving the 
rural classes of security, including food security, represented another measure 
that would add to the erosion of state autonomy over policy. There was more 
than just a commodity mode of integration with the Western world under-
pinning this relationship. Commodities are traded not only because they are 
objectifi ed labour, but also because there is a social relation that is itself the 
historically given context that advances the trade of commodities. The co- 
opting of the Arab bourgeoisie under neo- liberalism – its metamorphosis into 
a comprador class  – was nearly complete at the time of the Arab Spring, 
and the resultant disarticulation within an Arab formation reinforced the 
already- dire objective conditions to the point of explosion. 
 A non- Marxist but structuralist analysis along the lines of the non- 
radical Latin American dependency theory does not fully account for this 
relationship of a social entity to itself, including its contradictions and its 
mode of articulation with the modern sector through rural- urban class 
alliances (Larrain 1989). The question that concerns the agency infl uenc-
ing the dynamics of modern capital accumulation – its crisis, its demand 
for cheapened labour, and the ensuing politics of aggression in the hin-
terland resulting from the interlocking of two separate structures in an 
exchange relationship  – is underemphasised. Moreover, the social con-
tradiction, which is intrinsic to every class society, is overshadowed by 
the rubric of the nation- state. But a state is a form of social organisation 
with varying levels of sovereignty and multiple layers of class and security 
structures. One fi rst should question the relationship of rural or urban 
labour to its own ruling class. Could there have been social changes in 
the rural sector as a result of its own internal class antagonisms, changes 
that steered matters in parallel with the interest of more modern capi-
tal, as in the salient case of a partnership of landowning classes with the 
bourgeoisie? The undertone that structures are somewhat immutable and 
determined by a trans- historical ‘nationalist’ sentiment of social classes is 
the Achilles heel of structuralist non- Marxist dependency theory.  The fail-
ure of Latin America’s import- substitution policies was not a result of the 
failure of the policy itself; failure was more intelligently attributed to the 
inevitable collaboration of the Latin comprador bourgeoisie with the capi-
talist class of the imperialist centre (Larrain 1989) . Account was taken of 
the higher degree of imperialist belligerence – this is what has happened in 
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the AW.  The failing of the structuralist approach lies in underemphasising 
the social context of value formation in a social process imbued with con-
tradictions.  Worse yet, import substitution in an Arab context is destined 
to fail at a quicker rate when the basis for trade, capital fl ows and foreign 
exchange rules are almost wholly pre- furnished by the imperialist. The 
way to expose this failure is through a value- theory- based understanding, 
which fundamentally changes the rules of intellectual engagement. Such 
an approach posits a historical reading of the social class and power struc-
ture as a precursor to reifi ed policy and price formation. 
 The Marxian Critique 
 The proletarianisation process can be encapsulated in the relationship 
of exchange of labour power, itself a commodity, for other commodities. 
Examining the issue at this level of abstraction lays bare the social relations 
that underlie the proletarianisation process. Also, by understanding these 
relationships from a value perspective, a prognosis could be derived from the 
tendencies in social relations governing present developments. On the sur-
face, one observes an exchange taking place between a less- developed entity, 
the less- modernising or rural sector, and the modern developed or urban sec-
tor. The former exports or sells labour power for wage goods from the devel-
oped entity. The functional relationship between the two formations dictates 
that one serves a purpose for the other. The rural area pays for part of its 
trade defi cit with the remuneration from remittances. 
 That labour moves in response to higher wages is a notion that captures 
only a one- sided aspect of exchange. The moment exchange takes place, 
the determinants of the functional relationship (labour working for wage 
goods away from home), and those of the internal rural relationship (expel-
ling the additional stock of labour power from the countryside) are combined 
in the objects being exchanged. These objects are labour power and wage 
goods: both are objectifi ed value alienated from their producers. Seen from 
the optic of the rural areas, the exchange relationship is not about just the last 
moment when the person moves away to work; it is also about the history of 
scant work opportunity at home and the cost of maintaining labourers. The 
social cost of the reproduction of labour, all that moneyed and non- moneyed 
value that went into supporting the labourer who is unemployable at home 
since birth, bears no fruit for the suppressed rural sector. The problem as 
such cannot be reduced to the formal idea that the price of labour power 
(the wage rate) pulls labour, because the rural sector has already been sub-
stantially deconstructed before the allure of urban wages comes into being. 
Simply, there is a history to the making of the migrant. 
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 Analytically, the question of whether exchange of labour power for wages 
occurs because rural migrants serve a function for urban capital and are 
enticed by wages, or because rural labour is vastly unemployed in the rural 
sector and therefore has to move, appear simultaneously in thought. However, 
the courses of these developments are not simultaneous. The political and 
economic dispossession of the rural areas precede the making of labourers 
whose labour power is readied to be exchanged. The question of causal deter-
minacy is not a statistical exercise ascribing so much to wage pull or labour 
push; it is about the primacy of historical agency, that particular social rela-
tionship reproduced often enough to resituate the grounds beneath the theft 
of rural labour by modern capital.  As Ollman (2003) put it in his ‘Dance of 
the Dialectic’, ask not who took the goose from the commons, the question 
should be who took the commons from the goose. 
 Empirical studies meticulously describe each case of migration as diff er-
ent, such that there will be as many theories as there are studies. Each case is 
diff erent, indeed. Yet again, a mere listing of diff erences obscures the general 
social dynamics creating the conditions for proletarianisation. The univer-
sal dynamic is the  process of proletarianisation itself, or it is how the law of 
value asserts itself. For the neoclassical method, this relationship of exchange 
becomes conceptually discernible only if it is ultimately reduced to a price or 
wage. But many underdeveloped social formations knew no money system 
and had no money prices to begin with. Recalling: prices are not given; they 
emerge on the basis of a distorted power structure. Let us put the question 
this way: Is it possible for the price of labour to be set so much below what is 
needed to maintain human life that emigration becomes a survival necessity? 
 Of course the answer to the question from a neoclassical point of view 
is that in the atomised world of equilibria, there will be a price, no matter 
how low, which will clear the market. That low price may also clear the lives 
of many labourers. But the price system is an epiphenomenon of the social 
wage system, which is what needs to be explained. To capture the kernel of 
proletarianisation, I need to document the history of establishing wage labour 
(the socialisation of rural labour) and the removal of additional labour from 
land in synch with the demands of capital.  To bring this to light, I illustrate 
the process, from a Marxian perspective of exchange, as the mediation of 
the contradiction between value and use value or between the social cost 
of labour (investment in labour) and the productivity of labour. Labour is a 
qualitatively unique category in that it is both a commodity (labour power, 
which is what the labourer actually sells) and a producer of commodities – a 
producer whose rate of contribution to making commodities can be under-
valued by the rate of exploitation. But for the moment let us consider only the 
one aspect wherein labour power (the intellectual and physical activity that 
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workers impart to commodities or services) is a commodity being exchanged 
for another commodity. 
 Any commodity is a product of purposeful social activity, and it is at the 
end of the production process, defi ned as an objective entity. Each commod-
ity in itself, before it enters into exchange, has two qualities: use value and 
value. Value, unlike the Ricardian point, is not only some average quantity 
of labour (as in the average intensive magnitude of labour whereby a given 
quantity of labour is expended in a given time), which is the Ricardian sub-
stance of value: the average physiological input of labour in the commodity. 
The natural act of labouring is trans- historical. It only presupposes value as 
socially necessary labour time:  that is, the historically given relation under 
commodity production that socially equalises labour (Rubin 1972). Value as 
such is the mediation of the commodity’s internal contradiction:  it is sub-
ject and substance. Another way of putting this: value is the inner relation 
of a commodity  to itself , outwardly revealed through the relation to another 
commodity (Ilyenkov 1963). Labour power is useful (in the good it produces 
or the service it provides; its productivity), but also it has a cost. In the case 
we are considering, the rural sector’s outlay on the human development and 
maintenance of the labourer in schooling, healthcare and food (moneyed and 
non- moneyed care) is the cost of reproducing rural labour power, its intrinsic 
value. This value, to which the urban capitalist contributed nothing, is trans-
ferred into the commodities that rural labour produces once it migrates. The 
same is true of the modern (urban) sector’s labour power and commodities. 
Thus, before exchange occurs, each commodity, as value and the product of 
value relations, has a dual quality (value or socially necessary labour time and 
use value) and a relationship to itself. This relationship of the good to itself is 
a contradictory one. First, the labour- power commodity has an inherent cost 
in terms of the outlays of labour that reproduce labour; but, second, it has 
little or no use value to its owner within the squeezed rural social formation 
wherein it was bred, but has no market into which it can deployed or realised. 
It is similar to the objectifi ed commodity that the industrial capitalist pro-
duces and must sell. To parody the situation from a Marxian angle: exchange 
(here, the act of migration itself reciprocated by wage goods) mediates inter-
nal value contradictions between value proper (the labour time socially neces-
sary to produce the labour power) and the use value that labour power can 
impart to commodities in the process of production (Marx 1867). 
 Tangentially, exchange does not just come about in the moment, or 
when supply- and- demand curves appear on the blackboards of classrooms; 
exchange is the outward manifestation or phenomenon resolving the inner 
contradiction found in the actual goods. This again is a historically, or com-
modity production, specifi c condition:  society has created labourers, and 
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capital has robbed the grounds upon which they could labour. However, the 
process does not come to rest because labour is being pushed out as a result of 
the contradiction between value and use value. There is now the problem of 
exchanging so many diff erent useful and exchangeable commodities for one 
another. Initially the contradiction that has arisen in the determination of use 
and exchange values was resolved by the money form of value. Although each 
of the commodities being exchanged retains usefulness and exchangeability 
at the same time, the money form, having only exchange value, subsumes 
use value and mediates the manifold concreteness of exchange relationships. 
Labour power, like other commodities, sells for money or wage goods. 
 Marx resolves the antinomies that usually pile up in the formal system of 
thought by following the development of the object in real time; the contra-
dictions are preserved and ensure a dynamic of movement from one stage to 
another. Through social forms of organisation, each concrete or particular 
social condition (like expanding trade or exchange in a particular market) 
transcends its own barriers by growing into a more universal or abstract 
form, doing so via the money form. Methodologically, the ascent is histori-
cally fashioned, and what became abstract at one point in time will inevitably 
be perceived as concrete as a result of the persistence of contradictions (the 
concrete is a manifestation of the abstract, and both are modes of abstractions 
from an unfolding actuality). Labour power is a peculiar commodity, and it 
only came into being with the rise of capitalist relations. Although Greco- 
Roman forms of slavery had included marginal forms of the labourer con-
verging with labour power (Emmanuel 1972), labour power as such became 
prevalent as a commodity when ‘the commodity became money’ under capi-
talism. Labour power, the commodity whose undervaluing results in surplus 
value, is the most distinguishing feature of capital as an ahistorical social 
relationship under capitalism. 10 
 Marx shows that the money form and the evolution of credit keep on medi-
ating various social contradictions associated with class and with forms of 
social organisation and distribution (Ilyenkov 1982). In contrast to the neo-
classical approach, wherein money becomes a store of value, Marx shows 
that the money form of value (one of the many forms of value) captures the 
lopsided power structure and contradictions within the capitalist class sys-
tem. Money is anything but neutral. For example, the build- up of fi ctitious 
capital (the layers upon layers of unpayable debt in the capital markets) has a 
 10  For Marx an hour of average socially necessary labour produces the same value no 
matter the relative capital- intensity of the particular industry in which a worker is 
employed, surplus value being exclusively the diff erence between the value equivalent 
of the wages paid to the workers and the value of that workers’ total output. 
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non- fi ctitious impact on the working class (the working class is made to pay 
for the debts); hence fi ctitious capital raises in absolute terms the share of 
the social product accruing to the bourgeoisie (Bellofi ore 2009). Money is a 
measure of value brokered by the dominant classes to regenerate the social 
conditions for accumulation. 
 It is necessary for our purposes to examine the conditions that demand 
the development of the exchange of labour power for a money wage from the 
internal relationships found in the creation of both labour power and other 
commodities. This allows for an understanding of the proletarianisation pro-
cess as part of the permanent crisis of capitalism, which is manifest primarily 
in a crisis of overproduction and entails the destruction of value and the sup-
pression of use value to pressing exchange conditions – the working of the law 
of value. One needs to know how these internal contradictions are mediated 
and resolved, not in thought, but in their actual course of development within 
a specifi c capitalist historical phase, which broadly defi ned is the relationship 
of capital. 
 Accordingly, the longstanding immiseration of the rural sector and its eco-
nomic quarantine recreate the conditions for not only super- exploitation but 
also for value destruction. This latter category often goes missing in Western 
Marxist discourse on imperialism because it situates, at the heart of capital 
accumulation, the killing of the labourer along with his or her labour power. 
The capitalist crisis of overproduction has an alter image, which is undercon-
sumption. The capping of the economic potential of the rural sector, limit-
ing its propensity for modernisation in order to impoverish it and make its 
own labour superfl uous to it, is partly the automatic refl ex, which is under-
consumption, or the negative mirror image of a much greater crisis, over- 
production. The destruction of small- ownership rights and the socialisation 
of the rural labour force devalue labour and slam shut the door of labour 
reabsorption in the rural areas. 
 This process also scores another point for capital, as the greater autonomy 
that arises from the domestic production of essential foodstuff s is part of the 
potential basis for working- class resistance. In rural or underdeveloped areas, 
the forms of building the reserve army of labour assume the extremes of com-
mercial exploitation (expulsion laws, violence and slave- like conditions); they 
are part of the ontological conditions for the creation of surplus value from 
the harnessing of primary inputs at the early stages of production such as raw 
material and labour. The production process is organic and one in which 
national boundaries, identity and political reconstructed barriers should not 
conceal the cross- national input chain that begins with the intellectual pro-
duction of design, the mining and the creation of the conditions for min-
ing and later the fi nalisation of the product. At each of these stages, forms 
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of violence and dispossession vary in intensity to reinforce the departure of 
value from price. The same lives with the same levels of skills with the same 
value assume a diff erent price or socially denominated values. The disarticu-
lation resulting from the growing redundancy and the associated social rifts 
deepen labour- force diff erentiation, which is an indispensable condition of 
accumulation. 
 Thus far, three interrelated issues arise from posing the problem in this 
manner. 
 The fi rst, as already explained, is that this exchange mediates a contradic-
tion between all the potentially employable rural labour and the limitation 
for its usability in the rural sector, or between value (the objective category 
as the stock of labour power) and use- value, employability. The greater the 
contradiction between these two, the greater will be the necessity for outmi-
gration or exchange abroad to realise the commodity that is labour power. As 
seen in the next section, the higher the rate of pauperisation of the country-
side as a result of its low share of income (not enough for it to reproduce itself ), 
the higher the rate of social dislocation. As mentioned earlier, the share of 
income of this and other sectors’ working classes is decided  not by productivity 
levels, but in the course of the class struggle. 
 Second, the valorisation of use value in a process of exchange determined 
by the balance of power in a class structure has an implacable bearing on 
alienation. The extent of alienation will be determined by the extent to 
which the working class is co- opted and the concomitant extent to which 
the labour- power commodity, itself produced by labour, stands above and 
rules over labour ‘as an alien and hostile power’ (Marx 1844) – the ‘fetishism 
of commodities’ side of the Marxian argument. That labour power comes 
to stand above labour – that is, a worker’s potential to put his or her labour 
power to work becomes more valuable than the worker herself – in a crisis- 
ridden developing context, amounts to the sort of alienation that commodi-
fi es nearly all aspects of human life. In weakened or bombarded formations 
like contemporary Iraq or Syria, humans themselves become commodi-
ties, and the dispensability of labour power (along with the labourer) deter-
mines labour’s fate. It is not the individual who will be left with a choice of 
whether to migrate or not; the class in power adopts choices in relation to 
the magnitude of the reserve army of labour and its bearing on the rate of 
accumulation. 
 The third issue is that of the money form. Although a universal equiva-
lent that resolves the contradictions arising in exchange, money conceals 
within itself the breadth of antinomies in the social system. In particular, 
by generalising wealth in the form of money, capital further ties the repro-
duction of the rural land- owning class to its industrial counterpart. Thus, 
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the proletarianisation process occurs not only through the austere meas-
ures imposed from outside, but also by the repression of the collaborationist 
land- owning class whose mode of wealth accumulation depends on money 
earned from cash crops. Equally important, money becomes an additional 
instrument by which the reproduction of capital (via its class power rapport) 
determines the social wealth devolved to each of the social classes in the 
rural areas. The mystique of the price system and a rationing of the sup-
ply of money to rural areas combine to squeeze the rural working popula-
tion. Through money/ price fetishism, the class in power reinforces the rate 
of exploitation and the rate of impoverishment necessary to create excess 
labour. 
 From an analytical perspective, the question as to why there is uneven 
development in this union of modern sectors and less- developing sectors 
appears to represent the duality that defi nes the boundary of the subject. 
Knowing their diff erences appears to explain proletarianisation and migra-
tion. However, upon a closer reading, these two sectors are separate as well as 
united. The political hegemony exercised over the rural area links it to capi-
talism, not via the trade in commodities/ labour route alone, but primarily by 
a social relationship, namely the political reach of capital. Capitalists acquire 
territory to engage it in capitalist production. The hegemonic relationship 
of urban over rural is essentially an extension of the social relationship of 
central capital into the hinterland. It matters little whether the majority of 
the rural sector was unemployed or employed, recalling the point that a high 
rate of unemployment (that is, of workers without work) is not what distin-
guishes a capitalist from a pre- capitalist formation. At any rate, the compari-
son is unfi tting since in pre- capitalist formations almost all are engaged in 
low productivity work. Capital as self- expanding value needs the power to 
 potentially select and engage resources in the process of profi t- driven produc-
tion. However, because accumulation is profi t- driven and overproduction is 
a permanent condition, idle resources also form part of the concomitancy for 
the creation of value, hence, the vastly idle underemployed rural population. 
Insofar as the rural sector is socially and politically subjected to the diktat 
of central capital where the fi nal stages of production culminate, one ceases 
to observe any separation between two morphologically diff erent social and 
geographical entities. The capitalist sector sublates the pre- capitalist sector. 11 
It stands to reason, therefore, that a diagnosis of the problem will have to 
address the leading social agency of the ruling class of the modern sector 
and its subordinate ally, the rural landowning class, which together pauperise 
rural areas. 
 11  To sublate means to supersede, put an end to, but simultaneously maintain, preserve. 
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 The Concrete Condition 
 From the early 1980s on, as the ideology of socialist resistance waned, more 
people became divorced from their previous ways of making a living and 
were driven into poverty. They were separated from their private means of 
subsistence, socialised as labour and deprived of the ideological and organi-
sational means of developing a framework to meet the requirements of decent 
livelihood. So huge was the exodus from the countryside that the UN began 
addressing the issue of an ageing demographic profi le of the rural population 
in the AW (UN 2008a). 
 In the AW, over half of the consumed food bundle is imported, so a rise in 
food prices can reduce income. The developments in the agricultural sector 
as per  Tables 5.3 and  5.4 show a reduction in the contribution of agricul-
ture to GDP, a decrease in the rate of agriculture employment and persistent 
higher poverty in the rural areas. 
 In the past three decades, most Arab countries joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  This period represents a greater openness in agri-
cultural markets and, hence, greater susceptibility to price fl uctuations and 
import surges.  Intraregional Arab trade is at around 10 per cent of total 
trade with the rest of the world, despite the Generalised Arab Free Trade 
Agreement (GAFTA, in eff ect as of 1997), which is supposed to promote 
inter- Arab trade.  The comprador class and its cross- border allies ensure that 
Arab joint and developmental treaties are unmonitored for implementation 
and that all integration eff orts remain ineff ective. A more interlocked and 
interdependent Arab food market would add an element to Arab national and 
cross- national security that would shift the power dynamic, tilting the base of 
international negotiations toward Arab countries. But neither the Arab com-
prador class nor its international partners would support empowering work-
ing people in the AW with the freedom that comes from food independence. 
 In the poorer countries of the AW, the slightest decline in the domestic 
food supply runs the risk of being translated into a further reduction of per 
capita consumption. Over the past 20 years, average consumption per capita 
declined slightly (FAOSTAT, various years). Notably, for the same period, 
the per capita production of basic foods (the minimum food bundle of FAO) 
exhibited a downward trend, and the slack in the level of domestic supply 
was covered by higher imports (FAOSTAT, various years). It may be argued 
that greater market integration, lower prices, and accessibility of food supplies 
prevented consumption per capita from falling further and that, under more 
autarkic conditions, the  pervasive problem of malnutrition could have wors-
ened.  But autarkic conditions would not have eroded local- production capac-
ity.  Excluding the Gulf, Arab agricultural imports were 3.5 times greater than 
THE PERVERSE TRANSFORMATION
   235
235
 Table 5.2  Rural and urban populations of Arab countries, 1980– 2020 (percentages); 
fi gures do not include inhabitants of rural areas around Cairo who do not count as 
urban residents 
Percentage of rural population Percentage of urban population
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
56.2 50.1 46.3 42.6 38.6 43.9 49.8 53.7 57.4 61.4
 Source :  The Demographic Profi le of Arab Countries’ Ageing Rural Population, United 
Nations, 2008 a. 
 Table 5.3  The agriculture sector’s contribution to employment and as a share of 
GDP (%), selected countries and years 






























 Source : The World Bank 2004, MENA Development Report,  Unlocking the Employment Potential 
in the Middle East and North Africa: Toward a New Social Contract (Selected countries and years). 
 *  The decline of the Syrian agricultural sector began in 2000 with the onset of the second 
generation of neo- liberal reforms. Morocco and Syria represented the two Arab countries 
with the lowest rate of dependency on food import s. 
 Table 5.4  Distribution of rural and urban poverty * 
Country/ territory Percentage of the 
poor in urban areas
Percentage of the 
poor in rural areas
Percentage of rural 
poor in total
Yemen 21 40 84
Egypt 10 27 78
Iraq 16 39 …




Palestine 21 55 67
The Sudan 27 85 81
 Sources : World Bank- WDI (2008); for Iraq, Central Organization for Statistics and Informa-
tion Technology (COSIT) and the World Bank- WDI (2010); and, for the Sudan, FAOSTAT 
(2007). 
 *  Most of these fi gures were substantially revised after the uprisings of 2011 and a show a 
starker wealth– poverty diff erentia l. 
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exports in 2008 (AOAD, 2008). 12 Financing continuously increasing levels 
of imports under conditions of dwindling savings and balance- of- payments 
problems adds to the fi scal defi cit (save in the Gulf ).  In countries where food 
staples are subsidised, higher food prices increase the pressure on that defi cit. 
As things stand, average growth in GDP per capita in most Arab countries 
has stagnated (over 30  years until 2002 it rose, albeit in a highly unequal 
distribution way, but the overall average over those 30 years is closer to 1 per 
cent). More important, as mentioned in the Introduction the working popula-
tions’ shares of income fell progressively.  Together, income inequality dynam-
ics resulting from an inequitable tax regime and from balance- of- payments 
vulnerability has put the working class in a more precarious position as debts 
are paid by further reducing labour’s income share.  Unless investment and 
protection of the key sector of national agriculture are reinstituted, the fi nan-
cial enslavement of poorer countries will not abate. 
 Neo- liberal ‘market openness’ was supposed to release resources from 
low- productivity sectors and sharpen the comparative advantage of better- 
performing economic activities. However, productivity growth was more 
frequently low or negative, and the AW is still far from reaping the full ben-
efi ts of trade, had those benefi ts even existed under such arrangements. The 
combined impact of declining overall economic performance and balance- of- 
payments accounts implies a quasi- permanent dislocation of domestic labour 
and resources. Labour released from sectors rendered uncompetitive by an 
unbalanced pricing arrangement  – in particular subsistence agriculture  – 
adds to urban unemployment. 
 Initially, low- productivity in Arab agriculture had historical roots 
relating to colonial repression or neglect and antiquated technology. Arab 
nations, as defined by imperial treaties, emerged outside the centres of 
industrialisation and, apart from the early phase of post- independence 
reconstruction, they remained on a path of relative underdevelopment 
reinforced by lopsided trade treaties. Consequently, their productive 
capacity suffers from a compounded negative historical bias (deconstruc-
tion and low capitalisation by the comprador classes, reinforced by a 
neoliberal policy overseen by US- led imperialism since 1980). Also dis-
concerting is that there are indications that food- importing Arab coun-
tries, especially the poorer group, are becoming progressively more 
susceptible to production shortfalls.  The possible combination of conf licts 
and production shortfalls opens the gateway to lower food- consumption 
 12  Imports and exports include basic foods as well as marketable cash crops. See Devel-
opments in Arab Agricultural Trade, Arab Organisation for Agricultural develop-
ment, Statistical Abstract, No. 29. 2009. 
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levels per capita and accentuates the problem of malnutrition. Although 
linear trends can only be formally indicative of things to come under 
unchanging conditions, the trajectories of imports and exports per cap-
ita foretell growing dependency on imports (FAOSTAT, various years). 
Around the mid- 1970s, domestic basic food production in the Arab group 
represented more than three quarters of total domestic consumption 
(FAOSTAT various years). At the present rate of decline in output and, 
under constant conditions, by the year 2020 domestic food production 
will represent less than a quarter of consumption.  Maintaining the rate 
of consumption (food use) at the present level necessarily implies that the 
volume of imports will have to rise at a slightly higher rate than that in 
the 1990s. In a nutshell, if the poorer working strata are to maintain a 
steady level of food consumption per capita, more food will need to be 
imported because the rate of decline in food production may not be fully 
countervailed by the rate of growth in food imports. And when so much 
of the food bundle is imported and bought with meagre national wages, 
the two- dollar benchmark of poverty becomes meaningless.  Food specu-
lated on and priced in dollars and then paid for in the local currency will 
raise the share of working class income going to food consumption by 
the exact proportion of rising food prices in the dollar. That is why sub-
sidies represent an indispensable instrument of stabilisation given that 
food prices have been subjected to speculation and have been f luctuating 
so violently of late (between 2002 and 2016). 
 Would it take much to raise per- capita consumption and alleviate malnu-
trition under the existing structural framework? It should not, because the 
required handout amount represents a small share of the budget or a share 
that an insignifi cant amount of Offi  cial Development Assistance (ODA) could 
off set.  However, the quantity of cash or the logistics of food delivery needed 
to alleviate hunger and malnutrition are not the reason why these problems 
are not being solved. Hunger, malnutrition and food- intake defi ciency are a 
basic part of the imperialist or social control structure needed to regiment 
the labour process tailored for capital accumulation, both nationally and 
globally. The regimentation and repression of labour, or at times, its partial 
decimation, is what drives the pricing of resources in developing countries far 
below value, such that when the value and labour of the South are integrated 
with the production of the North, a higher surplus value and higher profi t rate 
would be wrought as a result of super exploitation. 
 A reversal of malnutrition requires little in resources but much in class 
restructuring to perform a  volte- face in development policy and its associated 
faulty macroeconomic interface with reality. Under more realistic projections, 
even if poorer Arab countries experience moderate- to- high rates of growth, 
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this would not off set the rate of decline in the domestic food sector without a 
balancing and redistributing of the growth across social strata, with particu-
lar attention to the expansion of the basic- necessities sector. Under structural 
adjustment, economic growth came to be based on yet more- unbalanced 
sectoral performance;  however, unlike Hirschman’s (1969) adumbration, the 
leading sector was extractive and exhibited few positive linkages to the rest of 
the economy.  The structure of these import- led economies is more conducive 
to food dependency because it tends to favour primary- sector exports or cash 
crops at the expense of the basic food sector. 
 The net result of these dire food- production conditions, in addition to wars 
and forcible expulsion from the land, has been intensifi ed proletarianisation. 
 However, the individual’s ‘choice’  – more necessity than choice  – to leave 
rural areas does not come about just because the higher accumulation of the 
modern centres necessitates the implementation of expulsion policies and the 
exchange of modern- sector commodity for labour services – it also arises as 
a result of an innate crisis of the rural system itself (rural– urban ruling- class 
articulation that botches rural reproduction). The primacy in this class artic-
ulation of weak and open systems is imperialism, or the uppermost cluster in 
the class hierarchy. Imperialist policy or war halts the growth of the rural sec-
tor itself by amputating the realisation of value in agricultural employment. 
There is a requirement to view the issue in terms of value because, as we will 
see below, a higher signifi cation of value through price in the rural areas 
signifi es shifts in the class structure.  To summarise, the theoretical features of 
proletarianisation are: 
 •  The rural areas  – by the extension of imperialist hegemony articulated 
with the demands of capital – have undergone signifi cant transformations 
and are not in any sense pre- capitalist. 
 •  The expansion of capital into rural areas requires the reproduction of 
cheapened labour from those areas. The extirpation of traditional farm 
labour is accomplished by imposing restrictive measures on agriculture, 
and by the politics of forcible dislocation. 
 •  The relationship of labour transfers to the urban centre came into being as 
an exchange relationship under the purview of imperialist hegemony and 
as a result of fuelling class contradictions within the Arab social formation. 
Cross- sector ruling class alliances and the violence of class politics exacer-
bated rural abjection. 
 •  The social costs of reproducing the migrant labour force in the rural areas 
cannot be reimbursed by remuneration, at least on account of super exploi-
tation, but also the fl ow of migrants continued unabated; hence, remunera-
tions do not recapitalise the less modern formations to retain labour. 
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 Resituating the Issue 
 Under the combined impacts of dislocation, neo- liberalism and a secular 
trend of growing organic composition of capital, 13 the reserve army of labour 
has become immense relative to existing capacity and the productively 
employed working population.  Where wars are not shortening lives, the pas-
sive gains to the working class resulting from cheaper mass- produced medi-
cations and vaccines are prolonging life expectancy in conditions of poverty. 
Imperialist ideologues often assess progress in developing formations from 
the standpoint of myth, such that regardless of past colonial genocide and 
war or neo- liberal policies, imperialism has improved the lives of former 
‘savages’ or uncultured creatures in the developing world. But the colonists’ 
own progress is predicated upon limiting or destroying the progress of an 
otherwise historically more developed Orient, upon whose passing it has 
accumulated its wealth. Myth aside, the improvements to working- class liv-
ing standards are best contrasted with a historically rising level of income 
related to the development of the productive forces, particularly technology. 
The decline in the share of wages, rising income inequality and negative 
productivity growth ensure that the historically determined standard of liv-
ing has also been declining. 
 The repression attendant upon the wage system, which regulates the qual-
ity of life and reproduction of the working class, needs not only to acceler-
ate the pauperisation of national labour but, interrelatedly, it has to cheapen 
labour as well, as a precondition for the creation of surplus value. Capital 
fl aunts the death, idleness and indigence of labour so as to contribute, by 
the demonstration eff ect, to hollowing out the power of the proletariat. As 
evidenced by conditions in war- torn least- developed countries, the horrors of 
the wage system implied by the creation of a war- indigent proletariat whose 
labour representation has been completely wiped out by the blood- drenched 
politics of identity, become inevitably more intense because of forced expulsion 
and to higher death rates due to violence and dislocation. In the organic total-
ity that is capital, the immiseration policy deployed by US- led imperialism 
not only drains the social product but metamorphoses into a self- reinforcing 
process whereby each successive loss for labour contributes to strengthening 
the ideological constructs of capital. Recalling, of course, that the share of 
wages accruing to the working class is reduced by politically fragmenting the 
labour force. 
 13  The organic composition of capital is a value relationship wherein the outlays on 
constant capital, including technological advance, surpass the outlays on variable 
capital or the labour side of the production process. The progress over time of this 
relationship displaces labour. 
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 In the AW, the urban poor’s living conditions have been battered under 
neo- liberalism. The segment of the working class obtaining ‘higher’ urban 
wages does not drive the exodus from the countryside by invidiousness. The 
fl aunting of the few successful cases of rural migrant exercising psychological 
pressure as the ideological alibi, misses the scene of the crime, which is: the 
wage rate itself is a symptom of the dislocation measures exercised upon the 
rural population in general. Ideological reproduction is antecedent to capi-
tal’s reproduction. Because of the integrated circuit of production globally, 
the show of destitute and more displaced workers pressure national and inter-
national wages downwards. At the heart of the matter, there are two mecha-
nisms at work displacing labour in the AW: 14 
 •  First, the politics of imperialism expressed in the economics of the relative 
and absolute impoverishment of the peripheral areas; and, 
 •  Second, the nearly complete integration that has resulted from the imposi-
tion of economic union via neo- liberalism and open- trade treaties. 
 The urban sector is the sole survival space available after the asphyxia-
tion of rural life. Persistent rural poverty, uneven development and depletion 
of the rural labour force are  ipso facto proof that remitted wages do not off set 
the lost value from the countryside. The low share of income accruing to the 
rural sector is related to the way this sector was integrated nationally and 
globally, and also to the power  rapport de classe behind this integration. The 
spectrum of integration varies from modernised agricultural production of 
cash crops to a repository for wars. The rural sectors of the AW swing to the 
latter case, given that war is a principal conduit of its underdevelopment. 
 As I have explained, this displaced labour contributes to value creation, 
but not via value- added work activity in the last stage of production:  there 
are value- added activities at every stage of production. The early stages of 
 14  In imperialistically integrated Arab economies, the creation of central wealth arises 
less from the engagement of labour in production than from its disengagement, weak-
ening and fragmentation. Value is generated by commercial exploitation or by inten-
sifying the commodifi cation and dehumanisation of labour: fi rst, nationally, through 
a lower wage share that allows the comprador class to invest more of the surplus 
abroad; and, second, by the rate at which human life is commodifi ed and made dis-
pensable, thereby reducing the ideological clout of global labour. A hungry, dispos-
sessed and disempowered Arab working population has been redeployed into an act 
of realisation via self- destruction in imperialist wars. The terms of power, refl ect-
ing class power, that underlie the terms of trade and the grabbing of resources for 
maintaining the global accumulation rate are reproduced by all forms of aggression, 
including the destruction of life in war. 
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production involve the disengagement of labour and or employment in work 
that requires extinguishing life in a reduced time span, such as menial work 
in unhealthy conditions or wartime employment in soldiering. When value 
as a social category is what it takes to reproduce society, erecting national 
boundaries and killing off  the other imparts absolute surplus value and, 
hence, wealth to the imperialist centre. Socially necessary labour time comes 
into being not only in imperialist centres: every direct and indirect historical 
condition of moulding value to the requirement of exchange is part of surplus 
value (Marx 1894). Put diff erently, in the interrelated and historical process of 
wealth creation, all the moments of the totality, all subordinate relationships 
to the core relationship of capital, contribute to value by directly or structur-
ally infl uencing the production process. That is why, despite hunger- poverty 
requiring little in money terms to be eliminated, no eff ort will be made to end 
it because, in the crisis of overproduction, the setting aside or destruction of 
resources, including humans, is how a higher rate of surplus value material-
ises. That is not counterfactual history; it is what happens on a regular basis 
under capitalism. 
 Moreover, fi nancialisation has elevated the snatching of wealth in money 
form via the crushing of the wage shares of income (lower labour share) 
into the ultimate mode of meeting capital’s tendencies of concentration and 
centralisation of production; 15  the latter two conditions are no longer only 
concrete, as in setting up huge monopolies in the centre,  but through the 
denomination of international wealth in money form (namely the dollar) they 
have also become abstract, strengthening the power of the cross- national 
bourgeoisie. In addition to the rising organic composition of capital, the 
dual process of profi ts growth through grabbing from labour income and the 
higher concentration of wealth in abstract value form (money) fuel the condi-
tions for the further disengagement of socialised labour. 
 The integration of capital through increased fi nancialisation under neo- 
liberalism accelerates the rate at which the operation of the absolute general 
law of capitalist accumulation (AGLCA) proceeds. Often in Western Marxist 
circles, according to Devine (2005), the operation of the AGLCA – the law 
in which the value composition of capital favours higher productivity and 
displaces labour  – neglects the international connectedness of production. 
A caveat is called for concerning the raw- material exporting periphery of the 
 15  Financialised capitalism uses the bogeyman of defi cits and debts under open capital 
accounts to raise taxes and reduce labour share. However, when the national cur-
rency is freely traded and transferred on the world market, it is no longer national. 
The international fi nancial centres shift real- value shares in their favour with so little 
eff ort by subjecting states to debt peonage. 
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Third World . Values generated in peripheral formations, or non- moneyed 
resources hitched to production by capitalism, are formed by violent social 
processes and transformed into prices within a disproportionate class and 
power context. Tearing apart old ways of maintaining a living, infl ating the 
ranks of the unemployed, snatching Third World resources and driving peo-
ple into abjection by means of war and neo- liberal policy – these build the 
social foundations for quarterly profi t rates. The politics of dispossession and 
imperialist aggression mediate the growing rift between private gain and the 
redistribution of value in a complex global production structure that sur-
passes the narrow confi nes of the nation state. 
 Working-Class Fragmentation and Identity 
 In the state of rural poverty of the AW, the ‘primacy of politics’ – or the idea 
that to discipline a working class capital may sacrifi ce moneyed resources by 
more than it gets directly back from its investment in putting this working 
class to productive work – acquires more poignancy. This is because these 
underdeveloped or rural formations matter more as to how they further 
imperialist interests via the formations’ own insecurity than as to how their 
development might add to value or wealth.  Fruitful resistance to imperialism 
revalorises, through development and rising incomes, not only the under-
developed formations but also, by implication, the global balance of forces. 
Successful resistance would also require the antidotes to neo- liberalism, which 
are expansionary fi scal and monetary policies fi nanced in relative autonomy 
from the shackles of the international fi nancial structure. In a nationalist 
capitalist environment, the national ruling classes have to temper their profi ts 
by limiting their own integration with world capital.  The rate of wealth accu-
mulation of the national bourgeoisie has to be capped by a ceiling that recir-
culates much of the social product within the national economy – a constraint 
that demolishes the very  raison d’être of a comprador ruling class. Hence, for 
any underdeveloped or rural developmental and anti- imperialist agenda to 
be put into eff ect, the class structure of the state will need to be dominated by 
a working- class political formation that can bridge intra- working- class diff er-
ences in an alliance against capital. 
 Unlike this desired outcome, identity- fuelled and inter- working class divi-
sions in the AW have turned into ugly confl icts. Shifting notions of identity, 
especially Shiite– Sunni, are often presented by the mainstream as constitut-
ing fundamental divisions that criss- cross classes. In a gross falsifi cation of 
history, such identities are assumed to be immutable across time and to form 
fault lines of bonding and organisation. These identities are taken as evidence 
that the immediacy of the cultural determinants of class are more pronounced 
THE PERVERSE TRANSFORMATION
   243
243
than are economic ones, as if economic determinants are locked into a com-
petitive game with cultural traditions. However, social classes cannot exist 
outside class relationships that tie them together; analysis of class in diverse 
social formations must begin at this point. It is within these relationships that 
class structures, including their history and evolution, are constituted. What a 
class is and does depends on how it is situated in relation to other classes; fore-
most of these is the US- led imperial fi nancial class with its ideological power 
as a class. Multiple fragmenting identities or a single working- class identity 
rise or fall in relation to imperialist ideological hegemony. In the early twen-
tieth century, the well- known colonial role in segmenting Arab society along 
identity lines failed in the face of the rising tide of world socialism. The Arab 
working classes and their inter- divisions mirror the rapport de force, which 
had recently come to include the retreat of the global left vis- à- vis the rise of 
imperialism. 
 The imperialist assault- and- control element is a determining moment (a 
principal historical relationship), shaping its ideological progeny into iden-
tities that divide working classes.  In these social relationships, capitalists 
organise not only their relations to the means of production, but also into 
distributional arrangements that cement capital as a social relationship. 
 This is the organised dimension of capital, a political process mediating its 
growing scope of action, in which state power represents the key articulating 
moment. Working classes, in relation to the dominant class, can maintain 
their organisation, their history and shared understanding of anti- imperialist 
or anti- capitalist struggles, and their collective experience, which together 
infl uence the cohesion of the working class a whole, including the peasantry. 
Class does not disappear beneath identity. It exists in relation to other classes 
and as a relationship to property in which legal arrangements enact the divi-
sion of labour according to the prevailing structures of political and ideologi-
cal power. At a very abstract level, class is the mediation of a particular state 
of being, materialised in the more general political form; this form is divisive 
in circumstances of defeat and retreat. These characteristics, in their com-
monalities and diff erences, are the outcome of the degree of cohesion within a 
class and of the balance of forces, including ideological ones, within a political 
structure. 
 Class is a real constituent of the agency of history, albeit, in its relation-
ship to other classes. These relationships are materially grounded and can-
not be wished or washed away by countervailing ideology in the guise of 
divisive identity. Various cultural attributes and qualities devolve to social 
groups in relation to the outcome of class struggle. A class, therefore, is the 
process that divulges the manifold social characters that exist in relation to 
capital. The repression endured by the working classes in the AW in relation 
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to imperialism and its oil- control agenda emerges as a state of disarticula-
tion between social condition and consciousness manifested in all sorts of 
defeats at the current historical moment. While working- class fragmentation 
in terms of religion and other cultural categories is pursued everywhere under 
the barrage of funding and the ideological warfare of capital, imperialism 
splinters more malevolently when it targets the intersection at which the ruin-
ous social condition calls for anti- systemic working class action and solidarity. 
But, at the present stage, the degree to which people in the AW do or do not 
identify politically as members of a social class is far from exceptional in a 
comparative sense. And much like others, they do not exist socially outside 
the class system, either. 
 While there are precarious, and internally divided, working classes, there 
are also cases of cohesiveness and revolutionary thrust.  Just prior to the upris-
ing, for instance, strikes by Egyptian El Mahalla Workers and the Tunisian 
General Labour Union (UGTT) represented poles of resistance around which 
working- class solidarity formed and unifi ed a spectrum of diverse pauper-
ised strata (Cidamli 2008).  Only later, in the post- uprising crisis, did political 
Islam – the historical brainchild of colonialism and imperialistically groomed 
for the transition – appear as an organised force (Corm 2015). The Islamic 
political expression in this case was not univocal; it remains contingent upon 
the instruments and opportunities that emerged from tacit support in imperi-
alist quarters, where the aim is to abort the revolutionary momentum of the 
uprising. It is not the existence of a social class that should come into ques-
tion; it is which kind of political action is forming in response to the assault 
sustained by working people in the AW and, more importantly, in relation to 
imperialism. 
 A Closing Comment 
 Between 1980 and 2015, around a third of the inhabitants of Arab cities were 
rural migrants. Most of those migrants have joined the already- impoverished 
ranks of the urban working classes that engage in low productivity, informal 
and poorly paid activity. In the shanty towns where the social services of the 
state have been cut back, a politically ‘select’ group of NGOs caters to these 
migrants. These are, for the most part, civil- society institutions of Islamic 
orientation. With the ebbing of socialist ideology, the migrants have been 
subjected to the doctrine of political Islam that indicts corrupt individuals but 
not the context in which these individuals operate, which is capitalism. The 
security apparatus of Arab regimes, the only eff ective state institution, was 
careful in its choice of malleable civil- society operatives. More radical groups 
were constrained, while those that did not question the comprador basis of 
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peripheral capitalism were given full scope.  As indicated in  chapter 2 , after 
the bread riots of 1977 Sadat cohabitated with the more docile elements of the 
Muslim Brotherhood; likewise, for some time before the uprising, Western- 
compliant sections of the Muslim Brotherhood were fully functional under 
the auspices of American NGOs. 
 Peasant and working- class property, which was thieved via the state, had 
become the property of the ruling class. The uprisings of 2011 came and went 
and, where no war erupted, elections were held, but no one questioned the 
past thefts of the ruling class. Doubtless, a political process falling in line with 
the vision and strategy of imperialism, bereft of economic and social rights, 
will deliver once and again a style of democratisation like that installed by 
the United States after the Iraq invasion. So long as the ideological apparatus 
for the realisation of the working class in the state is determined by imperial-
ism, stolen wealth becomes the unquestionable entitlement of the ruling class. 
 Noting that the labour share is too small to revive healthy growth, the prin-
cipal policy tools that could rebalance the demand side of Arab economies, 
namely wealth redistribution and land reform, have been subjected to a coup 
de grace by the neo- liberal avalanche. 
 In view of the organic interlocking of the global economy, apolitical pol-
icy prescriptions focusing on demand- side Keynesianism to rebuild Arab 
national economies ring hollow. Even desirable more- expansionary fi scal 
and monetary policies are meaningless without tipping the balance of power 
and restraining the comprador bourgeoisie. By restraining, I mean least of 
all, allowing its expansion to proceed only in rationed money form denomi-
nated in national currency, without the capacity to transfer national currency 
abroad, as has been practised under Arab socialism. Arab socialist multiple 
exchange rates, interest rates and partial- barter trade resituate the rules of 
the game in favour of the distressed sectors of the economy and working- class 
incomes. 
 Regaining development means regaining policy autonomy under condi-
tions of popular sovereignty. The positive relationship between policy space 
and positive developmental outcome is such a straightforward question that, 
in spite of its sensitivity, was addressed by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD):  ‘[T] he idea of policy space refers to 
the freedom and ability of governments to identify and pursue the most appro-
priate mix of economic and social policies to achieve equitable and sustainable 
development’ (2014). Yet, in the typical half- truth type of positioning resulting 
from the UN’s subordination to the dominant imperialist power, it attributes 
loss of autonomy, in one instance, to ‘various legal obligations emerging from 
multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements’ (UNCTAD 2014). This appears 
as the UN Security Council deals with the possibility of regional wars escalating 
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into global ones, and state sovereignty has become a by- product of a univer-
sally democratic international law in which honouring agreements is part of the 
gentlemanly behaviour of Western nations. Exponential growth through profi t 
making in an open and integrated system calls for a higher rate of social debilita-
tion in its underbelly to feed its objective path:  what Meszaros (1995) designated 
as the metabolic rate of the reproduction of capital. In such an intrinsic relation-
ship, violent forms of the exercise of class power determine much of autonomy. 
Class power is not the ahistorical person or group in the executive offi  ce with 
megalomaniac individual agency; it is the avalanche that is history, its dominant 
ideological vortex and monolithic institutions into which Arabs and Africans 
are born. 
 Often, social democratic policies skip the baleful conditions in the lowest 
ranks of the international production order.  Looking at the barrage of Keynesian 
prescriptions as professed by UNCTAD, one would stand in awe at the naiveté 
of the idea that all countries can expand demand together, complementing each 
other and all rising into some sort of development heaven; of all things, such sce-
narios are envisaged with leading private sectors in state and economy. Private 
profi ts- determined global capital accumulation, taken as a totality, must raise 
the standards in one corner of the Third World at the expense of another, either 
in the First World or another layer of the Third. Absolute democratic Fordism is 
equivalent to socialism, where profi ts are publicly owned. Only when profi t rates 
are publicly generated and equally distributed across national boundaries do the 
interests of the poorest countries positively synch with the outcome of demand 
reform in any middle- income country. In such a socialist world, exploitation and 
surplus value would soon vanish. 
 In reality, middle- income countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and so forth, 
are being placated by the extent to which misery and war plague the low-
est echelons of the international division of labour (e.g., Yemen, Somalia, 
Mauritania and the Sudan). Without mention of the centrality of class 
antagonisms, Keynesian mantras obfuscate distributional mechanisms and 
strengthen the ideological hold of capital. They represent a way for the organ-
ised dimension of capital to manage accumulation by war and immiseration 
infl icted upon the  Lazarus layers of Third World labour. 16 Worst of all, the 
 16  Even in such basic arenas of humanitarian intervention, as in lending to the hungry, 
capitalist policy is more about control than mercy. Consider for example the defunct 
FAO (2001) project that was to create an international lending mechanism to ease 
the liquidity constraints on net food- importing developing countries, so that when 
crops fail, they can borrow at concessional rates to buy food. In 2001, the initial fund 
required only $16 billion to get started, but donors refused to set up such a lending 
fund, even though it would earn profi ts, and preferred to see poorer countries borrow 
at higher rates to keep them under control. 
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putative reasons for the underdevelopment of the poorest have shifted from 
genetic to cultural inferiority. 
 Dispossessing peasants entails a further socialising of labour and produc-
tion and an intensifi cation of the contradictions of capital. Looking at the 
crisis of the rural sector in terms of inhibiting the realisation of value (labour 
power) leading to under- valorisation of labour is relevant to policy and to the 
building of rural– urban class alliances. A structural transformation depend-
ant on a broad working- class alliance has to engage the new  Lazarus class in 
the struggle for socialised production and forms of social property. Although 
transitions to socialism currently appear illusory, reforms involving a repric-
ing mechanism are not an impossibility. Insofar as the social organisation of 
the dependent economy and its agricultural sector is concerned, two points 
arise from the foregoing emphasis on the value contradictions within the 
rural or underdeveloped sectors: fi rst, there has to be a reinvention of a price 
system that revalorises labour and capitalises the national economy and the 
rural regions, with price guarantees and subsidies being part of that reinven-
tion (Bettelheim 1975); second, through socialising agricultural property into 
collective or small- owned farms in such a way as to ensure that the social 
interest aligns with the private interest (land reform that combines produc-
tivity concerns with personal incentives and welfare). At the national level, 
retaining the social product for recirculation within national borders involves 
multilayered price engineering that ensures exchange- and interest- rate poli-
cies that lock in resources and an inter- industry price system that enhances 
output (regulated inter- industry prices). At a subordinate agricultural- sector 
level, guarantees for agricultural output, fi nancing for agriculture at conces-
sionary rates – and integrating agriculture into the economy via increased 
investment – represent the optimum strategies. 
 The fact that commodities can stand above people and dictate the alloca-
tion of resources stems from the way use value is valorised by a class structure 
that pits it against socially necessary labour. When alienated labour power is 
more valuable than the labourer, the problem cannot be solved by appeal-
ing to humanising the labour process. The profi t- driven wage system under 
capitalism cannot be humanised, and if some national working strata appear 
more secure, it is usually at the expense of other national or extra- national 
workers. Redundant labour contributes to relations accumulation by its very 
redundancy or by its engagement in wars, including proxy imperialist wars. 
By metabolising humanity and nature in an organically interrelated process, 
one that knows no national boundary and whose mode of growth under 
fi nancialisation extracts proportionately more of wealth by absolute surplus 
value, the production of the reserve army of labour not only becomes increas-
ingly integral to the dynamics of capital, but also to its partial destruction. 
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What has to change, therefore, are the two seemingly unchangeable pillars 
of capital:  the class structure, and the rate of surplus socialisation, both at 
the source (initial wealth redistribution) and the end product (taxing higher 
incomes): workers rule under more egalitarian conditions. 
 For the present, the same laws governing reproduction of society that cre-
ated the calamity prior to the Arab Spring remain in place. Imperialist strat-
egy continues to aim at further deconstructing the political underpinnings of 
working- class security, hence cheapening labour. Financial imperialism has 
expanded debt to the point where the labour of future generations will be com-
modifi ed and held as collateral to steady the value and the profi t rates from 
the order of fi at money that signifi es the wealth of the ruling classes. In this 
early phase of the twenty- fi rst century the imperialist grip on the economic 
channels that fuel inter- working class dividedness is ironclad. Now, as before, 
revolutionary consciousness must rise from outside the narrow boundaries of 
the economic struggle that only boosts sectional politics (Lenin 1902). Forms 
of action that mediate the narrow section (the particular) into the organisa-
tional whole (internationalist working- class politics) augur the rebirth of a 
global vision that empowers the Arab working classes and peasantry. 
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 Chapter 6 
 PERMANENT WAR IN THE 
ARAB WORLD 
 This fi nal chapter addresses the role of imperialist war in denying sovereignty 
to the Arab working masses and thereby sustaining a cheapened valuation of 
Arab resources for the purposes of metropolitan capital accumulation. The 
wars visited upon the AW are not an accident of history unrelated to the 
necessities of world capital. Carved up and remoulded by the continued prac-
tice of colonialism, imperialist aggression and re- colonisation, the AW rep-
resents an outstanding manifestation of permanent war theory (Luxemburg 
1913; Lenin 1916).  Oil in its raw form, together with the value of imperial 
rents wrought from its strategic control, represents a decisive constituent of 
the global accumulation process. US- led capital’s control of oil by means of 
violence sustains its rate of expropriation and the stature of the US empire. 
As such, the articulation of the Arab social formation with US- led imperial-
ism – the capitalist class cutting across national boundaries – issues from US- 
led hegemony and from wars of encroachment to seize the assets of the Arab 
region. To redress the declining contribution to the circuit of capital arising 
as a result of autonomous working classes retaining more of the value they 
created, US- led imperialism and its class allies regularly resort to military 
aggression. Militarism boosts war- related technological development and 
fi nancial expansion – and heightens the rates of dispossession cum devalori-
sation of insecure social formations, in particular, Arab formations.  Hence, 
as Mao Zedong (1938) might have put it in today’s context: the AW is articu-
lated with world capital by the barrel of the gun.  What the necessity of war to 
imperialism implies for Arab development is that imperialist belligerence or 
the serious threat thereof can result in the collapse of the state as a potential 
medium for working- class representation in the international political order. 
So far, where war is not already completely ravaging society, poor develop-
ment outcomes of the neo- liberal genre characterise Arab development. 
 In this concluding chapter, I address some aspects of the combined condi-
tion of war cum botched Arab development as the  necessary product of impe-
rialist aggression  qua permanent war. With Israel and the IS in the process of 
THE UNMAKING OF ARAB SOCIALISM
250
250
constructing ethnically pure states, eff acing internationally recognised bor-
ders and fl outing the conventions of the international security arrangement, 
the threats emanating from the region implicate the entire planet. Unless 
there grows an internationalist alternative from between the fault lines of con-
tradictions, wars will continue to create a sustainable downward social spiral 
that fragments the working classes along ethnic and sectarian lines.  More 
important, as a result of fi nancialisation, the implications of dehumanising 
the labour process in one corner of the world reconstitute the power of capital 
everywhere (Patanaik and Patnaik 2015).  For the fi rst time since the postwar 
period, the declining share of wages in the central labour– aristocratic nations 
unequivocally shows the organic ties of the global working classes. 1 Their 
descent is not only coincidentally related to the descent of the bombed nations 
or the poorest; it is caused by it. There end the fl imsy falsehoods of Western 
labour aristocracy, and here begins the search for a theory of struggle origi-
nating from the conditions of starving refugees in war- torn areas. 
 War and the Comprador Class 
 Although no state would be the realisation of the political ideal under capi-
talism, the Arab state has long since lost even the semblance of a supporting 
role for national capital, and it rarely embodies the rights of its citizenry by 
intermediation. The imperialist- dominated Arab state has to estrange the 
working class from its rights. It  creates the external constraints on the devel-
opment of civil liberties, which mostly through repression, as distinct from 
the salient psychological mind- twisting propaganda, have become internal-
ised by much of the population as self- policing measures. As a higher degree 
of the motto ‘better be feared than loved’, the state is an arbitrage by the 
exercise of violent repression or pacifi cation by direct handout rather than 
promoting consent by representation and, conjunctionally, wealth through 
productivity gains. Each Arab formation has a specifi c identity determined 
by its own class structure and the rapport of interlocked internal and external 
forces. As the ruling merchant class integrates with foreign capital, it becomes 
 1  Measuring output per worker in the centre conceals the direct and indirect value 
transfers from the periphery, which have a positive bearing on the reproduction of the 
central working classes, and whose transformation into price of production raises the 
objective levels of productivity in the centre. The fact that the level of real Northern 
wages declines  – or staggers behind productivity, by a large margin, despite such 
objective grounds that should raise it – could only mean that the Northern working 
classes are paying the price for the socialist ideological retreat to which they have 
contributed. This outcome alone should bring into focus the organic ties of labour 
worldwide. 
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part of – and materially rooted in – those external forces. It is half- witted to 
address the national and international class links or their impersonal, objec-
tive and historical relationships in terms of quantity or percentages assigned 
to either internal or external decision makers to apportion blame. Historical 
class relationships are also the prevailing balance of forces, or the overdeter-
mined history, which obviously has not favoured the working classes in the 
AW. One cannot overemphasise how misleading it is to conceptualise class 
reality anywhere in terms of national bereft of international, especially when 
the circuit of capital is transnational and the quantity of value assessed in 
a given chronological period is only meaningful in relation to its constitut-
ing social relationships developing in social time. 2 As argued in the previous 
chapter, value is subject– object, it is the physical commodity and the relation-
ships organising the commodity, while classes are interrelated transnational 
relationships that the Arab merchant class has integrated with the social rela-
tionship that is imperialism. 
 The merchant  qua comprador class feeds off  the conversion of national 
resources into dollar assets or acts as a henchman for imperialism, serving 
its strategic positioning objectives. The merchant class in charge of the social 
formation is an extreme version of the comprador. It holds a necrotrophic 
relationship with the national economy. It usurps value from the working 
class without reinvesting in it because it simply does not depend on rising 
national productivity to enhance its wealth. The inherited despotism of the 
old feudal formations, unshattered by liberal bourgeois revolutions, and 
lingering amidst the increasingly severe accumulation crisis, re- emerges in 
new divisive sectional (ideological) guises to deliver the regimentation of the 
labour process. 
 As it has been anecdotally put, the rich Arabs are protected by imperialist 
air power and may earn more interest on their wealth abroad than on rev-
enues from productive national undertakings. With the exception of the post- 
independence industrialisation drive, the merchant side of the Arab economy 
 2  Social time is that time in which revolutionary consciousness comes to fruition as a 
result of the inherent contradiction between subject and object in the course of prac-
tice, the rise of revolutionary consciousness as the working class (subject) fi ghts to lay 
hold to the use value that has been expropriated from it through the private channels of 
accumulation (object), after which society leaps forward at shorter intervals in chrono-
logical time. To parody the meaning of social time with the myth of Sisyphus as retold 
by Camus: all the quantities of rocks he rolled up the hill for any span of chronological 
time would have meant nothing until he came to the realisation that the gods have 
infl icted an unspeakable injustice upon him and that he had to stop them. Social time 
is that warp in chronological time in which awakening and revolutionary conscious-
ness either arises from the condition of revolt or brings about revolt. 
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was the only side carefully reared by colonialism; and in the neo- liberal era it 
had returned to the same position it had occupied in colonial times. However, 
in an Arab context, the sheer belligerence of imperialism calls into question 
the usual characterisation of the relationship between a postcolonial forma-
tion and the present imperial powers. The frail sovereignty of the Arab state, 
its precarious development, and its devastation by war constitute a case of 
development by wars of encroachment as opposed to industrial and trade- 
based exchange. In the choice between putting people to work for cheap 
wages or literally cheapening people, US- led imperialism integrates the AW 
through the latter mode. The condition of actual or potential defeat to the 
US– Israeli military alliance shapes an easily penetrable Arab environment 
for such state of play – war making. The calculated risks to imperialism are 
low and becoming lower. In comparison, the East Asian  cordon sanitaire, where 
a stronger correlation between development and security concerns prevails, 
imperialist capital fl ows and the infl uence of a militarily toothless Japanese 
state were able to pass certain welfare gains as a result of pouring resources 
into manufacturing and other tradable sectors. By contrast, the bellicosity 
of a US- led alliance and its sponsored Arab warlords who masquerade as 
nationalists but whose material reproductive base rests in geopolitical rents 
and international fi nancial circles, reverse industrialisation- based develop-
ment. War itself is necessarily but not exclusively the end goal and the linch-
pin of most social structures in the Arab region. 
 In addition to the historical momentum of imperialist aggression to redress 
power positions, the primacy of politics or the sociological character of impe-
rialism involves the act of strengthening the rule of capital by foregoing some 
intermediate monetary benefi ts. Although such concerns for power, control 
and stability of rule are central to the resilience of capital, as sociological rela-
tions underlining imperialist practice they hold much more for the AW than 
elsewhere. This is mainly the result of the imperialist consideration by which 
the politics of war and, conjunctionally, oil control overshadow the issue of 
developing the Arab region’s productive capacity for the purpose of trade. 
The circuitous fi nancial- gain channel for imperialism occurs through war, 
the power derived therefrom and ideological spinoff s rather than trade in 
civilian end- use commodities. 
 War in an underdeveloped context is under- valorisation and control 
through the disempowerment or alienation of humans and resources. There 
are two factual points that envelop the case of stripping Arab resources from 
their owners  qua producers and then cheapening them. First, there is not 
much for Western powers in trade gains to be accrued from the pittance of 
moneyed income of the AW, save for the Gulf states whose funds are already 
under the purview of the dominant fi nancial power. Apart from oil, there is 
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precious little to desire when the share of labour income of non- Gulf Arab 
counties is less than .5 per cent of world income.  Secondly, militarism’s spend-
ing (military Keynesianism) or, better yet, war spending are ends in them-
selves because they redistribute real value to the capitalist class and expand 
fi nancial assets  – simultaneously through higher credits (military spending 
or war debt) aff orded to the fi nancial class and austerity.  Foster et al. (2008) 
reasserted the Kaleckian position that US military spending grew because of 
capitalist empire rather than the need to contain the Soviet threat by soaking 
up the US’s vast surplus and helping stave off  economic stagnation.  This posi-
tion was also shared by Baran and Sweezy (1975) and Mandel (1975). As true 
as this proposition may be, it is secondary to the fact that wars of encroach-
ment capture, destroy or under- valorise real human and physical value in the 
Third World. 
 More so in this period of fi nancialisation (the existence of a huge money 
supply relative to real output) than in previous ones, military spending and 
its consummation of surplus are insuffi  cient on their own for the expansion 
of surplus without the actualisation of war. War upon the AW is not to be 
solely gauged in terms of degree of surplus or a lower rate of accumulation 
reaching a threshold that vents itself out by enacting confl ict. Imperialist war 
is an inherent sociological condition that steadies the rule of capital in rela-
tion to the rate of capital accumulation.  Abdel- Malek (1977) cautions against 
overemphasis on quantifi cation in the explanation of imperialism, especially 
as the Third World is trivialised because of its low share of dollar output from 
total world income.  Lauesen and Cope (2015) brilliantly capture the value 
relationship at the root of the imperialist drive in terms of the transformation 
of values into prices. 
 In a world where the market price of goods tends to be global while the market 
price of labour capacity varies because of class struggle – both historical and 
contemporary – the result is a redistribution of value from countries with a 
low market price for labour capacity to countries with a high market price for 
such. Thus imperialism must be explained in the context of the transformation 
of value into price. To claim that this shifts the concept of exploitation from 
the sphere of production to that of circulation, however, is disingenuous. It is 
human labour that creates value and surplus labour that creates surplus value. 
However, (surplus) value is not a physical property that labour adds to goods 
like some kind of molecule incorporated and stored in the product. Rather, 
value and the transformation of value into market price is the result of social 
relations between labour and capital and between diff erent capitals. It is the 
transformation from value to market price that ensures that the accumula-
tion process continues on an expanded scale. This expanded circuit of capital 
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involves the transformation of value and surplus value into profi t, and the 
transfer of value from the South to North according to the low prices paid for 
goods produced in the former by the latter. Exploitation does not, therefore, 
occur in one particular sector of production or national economy; it is the result 
of the total global capital accumulation process. (Lauesen and Cope 2015) 
 War as a principal conduit for ensuring that the transformation of value into 
price responds to the demands of imperialist accumulation. Once the war 
link in the global production structure is highlighted, the locus of interna-
tionalist class struggle should shift to war zones whose value is being stripped 
away and destroyed. Quantifi cation by the money form of an average quan-
tity of labour time (as in quantity of labour is the substance of value) whose 
price would revert to its real value or natural price is a Ricardian interpreta-
tion of the labour theory of value and not Marx’s position.  As mentioned in 
the  previous chapter , Marxian labour power – the commodity – is like any 
other commodity: an inner relationship of value to use, value externally man-
ifested in exchange value, not some arithmetic average of diff erent quantities 
of labour measured at a specifi c moment in time. The physiological (quan-
tity) aspects of value only presuppose the historically specifi c value relations 
under capitalism because the quantity of labour is determined via moneyed 
exchange. The process of realising the internal contradiction of a commodity 
(value or socially necessary labour against use value or labour’s productivity) 
through exchange – as in pricing it with a wage rate – involves all the trap-
pings of history and the class struggle, including no less, imperialist wars. The 
capitalist has through class power an inherent interest in under- pricing labour 
power with lower wages. Trying to make value and moneyed profi ts agree 
directly and without contradiction is ‘much more diffi  cult to solve than that of 
squaring the circle. […] It is simply an attempt to present that which does not 
exist as in fact existing’ (Marx 1863). At this stage in the analysis, let us just 
posit that labour power is a historically, politically and economically deter-
mined variable in whose valuation imperialist war is a central component. 
 Only when value is considered as immediate substance (physiological 
quantity) – a substance without a history of becoming as per the law of value, 
or as in an average quantity of labour – can one say that the Occidental work-
ing classes are principal wealth producers whose wages are justifi ed by higher 
productivity; but on its own such an average does not exist and, if it did, it 
cannot produce surplus value. Obviously people have always worked to pro-
duce, but only under capitalism is the allocation of labour determined by the 
exchange value of the labour power commodity. Typically, Marx always looks 
for the historical specifi city under capitalism to explain its workings. The 
various concrete labouring conditions have always existed as natural laws for 
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the reproduction of society. However, the social laws of development specifi c 
to commodity exchange under capitalism are refl ected as the intermediation 
of the value/ use value contradiction in moneyed form (Ilyenkov 1960). In 
this sense, the law of resolving the inner contradiction of value through mon-
eyed exchange is the universal, which is also a set of heterogeneous elements 
resolved, not by adding diff erent quantities of labour directly, but indirectly 
through its appearance in the price system. The contradictions in Marx’s 
system do not end; they resolve into another stage of becoming while remain-
ing preserved and negated simultaneously (more on this thorny topic in the 
section below on Barbaric development). 
 While on the same subject of labour power and its value, there are no abso-
lute advantages in productivity across the advanced economies because of 
the heterogeneity of productive capacities and the class- muzzled criterion by 
which productivity is assessed and measured.  Emmanuel (1972, 424) points 
out that ‘if it were really comparative productivity that determined wages 
and incomes in general, the underdeveloped countries should have a wage 
level and a standard of living higher than those of the advanced countries, 
since their advantage in the exported article is usually greater than their dis-
advantage in the imported one’.  Without distinguishing labour power from 
the labourer as a commodity and designating the class process of valoris-
ing labour power below its value, we will have the Ricardian substance- only 
labour theory of value, which Marx (1863) thought invalidates the labour 
theory of value and restores an ahistorical explanation of the sources of profi t, 
namely as in invested capital. Marx (1847) considered labour power as a com-
modity whose determination follows the rules applied to other commodities, 
and he eschewed such delusional propositions as: wages are determined by 
productivity.  A similar point was also propounded by Kalecki (1943) and 
Emmanuel (1972) who argued that wages are determined in the product and 
not in the labour market – the labour market aff ects labour only in relation 
to, and as a subcomponent of, workings of the broader product market. 3  More 
recently, Cope (2015) argues that although increased mechanisation results in 
the creation of more use- values per unit of time, only the intensifi ed consump-
tion of labour power can generate added value and, since wages are not the 
price paid for the result of labour but the price of labour power, higher wages 
are not the automatic consequence of productivity gains accruing to capital. 
 3  For Kalecki, the real wage – wages over prices – is determined simultaneously by the 
macro conditions of monopoly power and resource leakage abroad. However, because 
the general price level rises as a result of infl ation bringing wages down, the power of 
unions and the working class organisations have to kick in to raise the nominal wage 
(demand higher wages) to stabilise or raise the real wage level or the purchasing power 
of workers. 
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 What often goes unnoticed in the debate is that the whole structure of 
accumulation through war, realising and then raising the surplus, has at 
its core a value relationship at work. Deploying the huge Western moneyed 
surplus in military spending is of relevance, but it is only one part of the 
story. The cycle of  deploy value, destroy/ create value and revalorise in terms of 
class- power- mediated prices comes full circle as a result of the practice 
of imperialist war, which also plays a role in ensuring the rule of capi-
tal. Without theorising war into the circuit of value, there is only partial 
theory. As an aside, the law of value as the historical process that mani-
fests itself in diff erent forms of surplus- value- creation moments, includes, 
as stressed throughout, the continued re- enactment of commercial exploi-
tation, as colonial and imperialist wars that create massive numbers of 
wage slaves and cheap resources just as in chattel slavery, but on a much 
larger scale given the death rates from hunger and wars. Violence is cen-
tral to capitalism, and its conjoint sociological relationships reassert the 
relationship of imperialist looting time and again. Here one is looking at a 
historical value- creation process by violent dispossession whose relevance 
is underplayed in the conventional literature because of Eurocentric over-
emphasis on dollar- denominated income, which is higher in the developed 
world largely as a result of imperialist wars of aggression, past and present. 
One ought to ask the obvious question: Could the dollar itself, or dollar- 
denominated wealth, be what it is without the colonial or imperialist wars? 
Reverting to our own Arab and historically contingent setting, war is – by 
the inalienability of confl ict to historical development  – key to the rela-
tionship of the ruling Arab consortia to imperialism, even if it means the 
destruction of the assets of the Arab state. 
 Wars and the permanent arms economy realise moneyed value and 
reshape the social conditions that produce value. Apart from employing mil-
lions in the creation, destruction and realisation of value, the dynamic of 
war itself nourishes military technology and its civilian spinoff s using mainly 
public funds. War maintains the technological edge of the US- led capitalist 
class, whose institutional structure is the US proper; technological advantage 
is the material basis for supremacy in the international division of labour. 
Financially, funding for wars expands US indebtedness in the dollar space; 
hence, the fi nancial assets available for institutional fi nance to grab from the 
share of the working class and expand. Enlarged dollar- money supply has in 
turn to be underwritten by further military expansion and strategic impe-
rialist repositioning. All of these interrelated and self- propelling processes 
compose the totality of capital into which the war upon the AW has to be 
explained as a key moment. Having experienced the highest frequency of 
confl icts globally (SIPRI various years), the AW is already the soft underbelly 
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of capital, highly receptive and regenerative of permanent war, which is a 
principal stabilising component of capital. 
 The growth of credit expended on wars entails higher tax levies and lower 
social spending on the central working classes:  the all- too- familiar auster-
ity shifting a higher share of the social product to the capitalist class.  In the 
AW, the war relationship, and its attendant consequences in the surplus 
drain, commodify human lives – along with its monetised or non- monetised 
labour power –  and realises them in sudden death or shorter life expectancy 
relative to the historically determined potential.  Like technology, violence is 
endogenous (innate) to capitalism and transpires as a result of the fetishism 
(estrangement from direct social control) that commands the allocation of 
resources. Wars literally consume human lives and other valuable resources 
whose destruction is central to the commercial exploitation of the vanquished 
periphery. 
 When value as an internal contradiction is considered in its stages of 
transformation, or in its state of becoming – as concrete labour assumes – 
an abstract form in moneyed exchange determined by capital’s ideological 
power, war making subdues peripheral labour to the requirement of central 
profi t making. In the conditions of exchange resulting from shifting power 
balances, and according to which social values, the value and use- value of 
labour, conform to ruling- class power or imperialism, the dying Arabs and 
Africans in imperialist wars become also real producers of wealth. Their pre-
mature deaths are the initial building blocks in a production chain that knows 
no national borders. Commercial exploitation, which unwillingly joined the 
slave labourer to his or her labour power and extinguished their lives in short 
time spans, is re- enacted in war that forces Arab workers into self- defence and 
extinguishes their lives in short time spans. The organised dimensions of capi-
tal, its bequeathed culture and institutions, cannot be cultivated or personally 
commanded to arrest blind competitive accumulation and the violent- death 
process. On labour’s side, as evidenced by the defeat of peace movements in 
the twentieth and twenty- fi rst centuries, organised labour was also incapable 
of halting imperialist wars of aggression. Up until this instance in history, 
imperialist violence has escaped socially responsible forms of control. 
 Much of the AW is undergoing a dual process of debilitating contain-
ment leading to self- implosion or an outright war of aggression. The Arab 
comprador- merchant class, through its excessive practices, undermines its 
own security (at times its own security of person), sovereignty and state as 
part of a healthy apoptosis (a destruction that benefi ts capital) rendered by the 
historically given order guiding its alliance with imperialism. 
 In an Arab context, national economic relations and policies are not 
aff orded the chance to mature and steer politics in line with nationalist 
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concerns. Externally imposed politics appear as a  force majeure, with develop-
ment of economic relations subsumed by political objectives; at this histori-
cal juncture, with immense global democratic forces bottled up and unable 
to fi nd a political form of organisation, and with so many wars fragment-
ing working people, the horizon for the development of nationalist objectives 
appears elusive. But, as was noted in the second chapter, the higher velocity of 
exchange has further compressed time and space. Contingent upon a  volte face 
in the Eurocentrism of Western communism, just as fi nance creates booms 
and busts, the rise and fall of revolutionary consciousness in tandem with 
class- based organisation may mimic the sharp deviation in the business cycle. 
In any case, that remains to be born from the conditions of struggle. 
 Only narrow margins are aff orded to nationalist development policies, 
and the burden of imperialist aggression forces these societies to use their 
resources for military ends or to comply with the terms of imperialism. The 
secretion of the comprador class, its subsequent compliance with usurpation- 
cum- tribute policies packaged as neo- liberalism, and slow economic asphyxi-
ation, are manifestations of class fl ux during times of socialist ideological 
retreat. Such complicity in the case of Libya, Syria and Yemen laid the objec-
tive grounds for the war economy and its associated class transformations: the 
rise of the war bourgeois class and the war- indigent proletariat. The ‘prag-
matism’ of surrender to a militarily superior imperialism and its economic 
policies ensure the exacting of tribute via freer market policies. Conversely, 
the ideological victory of US- led imperialism over socialism and the Arab 
working class is not limited to extracting rents from the Arab region. Given 
oil’s strategic value, imperial rents fl ow from the rest of the globe to US- 
dominated markets by virtue of US- led imperialism’s violent deconstruction 
of the Arab and surrounding regions. 
 The rising insecurity of Arab formations after the invasion of Iraq also 
intensifi ed the rate of resource usurpation from the region (as measured by 
the rates of labour and capital fl ights in UN 2008). Not much is left for the 
local population to use to improve its lot in life. The advance of neo- liberalism 
as an ideology has compromised past gains and, even though national con-
trol of oil has already been lost due to fi nancialisation (oil was listed in the 
commodity market in the mid- 1980s), to add insult to injury, oil privatisa-
tion is back on the development agenda. 4 After the Arab Spring’s failure to 
 4  Whereas Iran is often slotted as the next candidate for deconstruction by US- led impe-
rialist war, it appears that the Saudi Vision 2030 plan neo- liberal reform may assist in 
bringing down Saudi Arabia fi rst. The Saudi Vision 2030 plan, a development plan 
based on private- sector promotion under open private accumulation channels mecha-
nisms and robber- baron capitalism, might deplete Saudi Arabia of all its resources 
and accentuate the schisms upon which intercommunal confl ict spirals. Incidentally 
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introduce socialisation policy and the dismay that followed, the region has 
been once more subjected to the full force of colonial war or to even worse 
anti- development agendas. On a parallel track, with resources being directed 
to private ends, the speed with which growth in national wealth is evaporat-
ing without a trace of development will further abet the cheap funding of 
jihadist elements that under the guise of adherence to religious law further 
commodify human life at the behest of capital. There is a real negative dia-
lectic, or a downward development spiral, that is commensurate with the slide 
in socialist ideology or with the departure of Eurocentric Marxism from the 
recognition that value theory and class war begin where imperialism does the 
most harm: the AW and Africa. 
 With the rise of jihadists violently opposing already sectional/ sectarian 
regimes, the Arab working class holds less and less control over its own des-
tiny. The frailty of the global left is such that all regional powers are either 
prostrating themselves at the door of the US empire or wishing to submit; 
but the empire is not accepting ‘yes’ for an answer for fear of peace break-
ing out. Meanwhile, the international avarice for control of regional oil has 
intensifi ed. Open regional confl icts after the Arab Spring have increased, and 
many of the national authoritarian regimes have further concentrated power 
by capitalising on the ideological defeat of popular forces after the uprisings. 
 When a social contract with the national proletarians cannot be written, the 
classes at the helms of these regimes exhibit an inherent tendency to grow by 
integrating themselves with international fi nancial capital. The underside of 
this mode of integration is twofold: fi rst, in addition to the destruction and 
realisation of value en masse by means of war, value- denoted assets (things 
without owners) become potential cheap material for capital; and, second, 
the Arab masses are held for ransom by US- led imperialism, along with their 
own oil, which many around the world will continue to pay for by holding 
dollars. 
an open confl ict in the Arabian Peninsula, in view of American self- reliance on oil 
and the pressure such confl ict may exert on China may boost the cycle of accumu-
lation by militarism, value destruction and power restructuring for US- led capital. 
Contingently upon the fl ux in the global power balances, or what would the setting 
of the Saudi Kingdom ablaze deliver in power and value relations to US- led capital, 
such historical course of events may just be around the corner. Apart from the recent 
peak in critiquing the Saudi human rights record in the mainstream media, the higher 
than usual war and spending defi cits drawing down the sovereign fund, there is an 
immense looting party waiting to be had by all those bidding to build the future Saudi 
Arabia. How Saudi Arabia Wants to Privatize Its Oil but Keep the Profi ts,  http:// sput-
niknews.com/ middleeast/ 20160112/ 1032998730/ saudi- aramco- privatization- pillage.
html#ixzz45xIth8Av (viewed 12 February 2016). 
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 Barbaric Development 
 If, despite vast resources, development still remains poor and capitalism 
imparts very little progress to the AW, a case of capitalist decadence á la 
Luxemburg can be argued (Luxemburg 2013). The notion of capitalist deca-
dence, as used in the early twentieth century, signifi es descent into barbarism 
(per Luxemburg’s famous statement that the choice for humanity was now 
between socialism and barbarism); one could approach development out-
comes in Arab countries that are exposed to wars as a case of descent into 
barbarism, especially with so little in international solidarity to arrest col-
lapse. Although the lack of capacity and modern technology imply underde-
velopment, the crux of development or the lack thereof could be explained by 
the success of anti- imperialist fronts composed of national and cross- border 
alliances. At a rudimentary level, the defi ning relationship in crystallising 
(as in palpable proof of ) revolutionary consciousness is when labour as the 
agent of history commandeers the circuits of capital; this is just another way 
of saying that the degree development is the degree of independence from 
the wage system or wage slavery. The least- developing countries, principally 
African and Arab states – where the extraction of raw material is vital to 
global capital accumulation and the  rapport de force is detrimentally in favour 
of the imperialist/ former colonist – are areas where the terms  decadence ,  reverse 
development , and often also  barbarism emerge. Insofar as the AW is concerned, 
the belligerence of US- led imperialism expands in direct proportion to its 
historical momentum for control and the relevance of oil as a strategic com-
modity. US dollar seignorage and the oil- dollar standard require that other 
capitalist circles with territorial/ strategic control ambitions be held at bay. 
 There is unity in the relationship between oil for its own sake and oil as 
means for furthering control. As to the ‘for its own sake’ part of the story, at 
more than 10 per cent of world trade (means of transport ranks second at 3 
per cent, using the Standard International Trade Classifi cation (SITC) at the 
3- digit level), dollarising oil represents a central goal for US- led capital.  On 
the control side, the energy share from oil of still- rising powers (China and 
India in particular) in the developing world is twice that of OECD; add to 
that a high oil- import dependency, and these countries become even more 
vulnerable to the strategic control element (Foster 2010). Account taken of 
the scaremongering related to its exhaustion, oil is strategic in its own right 
as collateral against dollar- seignorage and in how it appertains to all levels of 
the value- production chain (Patnaik 2008). Nearly all production processes 
require oil as input. Although humanity may have grown in numbers with-
out such high dependence on oil, the reality is that world population growth 
has expanded with direct input from oil- condensed energy content, and the 
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sudden withdrawal of such an energy source may precipitate instant crisis, 
hence the strategic value. 
 That is why serious discussion on the causes of wars cannot avoid the oil 
issue. Even when discussants centre on the balancing act of the US economy – 
Petras (2011a) uses the formula ‘Republic versus Empire’ to label the contra-
dictory relationship of militarised, fi nancialised American global hegemony 
to the health of the underlying US economy and the material security of 
its population – the foremost premise that drives the empire is strategic oil 
control. Strengthening control over oil resources or, inversely, weakening the 
popular hold on resources, provides US- led capital with more than adequate 
leverage on most oil- dependent countries. 
 The oil- dollar nexus and, in particular, the dollar- priced barrel bolsters 
the power of the US- led capital class that underwrites the credit needed 
to maintain the stable dollar as the world currency (Patnaik 2008). This is 
all the more relevant when fi nancialisation and earnings through fi nancial 
channels have come to represent more than half of corporate profi ts by 2010 
(Fine 2010). The US- led capital class overstretches both its military reach 
and its credit/ fi nancialisation, and for this it has to re- empower itself. The 
debts of the United States are not solely the state’s debts. As mentioned in 
the introduction, the debts of the social formation are the sum of private and 
public debts; however, there are also the global- transaction guarantees that 
the fi nancial standing of the United States backs, especially as global money 
supply (mostly dollarised) has grown to three times real global output over 
the neo- liberal era. The hegemony of the United States over several strategic 
areas, particularly in the AW, off ers its ruling class a vantage point in terms of 
collateral against the future; the Federal Reserve rate policy sets the tempo of 
global money transactions. Pricing oil by the dollar and calibrating the level 
of instability of the AW to how well the US- led fi nancial class assures itself 
of increasing power, allows it to snatch a higher share of the global fi nancial 
rents. The US ruling class is the envy of other capitalist classes as it enjoys 
rents upon rents. 
 The issue of stability or instability (war) in the AW, its tilting of power bal-
ances in favour of the US- led camp, has an objective bearing on the under- 
valorisation of resources and its positive ideological bonuses to capital. But at 
the same time it bears upon fi nancial grab just as oil control does. The control 
of the circular fl ow of Arab petrodollars for T- bills or weapons sales is second-
ary to the much more signifi cant category of imperial rents through circui-
tous dollar- seignorage fi nancial rents from the rest of the world; but because 
such regional control is key to the ongoing and worsening real- value snatch 
from the working classes globally (austerity riding on the back of neo liberal 
ideological strength), aggression against the AW becomes the mainstay of US 
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foreign policy. If it were not for these material undercurrents, the theory of 
imperialism would become a matter of psychological whim and would lose 
much of its political– economic grounding. 
 Accumulation in the age of fi nancial imperialism grows via a two- pronged 
approach to resolve the constant debacle of overproduction: expansion of civil-
ian end- use commodities and of military/ war- spending (Lenin 1916). Crises, 
whether the downturn of the business cycle in the 2008 fi nancial lapse or in 
permanent wars, further displace civilian end- use commodity realisation (the 
role of profi ts derived from the sale of commodities in the market) and boosts 
the role of aggressive ventures through encroachment wars. As argued, military 
spending and war are not only a way of loosening the realisation bottlenecks 
(the consummation of commodities in their sale and consumption) when sur-
pluses cross a certain threshold, but they are also a way of reasserting capital’s 
hegemony. Because regulating capitalist competition alone would not avert 
downturns – crisis is a permanent feature of capitalism (Sweezy 1981) unless 
one eliminates surplus value – permanent war has already been described as 
the leading practice of imperialism, the means whereby the mounting diffi  cul-
ties arising from the predicament of maintaining profi t rates while balanc-
ing out the production and distribution sides are resolved (Lenin 1916).  Lenin 
emphasised that militarism represents a key relationship in the global accumu-
lation process under monopoly capitalism, which does not preclude assessing 
imperialist militarism as action against the tide of revolutionary organisation 
and consciousness. However, in more concrete terms, Lenin (1916) as well as 
Luxemburg (1913) posited that war is permanent, because the drive for the 
division of colonies and spheres of infl uence for fi nance capital to maintain 
accumulation pits global powers against each other (Lenin 1916). In his cri-
tique of Kautsky, Lenin (1918) also made the point that these inter- imperialist 
diff erences are not reconcilable because war’s inherence to capital is part of 
its state of being and cannot be mediated through inter- imperialist policy that 
might halt war (ultra- imperialism). Capitalism would be going against its very 
nature. 
 Under capitalism, there was no moment at which global accumulation 
would have gained enough momentum to lift investment and consump-
tion simultaneously. I  have in mind the social conditions in the develop-
ing world, which is often omitted from a reductionist global business cycle 
frame of analysis (price- based). In diff erentiating modern imperialism from 
its early twentieth- century forms,  Foster (2015) sees that fi nancialised capi-
tal has a built- in tendency to advance by war ‘occurring in the context of 
what top U.S.  foreign policy strategists are calling a “New Thirty Years’ 
War” unleashed by Washington for strategic control of the Middle East and 
the surrounding regions’ .  The crisis is further exacerbated because fi nance 
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disparages the real production process and, as mentioned above, its expropri-
ation of the share of labour takes place by a combination of austerity at home 
and war abroad. Financial institutions wed themselves closely to the state, 
as the ‘too big to fail’ US banks and similar monopolies exercise power to 
extract value by decreasing the basic- living share of labour. Such unstoppable 
expropriation can only proceed by mystifying fi nancial processes.  Fictitious 
moneyed debts are bestowed with divine sanctity to the point where few pro-
pose social alternatives to irreproachable austerity and encroachment wars. 
 The mass of fi ctitious capital, that is, the layers upon layers of unpayable debt, 
which are underwritten by the hegemony of US- led capital, has to fl ow freely 
into higher returns low- wage sanctuaries or higher risk cum higher returns 
areas. The profi t rate is gauged against real and fi nancial capital and because 
so much credit was created for which there is no corresponding real activity, 
the drive to raise profi ts becomes ever more aggressive. Although in account-
ing terms the drain through the open capital accounts was plain to see, in 
post– Arab Spring states, especially Egypt, not a single thought was given 
to delinking the national economy from international fi nancial containment 
through indebtedness.  Also, not a thought was given to the fact that it is quasi- 
impossible for the bourgeois state apparatus, including the whole edifi ce of 
mainstream social science, to propagate any truth that may endanger capi-
tal’s rule. Of the fallacies promoted against socialism, the adage that people 
have to queue for hours to buy a loaf of bread has become so engrained after 
so much inculcation by apparatuses of capital that social policy alternatives 
were completely written off  the map of viable alternatives. 
 In insecure and dependent formations, such as Arab countries, the subor-
dination of state to capital is more defi nitive. Ruling capital, the association 
of local to foreign bourgeoisie, is inspirited by imperialist forces in its seiz-
ing of the state. The collusion between the state and fi nancially integrated 
capital manifests itself in persistent defl ationary policies at home, the most 
usurping of which is the stabilisation of the national currency with the dollar 
under open capital accounts. The vile trinity of weak unions and proletar-
ian power, dollar- pegged exchange- rate regimes and free capital fl ows erodes 
the already- low labour share through rising general consumer price levels 
and dollar- reserves building to guarantee the conversion of a national cur-
rency becoming ever so cheap by monopoly pricing, yet converted at fi xed 
rates for dollars. Apart from the Gulf States, the Arab central banks subsi-
dise the wealthier class by maintaining the currency conversion rate from the 
drawing- down of national assets to keep the wealth of the owning class steady 
in the dollar. 
 Let us re- posit the all too well- known fact about the rise of fi nancial capital 
but deal with another disastrous spinoff  of which: fi nancial capital expands 
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more by snatching a bigger share of the existing surplus than by expand-
ing that surplus through larger markets and productivity gains; hence, it 
requires a stabilisation of the exchange rate to hold the value of its assets 
steady, and infl ation to deprive the working class of a higher share of income. 
 In Arab formations, the alliance of comprador with international fi nancial 
capital sanctifi es capital- accounts openness, despite the pressures that idle 
reserve and capital outfl ows exert on the national economy. Not once did the 
word ‘regulation’ stand out in the post– Arab Spring policy discussions.  The 
leakage resulting from capital and trade openness cripples national macro 
policies. It is not that comprador- hijacked Arab countries have a choice any 
longer; they simply lose control and regiment fi scal spending by reducing 
primary spending (the sort of spending on schooling and health, which is 
the austerity dictated by the IFIs), thereby short- changing labour. An unre-
strained market mechanism, in the presence of a war- bent imperialist force 
dominating the political process through its proxies, bleeds national resources 
to a higher degree by reducing the working- class share of the social product. 
Consequently, the growing imbalance between working- class consumption 
and the fl ight of resources will, contingent on the ideological hold of capital 
over society and state, contribute to splitting society at the seams – as already 
happened prior to the Arab Spring. 
 When US- led capital seizes the oil jugular, it also pressures diff erent con-
tending circles of capital into further acquiescing to its dollar- debt expan-
sion. What simple accounting conceals is that a class in charge of an empire 
enjoying dollar- seignorage and imperial rents incurs no losses in permanent 
wars. Borrowing almost indefi nitely in its own currency aff ords it power over 
its lenders and pushes the lenders to support its military adventurism, as they 
fear that loss of hegemony over strategic areas may cause dollar devaluation 
(dollar devaluation erodes world savings). The argument that imperialism has 
had no vested interest in invading the Third World because it is dollar- costly 
to the US overlooks the relationship of imperialist subjugation, which is cen-
tral to the value foundation of the dollar. It also lumps the US working class 
with its ruling class willy- nilly. In truth, the money form is an appearance 
that does not explain much on its own. When the British Empire waned after 
World War I, the pound circulated by US charity (Patnaik 2008). Wars of 
imperialist conquest are central to the value of the dollar, which is both signi-
fi cation of value and instrument of repression. 
 Imperialist assaults in Palestine, Yemen, Syria, Iraq and elsewhere restruc-
ture power positions and standing and are crucial to accumulation by expro-
priation. Colonial and imperialist policy in an Arab context de- industrialises 
the colonised or hegemonised economy and thereby renders it a pedestal to 
the colonialist’s own economy; furthermore, this policy prices the resources 
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and values of the subjected population by its degree of control relative to 
value. The power behind imperialist price setting and commercial exploita-
tion is not the typical monopoly power related to high entry costs or prohibi-
tive technological know- how.  It is brute violence from which historical surplus 
value has already been amassed by the successor states of colonial powers 
(Abdel- Malek 1981). 
 Imperial rents to the US- led fi nancial class are not only signifi cant, but 
they have become the gyroscope of the system’s stability. The power of fi nan-
cial capital had reached such heights by 2008 that it could shift its debts onto 
the balance sheets of central banks while continuing to borrow and expand 
even after the crash.  After World War II, part of the imperial rents and trib-
ute fl ows through fi nancial channels to US- led capital continued to act as 
bribes to central working classes.  The often- touted idea of Western labour 
aristocracy that reform leads to revolution, fl opped. Instead, reform led to 
retrogression in revolutionary consciousness in the centre.  It further boosted 
the wages of central working classes and the wealth of aristocratic nations 
as per Emmanuel (1972). Once the struggle shifts away from the point of 
production to the sphere of exchange (circulation), ‘the struggle ceases to be 
fundamentally a class war of the wage workers in resistance to the extrac-
tion of surplus value by the exploiters, and becomes a question of merely 
regulating the exchange process by the state, i.e.[,] of organizing capitalism’ 
(Browder 1933, 35).  In circulation, fed partially by war tribute and super- 
exploitation from which the share of wages of western workers’ rises, workers 
and capitalists frequently share the same interests: as in capital growing by 
imperialist looting and passing some of the gains to allied sections of Western 
labour. However, when the struggle of workers focuses on the conditions of 
production, for instance, ‘do not bomb Arabs for the oil we use in our cars 
and factories’, by focusing on the point of origin in production the struggle of 
workers veers closer to an internationalist class war. 
 The sociological underpinnings of imperialism gained strength as a result 
of labour’s putting nationalism before internationalism and compromise 
before anti- systemic struggle, combined with capital’s awareness of the need 
to discipline its blinkered competition to ensure the sturdiness of its hegem-
ony. Under neo- liberalism, while the share of global labour fell as a result of 
international capital becoming homogenised, resistance became divided and 
less organised.  Through economic openness, capital’s unhindered progress 
integrated outlying national bourgeoisies and commodifi ed their countries’ 
resources including in some cases their air and water. In this condensation of 
power under the leadership of the US fi nancial rentier class, there emerged 
a new general condition whose causal determination, rooted in the tectonic 
plates of capital’s underlying dynamics, transpire as immediacy in its politics. 
THE UNMAKING OF ARAB SOCIALISM
266
266
Whatever exigencies of accumulation reported in quarterly profi t rates dic-
tate, the current nomenklatura of the bourgeoisie introduces changes to 
the historical legacy of the institutions of the Cold War, freeing its hands 
for re- writing old international treaties, concocting aggressive new ones and 
encroachment wars. The higher rate of integration of capital, its homogene-
ity, also allows it to decide its rate of profi t before wages, especially so that no 
internationally organised labour movement can eff ectively oppose the status 
quo with a viable form of organisation and ideological alternative. 
 History has borne out the point made by Arghiri Emmanuel in 1970, when 
he posited that it is diffi  cult for the interests of the richer and poorer interna-
tional labouring classes to converge at a given point in time. Whenever inter-
national working class interests converge, through the primacy of politics or 
the sociological underpinnings of capital, the ruling central class dips into its 
purse and sows the divisions. The knack for economising, as in trying to tally 
prices with values at a specifi c interval in time, should not be over- emphasised 
as central to the theory of imperialism, which is indubitably sociological 
(Abdel- Malek 1981). Trends in prices and the money form serve to demon-
strate changes in the degree of exploitation but cannot refl ect the sum of val-
ues in a single period. Emmanuel’s (1972) interpretation of unequal exchange 
is more than just the façade of declining terms of trade; it is the totality of 
the condition of exploitation, particularly the commercial exploitation of the 
peripheral formations, which enrobes class in national guise. The other side 
of Emmanuel’s commercial exploitation argument is that peripheral wages 
are a steep ‘under- pricing’ of the social cost of reproduction of labour. 
 The quantifi cation of value by colonial/ imperialist criteria and dollar- 
assessed low productivity should not relegate the developing world to lower- 
value status. The notion of quantifying value relations according to Western 
higher technology and higher productivity to justify central higher wages 
omits the fact that wages and productivity are  a priori social. Measurement 
as such is a convention that requires the subjection of social time to a class 
desired interval in chronological time. What is social and organic is indivis-
ible, and the time from which one begins to measure the net additions of 
value added in a value chain determines also one’s class position. The whole 
pernicious interpretation of assigning higher value, and therefore wages, to 
technology- based productivity overlooks the interrelatedness of production 
and the imperialist savagery, which is circularly a predicate for dollar- based 
higher central productivity. The dollar, as I argue later, has a value that is 
determined by imperialist aggression and strategic oil control rather than by 
some Western technological edge. 
 In  Capital volume 1, Chapter 17, Marx (1867) assumed that commodities 
are sold at their value and that the price of labour power rises occasionally 
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above its value, but never sinks below it. He then theorises that ‘the relative 
magnitudes of surplus value and of the price of labour power are determined 
by three circumstances:  (1)  the length of the working day, or the extensive 
magnitude of labour; (2) the normal intensity of labour, its intensive magni-
tude, whereby a given quantity of labour is expended in a given time; and 
(3) the productiveness of labour, whereby the same quantum of labour yields, 
in a given time, a greater or less quantum of product, dependent on the degree 
of development in the conditions of production’ (Marx 1867). In  Capital , vol-
ume 3, Marx (1894) posits that the reduction of wages below the value of 
labour power as a way to increase surplus value, mitigates against the ten-
dency of the rate of profi t to fall. Not only that, ‘wages below value’ or super- 
exploitation is the most important factor to allay the tendency of the profi t 
rates to fall. The fi rst proposition from volume 1 illustrates how various inter-
active forces acting upon the price of labour power and the making of surplus 
value under selected historical abstractions or one- sided abstractions such as 
value set at price. The purpose is to demonstrate that wages are the price of 
labour power, which is itself a commodity produced by the socially necessary 
labour time invested in it, but one whose price, the wage, even when set at 
its value creates the condition in which ‘relative to surplus- value, the value of 
labour- power would keep falling, and thus the abyss between the life- situation 
of the worker and that of the capitalist would keep widening’ (Marx 1867). 
In money form signifi cation, the profi t rates rise by depressing the wage rates 
and inequality is destined to abound. In the second proposition Marx follows 
up by exposing the workings of the law of value, or ‘when science comes in’ to 
document the making of surplus value under more developed capitalism or, 
one may add, a central capitalism that has already integrated the globe and 
can, through its class- power exercise, depress the global share of wages of the 
working class through outright dispossession or intra working- class division 
via income diff erentials and ideological means. Smith’s (2016, 240) commen-
tary on super- exploitation stresses the signifi cance of pushing wages below the 
value of labour power in generating surplus value; however, he remarks that 
Marx ‘excludes it from further analysis’. He goes on to note that this exclusion 
‘was overlooked by orthodox Marxists as they scoured  Capital for ammunition 
to use against  dependency theory,  seizing instead on Marx’s comment that 
higher real wages in England than in Germany and Russia are compatible 
with a higher rates of exploitation in England, his assumption of a very much 
lower rate of surplus - value in China than in England, and a few other scat-
tered asides, in order to exclude the blindingly obvious fact of higher rates 
of exploitation from theory, and in so doing they use  Capital itself to obscure 
capitalism’s imperialist trajectory and shield it from criticism’ (Smith 2016, 
240). Whereas the orthodox Marxists have gone to such measures to avoid 
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the obvious condition of wages falling below the value of labour power, they 
paid little or no attention to how the law of value asserts itself as a means of 
denying sovereignty to the Arab working masses by war and, in addition 
to the creation of an indigent or war- indigent proletariat, also sustaining a 
cheapened valuation of the whole of Arab resources. 
 Cope (2015) posits that super international wages are wages substantially 
greater than the global median value of labour power and are received only 
by the upper echelons of the international working class.  In terms of meas-
urement, the average quantity of labour power at a certain point in time 
cannot be calculated as being worth so many exact dollars. Value is the con-
stantly shifting relationship of internal contradictions within the commodity 
manifest in class- power brokered prices. The closest one could come to eying 
the departure of value from price is to follow the relative movement over a 
trend of prices earned by direct producers vis- à- vis the prices wrought at the 
fi nal point of sale (Boratav 2001). In the case of wages, the trend in the share 
of wages that is necessary to satisfy the rising historically determined living 
standard (not the hunter- gatherer food basket as per Eurocentric defi nitions) 
plotted against the accrued lowly share of wages best captures the departure 
of wages from the value of labour power. 
 However, as has been shown by Emmanuel (1972), in terms of compara-
tive advantage, the developing world enjoys much higher productivity as a 
result of producing ‘exotic’ commodities. He also elaborated Marx’s posi-
tion that the capitalist does not buy labour, but labour power, and whatever 
surplus may result from an increase in the productivity of labour belongs 
to the capitalist or the owner of the means of production, not to the worker 
(Emmanuel 1972, 419). Although Marx subordinated the physiological aspect 
of labour, its intensity (the quantity of labour expended in a given time) and its 
resolution in extended labour time (the basic measure of labour) to the social 
character of value and its bearing on the distribution of labour, in terms of 
average intensity of labour, with so many sweatshops and wartime produc-
tion conditions springing up around the world, this would also lead to the 
conclusion that the occidental working classes are not principal wealth pro-
ducers whose wages are justifi ed by higher productivity – a productivity that 
is not  really theirs. The emphasis on  really is because the higher share of wages 
of the higher echelons of the Western working classes are not the result of 
higher productivity. This echelon is part saver and owner of wealth through 
the gains of their working class struggle, which were later abused by capital 
to increase the wage diff erential within the working class, but as always with 
capital’s incessant attempt to reduce the share of all the workers in income. 
The political calculus of the sustainability of the central ruling class in the 
process of co- opting or dividing not only its own working classes, but also 
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developing world working classes, occurs through many divisive measures, of 
which the war on the AW and the staged terror act deliver a signifi cant boost 
inter working class dividedness. 
 The legacy of imperialism has already bestowed Western working classes 
with a privileged position within the international market, boosted all along 
by their accent on nationalistic unionism in their class struggle. The premise 
that production and the wage system are  a priori social, as opposed to private, 
allow the higher central wages to be deduced as the illegitimate fruits of impe-
rialism. Just by the reductionist proposition that workers do not own capital 
and the additional productivity as a result of mechanisation, either the addi-
tional productivity should belong to all workers predicating production from 
the beginning of the process, or the intensity of work should be the basis of 
productivity and, hence, developing countries’ workers toiling in diffi  cult con-
ditions are more productive. Individual productivities can be approximated 
in prices or quantities, but only as averages indicative of social productivity. 
Social productivity and the wage system derive from transnational produc-
tion and class struggles that contribute to regulating the rate of surplus value. 
In sweatshop economies, the law of value, through the politics of imperialism, 
operates to ensure that peripheral technology does not gain speed (catches up 
with Western technology), and wages remain low relative to the demands of 
central capital. In war economies that are rich with natural resources, such 
as the Arab economies, imperialist politics ensures a power balance by which 
the productive capacity of the aggressed formations is debilitated along with 
the political forms that allows their population to command the ownership 
of their resources – the ultimate form of this measure is the degree of frag-
mentation of states. The concrete conditions and the relations constituting 
the social actuality of the production and wage systems are interrelated and 
qualitative with an abstract or general quantitative side discernible by meas-
urement convention. 
 However, it is also that superfi cial measurement convention which signals 
to the owning class and sets the criterion for the owning class to allocate 
resources. In an organically interconnected global production order, the pro-
portional distribution of labour asserts itself, where the interconnection of 
social labour is manifested in the private exchange of the individual products 
of labour, by precisely the exchange value of these products (Marx 1868). 
Moreover, what is socially necessary arises from blind competition, there-
fore everyday exchange relations cannot be directly identical with the mag-
nitudes of value. As labour’s political dividedness grows, so do the conduits 
for disengaging more labour or engaging labourers in war and accelerating 
value fl ows to aristocratic nations. The setting aside or destruction of value 
is primal to capital, and it is interrelated with the trade- off  between inherent 
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technological advance (organic composition of capital) and the requirement 
to increase rate of surplus value by higher rates of exploitation. Forcibly dis-
engaged labour is also social, and its relationship to capital is a predicate of 
productivity and the wage rate. Since ‘the historic task of bourgeois society 
is the establishment of the world market, at least in its basic outlines, and a 
mode of production that rests on its basis […] and since that task was accom-
plished with the colonisation of California and Australia’ (Marx 1858,103), 
this predicate of capital (Third World abjection) is real, historical and pre-
cedes the signifi cation of wealth in dollar value. 
 Europe could not have achieved tremendous wealth without reliance on 
imperialist loot. That the Third World has to remain underdeveloped vis- à- 
vis the Western formations issues from the same premise as above (the looting 
of the world) and as per Marx’s absolute general law of capitalist development. 
War in the context of commercial exploitation, just like the extreme condition 
of slavery that combines the labourer with labour power, realises  cum wastes 
labourers and their labour power – realising a commodity is its sale on the 
market so that it be consumed, but the consumption of labour power in war 
means also the death of its bearer, the labourer. War itself is a production 
process with at least this dual purpose: the realisation of the war commodi-
ties and the production of new power balances; the latter are the service that 
war generates for imperialism depending on the outcome of war. The social 
relationship of capital and its violent facet, imperialism, are reasserted by 
wars of encroachment.  It is relevant to note that the production space is the 
global interconnected process, and the time frame is the historical dimension 
beginning with birth of capitalism and the start of surplus value making or 
historical surplus value.  The length and scope of such boundaries of time and 
space inform the ideological content and inclination of any conceptual frame-
work used by scholars. It is reductionism with the avowed intent to discrimi-
nate, and apologetic to speak of capitalist development in one country while 
neglecting the imperialist- infl icted disasters. Similarly, only by the ideological 
chimera of capital and reductionism can a quantifi cation of value in this or 
that corner of the world be used as reason for the division of the social wage 
to the international working class. 
 The share of wages under capitalism from the social product is deter-
mined by the political power of labour. No matter how productive labour 
is, without political representation its share of income would drop to zilch. 
 Higher central wages have come about as a result of the sociological rela-
tionship of imperialism (stabilising capital) wherein moral and historical fac-
tors play a role in maintaining rising wages (Emmanuel 1972):  Emmanuel 
as per Marx considered that the value of labour power has a certain moral 
and historical element, namely, the determination of wages by class struggle 
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within the boundaries of a conditioned mode of production – let us just say 
perceived as national or within a national boundary. Obviously, the same 
ruling comprador/ merchant class morality applied to the war- aggressed AW 
introduces only poverty wages.  However, given the broader state of being 
(ontological state) of capital by which the cheapening of labour power has to 
proceed, it is superfl uous to assign importance to this section or that section 
of labour according to the quality of its machines; not only because labourers 
do not own the machines, but  a priori because, even if supposedly technology– 
productivity mattered to wages, it is irrelevant to the fact that capital must 
create wholly disengaged and unproductive labour as a condition for produc-
tion. The anomaly can be put as such:  productivity matters to capital and 
may bolster the wage rate for a thin group of the global population as a result 
of selective sharing from higher wealth, but capital must create unproductive 
resources and idle people in order to maintain its profi t rates; the question then 
can be put as such: with such a trade- off , which sections of the working class 
deserve to lead revolutionary struggle – the ones being put to work and paid a 
slightly higher wage or the ones that are poverty employed, bombed or starv-
ing? In hindsight, the whole construct that Western unionised labour, posited 
as a prerequisite for socialist transformation, is tacit complicity with capital to 
avoid the necessity not only of revolutionary violence in the class struggle, but 
also the sort of civil disobedience that disrupts the Western class formation. 
This may be the foolish logical end, but it could not be more foolish than what 
is happening or what is going to happen given the current balance of forces. 
 At any rate, capital’s class values ascribe inherent rights and entitle-
ments to Western labour. The higher paid echelons of central labour, whose 
wages and ‘consciousness’ partly derive from imperialist aggression, is what 
ensures the worse misfortune of peripheral labour and, with it, the practice 
that ensures the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation. The diffi  cult 
part of building an internationalist class struggle is that the social existence 
of huge sections of central classes, an existence partly funded by imperialist 
booty, is what determines their consciousness. 
 The colonising force or imperialism resorts to aggression to block indus-
trialisation in weakened security formations and, subsequently, organises 
the conquered economy to become a tributary to central production. Note 
that the value contributions of various working classes to fi nal products are 
 qualitatively diff erent (involving diff erent labour processes and intensities) and 
organically interrelated; Emmanuel underemphasises the value transfer from 
the periphery per se because of its low- priced value summed up in capital 
fl ows. Peripheral capital fl ows to the centre are only indicative of the part 
of the social product being siphoned off  – sub- Saharan capital fl ight is but 
a minute percentage of total capital fl ows in the centre (UNCTAD- WIR, 
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various years). Apart from the Gulf states, the money value signifying sur-
plus usurpation from Arab countries to the centre appears too insignifi cant; 
but the real value, the ongoing historical surplus formation along with the 
expendability of human lives in war is gigantic. The omission of war- related 
seized value, especially human lives consumed in wars and austerity politics, 
invariably lowers any estimate of the surplus value created by the peripheral 
working class. Apart from its negative ideological by- products upon aggressed 
populations as a result of defeat, war is a massive super exploitation enterprise 
that compresses most national, and often international, prices associated with 
the assets of working classes far below their value. At any rate, the separation 
lines between absolute and relative surplus value are arbitrary, especially as 
lives of equal value perish in the periphery as a result of the war industry in 
its moment of realisation – its consummation of the labourer and his or her 
labour power in the market of Western militarism. 
 To recap: there is more to colonialism and imperialism than just the simple 
argument of accounts and money fl ow from the AW. Colonising to strip the 
peripheral nation’s working class of the right to exercise sovereignty, through 
the state, over its human and natural resources also contributes through 
balance- of- forces channels to setting the exchange prices against the dol-
lar globally. In the case of the Arab working class, its primary commodities 
are seized by imperialism’s employing military capital while, conjointly, this 
militarisation releases the pent- up surplus in the centre. This condition for 
the realisation of the central surplus through military aggression forces upon 
Arab formations a military cost far beyond their means. It creates a wartime 
mode of life, a war economy, and with it war- related social classes, the war- 
indigent proletariat. War also shifts Arab civilian wealth into military enter-
prise. It literally employs and commodifi es Arab human labour and destroys 
its value in a process of modern military production that uses technology 
far superior to anything else around. War reverses the physical- end process 
of high- end technology production to culminate in the AW rather than the 
centre, because literally the bombs are dropped there. The AW is the spatial 
market where the war with its high technology and employed labour- soldiers 
and civilians are exchanged and consumed. The irony is that the Western 
war machine, including its bombs, in its stage of realisation employs both 
Arab and American soldiers. 
 In terms of productivity, the historical cycle comes full circle with the 
engagement of the Arab worker and the consumption of his or her life and 
labour power by imperialist high- tech bombs. The culture of science to which 
medieval Arabs contributed, returns in higher technological forms to engage 
and annihilate modern working Arabs. Just like chattel slavery, the Arab is 
forced into a war wherein the intensity and the absolute magnitude of the 
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release of labour power as fodder for the superior guns extinguishes lives in 
short time spans, hence the higher rate of surplus value. War realises value 
by the destruction of the military commodity itself along with Arab labour 
power and resituates power relations that are both services of value and at the 
same time inputs into value relations . The destruction of value by war, not 
of the product of labour only but also of living labour itself – as in the death 
rate – is a quintessential condition to devalue labour globally (counting the 
ideological impact by the demonstration eff ect). Apart from the immediate 
impact of war, the value necessary to reproduce the working population is 
doubly drained by the costs of war and its political eff ect, which renders the 
Arab working classes powerless. 
 Faltering Productive Capacity 
 Under conditions of war, the rate of productive capital build- up in the AW 
decelerates. Private investment growth follows prospective returns and the 
degree of risks associated therewith. However, in the AW, the issue is one of 
context rather than of individual responses to market signals. The context 
is the amalgam of the defenceless state, its acute class contradictions, and 
the war or the impending war. The investment– growth nexus, defi ned as 
the ‘inducement to invest’ and determined by the gap between the prospec-
tive rate of profi t and the rate of interest, is demand- and macro- context- 
determined (Kalecki 1972). There are in this, as in any macro accounting 
framework, salient tautologies and fallacies of composition. The investment- 
cum- growth rate is dependent on profi tability, and as demand rises the 
returns on investment fall along with the inducement to invest, precipitating 
a downturn. Under normal risk conditions, as the interest rate falls – indicat-
ing lower risks and raising investment – growth would rise as a result of a 
higher capital output ratio (Targetti and Thirwall 1989). However, because 
of diminishing returns to factors of production, the growth rate and returns 
begin to rise at lower rates, so that higher investment begets lower profi t rates. 
 The story changes in a capacity- wanting and war- ridden developing area 
such as the AW. With respect to capacity, it would require a defi cit in the 
trade account (lack of export market for domestic goods) and falling wages for 
investment to produce lower returns. In addition to low demand for domestic 
goods, higher risks and fi nancial costs attenuate the drive for investment – 
they can switch between various techniques without adding to the stock of 
capital. These are standard propositions in analytical rationalities, and one 
may add several variables that would change matters in one way or another, 
including an exogenous shock (a government push) that would redress the 
business- cycle downturn. 
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 However, none of these eloquent demand- side issues matter when Arab- 
type uncertainties are introduced. Not only do diminishing returns reduce 
reality to class- biased accounting or mathematics but also, in an Arab context, 
a formalised recipe for investment does not hold for historical reasons. Arab 
history, its objective and impersonal social forces saturated with violence, 
instantiates a qualitatively diff erent macro context. With the ever- present 
potential for war and the complete collapse of states, social time moves so 
fast that it compresses the intervals required for normal risk- assessment to be 
carried out. The horizon for planning and investing in long- term projects is 
uncertain because the working- class’s unchallenged vortex of history mediat-
ing the crisis of capital in war puts the long term in doubt. This uncertainty 
eschews the viability of a static analytical framework to think about the Arab 
conditions. An actuarial assessment of returns in a steady period is not pos-
sible, for there are few steady periods. In other words, the risks to capital 
formation in the AW are serious enough because neither the external politi-
cal threats nor the internal political and social stability factors allow long- 
term policy or production planning to take place. One doubts if there is any 
amount of animal spirits that would meet this challenge. 
 Violence alters the course, type, and structure of the risks. Institutions – 
including the state – and capital assets could be wiped out quickly in an act of 
war. Only very unusual types of animal spirits could deal with the potential of 
state collapse. The Arab state’s potential collapse eff aces the future that is nec-
essary for building private industrial strategy. In this context, private invest-
ment decisions will be locked into situations in which returns must redress 
capital costs within short periods, or else money capital turns to capital fl ight. 
 With the kind of uncertainties associated with complete collapse, the 
inducement to invest private capital nearly vanishes. Algebraically measured 
risks will bear little reference to reality. Under historical uncertainty, coin-
cidence collides with necessity and the probability values of future returns 
under diff erent states of nature fuse into one – the inevitability of war, and 
only that. It is not a question of change of degree or magnitude of risk, but 
rather that investors invest because they are part of the war economy in which 
they are involved by necessity – a wartime mode of life is predicated by war- 
related class formations whose reproduction rests in their ties to imperialism 
and other capital circles with strategic interests in the outcome of the war. 
Apart from war- capital building, historical uncertainty is the overriding bar-
rier to civilian capital formation. Uncertainty leaves us with three types of 
national capitals that are willing to invest in the potentially collapsing econ-
omy: state capital; the sections of national private capital that cannot move 
abroad; and the sections of private capital that metamorphose into war agents 
of imperialist powers, deriving returns from the military economy itself. The 
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many Arab warlords whose confl icting relationship is the war bourgeoisie are 
instances of the third group. 
 In these circumstances, the tendencies are for low- productivity capital to 
rise and for the growth rate to exhibit oil- related high volatility. One cannot 
wish away war in a war zone. What the mainstream fails to see is that rais-
ing investment under these war conditions becomes an operational issue in 
which Arab countries must ensure actual security (the substance of which is 
working- class security) in order to ensure investment and growth. That is 
not a matter of opinion; it is what happened, and it is a matter of fact (recall-
ing long- term average yearly per capita growth rates over three decades are 
low and declining, while investment quality swerved into the low output per 
capital ratio). Despite persistent eff orts to doctor and beautify the data, even 
an alien from outer space would read the statistics as tragedy.  That is why the 
persistent eff orts of US- led capital agencies – principally the World Bank – to 
minimise the role of government in the economy were also a premeditated 
crime meant to minimise the state, that is the potential political form for the 
organisation of the working class, into oblivion. 
 What is more, destruction to life and infrastructure, the loss in forgone 
income and the exodus of the labour force, skilled or otherwise, are not some-
how redeemed by peace or reconstruction plans. Wars diminish the socialis-
ing space in which universal, as opposed to narrower sectarian or sectional, 
values can grow. Through the blood- drenched politics of identity, wars cre-
ate real physical segregation and psychological lines that divide the working 
population. In the AW, war may appear to have indigenous causes arising 
from the tragic farce of fi ctitious Arab sect or clan identity as the sole politi-
cal form of working- class representation, but in actuality the courses of wars 
are charted by a transnational historical agency that also steers development. 
Sectarian and divisive identities thrive when imperialism wins, and this can 
be traced historically:  for instance, mainly Shiite Bahrain in 1970 refused 
to join mainly Shiite Iran and stuck to its Arabism. Tangentially, there is 
almost no resemblance between the types of political Islam practiced today 
and historical forms of Islamic politics. In point of fact, modern day political/ 
economic Islam shares more in its monetary policy with conservative par-
ties in advanced countries than it would have with the central banks of the 
caliphs, had central banks existed then. The historical agent that is US- led 
imperialism, intermediated by the transnational class alliances and institu-
tions of war, promotes aggression for its own sake and for oil control irrespec-
tive of the humanitarian lip service. 5 More concretely, the historical agents 
 5  It is not at all surprising that ‘the intelligence service of Israel considers a potential 
Sunni- Shiite war in Syria a favourable development for the country and the West, 
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are the mediation of US- led class power through impersonal and objective 
social forms, such as the Security Council and the Breton Woods institutions, 
whose governing structures are already US- biased. 
 The scramble is on by various capitalist circles to stake a foothold and 
share control over the region’s polity and resources.  Geopolitical rents just 
pour into the region.  The paid militias of Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen rep-
resent a stark case of money fl ows reproducing war- related classes, divisions 
and endless wars.  The US- led imperialist precondition is that the geopolitical 
fl ows be distributed along sectional/ sectarian lines to deepen the social rifts. 
Because the local forces are being marionetted by irreconcilable international 
forces, the Arab social formation will once more become incapable of main-
taining the living security of its population. 
 Closing Comment 
 In the AW, war is not the continuation of politics by violent means; it is rather 
the continuation of violence by means of politics. This inverted catchphrase rep-
resents the thesis around which the argument was woven. War, or permanent 
war, is not exclusive to the AW. For one thing, war affl  icts or has affl  icted every 
region of the globe at one time or another, most of them quite recently: it is only 
80 years since Europe was left torn apart by World War II. But war appears as an 
enduring feature of the AW. One might interject that the AW is a strategic cor-
ner, so even smaller wars are comparatively blown out of proportion. However, 
in addition to war’s strategic position, a good dose of media hype exaggerates its 
already strategic relevance. There is a sort of ‘Middle East war- media industry’ 
that surrounds events. While IS was burning alive a Jordanian pilot in early 
February 2015, a machete massacre took place in Eastern Congo but received 
little coverage in the mainstream media ( Indian Express 2015). Further in the past, 
the Six- Day War in 1967 received several times the attention allotted to the 
much bigger India– Pakistan war at around the same period. 
 Yet, hyped attention or media sensationalism about the region is not the 
line of argument one would want to pursue to show that there is a war, more 
so than in other regions, mediating the crisis of capital.  My contention is that 
war or the long- term prospect of war in the AW is a constant derived from 
a system of global accumulation and its attendant international relations. In 
the AW, war has become an end in itself. From the decolonisation wars, the 
colonisation of Palestine and the regional hot wars of the Cold War to the 
according to an email archive of former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
released by WikiLeaks 2012- 07- 23’.  https:// wikileaks.org/ clinton- emails/ emailid/ 
12171 (viewed 10 January 2016). 
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present ‘War on Terror’, there is but one common denominator, which is that 
the policies pursued were meant to incite confl ict. If any of the big players had 
sought to defuse tensions, the regional historical trajectory indicates that their 
eff orts systematically failed. The capitalist class in the United States, along 
with its subordinate international allies, ratchets up its power and that of the 
relationship of imperialism by dismantling the platforms of resistance of the 
working classes in the AW, including their states (weakening and fragment-
ing); hence, continued aggression. 
 Chossudovsky (2014) rightly proposes that the Arab formation is meta-
morphosing from a state into a territory as a result of US- led aggression. 
 The Arab state falls at the tail end of a system of international relations that 
necessitates it to be in a condition that swings between full- fl edged confl ict 
and a high degree of tension. The verb  necessitate is of particular relevance 
to the permanent- war thesis. This is because, fi rst, there is a high frequency 
of regional confl icts in the AW – the highest rate in the world (SIPRI, vari-
ous years), and second but more decisively because of the crisis of central 
capital, which has to destroy the right of Arab working classes to develop-
ment in order for US- led imperialism to hold hegemony over a strategic 
region. Arab development  qua working class security may potentially entail 
that communities take charge of their lives in a way that downgrades US- led 
regional hegemony. This cannot be permitted because of petrodollars and 
other value transfers from the AW proper and, more conclusively, because of 
the contribution to US- led power emanating from control of oil as a strategic 
resource to imperialism; the latter point that US- led imperialism has to deny 
the Arab working classes their right to development demonstrates the  necessity 
(as opposed to fortuitousness) of war to capital. The other point to keep in 
mind is that US- led imperialist militarism is more about value snatch than 
the deployment of excess monopoly surplus. 
 There are no imperialist bombings based on mistakes or wrong intelli-
gence; history is not a series of gaff es or unintended consequences for the 
leading imperialist class. The objective forces of history, and specifi cally 
of accumulation by war, did not represent existential threats to the ruling 
class: judging by the historical record of exponential growth with rising ine-
quality – mainly driven by loot from imperialist war war- derived technology, 
war fi nance and above all by imperialist power emanating from war – one 
may say that these ‘unintended consequences’ work wonders for the fi nancial 
class in charge. Capital’s organised dimension rarely forgoes a ‘good war’. 
‘We made a mistake’ or ‘the consequences were unintended’ are a facile per-
sonalisation of history – a reading of history as melodramatic farce, featur-
ing the ‘heroism’ of occupants of the Oval Offi  ce trying to bring peace and 
prosperity to the globe. 
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 Moreover, distortions abound in a context of war and ideological defeat-
ism.  In mid- 2000, when addressing Arab development, the chief of the 
Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA) at the World Bank, ended his 
lecture with the false wisdom that Arabs are to blame for their state of under-
development. Many on the liberal left inculcate this false wisdom and appor-
tion blame by national identity and cultural character as opposed to class. 
The abstract Arab, however, does not exist; an Arab working class does exist. 
There is no Arab who is so culturally incapable that he or she cannot respond 
to development challenges any more than there is a culturally incapable sub- 
Saharan African or Mayan. The notion of the Arab in the abstract is actually 
an ad hominem ideological attack on real, individual working- class and poor 
Arabs because it is used to blame them for their situation. Imperialistically 
propped- up Arab regimes hold steady according to the degree of repression 
they deploy against Arab working people. Putting into focus the cross- border 
ties of Arab ruling classes to US- led imperialism, along with a close reading 
of the balance of forces, underscores the fact that it is the imperialist class that 
becomes the agency of historical and Arab development. 
 The ideological descent of the left is post facto evidence of theoretical fl aws 
in understanding the international dimension of the law of value and the role 
of capital, as it principally divides central working classes from peripheral 
working classes. Western social democracy, including its left variant, has so 
far exhibited a failed praxis ( joint theory and practice) from which much of 
the world still reaps the fruits of the bad investment that has been put into the 
struggle; the fact that one is now at such a deep trough in forms of internation-
alist workers’ organisations and their associated ideology could only mean 
that much of the left was practically an ally of the right.  It had, through its 
labour- aristocrat practices anesthetised its own working class with idolisation 
of bourgeois democracy. In a system fraught with contradictions in which the 
adding- up fallacy never ceases to strike, bourgeois democracy in its distribu-
tional facet – that is the main stabilising relationship of an otherwise implo-
sive capital relationship  – cannot be applied across all nations (not that it 
contains the semblance of democracy as applied now).  The procedural mode 
by which the working class realises itself in the state is democratic or not by 
the share of the social product a working class commands. The deifi cation of 
the ‘voting system’, the idolised procedure with which much of the Western 
left is besotted, is the false justifi cation for the United States to bomb a Third 
World country, liberalise its economy, eradicate its opponents, enact a consti-
tutional framework that enshrines social segmentation and only then intro-
duce ‘universal’ suff rage. Along with car bombs ripping through the lives of 
the innocent, the vote becomes the supplication of the loaf of bread through 
the leader of the sector or sect. 
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 The reconstruction of the reconstruction of identity by bourgeois ideol-
ogy has driven working- class consciousness into a state of mythical animism. 
Such ideology is the progeny of false mainstream science. Twisting the mean-
ing of the real via departure from fact as a result of narrow empiricism or by 
analysing situations into infi nitesimal particles without relating them to the 
whole, has progressed as uncontested knowledge. Interpersonal comparison, 
which is vital for scientifi c development, has become rooted in the same rules 
and assumptions such that discussions of contentious subjects revert back to 
the same position without theoretical value added. No one disagrees on the 
basics, which are only the ideas that serve the ruling class. One can only fore-
see that such social science may turn out to be a footnote to the Sokal hoax 
once labour prevails. 
 The apologetic stance of apportioning blame on the basis of postcolonial 
nation- building failures in the developing formations presupposes that while 
colonialism pulls its troops out, it ceases to infl ict damage. Colonialism did not 
just set back the starting point of the AW, it acted out of the necessity to meet 
the social or metabolic rate of capital’s reproduction by sabotaging any or all 
social programmes. It reinforced Arab retrogression at every point in time, 
especially, in its alliance with political Islam and Saudi Arabia. A Western 
left that conceptually segments working- class struggle by its reifi ed national 
forms and venerates the voting procedure of bourgeois democracy, implic-
itly assumes an inner benevolence to capital that outweighs the genocides by 
which it cheapens its inputs  – the ‘capitalism is progressive’ stance behind 
which lies the justifi cation for capital. In terms of its function as procedure 
that pays off  the central working class from imperialist war booty, bourgeois 
democracy is anathema to third world development. This tacit adoration of 
bourgeois democracy is at the heart of reform building toward international 
working- class divisions and possibly fascism.  Arabs and sub- Saharan Africans 
have had the choice of dying at the hands of healthy, educated Western sol-
diers, or less educated ones, depending on the social democratic programmes 
of the welfare state in the North. 
 As class- based struggle declines, so does revolutionary class consciousness. 
 The catharsis of guilt by a raucous Western left whose platform is provided 
by corporate capital reinforces the notion that there is a yet- unrealised utopia 
in bourgeois democracy that is waiting to happen.  Such noise emerging from 
miniscule organisational forms overshadows the fact that the victory of capi-
tal was swift, violent and organisational before it became ideological. Just as 
one of the capitalist world leaders said in 1990 after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union: we can relax our right to detain individuals without charges because 
the disciplined- organised communists are no more; all we have now are the 
Anarchists and Trotskyists. There cannot be serious opposition to capital 
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without uncompromising resistance based on principles that transcend econ-
omistic unionism into anti- imperialism, or principles that focus on the sphere 
of production instead of circulation/ distribution. 
 Postscript 
 The articulation of the Arab formation with world capital is conducted by 
aggression involving a disproportionate use of force. Arab socialism failed 
because of the use of such force and not because it ‘ran out of steam’. What 
does it mean to say that Arab socialism ran out of steam or failed for intrinsic 
reasons when all the macro variables were healthier compared to the current 
neo- liberal abjection?  As the  lebensraum of US- led imperialism narrows under 
pressure from a China– Russia backed Iran in the Gulf, its drive to level any 
development platform (including state structures) that might serve to position 
competing capitalist forces in the region, escalates.  Historically, realpolitik 
and military power have been antecedents to all other forms of regional poli-
tics; hence, all the more substantiation to the point that the AW is articulated 
by the barrel of a gun. 
 However, as the diff erences of US- led capital with the opposition forces in 
the AW grow over issues of controlling indigenous resources, so will diff erences 
between various global circles of capital, especially nationalist capitals that are 
subjected to dollar peonage – China in particular, assuming that its capital 
remains nationalistic for the most part.  The pressure that the US faces in the 
AW from competitors for strategic resources is another reason why Israel can-
not integrate with the Arab region. Israel’s trade structure is inherently geared 
to Western markets and does not address the pittance of Arab market demand 
(Abou- Anaml 2006). After decades of peace with Egypt and Jordan, Israeli 
trade with these countries remains low – actually insignifi cant if one discounts 
Israel’s purchase of gas during its past times of dependence on imports (IMF 
various years). On the other side, the sections of Israeli capital with interests in 
integrating with the AW, or the tiny peace movement demanding the normali-
sation of relations with Arab countries, remain inconsequential. The Israeli 
formation reproduces its living standards (preferred trade partnerships and 
aid) and much of its  état d’esprit via imperialist partnering. In turn, the US- led 
assault on the AW leads to the strengthening of the colonial– settler relation-
ship as it foments enmity as grounds for future wars. When stripped from 
myth, the Israeli assault on the Palestinians is more about ideologically dis-
arming of the Palestinians and Arab populations of their means of resistance, 
which would obviously serve to deter value expropriation by imperialism, than 
about land. Israel’s unequivocal gendarme role to imperialism erects an insu-
perable barrier that separates Arab and Israeli working classes. 
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 Developments within the circles of central capital turn on two interrelated 
axes: the relationship of US- led capital to itself (principally how US imperial 
rents are performing in relation to its own economy), and the relationship of 
US- led capital to other nationally based capitals (how the rest of the world 
views its holding of the dollar as a precarious aff air). US- led capital equates 
itself with, or diff erentiates itself from, world capital by the degree of power 
it enjoys within the international division of labour – its edge in war- driven 
technology – and the violence exercised upon the periphery, especially the 
AW. The AW had already tested the limits of inter- imperialist collusion when 
the United States, by waging war on Iraq in 2003, breached the covenants of 
international law enacted in the Security Council. There are limits to dilut-
ing the national identity of capital, irrespective of the degree to which fi nan-
cial capital has been globalised – the nation is subordinate to capital, but is 
also a means for the reproduction of capital. The growing dependency of US 
capital on resources from abroad and on hegemony over oil regions is the 
bond holding together globally fi nancialised capital with US capital. 
 Formulaically, the degree of US- led belligerence will rely on the degree 
to which the dependent growth of US- led capital in its dollar form becomes 
a liability to other competing world capitals and warrants an orderly or dis-
orderly exit from dollar- held debt. Fundamentally, the liability is the inverse 
measure of how vital US- led encroachment becomes, particularly in the 
AW, in securing long- term guarantees to fi nancial capital. Although foreign-
ers hold US debt, and this may potentially infringe on the ownership of US 
resources, a debilitated AW, held as collateral and policed militarily, will 
delay the point at which dollar- world seignorage wanes. So long as world 
capital stabilises the worth of its dollar savings via US- led aggression on the 
AW, a condition of ultra- imperialism (or a consensus to continuously shift war 
to the periphery) also emerges; hence, the multilayered complexity of inter- 
imperialist relations. 
 In actuality, inasmuch as the growth of US- led capital continues to depend 
on the expansion of Arab or regional wars, on the pricing of oil in dollars and 
on a high degree of control over moneyed resource fl ows globally, diff erences 
within the circles of world capital (inter- imperialist rivalry) regarding hegem-
ony over the AW and the division of imperial rents, will also grow.  Arab 
wars are proxy wars, especially the Syrian confl ict, which drew Sino- Russian 
vetoes from the UN security Council and whose funding sends a clear signal 
that fi nancialisation does not dissipate inter- capitalist diff erences. Despite its 
associated perils, the current Russian intervention in Syria is a case in point. 
 Perceiving the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, Afghanistan and 
other assaulted areas in the past as failures of US policy is a political read-
ing, but from a political economic reading, especially in terms of cheapening 
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resources, these campaigns are a bonus for capital. In spite of retreats, the 
share of capital globally from world income continues to rise. Altogether, 
capital as ideology, expropriation and materialisation in production (the real 
relationship that transcends nationalist pretence) stands on fi rmer ground. 
 Over the last three decades, the real wages of the central working classes have 
stood still or fallen, and the dehumanisation of peripheral working classes has 
reached new depths , now possibly spilling over into Southern Europe, Greece 
in particular. 
 In the modern fi nancial age, the centripetal pull of working classes and 
their objective grounds for unity grew from the way their global wage share 
is drawn more and more as a residual from the pool of fi nance- capital prof-
its.  Financialisation also homogenises concrete capitals more readily as 
profi ts are internationalised. Many capitalists, through their ideological 
and institutional power, take the decision to shrink the wage share and stir 
inter- working- class enmities. More and more, working classes deal with one 
complex structure of capital: the US- led sponsored institutions (the organised 
dimension of capital) and not various disconnected capitals. 
 In the AW, the missionary work of imperialist- bolstered civil society infus-
ing religious precepts into public culture furthered religious alienation, or 
the displacement of responsibility for worldly misery to a supernatural power 
or to human failure to obey divinely ordained precepts. As working people 
endure harsher conditions, the Islamisation of political life off ers a short 
reprieve to the merchant leading class. In the absence of a socialist alternative 
model, change as per the 2011 uprising need not imply progress. Imperialist 
aggression reconstitutes weak peripheral ruling classes as an agglomeration of 
class allies in which its capital represents the tipping force within the national 
state – typical of colonialism. As working- class identities split away from the 
reality of working- class conditions, the leading ruling cross- border class alli-
ance with imperialism gains ground. For the time being, it appears that no 
matter how baleful the social conditions of peripheral wars and misery – of 
which there is no shortage in Africa and the AW – the rule of the dominant 
class will be kept intact by means of the ideological power it possesses, of 
which Islamist identity pitted against class is the foremost pillar. Once the 
politics of identity reproduces the bourgeoisies that shapes history, the his-
tory that is instantiated as the state of war, more of Arab history and, by 
implication, global working- class history becomes the over- determination 
that escapes social control. Labour’s share will continue to decline and be 
distributed in proportion to the degree of working- class power in the state, 
which is presently weak. In an international division of labour, the power of 
a peripheral working class is assessed by the extent to which it perforates the 
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state with its political organisations.  By implication, and as result of capital 
becoming more homogenous, the fall of the Arab working class is also the fall 
of the global working class. It is not at all coincidental that the wage shares in 
major parts of the world declined after the bombing and destruction of Iraq 
in 1991. 
 In an organic- like social order, the religious– ideological mission and the 
war in the periphery creep back to curtail the benefi ts and civil liberties of 
the central working classes. As the divide between aristocratic nations and 
commercially exploited nations becomes wider, so go the under- valorisation 
cum commodifi cation of both the human being and his or her labour power. 
 However, by the time the long- term bonds that tie world labour together 
become visible to the working classes, the intermittent periods presented as 
opportunities for one section of labour to make gains at the expense of another 
have been exploited by capital to the detriment of labour, as Emmanuel and 
Bettelheim (1970) correctly foretold.  The epitome of anti– Third World cen-
tral working- classes’ collaboration with capital peaked as they assented to 
so- called humanitarian bombings that often obliterated whole social forma-
tions. The destruction of states, of which the Syrian scenario is the latest, 
crowns the ideological victory of US- led imperialism. Instead of targeting the 
superiority of US- led imperialism by focusing on inter- capitalist divisions to 
induce capital’s necrosis, the priority of anti- imperialist struggles in the com-
mercially exploited nations is relegated to moralistic posturing that absolves 
imperialism from a whole history of genocide. 
 Imperialism is a complex relationship in which the central nation state 
is pitted against its own capital; but at the same time, both central capital 
and its nation state benefi t from imperial pillage. With the rise of China, 
the deepening of the class divide in the United States and the ballooning of 
its debts as a result of global dollarisation, a downgrading of US imperial 
standing lies in wait  – but only of the nation- state, not of international-
ised capital and its consequent violence in imperialism. Defeating capital 
requires an organised and armed internationalist working class move-
ment. US- led capital has historically responded by dollar devaluation to 
restructure the shares of wealth of diff erent circles of capital. Devaluing 
the wealth holdings in the dollar evokes an opposing reaction from foreign 
dollar holders and a ratcheting up of imperialist aggression, particularly 
against the AW – to redress imperialist stature. Until the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the diff erences over the redistribution of resources amongst the cap-
italist formations have been mediated, for the greater part, through politi-
cally engineered mechanisms against the common foe, the USSR. The 
rise of unrestrained capital globally was followed by the spread of austerity 
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inward, from the periphery to the centre. The rise of the free market as the 
uncontested ideology of capital also bolstered fetishism and further alien-
ated the endogenous production of technology and violence from rational 
social control. In the same way that austerity has migrated to the North, 
violence has begun its northward march. 
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